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ABSTRACT
Using the methods of strategic analysis, this research examines how the
Irish republican movement has viewed the role of the military instrument in
the political process. For much of its history the movement has been bound
together by a series of ideological precepts such as the belief that Ireland
is a continuing victim of British colonial exploitation, the commitment to
the forcible expulsion of the British presence, as wall as a refusal to com-
promise with, or even participate in, any of the political systems in Ire-
land.	 It has been these sorts of ideas which have shaped the way the
republican movement thinks about the exploitation of military power.
	 The
movement's evolution up to the early twentieth century helped inspire a suc-
cessful revolt against British rule.
	 However, the unfulfilled expectations
of the Anglo-Irish war, followed by the trauma of the Irish civil war,
largely froze the strategic development of the movement. In the following
years ideological symbolism came to dominate the IRA's strategic thinking.
It has been this process which has sometimes led the military instrument to
diverge from the norms of strategic theory as the ideology has prevented the
movement from recognising when its strategies have been successful in ful-
filling their potential. Persistence with a particular strategy, even though
it may have outlived its usefulness, has led to missed opportunities and
political marginalisation. Faced with defeat, the IRA searches around for a
more effective strategy in which to recast the military instrument. During
these searches, aspects of republican ideology have been challenged, though
usually at the expense of a damaging split. Today, the IRA's long war
approach is, rhetorically at least, less reliant on the myths of the past.
But there are still questions over whether the process of strategic planning
has been able to free itself from the influence of republican ideological
rigidity. Overall, the IRA's willingness to embrace a whole range of low
intensity war strategies creates the impression, contrary to the movement's
vigorous and assertive public facade, of a republican strategic tradition
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The Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) Gaelic motto, Tifa1dh ar la
(Our day will come), would seem to demonstrate the sense of inevitability
that many Irish republicans feel towards the eventual achievement of their
goal; an end to British rule in Northern Ireland and the political unific-
ation of the island of Ireland.	 Yet the past two decades of PIRA activity
reveal that republican faith in the historical tide is not so certain. Not
certain enough for republicans to believe that they simply need do nothing
and that one day the wave of the future will fall to the irresistible idea of
Irish unity. For republicans, the goal of unity is a vision for which plans
need to be made, campaigns organised and, in particular, armed force employ-
ed. Today, republican policy marches on a wide front encompassing elect-
oral participation, economic and social agitation and propaganda.
	 But the
focus of republican action remains the unswerving commitment to the armed
struggle. How the republican movement came, and continues, to see the
practice of military force as an effective instrument of policy is the
subject of this study.
It is important to stress that this analysis is not a history of the
IRA or of republican nationalism. Neither is it concerned with detailing
military tactics. Instead, this study sets out to test how responsive Irish
republican employment of the military instrument has been to strategic
theory. How has the republican movement viewed the role of force in the
political process? What are the factors which condition republican strat-
egic analysis? How effectively has the movement applied military means to
fulfil political objectives? Does the movement possess a firm grasp of the
limits of its military capabilities? Are there tensions between ideology
and practical considerations regarding the use of force?
	 These are the
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sorts of questions which will be explored.
	 In essence 1
 it is about the
composition and evolution of republican strategic thought.
In this research the term republicanism will refer to that section of
Irish nationalism which continues to support and organise military oper-
ations in order to end any form of British rule in Ireland. Where the
terms have become common descriptions, the Irish republican movement, the
IRA and PIRA (or the Provisionals) can, except where specified, be taken to
be synonymous. Obviously, this thesis cannot deal with every twist and
turn in the republican movement's long and varied military history there-
fore, the focus of this analysis will concentrate on the main agencies of
republican violence throughout the years like the IRA and not ephemeral
splinter groups like the Irish National Liberation Army (lILA) or the Irish
People's Liberation Organisation (IPLO).
The analysis will be taken in two stages. The first stage will seek
to examine some of the themes within the republican tradition that have
evolved from the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century. The
intention is to identify how these themes would be likely to affect the
future utilisation of the military instrument. This will be followed by an
appraisal of the period between 1q16 and 1923 which also had a key form-
ative influence on the character of republican military thinking. Also
surveyed in this first stage is the republican experience from the 1920s to
the 1960s, a period in which many of the trends in the process of republican
strategic formulation can be discerned. The second stage will concern
itself with the activities of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland from
the early 1970s to the present and will preoccupy the remaining chapters.
This era has seen the most sustained levels of republican military activity.
It has also embraced the greatest strategic innovation and, of course,
remains the period of most contemporary relevance.
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Strategic Theory
Conceptually, strategic theory is all about the 'use of available resources to
gain any objective'.' The way the term 'strategy' has grown up often ex-
pressly denotes the use, or threat of use, of organised armed force in poii-
tics. The broadest but perhaps the most acceptable definition was that
given by Liddell Hart who described strategy as the 'art of distributing and
applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy'.2 However, 'strategic
theory: art or science?' has been a source of debate among strategists for a
long time. The notion of a theory, as John Garnett observes, seems to
promise some relationship to the 'hard sciences'.2 One might see strategic
theory existing on the same level as, say, micro and macro economics: an
objective conceptual framework by which one can measure and generalise upon
the practice of the military instrument. In truth, strategic theory cannot
aspire to such an ideal. Often, the subject appears to fall between two
stools. Too formalised to be an art. Too loose to be scientific. Strat-
egic theory contains no code of hard and fast canons, but is more a way of
looking at the issues of violence in politics. It is no different from most
other subjects in the historical arts and social sciences in that it is re-
liant for its insights on assiduous research, careful judgement and intel-
lectual rigour. Strategic theory is formalised in the sense that it usually
carries a series of explicit assumptions which govern the way strategists
view the role of military power. Naturally, it is only right that these
conscious biases which are meant purposefully to affect the analysis are
openly stated at the outset. It should be said that strategists do not
always agree on the precise nature of the assumptions which underpin the
discipline, still less on the important political issues that they study.
1. N. Howard, The C,uses of Vars (London, 1983), p. 36.
2. B. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, 1967),
p. 335.
3. J. Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics
(London, 1984), p. 1.
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Nevertheless, as Garnett notes, most strategists belong to the same intel-
lectual tradition and that 'though strategists sometimes disagree with each
other, they rarely misunderstand each other."
The key assumptions and characteristics of strategic theory can be
listed under three main headings.
Var as an Instrument of Policy
To put it crudely, military power, as T.C. Schelling recognised, is about the
capacity to hurt and destroy, to inflict 'shock, loss and grief, privation and
horror'. Although war is usually an ugly and unheroic enterprise, one of
the principal assumptions of strategic theory is that military force is a
functional aspect of power, deliberately employed to achieve political objec-
tives. Of course, armed force is not always used in a politically instru-
mental fashion. There is no doubt, for example, that some elements in the
loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland have used their military muscle,
not to obtain specifically political goals, but as a means to offer informal
fire protection to some of Belfast's business enterprises. PIRA's violence,
on the other hand, sometimes seems more metaphorical than functional, geared
towards asserting a form of moral legitimacy within the nationalist commun-
ity, by projecting itself as the only organisation with sufficient will and
stature to physically resist the British. Violence, on both sides, is also
used to dispense 'paramilitary justice' to neighbourhood criminals and deal
with factional feuds.	 Although violence can often be used in ways other
than to attain policy objectives, they will not be treated in any detail here.
One must acknowledge that violence, even when practised by political
actors, as Garnett has said, 'can develop a frightening momentum in which
4. J. Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions' in J. Baylis, et
al, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (London, 1975) p. 9.
5. 1. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Jew Haven, lass., 1988), p. 2.
8. See N. Dillon, The Dirty Var (London, 1990), pp. 443-458.
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political goals become submerged in senseless violence."
	 Strategists are
interested In such situations only in so far as they may affect the Judge-
meat of a political actor's strategic analysis.
	 Usually though, 'extra-
political' violence, especially if it is so evidently pathological, is not the
preserve of strategic theory. For strategists, 'war' in the words of
Clausewitz, is 'a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other
means', and the deed of war itself, ¶an act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will.'
In the abstract, war, In its absolute form, is a single, almost instant-
aneous, blow to wipe out the enemy. Clausewitz argued that in theory all
wars will have a tendency to work their way to an extreme where each side
operates to the limits of its endurance. In reality, of course, war is
limited from the absolute by any number of variables; finite resources,
geography, logistics and so on. Therefore, war is never a single act, but
usually consists of a series of engagements.'° This insight is important
because it emphasises that real war is not simply about the crude applic-
ation of military might but is a more calculating and competitive environ-
ment. This understanding helps to introduce us to the concepts of bargain-
ing in war and limited war. Schelling takes the view that conflicts are
usually bargaining situations where the 'ability of one participant to gain
his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions
that the other participant will make." The aim is to manipulate the
military instrument, not necessarily to inflict a crushing defeat on the
enemy, but to influence his behaviour so that ha complies with the adver-
sary's demands. This process is especially noticeable in limited wars
7. J. Garnett, 'The Role of Jilitary Power', in J. Baylis, et al, p. 50.
8. C. von Clausewitz, On Var, trans. and ad. N. Howard and P. Paret,
(Princeton, NJ., 1984), p. 87.
9. Ibid., p. 75.
10. Ibid., pp. 75-80.
11. T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Nass., 1980),
p. 5.
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where one or other of the combatants does not feel it necessary to commit
all of its resources to the conflict, possibly for example, because it has
very limited objectives. In this context, the conduct of either one or both
of the belligerents, will be governed by expectations of what the other will
find acceptable and may necessitate the adoption of political goals which,
though not perfect, will nevertheless be tolerable for both sides.
The notion of limited war is useful in that it helps us to comprehend
those conflicts which exist between unequal participants. This is partic-
ularly relevant to the Irish republican case study as its strategic history
has largely been about how the movement has tried to circumvent the superior
power of the British. For groups like the IRA, coercive bargaining will
normally involve indicating to the adversary, through military action, that
the costs of not acceding to its political demands will outweigh the costs
of concession. In this sort of conflict the weaker party may not be able
to achieve any tangible military objectives, such as securing a piece of
territory, instead, as Clausewitz observed, 'another military objective must
be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolise it in peace
negotiations." 2 In this regard, a belligerent may feel, for example, that
given the means at its disposal trying to exhaust the enemy's patience with
a series of small-scale attacks would be a more appropriate military aim.
When political actors seek these types of intangible military objectives
strategic planning takes on an even more intriguing dimension as it re-
quires, amongst other things, both a highly sophisticated understanding of
the utility of the military instrument, particularly how it may be exploited
In a psychological sense, and a careful appreciation of adversarial power.
The limited war concept embraces the whole range of low intensity war
strategies, including that of terrorism. It is regrettable that the
indiscriminate use of the word 'terrorism' by all parties to the Irish
12. Clausewitz, p. 81.
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conflict has turned it into a divisive term of abuse. Strategists should
have no difficulty in defining terrorism as the deliberate creation of fear,
through the use or threat of use, of military force for political ends.
Just like any other strategy, it can be regarded as a neutral instrument of
policy which can be employed by state and non-state actors alike without
moral judgement being passed on those who practise it. This is how the
term will be used in this analysis and will be applied carefully only when
it is believed that it represents an accurate description of republican
activity at any particular time.
Additionally, it is worth pointing out that while the phrase the 'miii-
tary instrwient' conveys the sense in which force is being used in pursuit
of policy objectives, strategic theory actually makes no moral or legal
distinctions between descriptions of political violence. Therefore, words
like 'force', 'violence', 'armed struggle', and so on, can be treated as
perfectly decent strategic terms and will be used inter-changeably with the
term 'military instrument'. It should also be added that the notion of 'war'
in this context describes only clashes of organised armed force and does not
imply any legal protocol covering areas such as formal declarations of war
or treatment of prisoners in captivity, etc..
The Power Political Approach
Underpinning the assumption of the instrumentality of war is the notion of
power politics. 	 It is an idea which is often closely associated with the
so-called realist school of international political theory. To simplify
the arguments of the realist tradition, it can be said to represent a view
which accepts a world of competing political entities, each pursuing their
interests, as the chief regulator of the international system. Political
13. See K. 1{olsti, Inter-national Politics: A Framework of Analysis
(Englewoad Cliffs, N.J., 1977), pp. 3-25.
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actors within the system will seek to enhance their power relative to others
in order to defend their interests.' 4 Thus, war is regarded as a liablility
of the political system, in both the international and domestic environments,
as clashes of interest will, from time to time, lead to military hostilities.
The essence of the realist position has been summed up by Gordon Earland:
'Realism is a clear recognition of the limits of morality and reason in
politics: the acceptance of the fact that political realities are power real-
ities and that power must be countered with power; that self-interest is the
primary datum in the action of all groups and nations."
The power political approach is the wider context in which most strat-
egists see the role of the military instrument. The concept of power Is a
complex idea in itself but can be defined here, in the words of S.R. Purnell,
as 'the capacity of an individual or an organisation to have his or its
way." Military strength is only one attribute of power.' 7 Few strat-
egists would, to misquote Mao, subscribe to the belief that political power
grows only out of the barrel of a gun. It is certainly true, however, that
the destructive potential of military power often makes those who possess it
In large quantities highly influential.	 Vithin the political system power
often remains latent as it can only be realised when it is exerted on some-
thing else in the system, usually another political actor.	 To this extent,
war is one of the few ways in which an actual power relationship can be
accurately determined. In this respect the Irish republican movement is
ripe for strategic analysis because of the way In which it has constantly
sought to iiobilise its resources for conflict with Britain.
Because strategic theorists recognise established positions of power
14.See A. Volfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962), pp. 82-83
and p. 89.
15.Quoted in Garnatt, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions', p. 11.
18. S. Purnell, The Scciety of States (London, 1973), p. 128.
17. For a full discussion of the nature of power see .1. Spanier, Games
Nations Play (New York, 1984), pp. 119-298.
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they do not directly concern themselves with issues of causality. Vhila
every effort will be made to present the evolution of republican strategy
within its proper historical context, it will not seek to explain, for
instance, why political violence occurs or why events happened in the manner
they did. If strategic analysis throws any light on these sorts of ques-
tions then this is all to the good but it is not the primary task. The job
of the strategic theorist is to examine how political actors define the
circumstances around them and how they react to those circumstances to
achieve their objectives.	 One result of this approach is that strategic
theory is characterised by a degree of innate conservatism. This is not
because strategists necessarily approve of the status quo. It is purely an
academic stance in the sense that the onus is put on those who advocate a
change in the status quo to demonstrate that they have the wherewithal - the
power - to do it.
Rationality and the Primacy of Political Control in Var
The presupposition of both of the preceding assumptions is the belief that
political actors are behaving rationally. F. Lopez-Alves has described
rational action simply and effectively as conduct which 'is determined by
the endeavour to relate means to ends as efficiently as pcssible'.
	 How
one calculates rationality is altogether more difficult. 	 Complete ration-
ality requires perfect information and total objectivity. For strategists
to pontificate on rationality might suggest that they are somehow endowed
with remarkable powers of reasoning denied to all other human beings. Such
hubris, if possessed by strategists, would devalue any analysis. The
assumption of rationality 'does not suppose' as Lopez-Alves comments, 'that
all rational decisions are right ones' merely that an 'actor's decisions are
18. F. Lopez-Alves, 'Political Crises, Strategic Choices, and Terrorism:
The Rise and Pall of the Uruguayan Tuparmaros', Terrorism and Political
Violence, (London) Vol. 1, April 1989, No. 2, p. 204.
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made after careful coet-benef it calculation, and the means chosen seem
optimal to accomplish the desired end."
	 Strategists assume rationality
because they cannot really assume anything else. One may conclude after
surveying the evidence that an actor is misapplying the military instrument.
But it cannot be assumed at the outset that the actor is irrational. This
would be a job for the psychologists not the strategists.
Within the framework of strategic theory, commentary on rationality
tends to focus on the means of policy. This does not preclude thinking
through the implications of a chosen course of action to its logical con-
clusion or, where appropriate, an examination of the various options open to
a political actor. However, as the discussion above implies, the assumption
of rationality presumes that the political ends are not totally incompatible
with the means. If it were obvious that this was the case then strategists
would never attempt an analysis in the first place. All that this means in
this context is that as a general rule, strategic theory remains academically
disinterested in the moral validity of the ends of policy.	 Accordingly,
this study will have nothing to say on the desirability or otherwise of
Irish republican objectives like a united Ireland. Assessment in this
analysis will be offered only in so far as decisions regarding the military
instrument appear to help or hinder the achievement of political goals.
Closely connected with the assumption of rationality and the relation-
ship between means and ends, is the idea of the primacy of political control
in war. Clausewitz argued that war is not simply a sustained burst of
violence to achieve the political ends sought, but is a more variable phen-
omenon. 'War moves on its own goal with varying speed', Clausewitz said,
'but it always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and
for its own course to be changed one way or another - long enough, in other
19. Ibid., p. 204.
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words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence.' 20
	As
war results from a political purpose it is this element which will 'remain
the supreme consideration'' in its conduct. 'Policy, then, will permeate
all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature will admit, it
will have a continuous influence on them.' 22 This observation is crucial to
our understanding of rationality within strategic theory as it recognisee
that the correlation of ends and means can shift in war. If the ends are
proving unobtainable the political actor may seek to reformulate his strat-
egy either by changing the means or moderating the objectives. Clausewitz
was not saying that this is an inevitable process in warfare, merely that
wars are sufficiently drawn out affairs for the political authority, if it so
wishes, to calibrate the war to ensure that the overall aims do not outrun
the means to achieve them.	 In this way, the conduct of war can be kept
within the realms of rational activity.
The Strategic Approach to the Irish Republican Novement
Overall, strategic theory is not about the study of war per se. It is only
one branch, arguably even just a sub-branch, of a much wider study of mili-
tary power.	 It is just one approach among many with limited terms of ref-
erence as outlined above.. 	 To preserve structure and maintain critical
judgement this research will be held tightly within this framework.
Like most analytical frameworks, strategic theory offers a way of
reducing an amorphous mass to manageable proportions and of imposing intel-
lectual structure and discipline where there may well be none. No single
theory can deal with the complex reality of Irish republican violence in its
entirety. Therefore, it should be emphasised that the use of theory in this
research is designed, not to promote any particular view through prediction
20. Clausewitz, p. 87.
21. Ibid., p. 87.
22. Ibid., p. 87.
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or prescription, but to help investigate, understand and explain some of the
questions arising from the republican movement's practice of military force.
To this extent, the strategic approach is not a rigid concept. Because
each situation varies so enormously in both time and place, it is impossible
to elaborate durable and all-embracing strategic models. Strategic theory
can only delineate norms of expected logical behaviour within any specific
situation. The accent will not therefore be placed on relating republican
activity specifically to pr-s-existing theories of conventional or unconven-
tional war. Instead, the analysis will concentrate on viewing the evolution
of republican strategy as a process unique within its own historical context
while the effectiveness of the movement's military conduct will be inter-
preted through the broad principles of strategic evaluation set down here.
This flexibility will allow the analysis to develop without suggesting either
that Irish republican strategy is somehow exceptionally deficient in the
annals of warfare or that the methods of analysis constitute immutable
principles of strategic law.
The Historical Backgrrnd
Because this thesis concentrates on developing arguments and themes it does
not always hold to the chronology within the chapters. Therefore, it is
useful, at this point, to anchor the analysis by giving a very brief his-
torical resume of the period from the late eighteenth century up to the
Easter rising in Dublin in 1 q16, from which the modern IRA would emerge in
the subsequent years. 	 In this way, a general appreciation of the origins
and growth of the Irish republican tradition can be gained.
The prevailing character of Irish political history has reflected the
turbulent themes of migration, invasion, rebellion and repression. The
primary source of this turbulence over the centuries arose from the tension
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between Ireland and England 1
 or more specifically from Irish resistance to
the steady encroachment of English influence. The migration of settlers
between the islands of Great Britain and Ireland had been common enough
during the centuries but the political and religious turmoil caused by the
Reformation era sharpened English interest in securing territorial control
over Ireland.	 Fear that the forces of the Counter-Reformation, like Spain,
would seek to use Catholic Ireland as a base to invade Great Britain, spurred
Protestant England's attempts to pacify the country. The most notable
attempts at pacification were the Protestant plantations of the early seven-
teenth century. The planters were of mainly Scots Presbyterian stock and
the majority settled in the province of Ulster in the Iorth-East of Ireland,
displacing many local Catholics from the land in the process. Overall, the
years of tension and conflict ensured that Ireland experienced continual
political instability with all its attendant violent consequences.
In 1782 the Irish Parliament in Dublin gained a substantial measure of
legislative independence from London 1
 though the franchise was not universal
and excluded both Catholics and Presbyterians (also called Dissenters) from
power. The parliament and the administration were controlled by the small
Anglo-Irish aristocracy, known as the Protestant Ascendancy. Catholic
resentment towards the Ascendency focused chiefly on the exploitative, near
feudal, situation on the land which condemned the Irish peasantry to a pre-
carious existence at the edges of starvation.
	 This period witnessed con-
siderable agrarian violence carried out by small oath-bound groups, often
referred to generically as the 'Yhiteboys'.
	 Their activities usually con-
sisted of small-scale raids such as firing into farmhouses, mutilating cattle
and the burning of haystacks.
	 The violence was not directly political in
nature but intended to alleviate conditions on the land for the tenantry.
23. For a useful survey see K. Beames, Peasants and Power: The Whiteboy
Kovement and their Control in Pre-Famine Ireland (Brighton, 1983),
especially pp. 71-88 and pp. 204-217.
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Generally, despite the continued plight of the peasantry there was little
sign that the Catholic population harboured thoughts of political revolution.
Instead, the main political challenge came from a reform group representing
principally the increasingly affluent Presbyterians who were angered that
while their economic importance was growing, they continued to be denied
political influence.
The American and French revolutions gave great encouragement to those
in Ireland who sought political change and helped stimulate the formation of
the Society of the United Irishmen in 1791. The Society proclaimed that it
had been: 'constituted for the purpose of forwarding a Brotherhood of Affect-
ion, a Communion of Rights, and a union of Power among Irishmen of every
religious persuasion, and thereby to obtain a complete Reform in the Legis-
lature, founded on the Principles of civil, political and religious liberty.'2'
By embracing the issue of political reform, in particular the enfranchisement
of Catholics, this Dissenter dominated society gained considerable syilpathy.
But by 1794 the society had lost faith in the reform process and reorganised
itself into a secret organisation which aimed to conspire, with French help,
to overthrow British rule. The United Irishmen launched their rebellion on
23 lay 1798. Forewarned by informers, the Irish administration moved
quickly to suppress the rising and arrested mast of the leading conspirit-
ore, including the rebel commander, Lord Fitzgerald. Leaderless and ill
prepared, the rebellion was quickly put down, though solid resistance in the
South around Wexford continued until early July when the rebels were finally
defeated at the Battle of Vinegar Hill.
The 1798 rebellion is seen as the key event which marked the emergence
of the irish republican tradition.	 Attention has been focused on the role
played by one of the conspiritors, Theobald Wolfe Tone. Tone had been a
leading advocate of Catholic emancipation and had been deepatched to France
24. Quoted in T. Jackson, Ireland Her Own (London, 1948), p. 99.
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in order to seek military assistance to support the rebellion in Ireland.
French forces eventually landed over a month after the collapse of the
rising and were soon defeated by stronger British forces. The final chap-
ter in the proceedings was played out in late September when another French
invasion force was intercepted off the Worth-Vest coast of Ireland by the
Royal Navy. Amongst those captured was Wolfe Tone who was sentenced to
hang for his part in the conspiracy but committed suicide on the 19 Nov-
ember 1798.
Tone was, in fact, a relatively minor figure in the 1798 rebellion.
Further, historians suggest that he was something of a colonial misfit who
embraced the cause of Irish independence, turning against his own Protestant
Ascendancy roots after his schemes for colonial expansion in the South Seas
were rebuffed by the British government.2
 Woreover, both Tone and the
United Irishmen, it is said, cared little for the downtrodden peasantry and
even less for Catholicism and were prepared to endorse Catholic emancipation
only in order to lever themselves and their Dissenter dominated clique into
power.2
	There is no doubt that the veneration of Tone within contemporary
republicanism owes much to nationalist myth building. Ris reputation was
really made only by later writers, like Patrick Pearse in the early twentieth
century, who declared that Tone: 'stands first in point of time, and first in
point of greatness.	 Indeed, he is, I believe, the greatest man of our
na' .
Pearse saw in Tone's thoughts and actions the embodiment of the repub-
lican philosophy. In the first instance, it was Tone who enunciated the
basic tenet of Irish republican principle; that separation from England was
the essential pre-requisite for the Irish nation to realise its potential.
25. See R. ICee, The Green Flag (London, 1978), p. 48.
26.See T. Dunne, Theobald Wolfe Tone: An Analysis of His Political
Philcophy (Cork, 1982), p. 17-18 and p. 57.
27. P. Pearse, Political Vritings and Speeches (Dublin, 1952), pp. 263-264.
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Tone confided that: 'From my earliest youth I have regarded the connection
between Ireland and Great Britain as the curse of the Irish nation, and felt
convinced that, whilst it lasted, this country could never be free nor
happy.
Secondly, Tone appeared to those like Pearse as the champion of the
unity of the Irish people. In one of his most renowned passages, Tone
wrote of his desire: 'To unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the
memory of all past dissensions, and to substitute the common name of Irish-
men in place of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter'.
It was Tone's belief that only a union between Catholics and Protestants
could challenge the ruling establishment. In order to do this the bulk of
the Catholic masses would have to be mobilised. This meant that the Prot-
estants would have to commit themselves to Catholic political and economic
emancipation.	 Tone expressed his views in a pamphlet he drew up in 1791,
An Argument on Behalf of Catholics in Ireland by a Northern Vhig, which he
said was aimed at convincing his colleagues in the United Irishmen:
that they and the Catholics had but one common interest and one common
enemy that the depression and slavery of Ireland was produced and per-
petuated by the divisions existing between them, and that, consequently,
to assert the independence of their country, and their own individual
liberties, it was necessary to forget all former feuds, to consolidate the
entire strength of the whole nation, and to form for the future but one
people.'°
Finally, Tone's significance lay in the image of martyrdom.
	 He had
sought to rouse Ireland through rebellion to challenge British rule and had
paid with his life. This was the ultimate expression of commitment to the
national cause. In subsequent years this was to give rise to a powerful
cult of martyrdom which introduced a strong transcendental element into
republicanism, implying that it was worthy to pursue the purified vision of
28. Quoted in ibid., p. 282.
29. P. XacAonghusa and L. O'Reagain, The Best of Wolfe Tone (Cork, 1972),
p. 46.
30. Quoted in Pearse, P. 270.
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the Irish nation, even though it may end in death.
	 It was this image on
which many nationalists drew for inspiration. In 1898, on the centenary of
the United Irishmen's rebellion, the nationalist parliamentarian, John Dillon,
proclaimed that Tone and his colleagues had provided 'a precious inheritance
to the Irish people, and one which, if studied and acted upon, will in my
Judgement, be the best guidance to the patriot's part'. 3'	 For all these
reasons Tone is seen as the personification of the republican spirit.
The aftermath of the 1798 rebellion saw the imposition of the Act of
Union in 1801 which abolished the Irish assembly and transferred the adam-
istration of Ireland to Westminster. In reaction to these developments
remnants of the United Irishmen conspiracy plotted another rising which was
launched on 23 July 1803. The attempted seizure of Dublin Castle, the seat
of government in Ireland, failed and the rebellion quickly disintegrated.
Realising the futility of the proceedings the rebel leader, Robert Emmet,
called off the insurrection and fled Dublin. He was caught a month later
and hanged on 20 September 1803. Although the rising was a fiasco, Emmet's
death was another highly symbolic event which went to build up republican
nartyrology, particularly due to Emmet's eloquent defence of the aspiration
to Irish independence at his trial in which he declared: 'Let no man write
my epitaph (until] my country can take her place among the nations of the
earth' .
The period from 1800 to 1830 saw the rapid industrialisation of the
Protestant dominated province of Ulster. Economic growth also drew large
numbers of Catholics towards the North-East to take advantage of the
opportunities opened up by commercial expansion. Fear that the influx of
Catholics would pose a danger to their way of life and commercial position
31.Quoted in D. Boyce, 'Water for the Fish: Terrorism and Public Opinion', in
A. O'Day and Y. Alexander (eds.), Terrorism in Ireland (London, 1984),
p. 152.
32.Quoted in X. Elliott, Partners in Revolution (London, 1982), p. 370.
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persuaded most Protestants to embrace the Act of Union. It was against
this background of economic and political polarisation between North and
South and between Catholic and Protestant that ].argely put an end to
Dissenter agitation for independence and from which the force of Ulster
unionism would emerge.
Xeanwhile, Catholics were also coalescing In political terms around the
personality of Daniel O'Connell who led the Catholic Association, formed in
1823, which successfully mobilised popular opinion to gain Increased land
rights for the peasantry. O'Connell's leadership did much to awaken Irish
national consciousness, distilling a common sense of identity which crossed
nearly all sections of Catholic society. Later, O'Connell campaigned at the
head of the Repeal Association which aimed to revoke the Act of Union and to
restore the Irish parliament.
Within the repeal movement a group of young radicals known as Young
Ireland were to provide the next link in the Irish republican historical
chain. The Young Irelanders were not really rebels so much as cultural
romantics who believed that the definition of a vibrant national and cultural
tradition was a necessary pre-condition to substantiate any claim for self-
government.	 The group's newspaper, The Nation, edited by Thomas Davis,
evoked the image of a rich and heroic cultural heritage. 'Nationality is
(our] first great object', the Young Irelanders stated, 'Nationality which will
not only raise our people from their poverty, by securing to them the bless-
ings of a DOXESTIC LEGISLATURE, but inflame and purify them with a lofty
and heroic love of country'. 	 Young Ireland proclaimed force as a virtue.
Thomas Neagher declared that 'be it for defence or be it for the assertion
of a nation's liberty I look upon the sword as a sacred weapon'. 	 Rarely,
33. Source: Prospectus of a Dublin Weekly Journal to be called The Nation,
8 Oct. 1842, reprinted in D, Gwynn, Young Ireland and 1848 (Cork, 1949),
pp. 6-9.
34. Quoted in D. Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland (London, 1982), p. 169.
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though, did the group advocate the adoption of a policy of physical force.
Instead those like Davis saw the cultivation of a strong, gallant Irish
military tradition as a means of cultural regeneration to engender national
self-respect..
The newspaper, The Nation did become more militant following the death
of Davis in 1845 when John litchel became its editor. With the failure of
the repeal movement to make headway Mitchel had become disillusioned with
constitutional politics. loreover, policy differences with O'Connell caused
the group to split from the main repeal movement to set up a separate or-
ganisation, the Irish Confederation, in January 1847. litchel openly glori-
fied physical force, arguing that the 'true and only method of regenerating
Ireland might in course of time recommend itself to a nation so long abused
and deluded by Nlegalhs humbug'. His belligerence found little sympathy
with the rest of the Young Irelanders and he broke from the movement to
form his own paper, The United Irishman, in which he called for the arming
of the peasantry in order to wage a 'Holy War... in this island to sweep it
clean of the Bnglish name and nation.a7
litchel's writings were treated as seditious by the British and he was
sentenced to 14 years penal servitude in Australia in lay 1848. Shortly
before his arrest litchel came under the influence of James Fintan Lalor, a
contemporary thinker, who advocated linking agrarian reforms with nation-
alist issues.	 Lalor criticised the moderates in Young Ireland.
	 'They
wanted an alliance with the land owners' he said, 'they desired, not a
democratic, but merely a national revolution'.
	 Lalor argued that the
immediate cause of Ireland's misery lay in the land system. He suggested a
35. K. Davis, The Young Ireland Novement (Dublin, 1987), p. 249.
36. Source: The Nation, 8 Jan. 1848, quoted in P. O'Hegarty, A History of
Ireland Under the Union, 1801-1922 (London, 1952), p. 343.
37. Source: The United Irishman, 12 Feb. 1848, quoted in ibid., p. 351.
38. Quoted in R. Xunck, Ireland: Nation State and Class Struggle (Boulder,
Colorado, 1985).
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programme of non-violent protest and non-co-operation involving non-payment
of rents and taxes to undermine the landlords and establish peasant proprie-
torship. Lalor believed that land held the key to the nationalist question
as he felt the populace could be more effectively mobilised for tangible
goals like land reform than for more abstract notions of national rights.
Lalor's ideas were to have a significant influence on later republican
thinkers like James Connolly who praised Lalor as the 'Irish apostle of
revolutionary socialism.' His writings, Connolly said, contained 'not only
the beet plan of campaign suited for the needs of a country seeking its
freedom through insurrection against a dominant nation, but also held the
seeds of the more perfect social peace of the future.'tm°
In 1848 the Young Irelanders were swept up by the revolutionary fer-
your spreading through continental Europe, and they began to openly proclaim
the desirability of an insurrection. Taking the Young Irelanders' pronoun-
cements more seriously than they deserved, the authorities moved to arrest
the movement's leaders. The remnants of the leadership fled and mounted a
brief uprising which was defeated after a short skirmish at Ballingarry, Co.
Tipperary, on 5 August 1848.
	 The rising had been a fiasco.
	 But the
legacy of the Young Ireland era did make an important contribution to the
development of Irish republicanism. It was Davis who helped build the
republican vision of a distinctive and integrated national culture. Xitchel
did much to articulate the elemental aversion to English influence,
describing the British empire as 'the most base and horrible tyranny that
has ever scandalised the face of the earth.'4 ' And although Lalor's
thinking about the land reform issue evoked little response from the peas-
antry dispirited by the potato famine which ravaged Ireland between 1845
and 1848, his ideas were to have a major impact later in the century.
39. L. XcCaffrey, The Irish Question, 1800-1922 (Lexington, Kentucky, 1968).
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Finally, Young Ireland represented continuity in the republican tradition.
Even though the 1848 rising was a debacle, it could also be depicted as
another symbolic stand by selfless patriots who had given up their
livelihoods for the cause of Irish liberty.
The enormous hardship caused by the famine and the failure of further
attempts at land reform, helped stimulate the formation of the Irish
Revolutionary (later Republican) Brotherhood (IRB) which was established on
17 larch 1858. The IRB, which became more popularly known as the Fenians,
had two wings. One wing was established amongst the Irish diaspora in the
USA caused by mass emigration during the famine and led by John O'Mahoney.
The other wing in Ireland was led by James Stephens. Unlike their pre-
decessors in the United Irishmen and the Young Irelandars, who had felt
driven to rebellion as an act of last resort, the Fenians rejected British
rule from the start and dedicated themselves to its overthrow by force.
The Fenian newspaper, The Irish People, vigorously promulgated the message
of physical force separatism: 'independence, which, we are never tired of
repeating, can be won but by one method. This sometimes fails to achieve
independence but no method ever succeeded in winning it'.
James Stephens cautiously set about preparing the IRB for revolt.
However, the organisation was often fractious.
	 Stephens twice postponed
the date for an uprising.	 He was deposed by a faction under T.J. Kelly
which had been pressing for an early rising in Ireland.
	 The Fenians
eventually mounted their rising in larch 1887. It was a shambolic affair.
Planning was inadequate and the population remained passive. Only in Kerry
and Limerick was there any sU8tained resistance. The authorities put down
the rising in a matter of days. 	 As an attempt to seize power it was a
hopeless enterprise. Even John litchel believed that 'the project was in
42. Quoted in R. Piggott, Personal Recollections of an Irish Nationalist
Journalist (Dublin, 1882), p. 131.
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itself wild and could only be made to appear feasible by systematic delusion
and impcsture.14a
The most notable aspect of the Fenians, however, was that their activ-
ities did not cease after the 1867 rising.
	 Later in the year the IRE
rescued two Fenian prisoners in Manchester.
	 During the raid a policeman
was killed. In November 1867 three IRB men 1
 William Allan, Michael Larkin
and Michael O'Brien, were hanged for their part in the raid. The execution
of the 'Manchester Martyrs' produced a wave of sympathy throughout Ireland
which did much to popularise the Fenians in the public imagination. The
IRE struck again in England in December 1867 when a bomb Intended to dest-
roy the wall of Clarkenwell prison in London, to enable an IRB leader to
escape, killed a dozen or so civilians. The incidents at Manchester and
Clerkenwell produced widespread anxiety, 'Fenian Fever', throughout England.
The main political effect, though, was to influence William Gladstone, who
became Prime Minister in 1868, to introduce reforms in Ireland which in-
cluded the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869, followed by
the Land Act of 1870 which aimed to improve tenant rights.
Despite the continued activities of the IRB, there was a feeling that
the idea of armed insurrection had burned itself out. Increasingly, a
number of Pen tans were attracted by the prospect of some form of co-oper-
ation with the Irish nationalist parliamentarians to press for reforms on
the land. Falling agricultural commodity prices in the 1870s threatened to
depress the peasant economy in Ireland; another famine was not out of the
question. The impending economic crisis caused Fenians like Michael Davitt
to reconsider traditional IRB attitudes to social and economic reform.
Whereas the IRB had tended to steer clear of the reform issue, for fear that
reforms would dilute pressure for full separation, those like Davitt felt
43. Quoted in R. Anderson, Sidelights on the Home Rule Rovement (London,
1906), p. 68.
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that action had to be taken to relieve the situation on the land. Further-
more, he believed that 'landordism was a British garrison which barred the
way to nationalist independence."4
 Therefore, if the landlord system could
be undermined through reforms, then an important obstacle to self-determin-
ation would be removed. Essentially, these ideas represented a recrudes-
cence of Lalor's theories some three decades earlier.
In October 1879, Iichael Davitt founded the Land League. At its head
was Charles Stewart Parnell, leader of the Irish nationalists at Vestminster.
The League's aims were to campaign for a reduction in rents, the prevention
of evictions, and the eventual establishment of peasant proprietorship. The
alliance of sections of the Fenian movement, constitutionaliste and agrarian
interests proved highly effective. The Land League opposed evictions by
organising an embargo on evicted farms, while social ostracism was practised
on those who took up tenancies on farms from which others had already been
evicted. This was accompanied by a huge upsurge in agrarian violence and
intimidation which the League publicly deplored but tacitly backed to in-
crease pressure on the government.4B As a result, the period between 1880
and 1882 was known as the Land War. Inside parliament Parnell and his
colleagues lobbied for reform which produced the Land Act of April 1881.
The Act provided the Irish tenantry with fair rents, security of tenure and
freedom of sale. Parnell was gaoled when he refused to endorse the Act as
he felt its provisions were inadequate. The huge increase in rural violence
following his imprisonment discredited the government's coercionist policies
and persuaded Gladstone to release Parnell and undertake further reforms
like the abolition of rent arrears. Thus the Land Var was brought to an
end. Parnell derived great popularity from the concessions he had won from
the government which he used to renew his party's demand for home rule.
44.Quoted in Ibid., p. 86.
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The mainstream IRB, meanwhile, sullenly accepted the involvement of
individual members in the Land League but refused to sanction any official
participation, seeing it as a distraction from the main task of getting rid
of the British. The Fenians did raise their profile again in the 1880s
with a prolonged bombing campaign in England. The campaign was initiated
by the moveaent's American arm, the Clan-na-Gael. The bombings were car-
ried out by two sets of bombers. One renegade team was led by the veteran
IRB man Jeremiah O'Donovan Roesa. The other team, officially sponsored by
the Clan, was led by William Lomasney who was later to die while attempting
to place a bomb underneath London Bridge in 1884. In the main, the bombers
attacked targets like barracks and government offices. However, the
motives and aims of the campaign were obscure and there is little evidence
to suggest that it had any major political impact. By 1887 the bombings
had petered out.
Still, the nineteenth century Fenians are highly significant because
they were the first set of Irish revolutionaries who outlived their own
initial military failures.
	 Both the United Irishmen and Young Ireland had
been killed off by defeat. The 1867 rising was a disastrous undertaking
but it entered the future republican legend as another act of defiance on the
road to independence. The IRB remained in existence after 1867, dedicated
conspiricists, determined to overthrow British rule. The IRB'e activities
in this era, for example, the 'Xanchestar Xartyrs' episode, did much to raise
nationalist awareness amongst the Irish population at large. For all these
reasons, it was the Fenians who really established the Irish republican
tradition In name. Even so, in political terms, by the iBBOs, the IRB had
been thoroughly eclipsed by the Land League coalition and the way of the
future appeared to lie through home rule within the United Kingdom and not
revolutionary nationalist separatism.
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Progress over home rule in the following years proved painfully slow.
The first Home Rule Bill introduced by Gladstone in 1886 divided the Liberal
party and failed to get through the House of Commons. In the ensuing
election caused by the crisis, the Liberals were defeated by the Conservative
party.	 The Liberals returned to power in 1892 and introduced the second
Home Rule Bill in 1893.
	 This time the Bill passed in the Commons but was
rejected by the Conservative dominated House of Lords.
	 In the intervening
period the Irish Parliamentary Party also went through a damaging split when
in 1890 Parnell was named in divorce proceedings. This caused a bitter
division between those who backed Parnell and those who deserted him out of
fear of alienating both the Catholic Church (which came out strongly against
Parnell) and the more socially conservative elements in the Liberal party
whose support was necessary to pass any home rule legislation. The matter
largely resolved itself in favour of the anti-Parnellitee when Parnell
himself died in 1891.
Despite the frustrations over home rule there was little pressure for
any reassertion of violent nationalism. The IRB was, at this stage, a mori-
bund, directionlees organisation. It remained rhetorically committed to
physical force but was passive In the face of the still dominant Irish Par-
liamentary Party. Vhat did change the picture in the late nineteenth cen-
tury was a remarkable upsurge In cultural awareness in Ireland generated by
the prospect of self-determination under home rule.
	 In 1884 the Gaelic
Athletic Association was formed to revive and promote Irish games like
Gaelic football and hurling. Later in 1893 the Gaelic League was estab-
lished to revitalise Irish language and culture. This was accompanied by a
renaissance in Anglo- Irish literature, led by people like V.B. Yeats, who drew
on the romantic images of Celtic folklore for their writings which often
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promulgated an idealised view of traditional Irish life and culture.
	 The
success of the Gaelic revival Inevitably had political effects as nationalist
sentiments were rekindled.
	 An avowedly separatist political party, Sinn
Fain, was formed in 1907. Its leader, Arthur Griffith, advocated that Irish
representatives should abstain from Westminster and establish their own
assembly in Ireland, though he was also prepared to envisage some continuing
titular role for the monarchy. It was also during this period, around 1907,
that the IRB was reorganised and reinvigorated, under the tutelage of the
veteran Fenian Tom Clarke, which placed the movement in a good position to
exploit the fluidity of events in the following years.
By 1910, with the Irish Parliamentary Party supporting the Liberals in
office, home rule was back on the agenda. The third Home Rule Bill was
passed by the Commons, and though the Lords delayed the Bill they no longer
had the power to block it. The prospect of home rule caused a surge of
unrest in Ulster where many Protestants felt they were being abandoned to
the clutches of a Catholic dominated legislature. Protestant insecurity had
undoubtedly been heightened by the Gaelic revival which had closely identi-
fled Irish nationality with a Gaelic/Catholic cultural tradition. Protest-
ants threatened to resist the imposition of home rule by setting up the
paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1912. This was countered in
Jovember 1913 with the establishment of the Irish Volunteers which sought
to pressurise the government to resist the threats of the UVF.
The outbreak of the First World War seemed to avert the Impending
crisis by postponing the implementation of home rule. To prove Its loyalty
to the crown the UVF joined the British Army.
	 The Irish Volunteers, how-
ever, split over its attitude to the war.
	 The majority of its 170,000
members followed the call of the Irish Parliamentary leader, John Redmond,
46. See I. Xansergh, The Irish Question, 1840-1921 (London, 1965),
pp. 245-26?.
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to enlist in the British Army. This left a faction of about 15,000 Vol-
unteers, under their original leader, Roin Macleill, opposed to any involve-
ment in the war. It was XacNeill'e intention to use the anti-war Volunteers
to keep up the pressure on the British government to live up to its obli-
gations over home rule. The IRB, which had infiltrated the Volunteers, had
altogether different plans for the organisation. The advent of war offered
the IRB an opportunity to mount a rising while Britain was distracted by its
continental entanglements. In the summer of 1915 the IRE created a small
committee, later known as the Xilitary Council, to make plans for a rising.
So secretive was the work of the Council that by Easter 1916 it had itself
become largely autonomous of IRB control: a conspiracy within a con-
spiracy.47
The IRB Nilitary Council was composed of people like Patrick Pearse,
himself a writer and poet, who was strongly imbued with the romantic
imagery of the Gaelic revival which held out the vision of a thriving,
civilised, self-sufficient nation untainted by foreign influence. 4
 Pearse
regarded war and weapons as a noble and virtuous symbol of manhood and
nationhood. He was impressed by the formation of the UVF. 'I am glad
that the Orangemen have armed for it is a goodly thing to see arms in Irish
hands,' he said, 'I would like to see any and every body of Irish citizens
armed.' Above all, Pearse and his colleagues believed in the redemptive
power of blood sacrifice; the idea that a gallant military stand could be
spiritually regenerating, capable of lifting the Irish people out of the
complacent lethargy into which they were deemed to have fallen. In 1914
Pearse's co-conspiritor, Sean XacDermott, expressed this feeling in the
following way:
47. See O'Hegarty, pp. 696-699.
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Nationalism as known to Tone and Emmet is almost dead in the country and
a spurious substitute, as taught by the Irish Parliamentary Party, exists
...the Irish patriotic spirit will die forever unless a blood sacrifice is
made in the next few years... and it will be necessary for some of us to
offer ourselves as martyrs if nothing better can be done to preserve the
Irish national spirit...°
Also drawn into the IRB's conspiracy was the republican socialist,
James Connally, who was at the head of the Irish Citizen Army (ICA), a small
organisation of some 200 members, founded in 1913 to train and discipline
the workers and defend them in industrial disputes. He was convinced that
national liberation was a pre-requisite for social revolution but was initi-
ally sceptical towards the IRB. He was especially disparaging about repub-
lican martyrology, arguing that 'they should stop blethering about dead
Fenians' and 'get a few live ones for a change'.' However, Connolly became
disillusioned at the failure of European socialists to oppose World War One
and at the enthusiasm many Irishmen had shown for the British cause in the
war. Connolly publicly called for a rebellion and was co-opted onto the
Nilitary Council. By early 1916 he was convinced of the need for a violent
gesture. He believed that only 'the red tide of war on Irish soil' could
raise Ireland out of its 'sense of degradation', adding that 'without the
shedding of blood there is no Redemption.'
So it was that the IRE and the ICA conspired in unison. Pearse, in his
capacity as Director of Organisation of the Volunteers, lured the organis-
ation into rebellion under the guise of general manoeuvree on Easter Sunday
1916. When Ilacleill got wind that the manoeuvres were for an insurrection,
he countermanded the mobilisation, with the result that only 1000 Volunteers
turned out. The rebels held out for a week in the centre of Dublin before
surrendering.	 In the following weeks, all the captured rebel leaders,
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including Pearse and Connolly, were executed.
It was from these antecedents, from Wolfe Tone to 1916, that the repub-
lican tradition became established in the public consciousness. It was a
tradition which inculcated in its followers a deep mystical love of an Ire-
land free from outside interference. The republican ethos saw the pro-
cession of nationalist uprisings in pursuit of Irish independence not as
military failures but as symbolic acts of defiance, spiritually renewing, and
capable of inspiring others. It was a sentiment encapsulated by Patrick
Pearse at his court-martial on 2 May 1916, shortly before his execution,
when he said: 'To refuse to fight would have been to lose, to fight is to
win; we have kept faith with the past, and handed on a tradition to the
future.'4
Although this section represents only a very general outline of the
period between the 1790s and 1916, it has sought to identify both the
various milestones in republican history and some of the key personalities
involved. It is over this period that Chapter 1 seeks to discern a number
of themes which have helped mould the way the republican movement thinks
about the military instrument. The following chapters take this forward by
examining the evolution of the military Instrument in republican strategic
thinking from 1916 onwards.
Of course, the 1916 Easter rising was the precursor to the monumental
events of the Anglo-Irish war, the division of Ireland, the Irish civil war,
all the way up to the present day troubles in Northern Ireland. Since this
study Is not an historical narrative it is obviously impossible to treat all
the Important events with the degree of attention they surely deserve in
more general histories. Indeed, for this reason the thesis cannot range
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over every facet of IRA activity. Because the material is, in the main,
treated thematically within each chapter and specifically in relation to the
development of the military instrument in republican strategic thinking, then
inevitably the events chosen to elucidate the analysis are going to be
somewhat selective. So, just for example, the text will not attempt to
analyse, say, every single major IRA bombing or shooting which happened in
the period covered by each chapter, but concentrate only on a number of key
events which illustrate specific points of the argument. In this respect,
it would be fair to say that some general knowledge of the course of Irish
history is assumed. However, readers who wish to acquaint themselves with
the main events of the period that this thesis covers may find it helpful to
refer to the chronology in the appendices.
Terminology and Sources
Of ten the way names and places are expressed in the debate on the Irish
question are imbued with much symbolic significance. Sometimes they are
taken to indicate political preferences. Vhile it is difficult to devise a
completely neutral set of words, for the sake of clarity it is worth speci-
fying how a number of terms will be used in the text. As a general rule,
official place names will be used, though there will be a few variations.
The term the 'Republic' will refer to the Republic of Ireland created after
1g49. Before 194 the 'South', as the Republic will sometimes be called,
was known as the Irish Free State. Today, republicans frequently refer to
the South as the 'Free State' or the 'twenty-six counties'. Northern Ireland
will occasionally be referred to as the North or Ulster.
	 Republicans and
nationalists often dub Northern Ireland the 'six counties' or the 'North of
Ireland'.	 The name Derry will be used to distinguish the city from the
county of Londonderry.
In discussing the present conflict in Northern Ireland, the terms
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Catholic and Protestant will be used in the manner outlined by Desiwnd
Fennell to denote a politico-ethnic distinction between what he calls the
Ulster- Irish and the Ulster-British. In this way, Protestant and Catholic
will be used inter-changeably with the respective descriptions nationalist
and unionist/loyalist.
The breadth of the secondary material on Irish politics and history is
enormous and can defy the imagination. The bibliography at the back of the
thesis is by no means exhaustive and can itself only convey a flavour of
what is on offer to the reader. It would be impractical to attempt an all
embracing survey of the literature here? but it is worth briefly mentioning
a number of works that have been helpful in this analysis.
	 P.S.L. Lyons's,
Ireland Since the Famine (1971) is one of the stalwart histories.
	 An
immensely detailed and scholarly work, Lyons provides a lucid and well
rounded descriptive Introduction to modern Irish history.
	 P.S. O'Hegarty
has also written a detailed and useful work, A History of Ireland Under the
Union, 1801-1922 (1952). O'Hegarty concentrates on quoting long tracts
from nationalist newspapers like The Nation, The United Irishman and The
Irish People. Although the scope Is narrow and partial, this approach
enables one to gain an appreciation of the Intellectual development of
nationalist thinking, particularly during the nineteenth century, via the
printed word. One of the most rewarding historical assessments is Jicholas
Nansergh's The Irish Question, 1840-1921 (1965). Jot only does Xansergh
offer a balanced, well-argued narrative, but he also devotes chapters to
themes like the communist attitude to the Irish question and the influence
of Gaelic romanticism in Irish politics, all of which help to consolidate
background knowledge.
55. D. Pennell, The State of the Nation (Dublin, 1983), pp. 105-109.
50. For an excellent literature survey see T. body (ed.), Irish
Historicgraphy, 1936-1970 (Dublin, 1971). H. bulvey's contributions on
nineteenth and twentieth century historiography (pp. 71-136) are
especially recommended.
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Sean Cronin's Irish Nationalism (1980) gives a basic but solid account
of the history of Irish nationalism. D.G. Boyce, with his Nationalism in
Ireland (1982), provides a ilore analytical study of the subject which
focuses a bit more on the ideation of nationalism as a theoretical concept
and its evolution in practice in Ireland through the years.
	 If one has to
single out one particular work in this field, however, it would be Robert
Kee's The Green Flag (1972). It is thoroughly researched, fluidly written,
critical but sensitive to the motives of all sides concerned. Kee's service
is to put Irish nationalism into historical perspective by showing that, for
the most part, physical force separatism was a minority pastime which only
gained moral ascendancy after 1918, and that the struggle for independence
between 1919 and 1921 was, for most people, less a crusade for the mystical
republican vision, more a final, exasperated attempt to achieve a measure of
national self-expression so long suppressed and denied. Perhaps the only
pity with Kee's book is that it does not extend its clear-sighted and dis-
passionate analysis beyond the Irish civil war of 1922-1923.
There are still only two general histories of the IRA, Tim Pat Coogan's
The IRA (1987) and J. Bowyer Bell's, The Secret Army (1989). Both are
weighty volumes. Coogan is lively, opinionated and excellent in recounting
the reminiscences of IRA members.
	 The emphasis on personalities and its
mixture of anecdotes and opinion, and lack of sourced material, can make the
book seem rather unstructured at times. Even so, written by a journalist
who is obviously passionately committed to the principle of a united Ireland,
The IRA is required reading for those who wish to understand the republican-
nationalist perspective.	 Of particular interest is an examination of the
Provisional IRA's standard training manual, the Green Bixjk, contained in the
appendices.	 With Coogan's informative commentary this has been especially
valuable to the analysis in Chapter 0.
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With Bowyer Bell, the IRA receives more academic treatment,
	 Like
Googan, the text is based on numerous interviews. The work is better sour-
ced than Googan and keeps firmly to the chronology from 1916 onwards. The
account is more sober than Coogan, though Bowyer Bell is not incapable of
literary flourish, and in this respect it is regarded as the standard work
on the IRA, not least by the IRA itself. Some of Bell's work has even been
reprinted in the movement's own journals. 57 The stamp of IRA approval does
not compromise Bowyer Bell's work for The Secret Army is no IRA po1og1a.
The main weakness of The IRA and The Secret Army, for which neither
author can be blamed, is that both books were first published in 1970 before
the present IRA campaign really got under way.
	 To keep pace with events
this has necessitated the up-date of both books, In Coogan's case large
tracts have been periodically tacked on in an unwieldy fashion with no at-
tempt to tie the various strands of the analysis into an overall conclusion
or summary, admittedly a difficult job when there is no end in sight to the
conflict. Bowyer Bell's up-date to 1979, on the other hand, is just a quick
spin through events which does not throw much light onto the motivations
and intentions of the participants, or the implications of their actions.
Coogan's and Bowyer Bell's greatest strength, though, lies earlier in time in
the way their extensive Interviews and researches Illuminate the period from
the 1920s to the 1960s which has, on the whole, received scant attention in
the literature. They plot, often in fascinating detail, the descent of the
IRA into a tiny military conspiracy while illustrating the strength of com-
mitment to republican values that sustained the movement through these lean
years. Yet both books demonstrate the problem inherent in all commentaries
on the IRA, that they are prone to date rather rapidly. The result is that
the best accounts of the IRA post-1969 are to be found elsewhere.
57. See J. Boywer Bell, 'Oglaigh Na h-Eireann (Irish Republican Army] - An
Expert's View', An Phablacht, 22 Feb. 1974.
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Kevin Kelley follows the progress of the IRA up to the early 1980s in
The Longest Var (1982), though it is really a more general history of the
conflict in Northern Ireland with a pronounced republican bias. Pat
Bishop's and Bamonn Mallie's The Provisional IRA (1987) offers the mast
comprehensive history of the movement to data. The book is based largely
on Xallie's interviews with current and past republican leaders and docu-
ments the history of the Provisionals from the movement's inception in 1969
to late 1986. Written more with mass consumption than academic rigour in
mind, it nevertheless provides an illuminating insight into the Provisionals.
One of the most interesting studies of recent years is Liam Clarke's Broad-
ening the Battlefield (1987). Clarke gives a detailed account of the
struggles inside the Xaze prison (Long Kesh to republicans) for political
status and how this led to a fundamental shift in republican political
thinking which was to manifest itself in the emergence of Sinn Fein as a
significant political force in Northern ireland in the mid-1980s. Clarke
charts the manoeuvrings of the younger republican leaders who were to steer
through these changes and the friction this caused with the more conserv-
ative elements. Also, the appendices contain PIRA's 1977 Staff Report which
set the course for the revisions in the movement's strategy in the years
ahead. Clarke's study has been essential background reading for the final
two chapters of the thesis. In relation to the events covered by Clarke, it
is also worth mentioning Adrian Guelke's Northern Ireland: The International
Perspective (1988). This is an important commentary in its own right,
dealing with the internationalisation of the conflict as it does, but his
chapter on 'Republican Perceptions' provides a concise and perspicacious
overview of the changes in IRA policy over recent years.
For all that has been written on Irish affairs there is still relatively
little sustained, in-depth analysis of the thinking which drives the IRA's
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belief in violence as a viable political tool.
	 Indeed, this lack of analysis
applies to all political actors in the Irish context.
	 Such writings still
seem to be confined to single chapters which inevitably contain a high level
of generality. However, Padraig O'Xallay's chapter in his The Uncivil Wars
(1983) is a thought provoking piece which examines the relationship between
the IRA's armed struggle and the than emergent electoral policy of Sina Pain.
For the most part, O'Ialley allows republican leaders to speak for themselv-
es by quoting large oral segments with minimal intervening comment. In the
latter half of the chapter he proceeds to dissect some of the ideological
strands which underpin IRA violence In the process he constructs a damn-
ing critique which attacks both the IRA's mythological Gaelic exclusivism,
with its consequent antagonistic, stereotypical view of Ulster Protestants as
alien interlopers, and the ambiguity of Southern politicians whose constit-
utional claim on the North, he believes, continues to endow PIRA's campaign
with a spurious quasi-legitimacy.
Arthur Aughey's section 'Political Violence in Northern Ireland' in H.H.
Tucker (ed.), Combating the Terrorists (1988) affords a very short but
informative synopsis of the strategy and tactics of the IRA. Aughey also
outlines the aims of the loyalist paramilitaries and gives a brief assess-
ment of the British government's political response to the crisis. Overall,
though, it is true to say that the best contemporary commentaries on paz-a-
military strategies still tend to emanate from journalistic quarters in the
writings of those like David NcKittrick (The Independent, formally of The
Irish Times) and Ed Xoloney (The Irish Times).
There are more general surveys on the issue of violence of which
Charles Townehend's Political Violence in Ireland (1983) is a seminal study,
being massively researched and rich in quotations from original sources.
There is not much in the way of strategic analysis, though there are occas-
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ional references to military theories and thinkers. For example, there is a
brief allusion to terrorist theory and Vhiteboy activities and odd compar-
isons between the development of republican military doctrine in the early
twentieth century with various strands of Xaoist thought.
	 But Townshend
does not purport to offer a comprehensive strategic evaluation. Political
Violence is an historical review which aims to reflect the full experience of
violence in Irish politics and society in all its variegated forms; nation-
alist, unionist, British, agrarian.
One of the most unusual offerings to have emerged on the present con-
flict is supplied by Xartin Dillon and Denis Lehane in Political Nurder in
lorthern Ireland (1973) which catalogues a series of sectarian killings in
the province between 1988 and 1973. For all the grusomeness of the subject
matter, it is an important work which helps explain the rise of the loyalist
paranilitaries in the early 1970s. In this respect it has been of assist-
ance in Chapter 5 which looks in part at the implications of the sectarian
war for PIRA's strategy. On a not too dissimilar theme, Dillon's latest
book, The Dirty Var (1988), examines the secret world of informers, intel-
ligence gathering, paramilitary racketeering, unsolved murders, allegations of
collusion between the security forces and loyalist gangs, and other content-
ious issues.	 It is an intriguing study. Dillon's treatment of his mater-
ial is especially impressive as he never stretches evidence farther than it
will allow. Therefore, rather than succumbing to the temptation to indulge
in unfounded conspiracy theory, Dillon prefers to admit that his investi-
gations often leave even more questions than answers. Perhaps the most
valuable service which both Political Nurder and The Dirty Var genuinely
perform is to constantly remind the reader what the basic form of the con-
flict usually takes; squalid acts of incredible brutality. It is something
-
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which all observers who seek to analyse events in the glacial terminology of
academia, strategists especially 1
 would be wise never to forget.
Possibly the iiost striking feature of the literature on the republican
movement over the past twenty years is the scarcity of memoirs of individ-
ual members. There are obvious reasons for this. The IRA is a secretive
organisation whose members do not spill out their reminiscences out of def-
erence to their rebel vocation and to protect those still involved. Also,
the more public figures in Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) have in their careers
often traversed a line between the legal and illegal and so feel restricted
in what they can reveal. Gerry Adams, the current president of PSF, and a
prolific writer, is a case in point.	 His Falls Nemories (1982) tell of his
childhood growing up in Vest Belfast. A Pathway to ace (1988) is a poli-
tical tract. The Politics of Irish Freedom (1986) is part memoir, part
political tract in which Adams describes how he became involved in repub-
lican politics and is an excellent exposition of the contemporary republican
outlook. Yet none of these reveal anything of his time within the ranks of
the Provisional IRA during which he rose to become the organisation's
Belfast commander, and later, allegedly, its chief of staff.
The two most notable reminiscences which have appeared over the years
are those of lana XcGuire and Sean XacStiofain. XcGuire's To Take Arms
(1973) is a racey account of her involvement with the movement between 1971
and 1972. The book contains many defects. The title itself is misleading
since it is evident that XcGulre never saw any combat with PIRA. Further,
her status within the movement was obscure. It is unclear whether she was
a member of PIRA or PSF, as is the extent to which she had access to the
top echelons of the Provisionals. Also, a large part of her statement is
taken up with retelling her travails in a bungled arms smuggling operation
in Amsterdam - an insignificant episode if ever there was one. Fundament-
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ally, XcGuire was not representative of typical IRA material. She was a
young woman graduate from a well-to-do background, rather naively attracted
into the movement by what she believed at the time was its radical chic.
Nevertheless, XcGuire writes well and she is strong in the latter part of
her account when she describes the internal machinations which were to
eventually lead her to desert the movement when the bloody effects of PlEA's
campaign became too much.
By contrast, XacStiofain's Nemc,irs of a Revolutionary (1975) is the
somewhat dour testimony of PlEA's first chief of staff.
	 Xacstiofain con-
centrates on the bare historical mechanics. Utterly unreflective, with no
hint of any kind of introspection which might have allowed himself to probe
his own motivations for the reader's edification, these are the memoirs of
someone convinced of the righteousness of his cause. Precious little is
said about strategic debates or any sort of policy discussions within PIRA's
Army Council, and on the whole, he does not say much which was not already
known.	 Even so, XacStiofain does occasionally enlighten some of the key
phases in republican history. In particular, he is at his best recounting
the factionalism which developed after the end of the IRA's unsuccessful
border war in 1962 - a process which was eventually to lead in 1969 to the
split in republican ranks and the formation of PlEA. In summary, for all
their deficiencies, both MacStiofain and NcGuire are highly instructive
reading. Both works are flawed. But both are vitally important, precisely
because they are the only detailed accounts we have of life within IRA
circles. NacStiofain's memoirs are highly pertinent to the 1960e and early
1970s and XcGuire's testimony is central in helping to comprehend PlEA's
actions at one of the most crucial points of its history in mid-1972.
Another aspect of the literature on Ireland is that there are still few
studies which deal with specific issues within Irish republican ideology.
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One recent exception is Henry Patterson's The Politics of IllusIon (1989)
which traces the history of socialist republican thinking. The book is
important if one hopes to understand the cycles in republican activity be-
cause on a number of occasions, usually after military failure, the movement,
or at least factions of it, have articulated a socialist path as a means,
Patterson says, to keep alive the republican tradition by recasting militant
nationalism within what was hoped would be a more popular socio-economic
framework.	 Because social revolutionary programmes are often highly con-
scious of the correlation of ends and means, great thought is usually given
to the individual components of such projects. In this regard Patterson
provides a particularly good discussion on the controversial revision of the
armed struggle which took place in republican thinking when a more overtly
socialist course was adopted in the 1980s.
There are, of course, many other erudite articles and chapters which do
pursue precise themes within the ambit of republicanism and political
violence. For example, Frank Burton's chapter 'Republicanism: The IRA and
the Community', in his The Politics of LegItimacy (1978) takes the reader to
street level to understand the sometimes tense but often mutually supportive
relationship between the IRA and the nationalist population of Belfast during
the early 1970s. Alternatively, the series of books edited by Yonah
Alexander and Alan O'Day (Terrorism in Ireland (1984), Ireland's Terrorist
Dilemma (1986), Ireland's Terrorist Trauma (1989)), contain many diverse
contributions on the conflict from 'Political Assassination in the Irish
Tradition' (1984) by Tom Corfe, to the treatment of Northern Ireland by
political cartoonists - 'English Cartoonists; Ulster Realities' (1986) by John
Kirkiady. J. Bowyer Bell also brings together an interesting but disparate
collection of his own essays on violence in Ireland, The Gun in Politics
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(1987); a veritable literary tapestry of his ruminations over many years, but
something which does not add up to a coherent picture of the subject.
This thesis has also been aided by a number of compilations of docu-
ments and statistics. For example, the statistics on the conflict in
Northern Ireland published by the Irish Information Partnership have been
invaluable.	 Arthur Nitchell and Padraig O'Snodalgh bring together a
compendium of original documentary material in fish Po1itic.1 Dcbzvments,
1916-1949 (1985) which has proved very useful for Chapters 2 and 3. In
addition, V.D. Flackes' editions of Northern Irel,nd: A Po1itic1 Directory
(the latest of which is the 1989 edition with Sydney Elliott), have been an
indispensable source of factual information.
Overall, opinions differ on how well Ireland has been covered by con-
temporary writers. 3. Bowyer Bell, in his own assessment of the literature,
thinks that on the whole it has been poorly served over the years, with much
that is indescribably awful. 	 That there exists second and third rate
material is undeniable. However, the truth is probably that Ireland has
been well served by writers and analysts. The problem is that so much has
been produced, and continues to issue forth from all directions, that good
work does not immediately advertise itself. 	 The profusion of information,
therefore, makes it difficult to sort out the worthy from the bland, the
partisan, the repetitive and the superficial. Consequentially, so much of
what can be considered good often comes down to a matter of personal inter-
est and taste. This section has attempted to at least highlight some of
the relevant works in the area but, in so doing, also to identify a gap in
the literature in relation to the lack of any systematic strategic analysis
of the Irish republican movement. J. Bowyer Bell, himself has drawn atten-
tion to the general absence of 'solid.., strategical analysis.' 	 Such an
58. J. Bowyer Bell, The Gun in Politics (New York, 1987), p. 264 and p. 319.
59. 3. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1979 (Dublin, 1989),
p. 459.
- 48 -
omission is a surprising feature of a subject which has generated an
abundant and diverse anthology. This thesis attempts to make a contri-
bution to this understudied area.
The originality of this thesis, therefore, lies in its method of
approach which seeks to use strategic theory to chart the way the Irish re-
publican movement has thought about the employment of violence for political
purposes. In a broad conceptual sense, it is hoped that this research will
help contribute to the formulation of a more novel theoretical framework in
which to examine other low intensity conflicts. This dimension has been
very much neglected within the discipline of strategic studies as theoretical
work has tended to focus almost exclusively on nuclear politics and limited
conventional war scenarios. By relating 'classical' concepts of strategic
theory to a single case study of low intensity warfare, the thesis should
provide a new angle within the discipline and maybe encourage further theo-
retical exploration in this field, lore specifically, the research will shed
light onto the Irish republican strategic ethos which should enhance our
understanding of how the movement conceives the utility of the military
instrument.	 Such an appreciation may even help to provide some insight
into why the IRA behaves in the manner it does.
Important though the secondary sources are for consolidating back-
ground knowledge, the bulk of this study is based on primary material. The
numerous publications produced by the Irish republican movement provides the
main source of primary information for this research. This material is
supplemented by a review of the Irish, British and international press.
This thesis is not based on interviews. During a research trip to Northern
Ireland in the summer of 1989 many of those involved in the political and
security affairs of the province were interviewed as a matter of routine.





be of sufficient direct relevance to warrant inclusion.
	 Because the vast
majority of primary data was gathered during the summer research trip the
analysis does not extend much beyond autumn 1989. Therefore, this thesis
stands as a record of the republican movement's strategic thinking up to, at
most, the early months of 1990.
J. Bowyer Bell has written lucidly on the problems facing students of
Irish republican history in gaining accurate information on the subject.°
The IRA is an army on the run. On the military side there is no such thing
as any collection of records and documents. 	 The little that has been
committed to paper has often been either last, seized or destroyed.
	 The
republican press is useful though offers only a partial insight.
	 Little of
substance is mentioned on the IRA and, as Bowyar Bell says, 'divisions over
policy and personality are argued out of print if at all possible.'' As a
consequence, it is impossible for anyone not privy to the movement's intern-
al machinations to write as if they were looking over the shoulders of the
IRA's Army Council.
In spite of these complications, headway can be made. 	 John Garnett
has commented that it is impossible to know all the facts as they relate to
any particular question, such is the preserve only of an omniscient god. In
any case, he says, students do not really deal In facts as such, so much as
available evidence. So while this analysis will always try where poss-
ible to get behind the military rhetoric, the Intention is also to take the
Irish republican movement at its word and to assess its pronouncements, with
reference to strategic theory, to see how they stand up under sustained
scrutiny.
There is no doubt, however, that we are still left with a very
incomplete picture. This is why emphasis has been placed on viewing the
60. Boywer Bell, The Secret Army, p. 454.
61. Ibid., pp. 447-463.
62. Garnett, Co.wmonsense and the Theory of International Politics, p. 105.
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republican movement's utilisation of the military instrument through an
evolutionary perspective. On this background, one can attempt to trace
lines of continuity and build up an impression of the process of republican
strategic formulation. 	 Nevertheless, It is difficult to appreciate the full
impact of all the soda-historical factors which may consciously or uncons-
ciously influence the IRA's behaviour. 	 It is rather like the puppet and the
puppeteer.	 We know there must be other guiding hands which govern the
puppet's movements. Yet all we can see Is the puppet. Therefore,
metaphorically speaking, we can only attempt to analyse what the puppet
itself thinks it is doing.
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CHAFFER 1
TKEXES II IRISH REPUBLICAI JILITAPT THOUGHT - THE EVOLUT 101 OP A STRATEGIC
TRADIT 101
Although strategic theory is premised on the assumption of the use of mili-
tary power as a rational instrument of policy, it would be quite erroneous to
judge any political group by some absolute formula of rationality. Jo group
could be expected to conform to such a formula as ideological and cultural
biases would inevitably dislodge political activity from any narrow and
fixed concept of rationality.
Strategy does not exist in the domain of pure reason, clear insight and
certitude of calculation. It was Clausewitz who emphasised that in military
matters passions and chance rule just as much as careful, pre-meditated
action. Strategic theory must, therefore, always strive to take account of
the human factor because: 'The art of war deals with living and with moral
forces.	 Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must
always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as the
smallest." It is consideration of the more intangible factors that cond-
ition the application of force which makes strategy a vibrant and worthwhile
subject to study rather than an obscure exercise in hypotheticals. Indeed,
trying to ascertain how a group's image of reality affects the kinds of
decisions it takes is one of the key elements in strategic analysis. In
this way, strategic theory should not be seen as incompatible with ideology.
In fact they are complementary. An ideology represents that core of motiv-
ational beliefs which seeks to move a group towards certain ends while
strategy constitutes the exploitation of available means to reach those ends.
If there were no ideologies then presumably there would be no requirement
for political change, and consequently, no need for the formulation of any
strategies. What is of interest to strategists, and will be a major concern
1. Clausewitz, On War, p. 86.
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of this study, is the extent to which ideological symbolism may interfere
unduly with the decision making process, but as mentioned in the intro-
duction, this does not lead to the automatic presumption of irrationality.
To reiterate, strategy is not something to be pursued along the path of
narrow theory against which all political behaviour of combatants is to be
tested.	 Again, as Clausewitz noted, there is no such thing as a strict
theory of warfare.	 All we have in the real world are laws of probab-
ilIty' 2 - a set of strategic norms.
	 In this sense, as Garnett says, strat-
egic analysis develops along two levels.
	 On one level strategists look at
strategic norms to demonstrate the logic of certain actions based on the
sober, conscious calculation of self-interest.
	 On the other level, strat-
egists must examine strategic decision makers in all their complexity,
taking into account those factors which may impose themselves on the actor
and influence his conduct.3
An appreciation of the ideological parameters which underpin the devel-
opment of a political actor's decision making is especially important with
regard to a situation where a strategy has evolved organically, unlike, say,
theories of deterrence or blitzkrieg, which are largely moulded and regulated
by stark technological limitations.
	 Irish republican strategy, as in any
guerrilla war scenario, is a product of its native land and people. It is,
therefore, unique in its location, scope and history, and it evolves in accord
with these unique characteristics.
Of course, the true origins of republican strategic thinking stretch
back to the outer reaches of Irish history, and arguably even to mythic pre-
history. It is impossible to do justice to even a fraction of the repub-
lican movement's rich historical inheritance in the space available here.
So, the intention of this chapter is to analyse schematically the evolution
2. IbId., p. 80.
3. Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions', in Baylis, et al, p. 19.
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of a number of ideological themes within the republican tradition which have
a bearing upon the employment of the military instrument. This chapter
will hope to indicate how these ideological precepts have been sustained
since the late eighteenth century and how they continue to exert themselves
on contemporary republican thinking.
	 Needless to say 1
 the themes to be
examined do not represent all of the characteristics of the republican trad-
ition.	 Also, to an extent, the themes are inter-related, so separating them
out under individual headings is a somewhat artificial process. Neverthe-
less, by this method one may be able to distil a distinct pattern of repub-
lican strategic formulation. The themes to be examined will be, in order,
the republican movement's characterisation of Ireland's relationship with
Britain; elitism and the concept of generational revolt in the republican
tradition; republican perceptions of the functionality of violence; doctrinal
absolutism in republican ideology; and finally, the republican analysis of
the nature of loyalism.
As the historical outline in the introduction indicated, the modern
republican movement draws its inspiration from a tradition of conspiracy
which centres on a number of rebellions, most notably the revolts of the
United Irishmen in 1798, the Young Irelanders in 1848, the Fenians in 1867
and, probably most importantly, the Easter Rising of 1916. Although the
movement claims this heritage of revolt to represent a direct line of suc-
cession with the modern era, it would be wrong to speak in terms of a
clearly defined republican strategic legacy. For example, it is doubtful
whether those like the United Irishmen or the Young Irelanders ever con-
sidered themselves republicans in any meaningful sense of the term as we
might understand it today.	 As is so often the case, interpretations of
history are used to support political positions in the present. 4
 Indeed,
this is the process in which we are interested for the purposes of this
4. See P. Gibbon, 'Orange and Green Myths', Fortnight Aug. 1972.
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chapter. We are not concerned here with the exact nature of the events as
they unfolded but with perceptions of the past and the effects they have on
the republican movement's strategic analysis.
The Relationship with Britain - The Colonial Analysis
'British soldiers and British administrators have never brought anything but
death, suffering, starvation and untold misery to the people in this country.
They will never bring anything else until they get out'.' These sentiments
expressed in one small PSF publication in the 1970e encapsulate the emot-
ional core of republicanism. Wolfe Tone, one of the figures in the rebel-
lion of the United Irishmen in 1798 and hailed in the modern era as the
founding father of the republican tradition, declared: 'From my earliest
youth I have regarded the connection between Ireland and England as the
curse of the Irish nation."
	 Consequently, from this assumption, Tone is
said to have concluded that England was the 'party solely responsible for
all the ills afflicting Ireland'. 7
 It is the root rejection of British, or
more particularly English, influence in Ireland which remains the most
distinguishing feature of republican thinking. Why should this be so? To
comprehend republican practice of the military instrument it is necessary to
understand the reason for this perception as the answer provides the
intellectual basis upon which the movement has sought to define relevant
strategies.
The republican view of the relationship between Ireland and Britain was
forcefully stated by Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) in 1988 during a series of
meetings held with the main constitutional nationalist party in Northern
Ireland, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). 'British interfer-
ence in Ireland', PSF claimed, 'has and continues to be malign because its
5. Hire Iua (PSF news sheet, n.p.), Jan. 1977.
C. Quoted in G. Adams, A Pathway to Peace (Cork, 1988), p. 48.
7. S.O.D., 'Wolfe Tone and Today', The United Irishman (UI) June 1949.
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presence has and continues to be based on its own self-interests.' The
history of British involvement in Irish affairs is seen in terms of Britain's
attempts to use its power systematically to drain Ireland of its human and
material resources through under-development, restricted markets, famine and
emigration, and the imposition of alien institutions. The present situation
in Northern Ireland is deemed to play a key role in Britain's continuing
imperial design. Republicans see the province's existence as an artific-
ially manufactured political arrangement to preserve British domination of
the whole island. One republican writer has compared it to a robber, who,
having broken into someone's home and 'while leering at the householder, he
tells you, look get on with your own business, I am occupying only one
room.'	 In this way, republicans allege that the British presence distracts
and divides the people and disfigures all aspects of political and social
life in Ireland. It prevents the emergence of a mature class-based polity,
retards economic progress and distorts social and cultural values, thereby
leaving the British in the North, and their neo-colonial business allies in
the South, to carry on making their mint out of the exploitation of the Irish
people.'°
The notion of colonial subjugation is one of the strongest themes in
Irish nationalism. 	 The contention that Ireland remains at the mercy of an
exploitative foreign power, with all the attendant suffering which it causes,
forms the central hypothesis of republican political analysis. 	 In Tone's
opinion, the 'bane of Irish prosperity is the influence of England.' 'I
believe', Tone went on, 'that influence will be ever extended while the con-
nection between the countries continues." 1 It was this impression of the
8. G. Adams, Towards a Strategy for Peace, Letter to J. flume (PSF Document
No. 1, PSP-SDLP Talks), 14 Xarch 1988, p. 1.
9. J. Hope 'Vhy England Occupies Ireland', An Phoblacht CAP), 5 April 1978.
10. Adams, A Pathway to Peace, p. 10 and pp. 32-33,
11. Quoted in J. Froude, The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century,
Vol. 111 (London, 1895), p. 18.
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fixed nature of British interests in Ireland that convinced the United Irish-
men that they could never be masters of their own destiny. The movement's
1797 constitution proclaimed: 'We have no National Government; we are ruled
by Englishmen and the Servants of Englishmen, whose Object is the Interest
of another country, whose Instrument is corruption and whose Strength is the
Weakness of Ireland'.'
The republican diagnosis of Ireland's predicament was straightforward.
Echoing the words of Tone, an article in the republican newspaper, An
Phoblacht, proclaimed that 'Ireland would never be free, prosperous or happy
until she was independent and that independence was unattainable while the
connection with England lasted.sla The consequent belief that the British
have no moral right to govern, or have any influence in Ireland provides the
basis of republican strategic thought as it helps to define both the poli-
tical object to be gained and the military goal with which to achieve it.
The political object as described by Tone was 'to break the connection with
England, the never failing source of all our political evils and to assert
the independence of my The demand for independence only became
entrenched in republican philosophy after the emergence in the mid-nine-
teenth century of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, also known as the
Fenians. The IRB was established by a small group of nationalists to co-
ordinate conspiritorial efforts in Ireland. Unlike the United Irishmen and
the Young Irelanders before them, who had initially tried to work within the
constitutional process but had felt pushed into rebellion as an act of
desperation, the IRB from the outset repudiated British rule and dedicated
itself to conspire against Britain as a first resort.' • Since the time of
12. The Constitution of the United Irishmen (1797) in C. Carlton (ad.),
Bigotry and Blocxi: Dccuments on the Ulster Troubles (Chicago, 1977),
p. 46.
13. Quoted in J. Brennan, 'The Philosophy of Tone', AP, 18 June 1932.
14. Quoted in ltacAonghusa and O'Reagain, The Best of Wolfe Tone, p. 46.
15. Carty, Ireland from the Great Famine to the Treaty, 1851-1921, p. 30.
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the Fenians the aim of complete British disengagement from Ireland has
remained the foremost goal of the republican movement. In the view of the
present president of PSF, Gerry Adams, 'British withdrawal is a necessary
pre-condition if we are to secure the basis upon which peace can be built in
Ireland."
The military objective by which Irish republican violence would seek to
expel the British is an altogether more problematic affair. The radical
thinker of the nineteenth century and associate of the Young Ireland move-
ment, James Fintan Lalor, summed up the military position at the time, thus
In the case of Ireland now there is but one fact to deal with, and one
question to be considered. The fact is this - that there are at present
in occupation of our country some 40,000 armed men in the livery and
service of Bngland; and the question is - how best and soonest to kill
and capture those 40,000 men."
Part of the answer as to how and where to apply violence in republican
strategy was supplied by the conciseness of the movement's analysis in
clearly identifying the enemy. 'British imperialism' is cast as the general
shape of the threat to Ireland' and the British government, as the main
regulator of imperial policy, as the central authority to be coerced.
Daithi O'Gonaill, a founder member of the Provisional IRA, made this point
explicit in 1974 when he declared that 'the British Government... hold(s) the
key to peace and war." The clear belief of such a statement was that
attacks on the symbols and structures of British authority would be able to
alter governmental attitudes towards Ireland.
By the late nineteenth century a pattern of republican-nationalist
military activity was beginning to emerge in a form which in certain ways
would be recognisable today. For instance, one of the first major acts of
political assassination was carried out in Way 1882 by a group calling
16. G. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom (Dingle, Co. Kerry, 1986), p. 165.
17. Quoted in P. Pearse, Ghosts (1912), Part VII, reprinted in AP, 1 Oct.
1926.
18. See Republican News (RN), 16 Feb. 1973.
19. 'Daithi O'Conaill Television Interview', RI, 30 Nov. 1974.
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itself the Invincibles when they murdered the Secretary of State for Ireland,
Lord Frederick Cavendish and his Under-Secretary, T.H. Burke, in Phoenix Park
in Dublin.	 The motives for the murders remain obscure and similar acts
were not repeated for many years. The Invinciblee were a shadowy
nationalist grouping, seemingly comprised of ex-Fenians but whose immediate
political origins appeared to reside ilore in the land agitation campaigns of
the time.2° However, some years afterwards one minor figure in the Invinc-
ible conspiracy, P.J .P. Tynan, explained the rationale for the murders as the
'removal' of those who upheld Britain's illegal and alien administration' and
described political assassination as a 'species of guerrilla warfare' to be
employed so that 'these ferocious offices should be kept vacant by the
continual suppression of their holders.'2'
Besides the Phoenix Park murders, the 1880s saw the outbreak of Fenian
dynamiting campaigns in England. The bombings began in January 1881 and
concentrated mainly on targets like military barracks and public offices.
The Byzantine nature of republican politics of the time makes it difficult to
fathom the precise purpose of the bombings as they were undertaken by rival
factions of the American arm of the Fenian movement, the Clan-na-Gael,
though the original intention was apparently to distract Britain from a
general insurrection in Ireland. 	 The bombings continued intermittently
with little effect until 1887. Nevertheless, the depiction of British
colonialism as the main adversary in Ireland's fight for independence had
been pressed to its logical military end. Along with the assassination of
important figures in the British establishment, 'bringing the struggle to the
enemy's backyard',2
 was to become a mainstay in republican military
20. See L. O'Broin, Revolutionary Underground (Dublin, 1976), pp. 27-29.
and T. Corfe, The Phosnix Park Nurdars (London, 1968), pp. 135-136.
21. Source: P. Tynan, The Irish Inv'incibles and Their Times (London, 1894),
p. 430, cited in 1. Corfe, 'Political Assassination in the Irish
Tradition', in O'Day and Alexander, Terrorism in Ireland, p. 122.
22. See N. Bourke, John O'Leary (Tralee, Co. Kerry, 1967), p. 145.
23. RN, 5 Feb. 1977.
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doctrine as it was through these means that the movement could hope to gain
the greatest influence over British policy.
The strength of republican analysis is that it presents a powerful and
easily comprehensible argument.
	 Yet its strength In this respect is also
its main theoretical weakness. The image of complete British culpability
risks promoting tunnel vision as It narrows the scope of republican analysis
by excluding a multiplicity of other factors which might also have some
bearing on the Irish context and affect strategic calculations accordingly.
This may rigidify the analysis to a degree where It Is itself elevated to a
point of dogma, 4
 and so create an unstable intellectual platform on which
to base assessments of the value of military force. In the worst case,
this can lead force to be applied out of blind hatred where violence is seen
not In functional terms but purely as a means of striking a righteous blow
against an enemy responsible for centuries of oppression. The main potent-
ial problem, as it concerns this study, is that the lack of a wider consid-
eration of influences may make the process of strategic formulation inflex-
ible and unseif-critical, unable to take account of changing circumstances,
thereby guiding and reinforcing other inaccurate or outmoded assumptions
which may flow from a highly restrictive analysis.
The latianalist Vanguard and Apostolic Succession
One obvious corollary of the republican movement's colonial analysis is the
cultivation of an idealised alternative to the despai].ations of British rule.
Emphasis on asserting Ireland's cultural achievements has played a major
part in the development of this theme in republican ideology. The Young
Irelandere were significant In this respect as they believed that cultural
rejuvenation was a pre-requisite to substantiate any claim for independence.
24. See D. O'teIl, Three Perennial Thames of Anti-Colonialism: The Irish Case
(Denver, 1976), p. 112.
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Through the promotion of Irish culture and history the movement sought to
build a distinctive and integrated national identity,' In the pages of the
Young Ireland newspaper, The lation, under its editor and intellectual mentor
of the movement, Thomas Davis, Ireland's claim to autonomy was advanced
through its portrayals of a vigorous, self-reliant and disciplined cultural
inheritance capable of resisting the corrupting values and oppression of
foreign intervention. 'And now, Englishmen, listen to us!', Davis announced,
'We tell you, and all whom it may concern, come what may - bribery or de-
ceit, justice, policy or war - we tell you, in the name of Ireland, Ireland
shall be a Nation!'2
It was in the early years of the twentieth century, against the back-
ground of an upsurge of interest in Gaelic culture, that the concept of Irish
nationality was further enhanced within the republican tradition through the
writings of Patrick Pearse. 	 Pearee's visions of nationhood reached quasi-
religious proportions. He rejected the view that independence was some-
thing to be decided empirically in terms of economic viability, ethnic
homogeneity, the consent of the imperial power and so on. The Irish nation
he believed to be a mystical entity, a unified whole embracing all man and
women in Ireland, something 'holy in itself.' 27
 'Freedom' in Pearse's view,
was conceived as 'a spiritual necessity' which 'transcends all corporeal
necessities' 2S
There is no doubt that the belief in Ireland as a single political unit
which can only attain 'true justice, peace and happiness' 2' with the over-
throw of British rule remains an object of devotion within the modern repub-
lican movement.	 The intensity with which this goal is held has endowed
25. .1. Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London, 1987),
pp. 104-105.
26. Quoted in Pearse, Ghosts, Part VII.
27. P. Pearse, Ghosts, Parts I-Ill, reprinted in AP, 17 Sept. 1926.
28. Ibid..
29. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 62 and see also p. 88.
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republicans with a strong sense of conviction in the correctness of their
motives and intentions.	 The impression is one of a nationalist vanguard
that sees itself as the embodiment of the true spirit of Ireland's destiny.
Intellectual elitism was certainly a feature of the Young Irelanders.
They saw their role as that of tutors to the masses in order, in Davis'
words, to 'spiritualise and nationalise them with higher and nobler aims,'°
Tom Garvin suggests that after the Irish civil war in 1923 this strand of
moral elitism bred a particularly puritanical republican persona which saw
the Irish people as a largely impassive mass who had been deflected from
following the true path to freedom by British and Free State propaganda.°'
Such attitudes are detectable within republican rhetoric. For example, in
1926 the Sinn Fein leader, Eamon de Valera, expressed the hope that after
the damage caused to republican unity by the civil war the movement 'would
receive back all those of the rank and file who had been misled in the
recent years.'	 He continued: 'Republicans must be prepared to recognise
that error is a human failing and make the necessary allowances.' In a
similar vein, one republican advocate writing in the early 1970s reminded
his readers that, as one of the 'minority revolutionary movements',
republicans were 'fighting against conservative odds to keep the real needs
and most urgent social and political problems before the people'.33
Implicit in these sorts of statements is a disposition which regards the
bulk of the people as rather guileless, capable of being manipulated and
unable to determine their 'real needs'.	 Deviation from the republican line
results not from differing perspectives and analyses but from 'human
failing'.	 The debasement of those who do not follow the republican course
30. Quoted in B. Norman, A History of Modern Ireland (London, 1971), p. 123.
31. T. Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland, 1858-1928 (Oxford,
1987), pp. 149-157.
32. B. de Valera, 'The Work Before Ireland', Al', 15 Jan. 1926.
33. J. Bennett introduction to S. Cronin and R. Roche, Freedom the Volfe Tone
Vay (Tralee, Co. Kerry, 1973), p. 67.
- 62 -
is enlightened only by the prospect that they will return to the fold having
seen the futility of the alternatives and having finally recognised their own
gullibility. In the recent past, the republican movement has had occasion
to proclaim openly that the IRA 'has a monopoly on true Irish patriotism'.
This type of thinking underlines the fact that the movement's conception of
the political arena is not one where men and women are invited to choose
freely between competing ideas and visions through argument and debate, but
is one characterised by a series of unmovable truths to which people should
owe allegiance.
The effect of republican elitism on the employment of the military
instrument has been to furnish the movement with a firm belief in the power
of exemplary violence to awaken the nationalist consciousness of the Irish
people. Explaining the motives for his involvement in the Fenian conspir-
acy, the IRB leader, James Stephens, wrote that 'if another decade was
allowed to pass without an endeavour of some kind or another to shake off
an unjust yoke, the Irish people would sink into a lethargy from which it
would be impossible for any patriot to arouse them.'
	 The notion that a
republican uprising could lift the people out of their apathy and. goad them
into action remained a pervasive theme in the movement's thought.
	 lore-
over, demonstrative action was seen as a method to crystallise public
disaffection into a mass effort to overturn the status quo. Stephens'
sentiments in this respect found their echo decades later in the twentieth
century when it was suggested that the 'nationalist atmosphere needs a
stimulus which will reinvigorate and free the hitherto muffled, thwarted and
psychologically repressed youth of Ireland to play their part in the rebuild-
ing of a new Ireland.'
34. AP/RI, 18 Peb. 1982.
35. Quoted in Kee, The Green Flag, p. 308.
36. S.O.D., 'Wolfe Tone and Today'.
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Evidence of the influence of the nationalist vanguard on the use of
force is discernable in the republican tradition of attempted rebellions.
All of them, to some degree, were premised on the hope that local risings
would encourage a mass revolt. The rebellion of the United Irishmen of Xay
178, though reliant on French intervention, was equally dependent on a
countrywide uprising. Only in Vexford were a significant number of rebels
prepared to rise up along with two smaller risings in Ulster, but by early
July these had been suppressed. The tiny conspiracy led by Robert Emmet in
1803, had hoped to excite the population through the seizure of Dublin
Castle, the seat of British government in Ireland, but it failed in this
objective and collapsed immediately. Neither did many feel willing or able
to follow the rebellions of the Young Irelanders in 1848 or the Fenians in
1867, both of which were put down in a matter of days.
That these risings failed to incite popular revolt emphasised the fact
that they were the work of a conspiritorial elite, not that military defeat
acted as any kind of deterrent for a determined minority. As the Penian
John O'Leary argued, it was 'ridiculous' to believe 'that if any people fail to
reach their goal, they prove thereby that they were never on the right
path.'37	Out of the failure of republican insurrection grew the image of
what Pearse called the 'apostolic succession'. The notion held that
uprisings could act as nationalistic statements to keep the republican ideal
alive so that it 'passes down from generation to generation from the nat-
ion's fathers'.° 	 None of the rebellions mentioned were ever intended
merely to be futile dramatic gestures.
	 Their organisers hoped on each
occasion that they could mount a serious challenge to British rule.
	 How-
ever, as John Devoy commented after the debacle of the 1867 rising, little
37. J. O'Leary, Recollections of Fentans and Fenianism, Vol.11 (Shannon, 1968),
pp. 242-243.
38. Pearse, Ghosts, Parts I-Ill.
39. Ibid..
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purposeful rationale could be claimed for the lack of success other than to
pass 'on the "burning brand" to the generations that followed.'40
 The con-
cept of the apostolic succession still plays a central role in sustaining the
idea of a direct linear connection between the republicans of the present
and the history of Irish resistance extending back, not just to Tone and the
United Irishmen, but beyond to all the other rebellions ever since the
Norman invasions of Ireland in the twelfth century.' 1
 The continuity of
revolt is important in republican heritage as a source of inspiration. For
many, the significant fact has not been that the rebellions did not succeed,
but, in the words of Pearse, that the 'chain of the separatist tradition has
never once snapped during the centuries.'4
Alongside the idea of the resuscitation of republicanism through exem-
plary military action exists a potent self-sacrificial motif. Those who are
seen to have given their lives for Irish freedom are held up in the present,
not just for admiration as past heroes, but to inspire emulation. Shortly
after the rebel forces in Ireland had been defeated in 1798, Wolfe Tone
proclaimed: 'From the blood of everyone of the martyrs of the liberty of
Ireland will spring, I hope, thousands to revenge their fall'. The essence
of this entreaty for Tone's future disciples has been to harness the emot-
ional power of martyrdom in order to draw people into the republican fold
and create a forceful rejuvenating dynamic which can carry the movement
forward to its objectives. For example, speaking of the influence of the
executions of three Penians in 1867 for their part in the rescue of two IRB
men in Nanchester in which a policeman was killed, the republican socialist,
James Cannolly, declared, 'the echo of those blows has for a generation been
40. J. Devoy, Recollections of an Irish Rebel (Shannon, 1969), p. 186.
41. See R. O'Bradaigh, 'What is Irish Republicanism?', in Irish Independent,
9 Dec. 1970.
42. P. Pearse, Ghosts, Parts IV-V, reprinted in AP 24 Sept. 1926.
43. Quoted in T. Dunne, Wolfe Tone: An Analysis of his Political Philosophy
(Cork, 1982), p. 80.
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as a baptismal dedication to the soul and life of thousands of Irish men and
women, consecrating them to the services of Irish freedom'44
 Connolly's
words illustrate the strong transcendental element contained In the appeal
to martyrdom. Pear-se invoked the memory of Emmet who was hanged after the
1803 rising, describing his death as a 'sacrifice Christ-like In its per-
fection' and affirmed: 'Be assured that such a death always means redemp-
tion... His attempt was not a failure, but a triumph for that deathless thing
called Irish Jationality,' The call is for individuals to submit them-
selves to a higher purpose. Sacrifice perpetuates the spirit of rebellion
and achieves a form of national catharsis. Death is not considered to be
an end but a continuation by laying the foundations for others to follow.
The belief in redemption through violence and sacrifice reached its height In
the few years preceding the 1916 uprising. Patrick Pear-se and his co-
conspiritors feared the slow extinction of Irish national identity if nothing
was done to challenge British domination. Uninhibited by the experience of
past rebellions, they wanted to launch a strike for Ireland, regardless of
the immediate military outcome, in order to liberate a new generation to
fight for Ireland's independence. As Thomas Clarke, a veteran IRB man and
oldest of the 1916 rebels explained: 'We want a kind of spiritual dynamite to
blow sky-high the chains of England on our minds and hearts.4
The self-sacrificial image is a compelling symbol of republican Idea-
logy and something from which the movement continues to draw much of its
inner strength. The ardent commitment to the republican ideal expressed
through the actions of a nationalist vanguard is perhaps the main reason for
the movement's longevity.
	 It also goes a long way to explain the move-
ment's tenacity even when confronted by vastly superior forces and, as often
44. Quoted in J. Connolly Heron (ed.), The Words of James Connofly (Cork,
1986), p. 79.
45. Quoted in Elliott, Partners in Revolution, p. 371.
45. Quoted in X. O'Dubhghaill, Insurrection Fires at Eastertide (Cork, 1966),
p. 133.
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as not, public hostility or incomprehension. These emotional undercurrents
remain pertinent to the contemporary era in reinforcing the movement's own
sense of legitimacy, as one grassroots PSF publication reiterated: 'It must
be made clear to all that it is the Republican movement which has done the
struggling, which has suffered the pain, which has kept the hope and the
vision, which has kept faith with the past and the future'47
Dogged determination is a vital ingredient for success in any strategy
and In the capacity for sheer endurance the republican movement possesses a
highly valuable resource. One danger of this emphasis on commitment and
will power engendered by the sacrificial tradition is that it can encourage
rather aberrant forms of elitist violence which are not apparently related
to the achievement of political objectives. At worst, the rationale for
bloodshed can slip Into existentialist justifications where the cathartic
element of martyrdom becomes the end in itself and the continuation of
violence seen as virtuous for its own sake.
	 On certain occasions such
emotional impulses are detectable in republican literature.
	 For instance,
one newsletter from the mid 17Os, harking back to an earlier epoch recall-
ed: 'Pearse wrote... "To fight is to win, not to fight is to lose."
	 Sixty
years later, his words are just as relevant now as they were then.
	 No
matter how long it takes, as long as we are fighting we are winning'.
For the most part, though, the republican movement has stressed that
the mystical appeal of self-sacrifice is a means to an end. Sacrifices in
the present may not immediately achieve the republican dream but they are
aimed at building momentum and gaining support so that one day the movement
will be sufficiently strong to realise its ends, as the following passage
reveals:
The road before us lies clear and unmistakable... The Irish Republic for
which all the generations have died... lies at the end of that road. It
47. Hire Og (PSF neweheet, Vest Belfast), Vol. 2., No. 4, n.d. (C. 1975).
48. The Volunteer (PSF, Lurgan), 9 April 1977.
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is a hard road to travel, because for many it may yet mean persecution,
sacrifice, death, but it is the only road to freedom, Let us achieve
unity of purpose to travel that road together in company with our com-
rades of a new generation who will complete the task of liberating this
country from her dark night of bondage.4
It is not the intention of this study to dwell on the metaphysical
aspects of republican thinking.
	 The theme of self-sacrifice can be noted
here as an important factor which sustains the movement's purpose and
cohesion. The significant feature from a strategic point of view is that
the concepts of the nationalist vanguard and the apostolic, or generational,
succession can condition the use of violence independently of any large-
scale popular backing. But, as Richard Kearney argues, in the Irish context
this does serve a wider functional role for the republican movement. It is
at times when republicans can portray themselves as sacrificial victims in
the face of overwhelming odds that military failure can assume a certain
mystique, thereby awakening the latent sympathies of the Irish people and
from which the movement can hope to mobilise support and so increase its
power.°
The Primary leans of Violence
Republican literature on the subject of physical force often exhibits a
highly power orientated view of a world of competing political interests
which rarely give way to each other except under the threat, or as a result
of, military coercion. Conversely, scepticism towards more peaceful methods
of persuasion is also clearly visible. Writing in the mid-nineteenth
century Father John Kenyon, a supporter of the Young Ireland movement,
asked: 'What is there in political rights more than any other rights that
they should all be attainable by moral force alone?'
	 He concluded: 'loral
force may obtain some rights.., because some men are honest and intelligent,
49. 8. O'Kally, 'The United Irishmen were Republicans', UI, July/Aug. 1948.
50. See R. Kearney, 'The IRA's Strategy of Failure', in I. Hederman and
R. Kearney (eds.), The Crane Bg (Dublin, 1982), pp. 700-702.
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but it cannot obtain all rights, personal or political, because it is the
fatal destiny of the earth, that many men will always be ignorant and
vtcious.'	 No doubt, most strategists would identify in this type of
remark a strong 'realist' position. Indeed, the acceptance of the inevit-
ability of violent clashes of interest to resolve political struggles has
been a consistent feature of republican belief, being reflected in declar-
ations such as that made at the 1863 Fenian National Convention in Chicago,
which stated that, 'no enslaved people (had] ever regained independence'
except by methods deemed 'in the enslaver's sense rebellious and illegal.'
Given this background, it is not surprising that, in the words of one
republican analysis, the 'use of physical force' is regarded as 'the only
instrument which would (or ever will) get rid of all these Anglicised forces
in Ireland'.'° The staunch belief in the utility of the military instrument
has helped elevate the concept of physical force to the high ground of re-
publicanism. 'Arms are the badges of freedom &4 as Thomas Davis put it.
This firm adherence to the principle of force, has bestowed republican doc-
trine with an almost permanent pre-disposition to engage in armed conspir-
acy, an imperative encapsulated by John Nitchel who continually exhorted his
colleagues in the Young Ireland movement to make military preparations:
'Instead of "Agitate, agitate" I would say to the people "Arms, Armt"'
Contained in this imperative lies the crux of the movement's dedication to
the use of force as the primary means to dislodge entrenched British cob-
nial interests. It is not simply that republicans believe that the British
remain unimpressed by peaceful political gestures but that the entire
51. 'Father John Kenyon: His views on Physical versus Koral Force', UI,
Sept. 1948.
52, Quoted in B. Hull, A History of Ireland and Her People, Vol. II
(London, ii.d.), p. 338.
53. I. de Buitleir, 'The Tradition of Physical Force', (Part 2), AP,
21 April 1934.
54.Quoted in Norman, p. 124.
55. Quoted in O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland Under the Union, 1801-1922,
p. 346.
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constitutional arena is a deliberate British creation to frustrate and
restrict Irish nationalist aspirations:
Over the centuries (Britain] has persuaded many brave and trusting Irish-
men to use peaceful political methods to attain their ends, or in other
words, to play the game by her rules. What chance do you have playing
against an opponent who dictates the rules? How can you beat a stacked
deck? None of them ever did.
In effect, those who pursue the peaceful road in goad faith are seen as
misguided whose efforts are wasted in a fruitless search to overcome the
inspired obduracy of the British political system. However, republican
antipathy towards the political process is fortified by another common sus-
picion that constitutional participation really conceals a lack of commitment
to the goal of independence. According to Terence XacSwiney, a Lard Xayor
of Cork who died on hunger strike in 1920: 'Noral force has been used
persistently to cover up the weakness of every politician who was afraid or
unwilling to fight for the whole rights of his country, and confusion has
been the consequence. '
Therefore, republicans feel that only by acting outside the realms of
established peaceful political conduct can British rule be seriously chal-
lenged. This conclusion is based not merely on a series of intellectual
postulations about the nature of British colonialism but on what republicans
perceive as hard practical experience. They look back to the failure of
Daniel O'Connell's efforts in the years between 1823 and 1843 to repeal the
1801 Act of Union, and later, to the blighted hopes and eventual demise of
the Home Rule movement in the early twentieth century, as manifestations of
the futility of the constitutional path. 	 On the other hand, violence, even
on a small scale, has been seen to yield results and act as an engine for
political change.	 For example, in the wake of the IRB's bid to rescue its
members at Nanchester in October 1887, followed a few weeks later by the
58. 'Dustin', 'The Neology of a Nilitary Campaign', RN 10 April 1976.
57. T. Xacswiney, Principles of Freedom (Chapter 3), reprinted in UI, Feb.
1962.
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killing of a dozen civilians in a bomb explosion in Clerkanwell, England was
gripped by a wave of public anxiety over Fenian activities. The political
reverberations enabled William Gladstone, when he became Prima minister in
1868, to turn his mind to Irish issues.
	 'These phenomena', Gladstone said
referring to the incidents at Nanchester and Clerkenwell, 'brought home to
the popular mind.., the vast import of the Irish controversy.'' The next
few years saw the disestablishment of the Protestant Church of Ireland and
the beginnings of the Home Rule movement. Britain had been seen to concede
to, or at least have policy partially dictated by, the threat of violence.
The point was not lost on the Fenians, causing John Devoy to observe that
Gladstone's remarks had 'proved a stronger argument in favour of physical
force - and even of terrorism - than any Irishman ever made.'°
Republicans can point to the agrarian violence of the Land War in the
early 1880s, which produced a commitment from the government to introduce
fundamental land reform in Ireland, and later to the IRA's campaign in the
Anglo-Irish War, which secured the independence of the Irish Free State, as
further proof to sustain the principle that: 'Spokesmen and negotiators are
only effective when they can say: uWe have guns to back our words."'
Today, the adage that 'armed force is the only language which Britain will
listen to' is uttered almost as a republican mantra. The strategic
reality behind such apparent cliches, as one republican editorial of recent
times grimly admitted, Is that 'in the absence of any credible alternative to
the armed struggle, we accept that bloodletting, however regrettable, will
continue.
When republicans in this day and age pronounce upon the efficacy of
58. See L. O'Broin, Fenian Fever (London, 1971), pp. 210-217.
59. Quoted in Carty, p. 27.
60. Devoy, p. 250.
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violence, few if any of them, have sufficient faith in the movement's mili-
tary abilities that they believe Britain can be physically ejected from
Ireland. 'I cannot imagine the IRA driving the British Army into the sea,
or anything like that' acknowledged the one time president of PSF, Ruairi
O'Bradaigh, in 1971.	 Recognition of the disparity in power has necess-
arily entailed modifications in the nature of both operational conduct and
the military objective sought in war. This has not always been the case.
The rebellions of 1798, 1848 and 1867, for example, all hoped to gather
sufficient men and material from within Ireland, or In the case of 1798 by
seeking direct outside assistance, to defeat the British through force of
arms and literally push them out of Ireland. Despite the record of failure,
the mainstream of the republican movement remained devoted to old style
insurrection throughout the nineteenth century. But by the mid-nineteenth
century there were those ready to accept the implausibility of all out
military confrontation. Lalor was edging his way to what would be a more
realistic military posture for those wishing to challenge superior British
force, when he wrote:
To be successful, your fight must be a defensive one. The force of
England is entrenched and fortified. You must draw it out of position;
break up its mass; break its trained line of march and manoeuvre - its
equal step and serried array... You must.., nullify its tactique and
strategy, as well as its discipline, decompose the science and systems
of war, and resolve them into their first elements. You must make the
hostile army a mob, as your own will be; force it to act on the offen-
sive and oblige it to undertake operations for which it was never
constructed.
Lalor's statement contains the main structural pre-requisitee of a
guerrilla war theory, and. at least indicates the transitional nature of
republican strategic thinking In the era, For though the movement's
strategic doctrine was to remain largely underdeveloped until the Anglo-
64. Belfast Telegraph, interview with R. O'Bradaigh, reprinted in AP, Sept.
1971.
65. Quoted in C. Towushend, Political Violence in Ireland (Oxford, 1983),
p. 32.
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Irish war, by the late nineteenth century a distinctive modus operandi was
beginning to take shape. We have mentioned already in this regard that
from the 1880s political assassination and bombing campaigns were to become
an established feature of republican activity.
	 In tandem with these devel-
opments the outline of a low intensity warfare doctrine also started to
emerge. This was noticeable during the planning of the dynamiting camp-
aigns by the Clan-na-Gael. One of the leading advocates of attacks against
Britain, Patrick Ford, argued that: 'A few active, intrepid and intelligent
men can do so much to annoy and hurt England.
	 The Irish cause requires
Skirmishers. it requires a little band of heroes who will initiate and keep
up, without intermission, a guerrilla warfare'. Originally, a Skirmishing
campaign was envisaged only as a series of diversionary attacks as a pre-
lude to a general insurrection in Ireland, though this never materialised.
The significant point is that some Fenians were prepared to entertain the
thought of military action within an extended time frame, rather than con-
centrating all efforts solely upon building up resources for a single,
violent outburst of rebellion.
The gradual movement towards the acceptance of a more protracted war
scenario would, in time, supplant the means of revolt as the primary milit-
ary objective. As preparations for the dynamiting campaign progressed this
shift became more discernable. James XcDermott, one of the protagonists of
the Skirmishing faction under O'Donovan Rossa, sketched out the purpose of
the campaign: 'We don't mean to meet England on the open battlefield - that
would be folly; but we do intend to carry on a warfare on the principle of
nihilism... What we want to do is to free Ireland from the cruel yoke of
British oppression.'	 Perhaps the misleading use of the term 'nihilism'
66. Quoted in C. Townehend, Political Violence in Ireland (Oxford, 1983),
p. 32
67. Source: Weekly Union, 10 July 1880, cited in N. Davitt, The Fall of
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illustrated that the process of change was essentially one of groping errat-
ically towards new concepts of military thinking. Nonetheless1 XcDermott
caught the spirit of the changes taking place, and though the dynamiting
campaigns were largely ineffective in terms of producing any tangible poli-
tical results, they did mark out the future course of republican strategy.
Henceforward, there was a greater willingness to consider military acts on
the basis of their political impact. No longer would warfare be conceived
entirely in its conventional sense where there could be little doubt that the
stronger side, the British, would always win.
Xodern republican strategic thought focuses on the proposition that
small-scale destructive acts can be used, not to reach any conclusive dec-
ision through force of arms, but to extend the duration of the conflict in
order to wear down the morale of the opponent. Exponents of this military
philosophy, like Robert Taber, are regularly cited to support IRA actions.
According to one republican periodical the 'revolutionary principle' revolves
around Taber's thesis that "the object of the guerrilla is not to win bat-
tles, but to avoid defeat, not to end the war but to prolong it, until poli-
tical victory, more important than any battlefield victory, has been won."'
It is within this sort of strategic format that the combination of the
republican movement's trenchant belief in the utility of violence and the
total dedication to the purity of the national object, can form a potentially
valuable weapon. It is the fusion of these two elements which gives the
movement the ability to maintain a continuous level of operational activity
over a considerable length of time, thereby denying the British the complete
victory it is believed they seek.	 Through these means, the republican
movement can aim to confront the British with the prospect of an intermin-
able conflict involving a costly and open ended commitment,
	 In so doing,
the movement can hope to outlast Britain's will to hold on.
68. Quoted in The Volunteer (PSF, Derry), Aug. 1974.
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A writer in the republican press in the early 1970s probably best
described the basic premise of the movement's attitude towards the use of
force by claiming that 'almost all civilisatlons on Earth owe their continued
existence during conflicts, to the success of violence.
	 I don't think the
fact that the use of valence can bring success is at issue.' It is this
kind of prominence accorded to the subject of violence in politics which
brings with it a series of potential hazards for republican strategy. The
adoption of a rather unquestioning approach towards the functionality of
violence risks concentrating all attention on violent means to the exclusion
of other methods which might also enhance the movement's effectiveness.
This excluslvism was encapsulated by Lalor's appeal to Irishmen to defend
their rights: 'Let men differ as they may about other principles, there Is
one principle that admits no dispute... the first priniciple of BLOW FOR
BLOW; blow for blow in self-defence - no matter for who or wherefore, no
matter for risk or result.'7°
An even more serious potential problem, and an accusation which the
movement has had to periodically fend off, is that when unstinting faith in
the value of violence blends with the more mystical elements of republican
ideology, violence can cease to be regarded as an instrument of policy, and
instead, be treated as an object of reverence in its own right. Predictably
perhaps, it has been Patrick Pearse who is often viewed as the main pro-
ponent of a cult of violence.71 In one of Pearse's most notable statements
he argued:
We must accustom ourselves to the thought of arms, to the sight of arms,
to the use of arms. We may make mistakes in the beginning and shoot
the wrong people: but bloodshed is a cleansing thing, and the nation
89. Beechmount Correspondent, 'The Question of Physical Force', AP,
19 Jan. 1973.
70. 3. Fintan Lalor, Irish Felon, No. 4, reprinted in L. Fogarty (ed.), James
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71. For a critical view of Pearse in this regard see iC Carty, In Bldy
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which regards it as the final horror has lost its manhood. There are
many things more horrible than bloodshed and slavery is one of them.72
Easy as it is to imagine Pearse as a lurid militarist, it should be
said that trust in the spiritually enobling virtues of violence was a
pervasive theme in the Edwardian era prior to World War One7
	
Pearse
should be seen in this context.	 Furthermore, the republican movement has
shown itself to be aware of this danger and prepared to deny any emotional
attachment to violence. For instance, Terence KcSwiney stressed that in
the cause of freedom 'war must be faced and blood must be shed, not glee-
fully, but as a terrible necessity' and that 'the mind must guide and govern
our passion.'74	Sensitivity to this issue is also reflected in the recent
age of republican violence. All the same, as the following passage indic-
ates, within republican rhetoric there is still a hint of what one may call a
'Pearseite' sub-text which sees fighting as more laudable than mere pass-
ivity:
The IRA know that physical force is not the sole means of revolutionary
social change. Guns do not have political principles. The Republican
movement is agonisingly aware that armed struggle without a just goal,
and based on a reasonable chance of achieving either defence of a belea-
gured community or the liberation of our country, is monstrously without
merit. Possession of arms is no certain test of patriotism 1 but... the
IRA believe that the risks of a carefully planned and principled armed
struggle are nothing to the shame of slavery.7
The basic difficulty from a strategic theorist's standpoint, however,
concerns the inherent limitations of armed force when viewed within a cam-
plete conflict scenario. If one recognises the unique coercive qualities of
violence in its proper strategic sense as a rational policy instrument, then
presumably one's adversary is also likely to see the functional benefits of
violence. This poses a problem if the adversary happens to be more power-
ful than oneself. The danger exists of a discrepancy appearing between the
72. Quoted in R. Dudley Edwards, Patrick Pearse (London, 1977), p. 179.
73. See B. Bond, Var and Society in Europe, 187O-19?O (London, 1984),
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scale of political demands and the capability to achieve thea through the
coercion of the enemy.
	 It is axiomatic that the attainment of one's poli-
tical goals through war will be secured via the defeat of the enemy.
	 The
most assured way to obtain victory will be through the destruction of the
enemy's forces.
	 To ensure success in war pre-supposes that one possesses
the necessary strength to defeat the enemy 7
	Rarely are wars so clear
cut. That is why many, if not most, wars are uncertain undertakings. But
for a demonstrably weaker side the issue is even more problematic, for no
matter how skilful its military blows may be, they will be no guarantee of
political victory.
	 Here lies one of the key questions so far as the pro-
gression of this study is concerned.
	 How has the republican movement
sought to manipulate the military instrument to compensate for its limited
capacity for physical denial vi e-a-vis British power? Resolving this
question is one of the major arts in creating a coherent low intensity war
strategy as it requires a subtle understanding of the delicacies involved in
applying military means to challenge the superior power of an opponent.
Absolutism and Abstentionism
One effect of the intensity of the republican movement's commitment to its
vision of an Ireland free from British rule has been the desire to see this
goal transformed into reality in its complete form. Pearse argued: 'that no
Mhalfway houseN
 is possible as a permanent solution of the issue between
Ireland and England. There were and are only two alternatives: an enslaved
Ireland and a free Ireland."
	 The stark choice available suggested by
Pearse, rejected any thought of compromise between the two positions. It
was all or nothing, It is an attitude which has become a prevalent feature
of the republican tradition. The movement does not see itself in business
76. See Clausewitz, pp. 596-597 and p. 601.
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to gain improvements which merely rehabilitate the status quo. This bear-
ing has been stated clearly by Sean XacStiofain, the first Chief of Staff of
the Provisional IRA, who said that 'the sacrifices and sufferings of revol-
utionary war can never be justified by mere reform.' 7 The implication that
concessions cannot compensate for past sacrifices makes the concept of
absolute obedience to republican objectives a highly symbolic principle.
Any relaxation in the demand for independence is seen as a betrayal of the
republican ideal. In Pearse's words:
The man who, in the name of Ireland, accepts as a "final settlement"
anything less by one fraction of an iota than separation from England...
is guilty of so immense an infidelity, so immense a crime against the
Irish nation, that one can only say of him that it were better for that
man (as it were certainly better for his country) that he had not been
born.7
The concept of absolutism compounds republican suspicions about the
constitutional process, which, as noted earlier, is also partly a function of
the movement's adherence to the use of violence. Jot only has political
participation been regarded as ineffective but also as ideologically corrupt-
ing. This has led to the movement's abstinence from direct involvement in
the political institutions of Ireland. The reasons for political abstention
ware spelled out succinctly in 1976:
At no time will they [republicans] give substance to the shadow of
democracy by participation in partitionist politics. To do so would be
to acknowledge not only the existence of two states in Ireland but also
by contesting elections and taking their seats they would be acknowl-
edging the rights of those two states to legislate for and on behalf of
their respective areas and would spell the end of republicanism as we
know it today.°
The sense of threat felt by the movement of being seen to confer any
degree of legitimacy on British rule in Ireland has been a major republican
concern through many generations. Lalor disapproved of any participation
within a constitutional arrangement which he believed had its boundaries of
78. 5. XacStiofain, Kewoirs of a Revolutionary (Edinburgh, 1975), p. 258.
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action artificially restricted by the British.el	 Neither were the Fenians
especially interested in politics. Indeed, the Fenians in some respects
were born out of disillusionment with parliamentary politics after the
failure in the 1850s of the Tenants Rights League to make any headway on
the land reform issue. One leading Fenian, Charles Kickhaa, argued that the
experience of the period had demonstrated that parliamentary action was 'a
demoralising shaa'.
	 Later in the century, the IRB gave limited backing to
the Home Rule party which was co-operating with the Land League to secure
land reforms. Despite its initial sympathy, the LRB withdrew its support
in August 1876 on the grounds that land rights were really a distraction
from the principal goal of seeking independence.
Fundamentally, republican misgivings over political activity have for a
long time been rooted in the perception that the political process is the
domain of the unprincipled where the purity of the ideology could be entrap-
ped and undermined in the murky world of compromise, careerism and exped-
iency. It is this sort of feeling which has often offended the ascetism of
republican certainties; the belief that it is simply dishonest for the move-
ment to enter into a political system which it has been pledged to destroy
for so many years: As one republican writer remarked:
To put it bluntly: We cannot live the lie of false oaths and declarations,
we cannot swallow the lie of participating in - and thereby perpetuating
- parliamentary assemblies which have their being in Britain's alleged
right to decide what kind of administration Ireland is to have and how
far she will be permitted to conduct her own affairs. We cannot break
our covenant of truth with either the living or the dead.
The uncompromising stance of the republican movement has a distinctive
influence on the process of strategic formulation. It provides the
movement with a clear sense of direction in life, ensuring that it will not
be shaken from the primary function of confronting British rule in Ireland.
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For example, Pearse asserted that no national leader should involve himself
in any issue other than the struggle for independence 'except with the object
of strengthening his forces for the main fight - the fight for nationhood',
The stubborn refusal to be deflected from the central task has done much to
consolidate the republican tradition, which has made the movement resistant
to short term set backs and enabled it to withstand a long term challenge to
British power.
For the most part, however, republican absolutism brings with it pros-
pective adverse effects, largely because it robs the movement of political
flexibility.	 Speaking in the early years of the conflict in Northern
Ireland Daithi O'Conaill declared:
Today the central issue in the war is one of conflict between Ireland's
right to freedom and England's determination to keep us in subjection.
All other issues are subordinate to this basic point. There can be no
compromise on the fundamental issue as to who should rule Ireland - the
parliament or the Irish people.
O'Conaill's opinions heavily paralleled those of Pearse and the rest, but they
were also a strong indication that the republican movement had little or no
conception that ends in war could be modified to take into account the vary-
Ing abilities of political actors to coerce each other. Such a view tends
to refute the idea that in low intensity warfare the weaker side should
wield the military instrument in order to maximise its power and then endea-
vour to reach a political settlement which reflects this optimal position.
In other words, republicans view war as a straight attempt to win all of the
objectives being pursued, regardless of the actual capacity to achieve them
through violent means. This places the republican movement in something of
a rhetorical bind as its deficiency in coercive power relative to that of
Britain occasionally leads it to employ tendentious arguments to sustain the
advocacy of physical force.	 Republican proponents claim that: 'Only
85. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, p. 105.
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physical force has succeeded in winning any reforms or concessions'. 	 But
they are quick to add that 'concessions can never be accepted at the price
of perpetuating greater injustices than those they alleviate.' 7
	This is
really a non-sequitur.	 As those like Pearse and XacStiofain have argued,
there can be no half-way house on the demand for independence. Reforms
are unacceptable to republicans precisely because they promote half-way
house solutions which perpetuate injustices by maintaining the sttus quo.
Republicans cannot, therefore, plausibly contend that reforms and concessions
validate the use of violence if reforms and concessions are actually consid-
ered to be good for nothing because they merely entrench the existing polit-
ical order without bringing the movement any nearer to its objectives. The
element of sophistry evident in some republican rhetoric appears as an
implicit admission that the movement has been strained to construct a viable
strategy which centres around the employment of armed force. This is an
important point, as it suggests that the movement has great difficulty in
countenancing the use of force to move towards its goals through inter-
mediate stages. The movement might, therefore, feel inhibited from taking
advantage of any political opportunities created by a military campaign out
of fear that interim positions will become permanent.
One reason for republican inflexibility stems from the concept of the
nationalist vanguard which excludes any requirement for prior popular
support as an aid to revolt. Historically, the absence of the desire to
cultivate a political constituency has meant that the movement has seen
little need to produce social, political and economic policies which would
encourage a wide following. Por most of the twentieth century, though,
republicans have felt it necessary to enunciate vague socialistic ideals, but
they have also been careful to stress where the priorities of the struggle
lay, as Jack Bennett made clear
87. S. O'Riain, Provost Patriots or Terrorists? (Dublin, 1974), p. 35.
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...it may be considered valid in today's conditions to set some form of
socialism as an ultimate objective - so long as 'socialism' Is not made a
pre-condition for achieving national freedom, and so long as the attain-
ment first of the necessary democratic, national framework is kept to the
forefront as the central and most Important object ive.
Without the articulation of a clear vision of a post-independence
society the movement frequently has to base its appeal on the hazy image of
an indivisible nation which provides powerful inspiration for the committed
few but often lacks broader appeal. This can prove detrimental for any
national liberation group as it by-passes sources of latent power which
might be tapped by a more politically and socially conscious movement.
Some theorists like Lalor and Connolly recognised the potential in trying to
couple political issues to the republican cause. In Connolly's words, 'the
linking together of our national aspirations with the hopes of the men and
women who have raised the standard of revolt against that system of capit-
alism and landlordism... would serve to place us in touch with fresh reser-
voirs of moral and physical strength'. However, the dismay at the Irish
workers' enthusiasm for the British cause in World War One which finally
drove Connolly Into the 1916 uprisIng 90
 ensured that his legacy became
firmly rooted in the vanguard tradition. According to one republican tract
of the early 1970s: 'Apathy forced him to countenance the one shock method
that could not be ignored - armed resistance to alien rule.''
The Intermix of ideological absolutism with military vanguardlsm can
leave organisations like the republican movement politically unsensitised
with the result that they find it difficult to alternate between political
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and military tactics.	 Peace can literally become a pause in between a
period of fighting as all energies will be directed towards preparing for
the next military exploit.
	 This problem has undoubtedly been reflected in
the Irish republican experience.
	 The question of the relationship between
force and politics in republican strategy was to prove a recurring source of
dispute for much of the twentieth century.
	 Before his conversion to the
precepts of insurrection, James Connolly castigated those republicans who
exalted in physical force. He believed that for many, physical force was
the only principle upon which they could agree. This precluded discussion
of all other topics relating to the nature of the ends to be attained.
'Nationalists of our day', Connolly exclaimed, 'are utterly regardless of
principle and only attach importance to methods - an Instance of putting the
cart before the horse, absolutely unique in Its imbecility and unparalled in
the history of the world.' 2
 Within a militarily top heavy political org-
anisation to which Connolly alluded, It Is going to be difficult to identify
any source of authority beyond the military realm capable of influencing the
organisation's conduct.
	 In this respect, the paucity of political thought
can negate the idea that policy should be able to shape the military Inst-
rument for the purpose of achieving specific goals. Yet if one is not
precise about the extent of the political aims to be sought, then how can
one gauge with any accuracy the military objectives necessary to realise
one's political demands? The risk of employing armed force without having
clearly defined policy objectives is that groups, such as the republican
movement, will end up as a permanent military conspiracy where the use of
violence becomes internally legitimised as an end in itself rather than as a
means to achieve anything politically tangible.
92, .1. Connolly, 'Physical Force in Irish Politics', Workers Republic,
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Rhetorical Secularism versus Crypto-Sectarianism
The republican movement maintains an explicit commitment to the establish-
ment of a secular society in Ireland,
	 The aim is 'to limit the control of
the Churches to things spiritual and to treat everyone equal before God.'
Along with this undertaking the movement promotes the idea of a common
national identity to which all groups in Ireland can subscribe, The
rejection of sectarianism was made plain by Volfe Tone who stated that his
means of undermining the connection with England were to 'unite the whole
people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past dissensions and to sub-
stitute the common name of Irishman in place of the denominations of Prot-
estant, Catholic and Diseenter.'	 Tone believed that both Catholics and
Dissenters (Presbyterians) were excluded from power by the perpetuation of
the ruling aristocratic Anglo- Irish ascendancy. 	 He concluded that it was
in Protestant interests to combine forces with Catholics against the common
enemy. 'Thus', as one republican reflected, 'were two groups drawn together
by injustices perpetrated on both of them and this mutual bond was soon to
be reinforced by the most dynamic political ideology in the history of this
island - that of Republicanism.'	 So it was that many of the leading
figures in the United Irishmen and Young Irelanders were Protestants, inclu-
ding Tone himself, as well as Davis and litchel. 	 Protestants were also
prominent in the sphere of constitutional nationalism with people like Isaac
Butt, the founder of the Home Rule party and the outstanding parliamentary
leader, Charles Stewart Parnell. Invariably republicans invoke the trad-
ition of Protestant involvement with the nationalist cause to appeal to Prot-
estants, in Daithi O'Conaill's terms, to 'work with us for the creation of a
new Ireland worthy of the memory of Wolfe Tone.'
	 While republican
93. P. Flynn, 'What is Irish Republicanism?', AP/RI, 11 Oct. 1980.
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ideology sees the Protestant community as integral to the Irish nation, this
conception sets clear boundaries to the Protestants' room for political
manoeuvre.	 These limits were signalled by Pearse who insisted 'that the
nation is more Important than any part of the nation'. 7
 Accordingly, as
Protestants are deemed to be a national minority they can have no independ-
ent existence outside the nation as a collective whole. It is this attitude,
combined with the analysis of Ireland as a problem of colonialism, which has
governed the way republicans have interpreted developments in Irish polit-
ical history since the 1790s. As they see it, after the United Irish rebel-
lion there emerged not two nations but two traditions. Sean O'Riain has
described one tradition as that which has transcended religious differences
and dedicated itself to the cause of independence. The other, he has all-
eged, 'was prepared to subjugate nationality to economic, sectarian and
social expediency,' The main republican contention here, Is that after
the British relinquished formal control over the twenty six counties of the
Irish Free State in 1922, they continued to exert a form of colonial control
over Ireland by carefully nurturing these anti-nationalist elements. Eamon
de Valera expressed republican concerns thus: 'England cannot continue ruling
us, and cheating us alike equally Worth and South, unless she can find here a
section of our own people prepared to play her game for her.'9
Republicans disclaim the view that the collaborationist tendency in
Irish politics has any intrinsic foundation In the Protestant religion,'00
but they do recognise that the 'political alignment of the people in the six
counties approximates to the differences in their religious beliefs."0'
This factor has been of inestimable value to England in pursuing her
policy of TMdivide and conquer,R because of it she has been enabled to give
the struggle for Irish freedom, in so far as it pertains to Ulster, a
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religious complexion. By playing on religious fears and beliefs of
Protestants she has built up a garrison of natives prepared to serve her
purpose and what she has taught them to believe are their own
interests.'02
Normally republicans have been more hesitant than the passage above
implies to specifically name the Protestant community as the sole agents of
loyalism. Rather, they have preferred to see Protestants as part of a wider
'ruling class.., determined to hold onto the privileges they enjoy under Brit-
ish rule privileges that to some extent at least, would be denied to them in
a MfjN Ireland."°3
	As a result, republicans believe that along with the
'majority of the Protestant population', Britain's native allies since the late
eighteenth century have included 'middle-class... Roman Catholic business
people and the Catholic Church hierarchy."°m
Not surprisingly, the depiction of loyalists as mere ciphers in the
British imperial system hardly endears the majority of Protestants to the
republican cause. To many Protestants, Irish republicanism appears a sect-
arian doctrine geared towards the defence, and triumph of, Irish Catholic
nationalism. Conversely, republican suspicion of loyalism can shade off
into crypto-sectarianism, and on occasions, barely disguised anti-Protestant
prejudice. Gerry Adams, for instance, asserts that 'loyalists have a des-
perate identity crisis.., over whether they are Ulster-Scotch, Picts, English
or British.' Rather than participate in a common Irish heritage, he argues,
'they waste their time trying to work out some kind of obscure notion of
Ulster Protestant culture."° Regardless of whether Protestants embrace
Irish culture as a whole either inside or outside the framework of a unitary
state, it is not unreasonable to expect that Northern Protestants, with their
own distinctive traditions, should wish to cultivate a regional identity.
The denigration of this aspiration by the republican movement's foremost
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contemporary theoretician, and his implicit association of Protestants with
what he calls loyalism's 'bigoted and irrational hatred of Catholics"°
registers a sectarian dimension to republican thinking. The movement's
sectarian affiliations have been most discernab].e in Northern Ireland where
the IRA has traditionally been regarded as a Catholic defence force. In
1987 the prominent Catholic churchman, Father Denis Faul, affirmed that for
many Catholics the Provisional IRA provides 'the last insurance card against
the madmen of extreme Proteetantisni'.'°7
A glance beneath the secular rhetoric reveals republican attitudes to-
wards the Protestant community to be just as confused as republicans believe
the loyalists are over their own identity. In a recent pronouncement on
the issue, Adams sought to emphasise 'that "Brits Out" is not a call as is
often mischievously suggested, for the forced banishment of those in the
north who presently consider themselves to be British subjects."° Despite
this apparent statement of good intent, it has been republicans as much as
anyone else who have helped fuel speculation as to whether Northern Protest-
ants would have much of a future in a republican Ireland. The analyst,
Padraig O'Xalley, has pointed out that in the republican mind Protestants
exist in a kind of limbo where regard for the loyalist community can veer
with rapidity from conciliation to animosity. 109
 On occasions, republicans
claim the loyalists to be an intrinsic element of the Irish nation or that
the 'Protestant working class are our brothers and sisters.'1 10 At other
times, loyalists have been variously described as 'Villiamite adventurers.
planters and settlers... their outlook as hopelessly anti-Irish as their
106.Ibid., p. 116
107.The Belfast Telegraph, 24 June 1987, cited in A. Guelke, Northern Ireland:
The International Perspective (Dublin, 1988), p. 32.
108.Adams, A Pathway to Peace, p. 11.
109.See P. O'Xallay, The Uncivil Wars (Belfast, 1983), pp. 287-299.
11O.Adams, A Pathway to Peace, p. 11.
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ancestors,"" or as 'neo-facists, anti-nationalist and antidemocratic."
As late as 1986 loyalists were being stigmatised as 'colonisers who will
always wage terror against the colonised as a form of blackmail against the
imperial power when it threatens to upset their hegemony.' 11 a	 it is the
ambivalence in the republican position which can seem threatening to many
Protestants. Noreover, the blurred republican distinction between Prot-
estants and the colonial ideology of loyalism can make the sectarian threat
appear all too real when IRA actions are directed against local security
forces in Northern Ireland drawn largely from the Protestant population.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the republican movement's position
over the sectarian issue is its relationship to the philosophy of Wolfe Tone.
During the PSF-SDLP talks in 1988, the SDLP team claimed that when Tone
wrote of his intention to '"substitute the name of Irishmen in place of the
denominations of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter" he was stating with
great clarity that his means or method of breaking the link with England
was to unite the people of Ireland first." in other words, Tone was not
advocating a simple 'Brits Out' policy but appealing for conciliation between
the communities in Ireland before moves towards independence could be cont-
emplated. The SDLP pressed PSF by asking whether the 'republican vision is
being advanced and whether the Tone goal "to abolish past dissensions" is
being furthered in any way by an IRA campaign which is directed largely
against indigenous people seen by the Protestant people as the defenders and
protectors of their heritage?"
PSF did not respond to the SDLP line of questioning but, in fact,
previous republican statements do supply an answer. In 1981, during the
111.De Buitleir, 'The Tradition of Physical Force', (part 2).
112.AP/RN, 5 Nov. 1981, cited in O'Xalley, p. 288.
113.AP/RI, 28 Aug. 1986.
114.SDLP Document No. 1 (PSF-SDLP Talks, 1988), 17 Xarch 1988, p. 4.
115.SDLP Document No. 4 (PSF-SDLP Talks, 1988), reprinted in The Irish Times,
19 Sept. 1988.
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speech delivered at the annual Wolfe Tone commemoration ceremony at
Bodenstown, Co. Kildare, Danny Morrison of PSF admitted that Tone's original
aim had been to unify Catholics and Protestants against Britain. Morrison
argued that British instigated sectarianism was stronger than Tone had real-
ised.	 Consequently, the scale of rural Catholic discontent at the time of
1798 was such that it gave way 'to an almost Catholic peasant rebellion in
parts of the South.' 'And how else could it have been', he continued, 'given
the power of the British in Ireland and the sectarianism which they had del-
iberately sown and continued to sow to this day?' There was a clear lesson
for the republican movement to draw:
While the British remain in the North propping up partition, they feed
sectarianism and overwhelmingly determine the behaviour pattern of the
Protestant people. There can never be real unity between the people
of the North while the British remain because they distort the picture.
But with the British out and Ireland one national unit, all will savour
equally the fruits of freedom, justice, prosperity and peace.1
Morrison's analysis, partial though it was, did contain a degree of
logic and was more than simple casuistry or self-justification. It was true
that during the 1798 rebellion the uprising around Vexford drifted into
sectarian conflict with atrocities being committed against local Protes-
tants.' 17 Partly out of fear at the sectarian passions aroused in the
rebellion, but also for a variety of mainly social and economic reasons,
Protestants turned away from nationalism and embraced the union with Great
Britain, leaving the mass of aggrieved Catholics standing for self-deter-
mination." The alternatives facing republicans in the wake of Protestant
estrangement from the nationalist cause were limited. They were either to
try to reach an accommodation between Catholic and Protestant interests
which risked being both divisive and ineffectual, or to attempt to travel
with the majority of disaffected Catholics. There was no real choice in the
116.D. Morrison, Bodenstown Speech, APIRN, 27 June 1981.
117.See T. Ireland, Ireland Past and Present (New York, 1942), p. 222.
ii8.P. Johnson, Ireland: Land of Troubles (London, 1980), p. 76.
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matter.	 By the mid-nineteenth century and the rise of the Fenians, the
republican movement was representative of a constituency overwhelmingly
Catholic in composition. The development of republicanism towards the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with its promotion of a distinctive
Gaelic cultural vision, became a doctrine with which Protestants found it
Increasingly difficult to identify." Although republicans may not have
preferred it this way, the logic of their position was that the practical
mechanics of republican nationalism, since the mid-nineteenth century, were
never fully national.
The Intent ion here Is not to pass judgement on the moral Integrity of
the republican movement's stand over the sectarian question, but to point out
that it does raise a number of Issues within the strategic aiibIt. In the
republican view, because the phenomenon of loyalism is a product of a
British imperial power play, it does not have a great deal of innate power.
According to one PSF discussion paper, 'loyalisli derives an artificial
strength from the British presence."° Correspondingly, loyalism cannot be
expected to have any independent life outside the configuration of a British
presence in Ireland as it will collapse once British support is withdrawn.
The assumption contained in this interpretation is that no power other than
Britain can act to prevent Irish unification, thus eliminating loyalism from
the republicans' strategic calculations. Therefore, from the republican
perspective, as Jack Bennett has claimed, there is nothing to stop Britain
from legislating the loyalists in Northern Ireland, against their will, 'into
a new situation in which they could quickly adapt themselves to the idea of
equal citizenship and claim for themselves an effective democratic voice in
the running of their own country'.'' 	 The implication here is that because
loyalists cannot influence British policy towards Northern Ireland one way
119.See I. Tierney, Ncxlern Ireland Since 1850 (Dublin, 1978), pp. 87-89.
120.PSF, A Scenario for Peace (Dublin), Nay 1987, p. 2.
121,J. Bennett in Cronin and Roche, pp. 20-21.
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or the other, republicans can use the military instrument to disrupt the
British connection without any regard for the political repercussions this
may have inside the loyalist community.
Because republicans assume that loyalism has no status in the eyes of
the British, they believe that with Britain removed from the picture, the
loyalists can be enticed into seeing the virtue of obtaining a real degree of
influence within an all Ireland context. Gerry Adams thinks that loyalists
will continue to fight for their own sectarian interests so long as the
British connection remains. 	 Once Britain is out of the way, the loyalists
would eventually work out where their real future lay. 'Loyalists', Adams
declared, 'can have no significant say under British rule... but they can have
and should have a very big say in the future shape of an independent Irish
constitution and in the shape of an independent Irish society."22
In so far as it is difficult to anticipate most future developments, the
republican analysis exists in the realm of extreme prognostication. There
can be no foolproof guide to future loyalist actions. For that reason what
strategists might ponder is the nature of possible loyalist responses to
changes in the political climate. Conceivably, it might be true, as Bennett
has suggested, that there would be little the loyalists could do if the Brit-
ish government decided to legislate them out of the United Kingdom. 	 But
could they be legislated into a united Ireland? If Adams' proposition is
right, that the loyalists would be able to have a 'big say' in the future
shape of a new post-British Ireland, then what would happen if the loyalists
used their 'big say' to reject the political union of Ireland? Could they
then be coerced? This would raise the question about the extent to which a
British withdrawal would actually change the existing power relationship in
Ireland between the forces of unionism and the forces of nationalism?
Should these types of questions be addressed, they may give republicans the
122.Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 124.
- 91 -
opportunity of contemplating how much of a real barrier the lack of loyalist
consent poses to the unification of Ireland, and whether the effects of
republican military operations on Protestant opinion significantly detract
from the movement's prospects of attaining its objectives?
Themes in Irish Republican Strategic Thinking
The purpose of this chapter has been to map out the parameters of republican
strategic formulation.	 It has sought to do this by exploring the charact-
eristics of, and lines of continuity within, republican thought.
	 As has
been indicated in the text, many of the characteristics alluded to are cen-
tral to both republican ideology and identity.
	 As a consequence, they are
likely to affect the way the movement relates to the military instrument.
It should be said at this point, that the features which have been
analysed in this chapter have not exerted a uniform influence on republican
strategy. Certain themes have been more dominant at different times. For
example, the extent to which the republican movement could adhere in prac-
tice to a non-sectarian stance became a crucial issue from the early to mid-
1970s. The question as to how far the military instrument could be manip-
ulated to achieve the movement's political goals was pertinent to the period
between 1919 and 1923. The relationship between force and politics in
republican strategy was to become an object of fundamental contention in the
late 1960s and early 1980s. And so on. The intention in the forthcoming
chapters is to use these themes to help explain how the movement has
attempted to employ armed force in pursuit of its political objectives at key
periods in its history.
The analysis contained in this chapter has also ventured to set down
some of the potential drawbacks, as well as advantages, in the republican
approach. As the introduction to this study made clear, no political actor
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can be expected to be entirely rational or intellectually coherent. If this
was the case, then political actors would always be able to exploit the
military instrument with absolute efficiency and maximise their interests to
the optimum. In the real world this never happens. Political actors have
to endeavour to carve out a strategy through a mire of complexity, always
with limited resources, deficient information and often with divergent
requirements.	 In the process of trying to fashion a clear-sighted strategy
the actor is likely to confront tensions within his own thinking. One of
the most striking paradoxes in respect of republican thought is the apparent
dichotomy between the movement's hard-headed belief in the instrumentality
of force and the somewhat mystical devotion to the concept of the Irish
nation. One view tends to support a highly power-political approach, while
the other is symptomatic of an intense emotional commitment seemingly
untrammelled by a world of tough realities. These two facets are bound to
cause a measure of friction in strategic planning. Therefore, by mentioning
some of the theoretical difficulties with the republican viewpoint is not to
suggest that the movement will inevitably become tangled in a web of its
own contradictions, but rather to describe the possible lines along which
the application of force may develop in order to provide a guide to work
through aspects of republican strategic thinking to their logical con-
clusions. Through these means, strategists can evaluate how republicans
seek to construct their strategy, utilise the military instrument and
reconcile doctrinal contradictions - in other words, all those elements which




TRAJSITIOJS IJ IRISH REPUBLICAJ STRATEGY - TEE DEVELOPKBJT OF THE AILITARY
IJSTRUJEJT PROJ THE EASTER 215110 TO THE CIVIL VAI
Thus far, the discussion has been confined to the classification of the main
elements that would have a bearing on the development of Irish republican
strategic thought. Attention will now be focused more specifically on the
republican experience in the twentieth century. This chapter first analyses
how the repercussions of the 1916 rising helped shift the emphasis in
republican thinking to enable the IRA to wage a prolonged guerrilla campaign
against the British. The analysis assesses how the movement exploited its
military potential to bring the British to agree to the Anglo- Irish Treaty of
1921. The chapter then investigates how the treaty settlement revealed the
existence of two very different strategic perspectives within the movement
between the pragmatists and the doctrinaires who refused to accept the llmi-
ted sovereignty granted by the Treaty. Finally, the chapter looks at the
deleterious impact doctrinaire thinking had on the anti-Treaty IRA's strategy
in the Irish civil war.
For many republicans the apotheosis of the tradition of rebellion was
reached in the Easter of 1916 when a small group of rebels seized the centre
of Dublin and proclaimed the creation of an Irish republic. This event has
mesmerised the movement ever since. The rising is celebrated annually and
the memory of its leaders intoned regularly to validate republican actions
in the present. In 1986 the movement's Easter declarations insisted that
the modern day members of the IRA 'are the inheritors of 1916 because they
have the same spirit of freedom which motivated the 1916 rebels'.' Ruairi
O'Bradaigh has even identified the influence of the 1916 rising as the
central feature of the modern republican persona: 'a republican today is one
who rejects the partition statelets and gives his allegiance to and seeks to
1. 'The Inheritors of 1916', AP/RI, 3 April 1986.
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restore the 32 county republic of Easter Week.'
In the chronicles of Irish revolt, the rising of 1916 was a significant
military encounter. The rebels held out for five days before surrendering.
The end of the rising left 500 people dead, 2500 injured and a larga area of
the centre of Dublin devastated. Yet the rising, in itself, so far as it
relates to the progression of this analysis, does not constitute an espec-
ially meaningful strategic episode. Indeed, a very narrow interpretation of
strategic theory would hold the rising to be no more than another failed
attempt at insurrection. The relevance of 1916 for our purposes lies not
within the relative merits of the rising as a military operation, but in its
impact on the republican movement in relation to the changing political
climate in Ireland between 1916 and 1918 that would culminate in the out-
break of the Anglo-Irish war, 1919-1921, followed by the Irish civil war,
1922-1923.
The reason why the Easter rebellion occupies such a reverential posit-
ion in the republican mind can be explained not only with reference to the
destiny of the succeeding years, but because the rising crystallised so many
of the movement's emotional drives in one single event. These primary mot-
ivations were encapsulated in the following passage from the proclamation
issued by the rebels at the start of the rising:
In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to nat-
ional freedom and sovereignty: six times during the past three hundred
years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right
and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby pro-
claim the Irish Republic as a sovereign independent state, and we pledge
our lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its free-
dom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.3
Here we have the fulfilment of the republican imperative - a desire to
express a commitment to a concept of Irish freedom and nationality by using
2. R. O'Bradaigh, 'What is Irish Republicanism?', The Irish Independent,
9 Dec. 1970.
3. Prv1amat1on of the Republic of Ireland, 1916, reprinted in A. Xitchell
and P. O.'Snodaigh (eds.), Irish Political Documents, 1916-1949 (Dublin,
1985), p. 17.
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exemplary military action to maintain continuity with a history of nation-
alist rebellion. 	 In particular, the twin influences of the apostolic succ-
ession and the nationalist vanguard are clearly perceptible. The theme of
generational revolt was an idea which weighed heavily with Patrick Pearse.
He feared that his countrymen would commit an act of national betrayal by
allowing an era to pass without some symbolic affirmation of the rejection
of British rule. He scorned the previous generation and its preoccupation
with Home Rule for failing to even attempt any demonstration against the
British: 'the failure of the last generation has been mean and shameful, and
no man has arisen from it to do or say a splendid thing, in virtue of which
it shall be forgiven.'4
Pearse and his colleagues felt it their duty to shake the Irish people
out of their passivity. For this reason the rising was an archetypal
elitist intrigue which was evident in the way the Military Council manip-
ulated the Irish Volunteers into an insurrection behind the back of the
organisation's leader, Boin Macleill. The rebels' faith in the ability of a
devout few to regenerate the republican cause was made plain by James
Connolly at his court martial:
Believing that the British Government has no right in Ireland, never had.
any right in Ireland, and never can have any right in Ireland, the pres-
ence, in any one generation of Irishmen, of even a respectable minority
ready to die to affirm that truth, makes that Government for ever a
usurpation and a crime against human progre6e.
The most important aspect of Connally's statement was the declared
willingness to die for the republican vision. 	 This is crucial to under-
standing the effect of 1910. It was not so much the violent act Itself
which caused the greatest political repercussions, but the executions of 15
of the rebel leaders in the weeks after the rising (there were 97 executions
4. Pearse, Ghosts, Parts I-Ill, AP, 17 Sept. 1920.
5. J. Connolly, Statement at Court Martial, 9 May 1910, reprinted in
0. Dudley Edwards and B. Ransom (eds.), Jaaes Connally: Selected
Political Vritings (Jew York, 1974), p. 378.
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in all) and the internment of 2000 other Volunteers.
	 The rebellion had
been deeply unpopular, but the executions and the subsequent enforcement of
martial law were heavily resented. The deaths of the rebels, Pearse and
Connolly amongst them, sealed the 1918 rising in the image of sacrificial
martyrdom, thereby providing the means by which the movement always hoped
it could reawaken the nationalist spirit in the masses.
	 On this occasion
the impression of the patriot-martyr did strike an emotional chord. Even
moderate nationalists like John Dillon, deputy leader of the Irish Parlia-
mentary Party, felt moved to attest that the rebels were not murderers, 'but
insurgents who have fought a clean, brave fight, however misguided'. In
more committed nationalist circles the impact was intense. Ernie O'Xalley,
later a renowned guerrilla leader in the Anglo-Irish war, wrote that in the
atmosphere immediately after the executions 'a strange love was born that
for some was never to die till they lay stiff on the hillside or in quick-
lime near a barrack wall.'7
The public reaction to the executions was a major factor in consolid-
ating opposition to British rule. It was not the only factor. The f rust-
ration caused by the failure to implement Home Rule, and discontent with
Vorld War One, in particular, the prospect of the extension of conscription
to Ireland also aroused much ill-feeling. Disaffection had swelled to an
extent that when the general election of December 1918 was held, Sinn Fein,
an avowedly separatist party, swept to victory, winning 73 out of the 105
Irish seats in the Westminster Parliament. Sinn Fein's manifesto committed
the party to the establishment of a republic and declared that it would
stand by the Proclamation of the Provisional Government of 1918. Pdthough
Sinn Fein contained republican elements, it was not an overtly physical
force party. In spite of its broad pledge to make 'use of any and every
6. Quoted in F. Lyons, John Dillon (London, 1988), p. 382.
7. Quoted in C. Duff, Six Days to Shake an Empire (London, 1966), p. 225.
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means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland's
the party primarily advocated withdrawing from Westminster and appealing to
the Paris Peace Conference for recognition of Ireland's right to statehood.
Sina Pein's first major act after the election on 21 January 119, was to set
up its own assembly, the Dali Eireann, and declare independence. The key
point about the rise of Sinn Fein was that it quantified the widespread
antagonism to British rule and lent substance to the republican claim that
Ireland was a colony held in subjection against its will. For the first
time, political conditions offered republicans the opportunity of developing
a strategy with demonstrable evidence to show that the majority of the Irish
population shared their fundamental objective - to get rid of the British
once and for all.
Transitions in Irish Republican Strategy - The Bmployment of the Military
Instrument in the Anglo- Irish War
The question facing members of Sinn Fein in the few weeks after the 1918
election was how to give effect to their desire for separation, as the Brit-
ish government appeared content to ignore the moves to set up the Dail. In
one of the first statements issued after the declaration of independence, the
Dail proclaimed that the 'existing state of war, between Ireland and England,
can never be ended until Ireland is definitely evacuated by the armed forces
of England.'9 The reference to a pre-existing state of hostilities may have
been a rhetorical flourish, but it also intimated that the Dali accepted the
need for armed resistance to British rule. Whatever the exact meaning, it
was the closest the Dali ever came to a formal declaration of war.
The challenge confronting republicans was how best to employ their
military resources to force out the British.
	 Traditionally, republican-
8. Sinn Fein Election Manifesto, 1918, reprinted in Mitchell and O'Snodaigh,
p. 48.
9. Dail Eireann Address to the Free Nations of the World, 21 Jan. 1919,
reprinted in Mitchell and O'Snodaigh, p. 59.
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nationalists had tended to view war in the conventional terms of brigades
and battalions, fixed positions, decisive battles and so an. According to
one republican military commentator, this thinking had held sway amongst the
Irish Volunteers and that the 1918 rising: 'was the logical outcome of the
outlook and training of the Volunteers during the two preceding years.
	 It
was a blunt, straightforward opposing of Irish military force to English
military force."° In theoretical terms this conception of war was valid.
The quickest and mast effective way of resolving clashes of power and ach-
ieving one's political goals has always been through the destruction of
enemy forces in major battles. But given the disparity in military
strength between Britain, which could draw on tens of thousands of well
equipped armed men, and the few thousand ill trained forces the republicans
could muster, the outcome of head-on clashes, as the fate of past rebellions
up to 1918 had demonstrated, could never be in real doubt.
In fact, the realities of the military situation prior to 1916 were not
lost in all nationalist circles. A group centred around the leadership of
the Irish Volunteers under Eoin XacNeill, including people like J.J. O'Connell,
Bimar O'Duffy and Bulmer Hobeon, were acutely sensitive to the nature of a
future conflict with Britain.
	 They frowned on the legends of romantic
rebellion.	 MacNeill, especially, was strongly against committing the Volun-
teers to any hasty venture of the type that the 1916 conspiritors had in
mind.' 1 Hobson had for some years seen the impossibility of openly defy-
ing British military power and had developed alternative ideas of passive
resistance and non-co-operation which he believed could 'offer an even,
steady, invulnerable resistance to all government'.' 2
	Both Hobson and
O'Connell drew up innovatory ideas on tactical doctrine that argued for a
10. Captain, V., 'IRA in 1922', AF, 25 March 1927.
11. See I. Tierney, Rain Nacleill, F. Martin (ed.) (Oxford, 1988), p. 165 and
p. 190.
12. Quoted in Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland, p. 243.
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move away from large-scale confrontations towards more mobile forms of
warfare using smaller military formations which would involve smaller
actions but minimise losses in combat.la
Possibly the most significant shift in the process of republican strat-
egic thought was due, not to any formal reassessments of military technique,
but a broader, less specific change in attitude amongst the Volunteers who
returned home after their release from internment. The stimulus for change
had been summed up by John XacBride, a rebel deputy commmander in the
Easter rising who, in a valedictory statement before he surrendered, told his
comrades never again to allow themselves 'to be cooped up inside the walls
of a building again'." During their internment some of the Volunteers like
Xichael Collins and Cathal Brugha had time to reflect on the essence of
XacBride's words.	 They emerged from the camps with serious reservations
about the conduct of the Easter rising. Collins, for instance, considered
the rising to have been disorganised while some like Brugha felt that a
secretive conspiritorial group like the IRB could no longer provide a viable
basis for a military challenge.' 	 Upon their return to Ireland at the end
of 1910 the ex-internees set about reorganising the Volunteers.
	 A better
regional network was established and plans were once more formulated to
resist the introduction of conscription,'	 Yet there was still no real
comprehension of the need for a switch in tactical emphasis towards a more
guerrilla orientated approach. 	 Xost were still inclined to view a future
war in the conventional terms of static positions.' 7 What had changed with
13. See Ibid., pp. 289-290.
14. Quoted in G. Bayes-McCoy, 'A Military History of the Rising', in Nowlan,
The Raking of 1916, p. 300.
15. 1. Hachy, Britain and Irish Sepa.ratis.m (Washington, 1977), p. 195. See
also, D. Lynch and F. O'Donoghue, The IRB and the 1916 Uprising (Cork,
n.d.), p. 32.
10. See 1. Gray, The Irish Answer (London, 1988), pp. 01-85 and T. Bowden,
The Breakdown of Public Security (London, 1977), pp. 84-88.
17. G. Hayes-McCoy, 'The Conduct of the Anglo-Irish War', in T. Desmond
Williams (ed.), The Irish Struggle (London, 1968), pp. 80-01.
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the new wave of republican leaders, was the recognition that if the military
instrument was to be employed effectively a very different style of warfare
would have to be waged compared to what had gone before. Romanticised
visions of gallantly futile stands in the face of British military might
would have to be banished.
	 Instead, a future conflict would call for a more
surreptitious and ruthless attitude. An indication of what republican
leaders envisaged was given by Richard Nulcahy, later to become Chief of
Staff of the Volunteers, while he was interned:
Freedom will never come without a revolution, but I fear the Irish people
are too soft for that. To have a real revolution, you must have bloody
fierce-minded men who do not care a scrap for death or bloodshed. A
real revolution is not a job for children or for saints or scholars. In
the course of revolution, any man, woman or child who is not with you is
against you. Shoot them and be damned to them.'
Although by 1918 republican strategy was still not defined to any great
degree, Nulcahy's remarks did suggest the lines along which the movement's
thinking would progress. The core of the evolving strategy centred, not
simply on the search for the technical means to achieve a margin of military
advantage in combat, but in confronting Britain on a psychological plane.
If republicans could synthesise the military instrument with perhaps their
most formidable asset, namely, the unflinching single-mindedness in pursuit
of their objectives, they could begin to pressurise perceived weaknesses in
the British position. By exchanging decisive battles for the prospect of
more stubborn and ferocious forms of warfare, republicans could hope to
demonstrate a more aggressive commitment to removing the British vis-a-vts
Britain's comparable resolve to maintain its interests in Ireland.
	 This
represents only the bare mental frame of republican strategic thinking as it
appeared to be taking shape towards the beginning of 1919. It would be,
primarily, the hard-edge of practical experience and necessity rather than
pre-planned conceptions that would do most to mould the republican movement
18. Quoted in S. O'Xahoney, Frongxh: University of Revolution (Dublin, 1987),
p. 67.
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into an effective guerrilla force. However, the more realistic and tractable
attitudes that prevailed in the republican leadership after the 191 rising
enabled the evolution of new military methods to be absorbed easily into
republican strategic doctrine.
In the months following the beginning of 1919 the military instrument
developed in a rather ad hoc fashion from Volunteer raids on police stations
which were carried out in order to steal weapons. It was from these small-
scale attacks that Ireland slid into the conflict now known as the Anglo-
Irish war. The killing of two policemen guarding a load of gelignita at
Soloheadbeg, Go. Tipperary, on 21 January 1919 is often taken as the start of
the war, though in fact there had been sporadic Volunteer attacks since
1918. It was not Just the brutality of the Soloheadbeg incident which
marked it out as the starting point, so much as its timing, occurring as it
did on the same day that the Dail met to declare independence. Taking its
cue from the 'state of war' said to exist by the Dail, the Volunteer Journal,
An t-Oglach announced on 31 January that 'as the principle means at the
command of the Irish people', the Volunteers would be entitled to 'use all
legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers and policemen of the
English usurper, and to slay them if it is necessary to do so in order to
overcome their reeistance."
The raids against police barracks broadened into a more concerted
campaign of violence and intimidation against the Royal Irish Constabulary
(RIG). Many barracks, especially in country areas, were abandoned.
Between January 1919 to October 1920 some 492 vacated barracks were
destroyed, a further 21 occupied barracks had also been destroyed and 117
RIC men had been killed. 20
 By July 1921 there had been 2000 resignations
19. An t-Oglach, 31 Jan. 1919, reprinted in A. Hepburn (ed.), The Conflict of
Nationality in Node.rn Ireland (London, 1980), pp. 112-113.
20. Statement by Lord Curzon to Parliament, 20 Oct. 1920, reprinted in
Mitchell and O'Snodaigh, p. 85.
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from the force and recruitment was badly hit.2 '	 The RIC's retreat from the
countryside often ceded partial control to the IRA. 	 In some areas the Dali
attempted to substitute its own legal and administrative structures like
republican law courts and police. 22
 In tandem with the overt conflict
against the RIG, the Volunteers, now increasingly referred to as the IRA,
established an effective network of informers which extended into G Division
of the Dublin etropolitan Police, the department responsible for dealing
with subversive activities, and even reached as far as the centre of govern-
iient in Ireland, Dublin Castle. In addition, the IRA's Director of Intel-
ligence, Wichael Collins, set up an assassination squad to eliminate British
agents. The most renowned enterprise undertaken by Collins' men was the
killing of 13 suspected agents on 20 November 1920, an incident known as
'Bloody Sunday'. Taken together, these measures effectively nautralised the
RIG as a counter-insurgency force.	 The destruction of the British intel-
ligence network also shut-off the flow of information to the RIG and further
eroded Britain's ability to strike at the IRA. 	 Indeed, towards the end of
1920 more audacious operations were carried out against army and police
patrols.	 Xany of these attacks were undertaken by what became known as
flying columns, full-time mobile units which engaged in fast offensive oper-
ations from concealed bases.aa Although flying column attacks were rarely
very destructive, they did succeed in keeping the countryside in turmoil
which necessitated the strengthening of armed escorts, thereby adding to the
strain imposed on the British.2m
The history of the IRA's activities in the Anglo-Irish war have been
covered extensively elsewhere and requires no elaboration beyond the details
21. .1. O'Beirne Ranelagh, A Short History of Ireland (Cambridge, 1983),
p. 194.
22.See N. Xclanus, Eamon de Valera (London, 1944), p. 63.
23.See L. Deasy, Towar'is Free Ireland (Dublin, 1973), pp. 154-168.




already stated. The question we are concerned with here is how, in a fig-
urative sense, can we enclose the IRA's conduct within a strategic framework
in a way that will help us comprehend the operation of the military instru-
ment? To form an answer to this question it is necessary to begin with a
consideration of the overall power relationship in the war. The key point
to bear in mind is that IRA actions, particularly against the RIG, damaged
Britain's capacity to govern Ireland through established administrative
structures.	 The attacks did not elminate or neutralise British power so
much as undermine civil authority to an extent where Britain was forced back
to rely on the crudest expression of that power, namely, coercion. This
turn of events was most noticeable in relation to the behaviour of the
auxiliary forces which were introduced in Spring 1Q20 in order to reinforce
the police. Elements of these forces, the most notorious of which were the
so-called 'Black and Tans', were often indisciplined and easily provoked into
reprisals. One American commission, for instance, detailed a litany of
misconduct by crown forces, including indiscriminate killings, assassinations
of suspected republicans and the wanton ransacking of towns and villages2
In spite of the apparent inability of British farces to deal with IRA attacks
with anything other than heavy handed repression, the general military situ-
ation remained the same.	 If anything, the arrival of the auxiliary forces
substantially increased the military odds against the IRA.
	 The combined
strength of crown forces during the conflict, including police, soldiers and
auxiliary units, amounted to some 80,000 men.
	 Against this number, the IRA
according to Xichael Collins, could muster 3000 ill-equipped activists.2
The crucial aspect of the conflict for those like Collins was never the
25. Conclusions of the Interim Report of American Commission on Conditions
in Ireland (Washington, D.C.), Jtarch 1921, reprinted in Mitchell and
O'Snodaigh, pp. 100-101.
26. 11. Foot, 'Revolt, Rebellion, Revolution, Civil War: The Irish Experience',
in I. Elliott-Bateman et al (eds.), Revolt to Revolution (Manchester,
1974), p. 183.
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military numbers game, but the fact that the improprieties committed by the
crown forces demonstrated the breakdown of civil control which, in turn,
hardened Irish opinion against British rule. Collins signified the impor-
tance of this point in a newspaper interview in April 1921: 'The terror the
British wanted to instil in this country has completely broken down... The
people of this country are with us and they do not give a damn what the
English do.'27
Having gained a rough appreciation of the IRA's progression within a
scenario where it was confronted by a numerically superior force, we can now
reach a more specific understanding of the strategic mechanics of the mili-
tary instrument in the Anglo-Irish war.
	 To start with, it is clear that
most of the IRA's larger scale military engagements were of a typical guer-
rilla warfare character. The IRA endeavoured to utilise surprise and mobil-
ity to concentrate local forces where tactical advantage could be achieved.
At no time did the IRA attempt to defend territory through positional war-
fare. The reason for this conduct stemmed from the primary need to fight
in such a way as to prevent the British from exploiting their military
superiority.	 By dispersing its forces and striking unexpectedly, the IRA
could hamper any British attempt to focus their resources on a few decisive
areas.	 If British strength could be sufficiently dissipated trying to
protect a vast range of possible targets then the numerical advantage would
be all but lost. 	 This line of thought was expressed by An t-Oglach which
stated: Vs will strike in our own way, in our own time. If we cannot, by
force of arms, drive the enemy out of our country at the present moment, we
can help to make his poetion impossible and his military activities
futile.
27. 1. Collins interview, Freeman's Journal, 22 April 1922, reprinted In
Xitchell and O'Snodaigh, p. 103
28. Quoted in P. Beaslai, Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland,
Vol. II (London, 1920), p. 383.
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The strategy which the IRA sought to practise can be described as one
of denial. It attempted to deny Britain the opportunity of waging a war of
annihilation for which its forces were most suited. The IRA's broad mili-
tary aim, however, was more fundamental than simply trying to preserve its
own resources by refusing to give battle.
	 The preservation of forces was
not designed in order that the IRA could then use its limited potential to
gradually eradicate British power through low level operations,
	 There was
no chance that the IRA could hope to inflict on the British a military death
by a thousand cuts. 	 The British always had the capacity to absorb the
relatively small losses imposed by IRA attacks.
	 The crucial point about
the strategy of denial was provided by Tom Barry, one of the IRA's best
commanders, who said that the 'paramount objective was to survive.' If
the IRA could avoid destruction and maintain its ability to strike at British
forces, it could prevent any military conclusion from being reached in the
short-term.	 It was in these circumstances that the republicans believed
their greatest opportunity lay.
	 The following piece, written in 1927,
reflected on the IRA's experience in the war, thus:
...guerrilla tactics can never achieve against a regularly organised army
a military decision. What they can do is to create what is really a
political situation whereby government by the big battalions becomes
impossible: a situation that may be dragged out to an indefinite length
and that may ultimately achieve for the side adopting these methods, the
same result as might be achieved by a decisive military victory.ao
The efficacy of the republican strategy rested on the political effects
of the IRA's campaign. The cumulative political impact both of a steady
level of IRA operations and of the British response to those operations,
could be interpreted in a way which was suggestive of a number of things;
firstly, that Britain's inability to restore civil control implied the lack of
popular legitimacy in Ireland for British rule; secondly, that correspond-
ingly, the republican cause enjoyed greater support; and thirdly, that as a
29. Quoted in Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, p. 66.
30. Captain V., 'IRA in 1922'.
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result of both of these implications Britain would continue to face a long
drawn out conflict.
Republicans did their best to refine these perceptions in the public
mind with an efficient propaganda campaign. 	 The Dail's Publicity Depart-
ment set up its own newsletter, the Irish Bulletin, which was circulated to
newspapers and politicians both in Britain and abroad,' It is difficult to
quantify how far republican propaganda affected opinions in Britain because
much unease was already being caused through routine press reportage. The
reprisals of the auxiliary forces, such as those in Baibriggan, Trim and
Cork, received widespread publicity throughout Britain and America.
Elements of the British press, like The Daily News, The Kanchester Guardian
and The Daily Herald, had been critical of the use of force in Ireland at the
outset. After the sacking of Balbriggan on 20 September 1920, the first
major reprisal of its kind, some papers like The Times and The Daily
Express, which had previously supported the restoration of order in Ireland,
began to question the wisdom of the British government's Irish policy.33
Other sections of British society like churchmen, opposition leaders and
trade unionists also campaigned against the war. 	 Disquiet over the
indiscipline of the Black and Tans was even voiced by such notable pro-
unionists as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Vilson.
In truth, the fact was that for many, the British position in Ireland had
become morally indefensible.
The destabilisation of British opinion represented the apex of the
republican strategy. The British government was faced with a major
31. D. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the
Naking of a New Ireland, 1918-1922 (London, 1972), p. 85.
32. See for example, 'Police Burn Town in County Meath - Explosion in Cork',
The New York Times, 28 Sept. 1920, reprinted in Xitchell and
O'Snodaigh, pp. 82-84.
33. Boyce, pp. 51-53.
34. Ibid., pp. 61-82.
35. F. Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal (London, 1935), p. 55.
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political embarrassment. Republicans could hope that the threat of further
domestic and international censure, and the prospect of a long and costly
war would form the conditions in which Britain would seek to re-evaluate its
interests in Ireland. The fact that by June 1921 the British government
had felt obliged to seek a truce and an end to the conflict was the firmest
indication of the effectiveness of this strategy.
Strategy and Bargaining - The Formation of the Anglo- Irish Treaty
A truce arranged between the British and Eamon de Valera, President of the
Dali, came into effect on 11 July 1921. 	 Full negotiations between the
British and Irish delegations were scheduled for October.	 Although the
truce was technically only a temporary cessation of hostilities, it did in
fact mark the end of the Anglo-Irish war. 	 The war had been about the
degree of autonomy Ireland should be granted. Britain was not fighting to
defend the status quo. Home Rule, albeit with the separation of Northern
Ireland under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, had
already been conceded. For republicans, the role of the military instrument
in the war had been about the establishment of a strong negotiating position
in order to extract the further concessions necessary to accord with their
political objectives. In the few months preceding the truce, Collins had
spelled out what the republican movement would expect to obtain from its
exertions. He told a reporter that the British Prime Xinister, David Lloyd
George, should recognise the Irish republic. Collins confirmed it was his
belief 'that the same effort which would get us Dominion Home Rule would get
us a Republic.' He also reiterated Sinn Fein's opposition to the partition
of Ireland: 'Ye do not intend to have Lloyd George put a little red spot on
the map of one corner of Ireland and call it part of England, as he does
Gibraltar. Ye want a united Ireland.'
36. I. Collins interview in Xitchell and O'Snodaigh, pp. 103-104.
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The main problem in trying to realise the objectives set out by Collins
was that the republican movement lacked the means to seize anything tangible
from the British with which it could transact in negotiations. As has been
mentioned previously both in this and earlier chapters 1
 this difficulty is
perhaps the most weighty for comparatively small political organisations to
surmount. The republican movement's limited capacity to hold territory was
illustrated in the Anglo-Irish war. Despite the Dali's attempts to estab-
lish its own administrative zones to give the otherwise symbolic republic
some substance, republican government was effective only in remote parts of
the South West of Ireland.	 The rest of the region was held firmly under
martial law. 7 As a result, the republican movement had no choice but to
adopt a strategy of limited war bargaining. In this concept of warfare
military engagements are, for the weaker side, designed not just to imply the
risk of unacceptable financial and military burdens, but for signalling,
pressure and control, in order to threaten those more intangible factors
which the enemy might hold dear like a settled domestic polity and a clean
International reputation. The success of the IRA's strategy rested
precisely on the skill with which the military instrument was manipulated to
demonstrate to the British that their civil writ had broken down in many
parts of Ireland and that a high political, as well as financial, price would
be exacted for the continuation of their rule. 	 The IRA had been able to
raise the level of violence to a point where existing tensions in British
society over Irish policy were further sharpened. IRA actions also helped
convince the British government that its measures were not having the
desired impact on the level of IRA operations. Towards the end of Spring
1921 the number of IRA attacks had risen from a previous average of about
37. See Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army, p. 24.
38. See R. Brown, 'Limited War', in C. Xclnnes and G. Sheffield (eds.), Varfare
in the Twentieth Century (London, 1988), pp. 174-175.
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30 a week to 55. Noreover, it was calculated that the pacification of
Ireland would require a commitment of Boer War proportions: a raising of
troop levels to 100,000 men, the establishment of security zones, massive
ground sweeps, and so on, at a probable cost of around £100 million per
annum.*O Overall, the British came to terms with the republican movement,
not because the physical costs of maintaining a form of control underpinned
by a substantial military presence was necessarily intolerable, but because
the estimate of the future costs of suppression appeared unreasonable in the
light of possibly more amenable ways to preserve their interests in Ireland
through the re-definition of political relations between the two countries.
This Is an essential point, because although the treaty settlement of
December 1921 reflected the extent of the IRA's success, it was also a
reflection of the underlying power relationships in Ireland and not the
ideals of the republican vision.
The main British concession under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty
was the provision for the legislative independence of the newly created
Irish Free State. The province of Northern Ireland, where IRA operations in
the war had been insignificant, was given the right to remain separate.
The monarchy was to remain the head of the Free State and an oath of alleg-
iance was to be sworn by all those who wished to participate in constitu-
tional politics.	 The Treaty also allowed Britain to retain control of a
number of naval installations.
	 In other words, the Treaty fell some way
short of Collins' confident expectations of a fully united and independent
republic.	 This was because the Treaty was an expression of altered
political circumstances and not any basic shift In the relative strengths of
the two belligerents. 	 Regardless of the optimistic rhetoric about the
attainment of a republic, the Irish delegation in the negotiations, of which
39. Townshend, The British Camp,ign in Ireland, p. 180.
40. 0. MacDonagh, Ireland (Englewocid Cliffs, N.J., 1968), p. 88.
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Collins was a prominent member, were aware both of the reality of British
power and the comparative weakness of the Irish military position. It was
Collins, above all, who proved the arch-pragmatist, as his review of the war
revealed:
Ye took as much of the government of Ireland out of the hands of the
enemy as we could, but we could not grasp all of it because he used the
whole of his forces to prevent us doing so, and we were unable to beat
him out of the country by force of arms. But neither had he beaten us.
Ye had made Ireland too uncomfortable for him... The British had not
surrendered and had no need to agree to humiliating terms any more than
we would have done. It was time for a settlement that would secure for
us their withdrawal and evacuation. There was duress, of course. On
their side, the pressure of world opinion to conform their practice to
their professions. On our side, the duress the weaker nation suffers
against the stronger, the duress to accept really substantial terms.'
Collins' analysis provides an accurate impression of the pressures with
which he and his colleagues in the Irish delegation had to contend. For
the irish plenipotentiaries, the IRA's military campaign had established a
very particular negotiating advantage. It derived not from the literal
inability of the British to apply their superior strength, but from the fact
that because of the way in which the IRA had fought, the British government
had been placed in a decidedly awkward political position. The guerrilla
tactics employed by the IRA, and the effectiveness with which British intel-
ligence in Ireland had been neutralised, had made it difficult for the police
and army to detect and destroy the IRA's military capacity. The only way
that the republican insurgency could have been extinguished would have been
through the wholesale subjugation of Ireland which would have starkly
identified Britain in the role of the colonial oppressor.
Theoretically, though, there were few military-technical barriers to
obstruct the British from imposing an even harsher security regime.
Indeed, throughout the war, the British military commander, General Ilacready,
had pressed for the full introduction of martial law all over the country.
41. Quoted in L, O'Broin, Nichael Collins (Dublin, 1980), p. 84.
42. T. Bowden, 'Ireland: Decay of Control', in Elliott-Bateiaan, et al,
pp. 225-228.
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The British government refused as it was anxious to avoid any measure that
would appear to confer belligerent status on the IRA. Such moves, it was
believed, would indicate Britain's inability to contain the situation, while
also suggesting that the IRA was an authentic expression of Irish national
will.'3
	Furthermore, it seems that the British were genuinely expecting a
fairly short policing operation against a gang of hoodlums," Once it
became clear that the degree of support for the IRA had been underestimated
and the resultant security measures implemented inadequate, the government
felt unable to embrace stronger methods through fear of alienating British
public opinion.45
 Consequently, the British response to the protraction of
the conflict was both half-hearted and counter-productive.
To summarise, it was political inhibition and not anything intrinsic to
IRA military actions which persuaded the British to negotiate. The British
could use the fact of their continued military superiority as an item in
their favour, because, to paraphrase the principle described by T.C.
Schelling, the threat of violence held in reserve can sometimes be of more
significance in limited war situations than the commitment of forces in
battle,45
 During the negotiations Lloyd George put this principle into
effect by threatening the resumption of massive war unless the Irish deleg-
ation came to terms.
	 Under such duress, to which Collins admitted in the
passage above, the delegation agreed to sign the Treaty.4'
The decision to accept the Treaty was reinforced by Collins' pessim-
istic assessment of the IRA's prospects should the war have been resumed.
In the months before the truce the IRA had begun to come under severe
pressure.	 Civilian morale had been affected by the reprisals of the crown
43. See Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland, p. 353.
44.See D. Boyce, 'Water for the Fish: Terrorism and Public Opinion', in
Y. Alexander and A. O'Day (eds.), Terrorism in Ireland, p. 153,
45.Townehend, The British Campaign in Ireland, pp. 203-204.
46.Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 143.
47.D. Nacardle, The Irish Republic (London, 1937), pp. 640-641.
- 112 -
forces, and as a result, citizens were more wary of co-operating with the
IRA.4
 Also, the IRA became more vulnerable as the British intelligence
system recovered from its initial setbacks. Of greatest immediate concern
was the acute shortage of arms. For example one commander, Liam Lynch,
told Collins that the shortage in the Cork area had become critical.49
Collins is even said to have remarked that the British had been mad to offer
a truce when they did, as the IRA would not have lasted another three
weeks .°
Collins' appraisal was probably coloured by the condition of the IRA in
Dublin which was close to breaking point, whereas the situation in the rest
of the country varied from area to area. 6' None of this detracted from the
decision to negotiate. 	 The IRA did not have the power to force its terms
on the British.	 Therefore, talks with the British were a necessity if
republicans wished to advance towards their objectives. However, the timing
of the truce was crucial.
	 The point was that the IRA had survived long
enough for Britain's will to falter first. This gave the republicans an
important psychological edge in the negotiations which they could exploit to
gain concessions. To have continued the war for the sake of it, especially
as the IRA had reached, and arguably already passed its optimum operational
capacity,' would have been futile as it would merely have weakened the
republican negotiating position. What Xichael Collins and his pragmatic
associates understood, was that at the political level the type of war in
which they had been engaged was essentially a bargaining process where
threats and counter threats could be traded. Some of Collins' more purist
compatriots found themselves unable to relate to this conception of warfare.
48. Xacflonagh, p. 87.
49. B. Holt, Protest in Arms (London, 1960), p. 355.
50. F. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (London, 1971), p. 425.
51. Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, p. 192.
52. Ibid., p. 193.
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The Treaty Settlement and the Clash of Strategic Perspectives
On 7 January 1922 the Pail ratified the Treaty by 84 votes to 57. A Prov-
isional government was set up under the terms of the Treaty as an interim
administration to pave the way for elections to the Free State Parliament.
For those who supported the Treaty settlement the period from 1916 to 1921
counted as a solid success. Republicans had shown that by adapting their
military methods to harness their traditional strengths of tenacity and
fortitude, they could fight a prolonged war against a vastly more powerful
opponent and, in so doing, achieve positive political results. The pro-
Treaty ites regretted that their efforts in the Anglo- Irish war had been
unable to secure the republic they desired. However, they tried to place
the settlement into some sort of historical perspective. The view of those
like Collins was that the tradition of nationalist struggle had not been a
remorseless march towards the unfettered independence of a united republic,
more a case of sporadic resistance to the slow but inexorable absorption of
Irish national identity within British culture. The Treaty halted this pro-
cess of Anglicisation. It provided for the evacuation of British forces,
the creation of a national army, as well as for full internal autonomy over
fiscal and social policy. To the pragmatists, all this was far too import-
ant to be endangered by some pedantic debate over republican emblems.
	 It
was substance which mattered. This did not mean that the pragmatiste had
abandoned their commitment to a republic.
	 The Treaty was simply a means
of stopping the rot. Above all, they saw the Treaty as a device which
Ireland could use to extricate itself from British domination in all its
manifestations. According to one pro-Treaty newspaper:
The shortest way to the full Republic is not through barren wrangles over
unrealities, but through the path opened by the Treaty. The Republic
will not be conjured out of the vasty deep by an incantation: in a world
53. See Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 442-443.
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of might and the use of might it will take shape when a consolidated and
united people have evolved the power to assert it.4
As indicated by the vote in the Dail, there was a large dissenting
minority who remained unconvinced by the pro-Treaty case.
	 For them, the
Treaty was no reward for the years of sacrifice.	 The Free State was not
the united, independent republic for which they had been fighting, but merely
a partitioned, quasi-autonomous dominion.
	 The anti-Treaty faction were
unable to reconcile themselves to the idea that the settlement could be used
as a stepping stone to a republic.
	 They regarded the Treaty with dismay,
suspicion and bitter hostility. How was it, then, that a Treaty negotiated
by appointees of the Dali could prove so unacceptable to such a sizeabie
part of the republican movement? The answer disclosed not simply shades
of disagreement over nuance, timing and direction, but the presence within
the same movement of two entirely different modes of thinking and strategic
approach.
For the anti-Treatyites the concept of the republic held great meaning.
In their view, the republic was an actuality. It had been proclaimed in
1916 and established by the elected representatives of the Dali In 1919.
Further, all of those involved with the movement during the Anglo-Irish war
had formerly sworn to 'defend the Irish Republic and the Government of the
Irish Republic, which is Dail Eireann, against all enemies, foreign and
domestic'.	 Anything which interfered with the notion of the republic was
deemed to be an illegal transgression against the lawfully constituted
authority in Ireland.	 The existence of the republic was considered an
unalterable fact and asserted vigorously:
There is only one legitimate Government In Ireland - the Government of
the Irish Republic. Even the most extreme of the Slave State (pro-
54. 'Republican Strength - Where it Really Lies', The Free State, 22 April
1922.
55.Oath of Allegiance to Dali Eireann, 20 Aug. 1919, reprinted in Kitchell
and O'Snodaigh, p. 66.
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Treaty] party admit that the Dali Bireann is the supreme authority In the
country. The Irish Republic is the Republic of all Ireland, not twenty-
six counties merely, and to it every citizen of Ireland owes allegiance.
It is evident from this belief, that from the point of view of the doc-
trinaire republicans, the Anglo-Irish war had never been about fighting for
something - concessions, negotiating positions, compromises etc., but about
safeguarding a pre-existing entity. As a consequence, any subsequent poli-
tical arrangement that failed to sustain the republic would be seen as a
humiliation because it would mean the actual loss of something to which they
had been supremely committed. For example, speaking in 1925, Bamon de
Valera, who led the opposition to the Treaty, stated that he had rejected the
settlement because it meant the 'disestablishment of the Republic - the State
established on the will of the people - the State which I had been elected
to uphold and defend', and because it entailed 'the surrender of the sover-
eignty of this nation to an outside power'.7
The explanation for the anti-Treatyites' attitude can be traced mit-
ially, to the monochrome view of Britain's guilt which seemed to prevent
republicans from making any allowance for the change in political circum-
stances brought about by the Anglo- Irish war. Their complete aversion to
any form of British influence meant that they found it difficult to dis-
tinguish qualitative differences In political relationships between Britain
and Ireland. Therefore, a loose connection with Britain was almost as bad
as an all engulfing British presence. Of particular concern in this respect
was the requirement under the Treaty of an oath of allegiance to the British
monarch. This was felt to be especially demeaning, not only because it
violated their oath to the republic, but also because it meant accepting a
lingering affinity with the evil British empire. What had been the point of
two and a half years of war if at the end of it republicans had to swear
56. The Plain People, 28 Xay 1922.
57. B. de Valera, 'Save Ulster for Ireland', AP, 4 Dec. 1925.
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allegiance to the very enemy they had been fighting to rid from Ireland?
'Are they', the anti-Treatyites enquired of the pragmatists, 'ready to avow
that there is a common citizenship, a community of race, of language, of
ideas, of ideals, of aspirations, between them and, for instance, the British
Black and Tans?' Nor ware the anti-Treatyltes persuaded by the pragmat-
late' argument that the oath of allegiance was simply a meaningless forma-
lity. 'Xr. Collins... says the Oath is only symbolical. Just so. But the
symbol to which he swore fidelity and wants the Irish people to cry "Amen",
is the symbol of England's sovereignty in Ireland."
The conviction of the doctrinaire republicans that clauses in the
Treaty, like the oath of allegiance, were not simply trivial affectations to
satisfy Britain's pretence at Imperial control, but were absolute and bind-
ing, ruled out any thought that the Treaty could be built on in the future.
One anti-Treaty publication declared: 'The people who talk of the Free State
being a step towards the Republic do not realise the almost utter impossibi-
lity of raising Ireland from the status of a partly contented country whose
highest and noblest rights and interests are denied, to the full status of
sovereign independence."0
 Bxhibited here are various overtones, noted in
the previous chapter, which indicate that the doctrinairee' stand over the
Treaty arose from a mixture of nationalist-elitism, suspicion of Britain and
unwavering loyalty to the republican vision. The 'no-half-way-house' atti-
tude of many republicans suggested that the extension of the Treaty would be
hopeless because it had been specifically designed to preserve British
interests by staving off full Irish independence. As a result, the Treaty
was not an advance but a step back because once British concessions had
defused the nationalist threat, the Irish people would lose the inclination
58. 'Things to Think About - The Oath', The Plain People, 9 April 1922.
59. Ibid..
60. 'Is the Free State a Step Towards the Republic?', The Nation, No. 5, 1922
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to seek the real republic. In the doctrinaires' highly polarised view, the
Treaty was nothing more than a dead-end which undermined all the principles
of republicanism.
To the pro-Treaty faction all this was incomprehensible.
	 They were
sceptical of the contention that the Treaty would somehow legally oblige
Ireland in perpetuity to relinquish any claim to greater independence.
Would those anti-Treatyitee who propounded this view, the pragmatists asked,
feel duty bound themselves to abide by such an obligation?
	 lot even the
most rigid republican was reckoned to be that naive. The pragmatists
sensed that the argument was merely a scare story to dissuade people from
voting for pro-Treaty candidates in the parliamentary elections due in June
1922. Supporters of the Treaty predicted, accurately as it turned out, that
the 'very men who assert now that the Treaty will bind Ireland in honour for
ever will assert the contrary as soon as the elections are over.''
lore consequentially, the pragmatists saw in the anti-Treatyite posi-
tion an obsessive concern for 'theories and abstractions which for the sake
of appearing to preserve a sham is ready to enter into a covenant of eternal
association with Bngland.' How could anyone, they wondered, be so preoc-
cupied with something which did not exist except in the symbolic form of
proclamations, declarations and a few gestures at republican government
during the Anglo-Irish war? The republic was an aspiration. It was never
a power-reality. 'The enemy were pushed back from the unchallenged usurp-
ation of the functions of civil government into standing on naked military
strength', said an article in The Free State, 'But they had the military
strength and they stood on it. There was no town in Ireland where our flag
could fly with impunity for a day'.
	 To profess blind adherence to a
mythical republic was not regarded as a quaint act of loyality to an
61. 'The "Trust to Luck" Policy', The Free State, 4 larch 1922.
62. H. de Blaghd, 'The Fenian Faith', The Free State, 18 larch 1922.
63. 'Fidelity or Foolishness?', The Free State, 29 July 1922.
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inspiring dream but a dangerous inability to separate the ideal from reality:
the failure to discriminate what were essentially propaganda moves intended
to influence world opinion from the fact that a functioning, sovereign
republic had not been established as a power political reality.
The pragmatists refuted any suggestion that their arguments were based
on the lame acceptance of Irish impotence in the face of British opposition
and the foreswearing of any right to pursue republican goals. Their rea-
soning was that as the republic never physically existed then the ideal
could not have been betrayed. 	 Nor could the Treaty kill it as an
aspiration.	 Their position over the Treaty was outlined thus: 'The
continuance of the struggle for independence is a question of tactics.
	 It
Is not a question of principle... All tactics must be Judged by their success,
and the key to success is adaptability.' 	 This statement is significant as
it indicated that the debate over the rather distractive Issues of the oath
and the materiality of the republic, masked a more serious dispute over
differing perceptions of power and the extent of the utility of violence in
the political process. As time went on, it became clear that the clash was
so fundamental that it would not be resolved without further conflict.
Therein lay the path which would lead Ireland to civil war.
Although dogmatic loyalty to an Indefinite republic was one of the
primary reasons which stoked up antipathy to the Treaty, the doctrinaire
faction also believed firmly that the success of the IRA's military campaign
should have enabled the movement to have gained Its full demands. They
assumed it was only the actions of the weak-willed Irish delegation that
threw away this opportunity. One republican writer claimed that guerrilla
methods had 'brought victory within our grasp and placed the nation in the
same position that a victory in the field would have done.' He continued:
'The methods did not fall, the men who should have reaped the harvest sown
84. Ibid..
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by these same methods did.'
	 This allegation represents the crux of the
anti-Treatyites' critique.
	 It also touches on some of the key components of
strategic theory. So what is the validity of the claim that the Treaty
supporters threw away the elements of victory? Taking war in its simplest
abstract form as a clash between two equally matched belligerents, the out-
come will be largely determined by the value each side places on winning the
contested object over which the conflict is being fought. Quite simply, the
belligerent which is more prepared to commit all its effort and resources to
vanquish the enemy in battle is likely to be victorious.
	 But the situation
is more complicated in a conflict between two obviously unequal sides as in
the Anglo- Irish war. Prom the standpoint of the physically weaker side,
the most favourable fighting conditions which it could expect to achieve
would be a prolongation of the war and, in the process, hope that the
stronger opponent would refrain from exercising its military superiority.
If such a stalemate ensues, the materially inferior side can claim a form of
psychological victory for holding the stronger side at bay. However, this
does not equate to a victory on the field of battle, as the anti-Treatyites
presumed, where one sides' capacity for physical resistance has been elimin-
ated through the destruction of its forces and where the victor can pre-
scribe the terms of settlement. Instead, if an inconclusive military situ-
ation arises, the belligerents may well try to reach a settlement using the
advantages in their respective positions to gain concessions and preserve
interests in order to obtain for themselves the best deal possible. Inevit-
ably, any compromise will be an imperfect but tolerable situation for both
sides. The point is that under the rational actor model, with each side
trying to maximise its own interests, if no outright victory has been
achieved then any overall settlement is always likely to be an expression of
65. Captain V., 'IRA in 1q22'.
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a politico-military situation in which neither side has been able to prevail
over the other.
It seems plain that the anti-Treaty republicans identified military
indecision with total victory in war. We can see this connection in the
following anti-Treaty pronouncement: 'The English can never come back.
Ireland beat the Tyrant to a standstill last year.
	 England only made a
truce because she could not fight on. England will never come back."
The association of a military standstill with the idea that the enemy could
not fight on, infers that as far as the doctrinaire republicans were con-
cerned, the truce had been offered, not out of any British reluctance to
further embroil themselves in a small but politically damaging conflict, but
because Britain had been physically compelled to discontinue the fight. The
supposition seemed to gel in the minds of many republicans that the truce
signified Britain's defeat and willingness to give in.
	 Looking at the
situation from a republican angle, it is easy to understand how such a per-
ception might have arisen. After years of prevarication and obstruction
over the issue of Irish self-government, the IRA's military campaign had
forced the British to relinquish the greater part of their control over Irish
affairs. By any standard this was a major accomplishment. It cannot be
surprising that many republicans felt it their right to dictate terms. That
any thought of reneging on the demand for full independence was so repug-
nant to republican hardliners, can be attributed, in part, to the belief that
it would be impossible to sell-out an overwhelmingly advantageous military
position. In reality, of course, circumstances were far more ambiguous.
One revolutionary theorist of the late twentieth century has pointed
out that tactical successes can lead political groups, particularly those
fighting against more powerful enemies, into thinking that they are stronger
than they really are. If this happens, operational effectiveness can be
66. 'Will the English Come Back?', The Nation, No. 2, 1922.
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confused with strategic victory. 67
 In the same way, one can surmise that
the successful execution of most IRA operations in the Anglo-Irish war may
well have led many republicans to overstate the impact of their military
campaign. Since the IRA's actions had not diminished British military
power to any significant degree, it was improbable that Britain would have
conceded in peace what had not been won in war. So it was to be expected
that Britain would use the fact of its continuing military might in Ireland
to bargain down any demand for a full republic. As a consequence, during
the tough negotiations in London between October and December 1921, the
British were able to remind the Irish delegation of the true scale of the
IRA's military achievement, which, as one delegate, Richard Xulcahy,
reiterated to his colleagues in the Dali, had been no more than to chase the
British out of a few 'fairly good sized police barracks."
Another aspect of the anti-Treatyitee' inflated impression of republican
power sprang from the apparent conviction that the communication of threat
flowed only in one direction - from the IRA to the British. This seemed to
inform the rather curious notion that while republicans were entitled to
exert the maximum leverage earned by their military efforts to demand what
they liked, the British should somehow not be similarly permitted to use
their superior strength on the ground to protect their own interests. The
effect was to render hardline republican elements oblivious to any idea that
the British could themselves pressurise the Irish delegates to reach a poli-
tical settlement which fell short of a republic. This was demonstrated by
remarks made by Austin Stack, an opponent of the Treaty, who recalled that
at the Dali Cabinet's first meeting after the signing of the Treaty, 'Xr.
(Arthur] Griffith (the leader of the Irish delegation], if I remember arlght1
would not admit duress by the British.	 Mr. Collins said if there was
67. See A. Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, trans. D. Hodges (New
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duress it was only the "duress of facts", whatever he meant by that.'
When it became clear to the anti-Treatyites that Britain had indeed
used the 'duress of facts' to force the Irish delegation to sign the Treaty,
they came up with the even more exotic allegation that the Treaty was inval-
id because it did not represent the true aspirations of the Irish people.
In 1920 de Valera restated the basis of the argument: 'Ye again challenge
those who proclaim that this State has been established by the will of the
Irish people, to allow a plebiscite to be taken with the threat of force
removed'.	 De Valera believed that, 'even those who accepted the Treaty had
only done so under the threat of "immediate and terrible war.""° It was
this kind of simplistic attitude towards the political process which so
exasperated the pragmatists. The doctrinaire view was treated with scorn.
How could popular opinion be gauged, they asked, without regard to outside
factors?
The national will, according to this theory, must not be based on a
consideration of existing facts but must be interpreted as being what the
people might be expected to wish if these unpleasant facts were non-
existent, and if the national will were functioning In vacua, free from
all external influence or pressure.7'
It was erroneous, therefore, to assert that political decisions could be
decided in the context of a 'national vacuum'. 	 Such a context, if it had
any basis in reality at all, could only come about through the wholesale
defeat of the enemy.	 Plainly, since the republican movement had not
performed such a military feat, then public approval for the Treaty could
not be measured against some abstract ideal. In these circumstances, the
pragmatists reasoned, 'the will of the people recognisee perforce, as does
the will of an individual, the limitations of physical conditions.'72 The
hard truth, as the pragmatists saw it, was that there was no option but to
69. Quoted in Pakenham, p. 331.
70. B. de Valera, 'The Work Before Ireland', AP, 15 Jan. 1926.
71. 'The Nation's Will', The Free State, 4 March 1922.
72. IbId.
- 123 -
accept the fact of Ireland's comparative weakness: 'there is no doubt', said
The Free State, 'as to where the preponderance of power lay when the Dali
decided to go to London to talk about a settlement.'73
 Accordingly, the
pragmat lets acknowledged that the Irish plenipotentiaries were sent to
London 'to get the best terms possible but with practically no hope of
bringing back an Ideal Republic.'7'
It is also worth pointing out here that the central inconsistency in
the doctrinaire republican position was to consent to talks in the first
place. If a republic was the minimum guarantee acceptable to the repub-
lican movement, nothing being negotiable up to that point, then logic deman-
ded that the war should have been continued until this principle had been
conceded. Yet the very act of agreeing to the truce and to the peace talks
signalled that both sides were willing to retreat from their previous rhet-
orical positions.	 The pragmatists called attention to the fact that de
Valera 'did not stipulate recognition of the Irish Republic as a basis for
the Peace parleys.'7
 The farthest de Valera went in setting pre-conditions
was to tell Lloyd George that there could be no satisfactory outcome to the
talks if the British denied 'Ireland's essential unity and set aside the
principle of national self-determination.'7
 In the end, de Valera accepted
the British invitation to negotiate on the even vaguer proposition of
'ascertaining how the association of ireland with the community of Nations
known as the British Empire may be best reconciled with Irish national
aspirations.'77
As may be clear already, the anti-Treaty followers were not simply
73. 'Fidelity or Foolishness?'
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confused over the approach to the negotiations, but appeared to have no
concept of negotiations. This outlook extended back to the apparent
inability of the doctrinaires to comprehend that in the type of conflict in
which they were involved, war was essentially a political bargaining process
where threat and counter-threat are exchanged to induce conciliation and
concession.	 One leading theorist of limited war, Thomas Schelling, has
written:
To think of war as a bargaining process is uncongenial to some of us.
Bargaining with violence smacks of violence, extortion, vicious politics,
callous diplomacy and everything indecent, illegal or uncivilised...
Bargaining also smacks of appeasement, of politics and diplomacy, of
accommodation or collaboration with the enemy, of selling out and
compromising, of everything weak and irresolute.7
These allusions to some of the perceived distasteful aspects of bargaining
with violence represent an accurate approximation of the suspicion with
which many doctrinaire republicans regarded the relationship between force
and politics. Indeed, their antagonism towards the Treaty was seemingly
predicated on the outright mistrust of the nature of the political process
itself; the belief that the Irish delegation had been undercut less by the
frailty in the republican military position so much as the artful perfidy of
British diplomacy and the gullibility of the delegates themselves. The
politicians in the British delegation, do Valera once declared, 'treated their
pledges and their promises as scraps of paper to be flung to the wind.'7'
The disillusion in republican ranks, the feeling that they had been tricked
out of their advantageous position, was certainly a factor which reinforced
the traditional view of the political environment as one of improbity and
duplicity. The ideological root of the misgivings concerning peaceful poli-
tical discourse can be traced back to the unconditional nature of republican
ideology.	 The doctrinaire view of the political arena, in so far as they
had any well-formed ideas on the subject, was that it lay in the orbit of
78.Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 215-216.
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absolutes which demanded the complete fulfilment of all political objectives
in one go. The Treaty offended against republican shibboleths as it adult-
erated the doctrinaire ideal by compromising with the vile British enemy.
Overall, the controversy surrounding the negotiations and settlement of 1921,
provides an illuminating contrast between a strategic interpretation of the
Anglo-Irish Treaty, as represented by the pragmatists, and the doctrinaire
approach which was unable to address how to get around British power, as it
theoretically excluded any thought of tactical compromise, no matter how
small or temporary, because anything short of the absolute was considered an
irredeemable defeat.
The Exposure of the Veakneesee in IRA Strategy in the Civil Var
In spite of the objections to the Treaty, it was never made clear by the
doctrinaire republicans how they proposed to extract better terms from the
British. Instead, the anti-Treatyites sustained their opposition with
nebulous appeals such as that contained in The Nation which promised that
'if the Republicans win out', then the, 'rotteness of British imperialism will
no longer corrupt the hearts of the weak people here.' The Nation went on:
'Think what a rapid growth of our great nation XUST follow the break with
England. Is this not worth any temporary sacrifice?'° The pragmatists
suspected that 'temporary sacrifice' meant plunging Ireland back into war
with Britain without any defined purpose. These suspicions were confirmed
by the reported remarks of Eamon de Valera at a meeting in Cork in February
1922, in which he had declared that Ireland should be prepared 'to go
another round in the race'.' The pro-Treatyltes attacked any such intim-
ations of further conflict as an 'insane gamble' that would jeopardise the
gains already made under the Treaty 'on the remote chance of our being able
80. 'Civil Var the Greater Evil', The Nation, No. 2, 1922.
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- 128 -
to worst England in a physical struggle, in which England this time will not
be hampered in her .wodus operandi by any considerations as to what the rest
of the world may think.' Later In larch, de Valera was even more
explicit when he warned that 'In order to achieve freedom' the anti-Treaty
IRA would have 'to march over the dead bodies of their own brothers.'
The probability of civil strife suggested by de Valera was really the
Inevitable result of the intractable divisions over the Treaty. In larch
1922 the split between the two republican factions was formalised when a
General Convention of the IRA, attended mainly by anti-Treatyites, repudiated
the authority of the Dali and elected its own executive. The anti-Treaty
IRA, or 'Irregulars' as they were called, set up their headquarters In the
centre of Dublin, In an area known as the Four Courts, in defiance of the
Free State government. Pressed by the British to deal with the Irregulars,
the Free State besieged the Four Courts on 28 June 1922. This signalled
the beginning of the Irish civil war which lasted until lay 1923 and cost an
estimated 600 killed and 3000 wounded.
The Irregulars were quickly driven out of Dublin and back to their
strongholds in the South and Vest, where they reverted to the same type of
guerrilla tactics used in the Anglo-Irish war. Yet the outbreak of host-
ilities exposed the insubstantial nature of the IRA's strategic thinking.
There is no conspicuous evidence to indicate that the IRA had any distinct
ideas about how to apply the military instrument to achieve Its political
objectives. The most plausible explanation of the IRA's conduct was that it
was attempting to draw Britain back into Ireland. This might have enabled
the republican factions to reunite and resist the common enemy.
	 Certain-
ly , the general tenor of anti-Treaty propaganda during the civil war seemed
82. Ibid..
83. B. de Valera, Speech in Kilarney 18 larch 1922, in K. Noynihan (ed.),
Speeches and Stte.ments by Eawon de Yalera 1917-1973 (DublIn, 1980),
pp. 103-104.
84. Beaslai, Vol. II, p. 401.
- 127 -
to imply that this may have been the intention:
Var with united forces against England Is preferable to civil war - so
the people thought; but (William] Coegrave (the Free State Prime Minister]
does not think so. He who was so timid against the English is most
fierce against his fellow countrymen. He who was unwilling to spend the
economic resources of war against England cannot bring himself to make
peace to save the resources of Ireland, resources which will be wasted In
a war against his fellow countrymen, whom he can never beat.
It is difficult to envisage how any plan to reinvolve Britain could
have been tenable. The pragmatists had always felt that further conflict
with Britain could only end In 'a new parley with the enemy under infinitely
worse conditions.' The Free Staters thought that the Irregulars' object-
ive in the civil war was to 'compel the country, thus shattered and disorg-
anised, to take up arms once more against the ordered and disciplined power
of the British Empire.'' The prospect of fighting a double war, one to
unite the republican movement and another against the British, was regarded
with horror, as the pro-Treaty newspaper, The Irish People emphasised: 'The
leaders - the Inventors of this policy - can hardly be considered sane.
The astonishing thing is that they have succeeded In Inducing any sane man
to follow them.' The Free State's room for manoeuvre was very limited.
With the British unlikely to tolerate any accommodation between the two
republican factions which broke the terms of the Treaty, It was unclear how
Irregular resistance could have inspired a change In attitude by the Free
State.	 Besides, the very basis of the pragmatists' case rested on the
argument that the Treaty gave Ireland the substance of independence and
protected the people from ar-med British reinterventIon.
	 With their key
objectives satIsfied, the praginatists could not realistically be expected to
acquiesce to the return of the British.
	 Such a prospect, it was feared,
would not only inflict more suffering and hardship, but under such
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circumstances, the British might even be welcomed back as peace keepers by
the bulk of the Irish population.'0
In actuality, the doctrinaires' alternative to the Treaty did not
encompass any concrete design to lead Ireland from the Treaty to something
tangibly better, rather they were holding out the profoundly metaphysical
reward of maintaining the purity of the republican ideal. Appealing to the
Irish people to reject the Treaty, the doctrinaire republicans issued the
following entreaty:
...you are asked, asked simply, by the historic nation speaking through
its protagonists In our time to remain true to the spiritual inheritance
of Nationality that has been handed down to you through the ages, and
preserve it, and pass it on to your children, pure, unsullied and uncomp-
romised, as you receive it from the man who fought and fell in Baster
Week and as they received it from the freedom fighting generations that
preceded them."
Similarly, right at the start of the civil war the Irregulars tried to rally
support by invoking the devotional mysticism of republican ideology: 'The
sacred spirits of the Illustrious Dead are with us in this great struggle.
"Death before Dishonour", being an unchanging principle of our national faith
as it was theirs, still inspires us to emulate their glorious effort."2
One can gather from the appeals to the tradition of heroic martyrdom
that the military instrument, as practised by the IRA in the civil war, was
not wielded as a functional tool to make political headway on the Treaty, but
as a means of preserving historical continuity in order to make another
violent stand to ensure the apostolic succession. This understanding is
important as it helps us to comprehend a possible strategic rationale for
the doctrinairee' conduct in the civil war. In particular, it helps to
answer the question as to why the anti-Treaty IRA continued to prosecute the
war for a further ten months In the face of overt public hostility? After
all, the Treaty settlement had been ratified by the Dail and approved by the
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people in the elections of June 1922 which returned a large majority of pro-
Treaty representatives. If the doctrinaires were purely interested in
making a token stand against the Treaty as a marker for future republican
generations, then they could just as well have retired, honour satisfied,
after the initial fighting in Dublin. 	 The reason for the IRA's persistence
can be discovered with reference to the ideological underpinnings of the
republican strategic tradition. Of special relevance in this respect were
the concepts of absolutism and the nationalist vanguard. It has been ment-
ioned above that any solution which did not provide for the absolute fulfil-
ment of republican goals was unacceptable In the minds of many doctrinaires,
The Treaty was rejected out of hand. It did not matter how public opinion
regarded the settlement. Their loyalty was to the republican vision, not to
the Irish people. The doctrinaire outlook simply did not admit the possib-
ility that changes in popular attitudes could affect their strategic calculus.
So they felt no need to moderate or adapt their views to take account of
changing political conditions, because no individual or group had the right
to place restrictions on Irish independence, as do Valera stated plainly: 'The
majority have no right to do wrong.' 93
 In this sense, the civil war meant
very different things to each side. For the Free State the central issue of
the war was the 'defence of the rights and liberties of the Irish people...
against the attempt by an armed band to rule by virtue of their revol-
vers.'9' For the anti-Treatyites, the war was the continuation of the
eternal struggle between those who wanted the unalloyed republic and those
who would traitorously oppose it.
Although many republicans saw their actions as an expression of pri-
vate morality rather than as an outgrowth of popular feeling, they did
believe that a violent stimulus administered to the body politic could also
93. Quoted in J. Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State (Alabama, 1980),
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serve a direct strategic purpose by drawing out the latent republican symp-
athies of the Irish people. The precedent for this was the 1916 rising
which had succeeded in overcoming public hostility to help galvanise the
national effort in the Anglo-Irish war. It was the doctrinaires' belief
that the 1916 rIsing had 'washed the scales from the eyes of the Irish
people and enabled them again to see, and to follow the path, the only path,
that leads to liberty and Independence.' Similarly, the anti-Treatyites
hoped that exemplary violence, combined with republican mysticism, would
prove as effective in crystallising public support in the civil war as it had
been in the Anglo-Irish war. This belief is reflected in the anti-Treaty-
ites' literature during the civil war which was full of 1916 metaphors: 'the
Republic consecrated by Pear-se and Connally, and the dearest and noblest of
our patriots', proclaimed one anti-Treaty paper, 'is once more fighting for
its life. Citizens, defend your Republic." 6
 In the same way, the Irreg-
ulars attempted to appeal to the nationalistic feelings of the Free State
Army by comparing its role to that of the RIG in the Anglo-Irish war: 'The
RIG were Irishmen to whom England gave arms and orders. Are you any
better? You know in your hearts Pear-se did not die for the British Empire
...Are you going to murder those who carry on their work and the holy cause
for which they gave their lives?'97
 By evoking the Imagery of republican
martyrology, the anti-Treatyitee felt they could wean popular sentiment away
from the Free State. So the doctrinaire republican perspective did contain
a certain strategic logic, though not one which the Free Staters found esp-
ecially impressive. They heavily criticised the emphasis placed on the role
of the republican vanguard in doctrinaire thinking. They argued that most
people would reject the false analogies with 1916 and the Anglo-Irish war:
95. 'The IRA Stands True', The Plain People, 9 April 1922.
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In all developments that have taken place since the approval of the
Treaty, the Irregulars have shown a singular incapacity to see their own
position... They were convinced that they had only to imitate one or two
details (of the) tactics of the leaders of 1916 in order to induce an
indiscriminating public to accept unquestioningly the theory that they
were re-doing the work of the heroic men to whose courage and foresight
the success of the past six years is due. They will not get the support
and co-operation of the people 1
 they will never be looked upon as the
successors of the flying columns which harried the British last year and
the year before.
The events of the civil war bore out the pragmatists' analysis by
revealing the doctrinaires' flawed assumptions about violence as a mobi]ising
factor. Moreover, the war corroborated the pragmatists' argument about the
fragility of the republican military position in the Anglo-Irish war and the
constraints which that imposed on the ability to achieve political object-
Ives. It Is somewhat paradoxical that while the doctrinaires were readily
identifiable as the most bellicose of the two factions 1
 it was the pragma-
tists' willingness to accept the limitations of the republican capacity for
armed conflict with the British which betrayed the far more hard-headed
appreciation of the function of the military instrument in the political
process. The pragmatists saw themselves as heirs to the old Fenians, whom
they asserted 'recognised clearly the Influence of force', and who were 'out
to beat the enemy and were held back by no unsoldierly scruples." The
Fenlans, it was said, cared little for the fantasies of a mythical republic.
They were acute realists who were easily reconciled to the harsh world of
power politics: 'They knew that In international affairs It is the military
position which rules the issue. They did not waste time and eloquence
standing oratorically on the Rock of Right."°° In the civil war, the Free
State applied this philosophy with ruthless efficiency. On 2 October 1922
the Free State instituted special Military Courts to deal with those charged
with attacking, or conspiring to attack, the forces of the state.
	 Such
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offencee were to be punishable by death, penal servitude, imprisonment,
deportation, internment or fines.'0'
The Irregulars accused the Free State of being 'in exactly the same
position as the British Enemy were before the truce... The machinery is the
same; the lying propaganda; the midnight terrorism; the murder of prisoners
of ware These are England's methods."° 2
 Although there were certain simil-
arities, the direct comparison of the Free State's conduct with that of the
British in the Anglo-Irish war was inaccurate. For a start, the emergency
laws enacted by the Free State were far more repressive and systematically
applied than anything introduced by the British. The Free State's policy
towards the IRA was ferocious, By the end of the war 77 IRA men had been
executed, three times the number executed by the British between 1919 and
1921.02
	Yet the Irregulars' analogy with the repression of the British
illustrated the misapprehensions under which their campaign laboured. The
crucial point was that the implementation of the Treaty had altered the
political climate in Ireland which permitted the Free State to adopt sweep-
ing counter-insurgency measures without incurring the same negative poli-
tical consequences experienced by the British in the previous two years of
fighting. During the Anglo-Irish war, the IRA's greatest asset was the
solid backing, or at least toleration, it received from the majority of the
Irish people who identified themselves with the IRA's central aim of getting
rid of the British. After 1922, with the British gone from most of the
country, the IRA found it difficult to sustain the popularity of its cause.
With the endorsement of the Treaty at the polls, the Free State leader,
William Ccsgrave, was prepared to use his mandate to force the IRA to comply
with the popular will. He had made his intentions plain at the opening of
1O1.Free State Proclamation of Nilitary Courts and Offer of Amnesty, 10 Oct.
1922, reprinted in Xitchell and O'Snodalgh, pp. 148-150.
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the Irish parliament on 11 September 1922:
The Nation which has struggled so long against the most powerful foreign
aggression wi]]. not submit to an armed minority which makes war upon its
liberties... The National Army is prepared to pay the price 1 and so are
we... There is now no reason why blame should be shifted on the British
or any other Government blamed if we do not succeed. This Parliament
and this Government is of the People and expects to get that support
which is essential to a Government and a Parliament.'°
In effect, the new political atmosphere which the Treaty ushered in
stripped the IRA's strategy of its utility. Bolstered by domestic opinion
and by external support from the British, the Free State did not feel con-
strained in seeking a decisive military victory against the Irregulars. In
this context, the IRA's strategy, which aimed to disrupt the popular base of
the Free State through low level military actions, became all but meaning-
less. Such a strategy could only be successfully employed, as in the
Anglo- Irish war, as a result of some degree of forebearance on the part of
the stronger belligerent which would allow the weaker side to endure and
eventually break the opponent's political will. But if the stronger side
attaches few self-imposed restraints to its conduct then the conflict will
not be presented in these terms as there will be little or no moral dimen-
sion for the weaker side to exploit. The war will simply become a contest
over who has the ability to commit the greatest military resources to the
conflict. If the stronger belligerent is prepared to use its resources in a
brutal, and probably, to some extent, indiscriminate fashion, then all the
advantages a guerrilla organisation might have enjoyed will disappear as
small-scale raids will make little impression on a well armed and determined
adversary. This is what happened in the Irish civil war. The fierce
suppression of the Irregulars and their sympathisers denied them the opport-
unity to make political capital out of a protracted conflict as they simply
could not endure the overwhelming onslaught of the state.
104.Speech by V. Coegrave at the Opening of the Free State Parliament,
11 Sept. 1922, reprinted in Xitchell and O'Snodaigh, pp. 144-145.
- 134 -
The Development of Irish Republican Strategic Thought, 1918-1923 -
The Unifinished Revolution and the Incomplete Strategy
By early 1923, having been subjected to the unrelenting assault of the Free
State, the IRA reached the point of exhaustion. The conflict struggled on
until late April when the IRA finally succUmbed to the inevitable and sue-
pended offensive operations. De Valera, the nominal leader of the anti-
Treatyites, told his companions that further resistance would be useless.
'Xilitary victory', he said, 'must be allowed to rest for the moment with
those who have destroyed the Republic."05
The end of the Irish civil war brought to a close one of the most
Impassioned periods in the history of the republican movement. In summary,
then, what can we say about the movement's overall strategic development
between 1910 and 1923? In the first Instance, the 1916 rising solidified
republican strategic culture, reinforcing the conviction that the actions of
a nationalist elite standing In line as the successors of past republican
generations could, through their sacrifices, enthuse the bulk of the Irish
people to unite around a broad appeal for freedom. The events from 1916 to
1919 still resonate through the republican movement to this day as it is
from this epoch that later republicans would draw the inspiration to con-
tinue the fight to complete the unfinished task of national liberation. As
one republican tract of the mid-1970s put it, the IRA 'owes its allegiance...
to the 32-county independent Irish Republic as proclaimed in 1916 and
endorsed by the Dail in 1919. This is not the Free State; it has yet to be
achieved."°
The years between 1916 and 1921 also fortified the belief in armed
force as the primary means to achieve the republic. For many republicans,
the success of the IRA's campaign in the Anglo- Irish war in dislodging the
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106.O'Riain, Provc: Patriots or Terrorists?, p. 23.
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British from most of Ireland, served to authenticate Pearse's maxim that
'Ireland armed will attain ultimately as much freedom as she wants."°7
Faith in the military instrument was strengthened as a result of the enor-
mous innovations which took place at the tactical level. The younger, more
practical, generation of republican leaders, who emerged in the aftermath of
the 1916 rising, were, in the early months of 1919, able to weld the largely
extemporaneous violence of bands of Irish Volunteers into a coherent camp-
aign of action. This shifted the entire focus of the republican military
outlook. Conventional ideas of massed confrontations and decisive victories
were discarded in favour of much smaller military encounters which allowed
the movement to fight a war of extended duration. In consequence, the
guerrilla tactics of the Anglo-Irish war, the killing of policemen, soldiers,
attacks on military, government and economic targets, and so on, became
enshrined in republican military methodology.
Ultimately, though, the development of republican strategy in this per-
lad can only be described as partial because innovations in military tech-
niques were not accompanied by any new thinking at the political level. It
was this point that caused the Internal divisions over republican strategy
and which led Ireland into civil war. The pragmatists in the movement were
able to accept that the new guerrilla orientated strategy could only be used
as a limited pressurising tool to extract concessions from the British. In
their view, to make advances towards political objectives, republicans would
have to show flexibility in their dealings with the British.
	 To the doc-
trinaires this was heterodoxy. For them, the entrenchment of republican
ideology in the wake of the 1916 rising reinforced their antagonism to com-
promise. Concessions from the British were taken as a sign of the efficacy
of violent methods, not as a means of reaching some half-baked deal with
their sworn enemy. The failure of the Treaty to live up to the idealism of
107.Quoted in Adams, A Pathway to Peace, p. 54.
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Pearse, Connolly and all the other republican sages, merely hardened their
resolve to carry on.
For that section of the movement calling itself the IRA, which would
continue the struggle into the civil war, the period from 1916 to 1921 left
it dogmatic, inflexible and unable to detect the limits upon its capacity to
achieve its objectives with its chosen methods. For example, as late as
April 1923, when it was evident that the IRA was near to defeat, its Chief
of Staff, Liaii Lynch, still believed victory was possible. Florence
O'Donoghue was prompted to comment that Lynch's 'appreciation of the mili-
tary situation was more optimistic than the facts warranted... He could not
and would not face the thought of defeat and collapse of Republican resist-
ance to the imposition of the Treaty."°
What the civil war illustrated above all was the Inability of the IRA
to critically appraise the utility of armed force in the context in which it
sought to practise it. The IRk's campaign appeared to be governed, not
with reference to what was realistically attainable through violence, but by
ideological imperatives which suggested that the true republic could be
achieved through Immediate resort to arms with hardly any thought to the
consequences, chances of success, or of more effective alternatives. Thus,
the IRA Ignored one of the most basic strategic principles, that political
circumstances will, almost inevitably, affix limits to what Is obtainable
with the military instrument. This stood in contrast to the IRA's campaign
in the Anglo-Irish war. Pragmatic leaders like Xichael Collins and Richard
Nulcahy were able to appreciate the confines of their strategy. The prof-
iciency of the IRA's campaign between 1919 and 1921 rested on the premise
that the more powerful enemy would In some way feel restrained, for poii-
tical or moral reasons, from bringing the full force of its superiority to
bear on its weaker opponent. The skill of the IRA's conduct depended on
108.Quoted in B. Neeson, The Civil War in Ireland (Cork, 1966), p. 197.
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the manipulation of military engagements to affect political perceptions in
Britain to an extent that caused influential sections of British opinion to
question the wisdom of Britain's policy in Ireland. Therein lay the main
weakness of this type of low intensity strategy, a weakness that the IRA
failed to heed in the civil war, which was that the strategy relied exclus-
ively on the exploitation of the psychological, rather than the destructive
effects, of armed action, thereby rendering such strategies vulnerable to
those who were willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest purely
in terms of the tangiblee of military power. As Clausewitz noted:
If the political aims [in war] are small, the motives slight and tensions
low, a prudent general may look for any way to avoid major crises and
decisive actions, exploit any weaknesses in the opponent's military and
political strategy, and reach a peaceful settlement, If his assumptions
are sound and promise success we are not entitled to criticise him. But
he must never forget he is moving on a devious path where the god of war
may catch him unawares.'°
1O9,Clausawitz, On War, p. 9.
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CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL COITROL VERSUS THE AlflOIOXOUS JILITARY IISTRUJ(EJT -
IRISH REPUBLICAJ STRATEGY FROI THE CIVIL WAR TO 1970
The difficulty the IRA had in the civil war of recognising the limitations of
its strategy raises wider questions about the political control of the mili-
tary Instrument. It was stressed in the introduction that one of the fund-
amental tenets of strategic theory was that for war to be instrumental It
cannot exist outside the realms of policy. If the political motive Is
obliterated then war becomes an independent dynamic practised for its own
sake rather than to achieve specific objectives. In fact, the notion of war
as an expression of political purpose is a truism.
	 How can it be other-
wise? No war has ever been the product of a spontaneous outbreak of mean-
ingless violence.	 For any belligerent to wage a war, it must have some
political rationale.	 The rationale may not be especially convincing when
placed under close scrutiny, but nevertheless, the war will be fought for a
particular reason. So when we talk about warfare as a continuation of
policy as an issue in strategic theory, we are not arguing about the pres-
ence of a political motive, rather, we are questioning the quality of the
political control exercised in war. The degree of political influence can
play a large part in shaping a conflict as the scale of the political
demands sought through war will help determine both the military objectives
and the effort necessary to achieve them.
The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to explore the relationship
within the republican movement between political control and the practice of
the military instrument with reference to the period from the 1920s to the
early 1970s. The shifting balance between military and political consid-
erations during these decades was to have a crucial effect on the develop-
ment of republican strategic thinking, the repercussions of which continued
to reverberate well beyond the 1970s. Since this chapter covers some 50
- 139 -
years of republican history, it should be underlined that the analysis will
not simply be a recitation of IRA activity during this era. The focus of
this enquiry will be on key phases within this time frame in order to show
how particular tensions and problems of the politico-military relationship
impacted on republican strategy and how the movement tried to resolve them.
This chapter begins by assessing the strains which developed between
the political and military elements of the republican movement during both
the Anglo-Irish war and the Irish civil war. The chapter goes on to chart
the decline of political control over the military instrument after the civil
war and to explain how this degraded the quality of republican strategic
anlaysie over the next four decades. The study also evaluates the attempt
to restore a sense of political balance in the 1960s when the IRA leadership
undertook an extensive strategic review. Consideration is given to the
internal dissension which this review provoked among sections of the move-
ment. In addition, the analysis looks at the extent to which disagreements
over strategic priorities were exacerbated by the crisis in Northern Ireland
in the late 1960s and how far such disagreements contributed to the split in
republican ranks which was to lead to the creation of the Provisional IRA.
To finish off, the analysis briefly assesses how the Official IRA mangaged
successfully to extricate itself from an overt military posture during the
early stages of the Northern Ireland conflict, so leaving the future course
of the armed struggle firmly in the hands of the Provisionals.
Unlike political entities like sovereign states where there is usually a
clear distinction between executive authority and the armed forces, amongst
sub-state groups fighting for power it is often difficult to determine the
exact source of political control. However, from the IRA's initial pron-
ouncements at the outset of the Anglo-Irish war the organisation's status
within the republican struggle appeared, at first glance, to be quite obvious.
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In August 1918, the newspaper An t-Oglach said that the Irish Volunteers
were a 'military body pure and simple' mere 'agents of the national will."
Similarly, in January 1919 the paper stated that if the Volunteers 'are
called on to shed their blood in defence of the new-born Republic, they will
not shrink from the sacrifice.
	 For the authority of the nation is behind
them, embodied in a lawfully constituted authority'.2
 The implication of
such announcements suggested that the 'lawfully constituted authority' resid-
ed in the elected representatives of the 'national will', namely, the Dail.
In reality, the situation was more complicated. Far from a harmonious
symbiosis, the relationship between the Dali and the IRA was ill-defined and
tense because for all practical purposes the two were separate organisations
following complementary, but unco-ordinated, policies.
	 There was no better
illustration of this position than the outbreak of hostilities themselves in
early 1919, which took place without approval from the Dail. The Volun-
teers believed that the election of the Dali and its declaration of indepen-
dence had given them the right to pursue the republic in the manner they
saw f it.3
 This was indicated in the An t-Oglach article of January 1919,
which declared that the 'state of war' said to exist between Ireland and
England in the Dail's first official address was 'a fact which has been
recognised and acted on by the Volunteers almost from their lnception'.
As IRA raids grew, which in turn stimulated British repression, so the
Dali was presented with a falt accoinpli.	 Increasingly the members of the
Dail felt compelled to align themselves with the IRA's campaign. De Valera
admitted that there was no formal connection between the Dali and the IRA
when in April 1919 he announced that the Dail's Xinister of Defence, Gathal
1. Quoted in K. Nowlan, 'Dali Eireann and the Army: Unity and Division', in
Williams, The Irish Struggle, p. C9.
2. An t-Oglach, 31 Jan. 1919, reprinted in Hepburn, The Conflict of
Nationality in Nodern Ireland, p. 112.
3. Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland, pp. 331-332.
4. An t-Oglach, 31 Jan. 1919, in Hepburn, p. 112.
- 141 -
Brugha, was only in 'close association with the voluntary military forces'.5
The oath of allegiance to the Dali of August 1919 was administered to the
IRA in order to give the impression that the military campaign was politic-
ally accountable. In practice, military operations continued unhindered by
any political strictures from the Dali. It was only towards the end of the
war that the Dali unreservedly accepted responsibility for the IRA's actions.
In an interview on 30 Xarch, 1921 de Valera stated:
The Army of the Republic is a recognised state force under civil control
of elected representatives of the people, with an organisation and discip-
line imposed by these representatives... The Government is, therefore,
responsible for the actions of this army. These are not acts of Irres-
ponsible Individual groups therefore, nor is the IRA, as the enemy would
have one believe, a praetorian guard. It is the national army of
defence,
The statement was a complete exaggeration of the Dali's influence over the
IRA. It was made for propaganda reasons. Without sanction from the Dali,
the IRA's campaign could come to be seen by the outside world as an uncon-
trolled series of sporadic murders rather than the actions of an authentic
national-liberation movement. Therefore, by openly endorsing the IRA the
Dali could strengthen its bargaining position, as the image of a unified
political and military organisation would make it more difficult for the
British to use the negotiating process to drive wedges through the movement.
Although the moves to establish the Dali's seniority were only paper
resolutions to put a veneer of political respectability on the military camp-
aign, they were, nevertheless, still resisted by many In the IRA, Even the
politically astute Xlchael Collins was hesitant over the introduction of the
Dali's oath of allegiance, fearing it would allow civilian control of military
policy.7	 He was later to refer to those in the Dali like, de Vaiera, as
'irresponsible meddlers' whom he felt were more concerned with criticising
5. Quoted in Hachy, Britain and Irish Separatism, p. 269.
0. Quoted in Carty, Ireland from the Great Famine to the Treaty, 1951-1921,
p. 202.
7. Jowlan, 'Dali Eireann and the Army', p. 70.8. Quoted in O'Broin, kichael Collins, p. 68.
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the IRA than with defeating the British, Nany IRA members felt it was they
who were the leading edge of the struggle. It was they who were taking on
the British, suffering the hardship and making the sacrifices. They did
not feel the need to cede control of the struggle to anyone outside the IRA,
even if it was in name only. The essence of the IRA's attitude was cap-
tured by Liam Lynch, who was later to become the organisations' Chief of
Staff in the civil war, who remarked that: 'The Army has to hew the way for
politics to follow.'
The poor state of intra-republican civil-military relations was sharp-
ened in the months preceding the civil war. It was the firm belief of Rory
O'Connor, the leader of the anti-Treaty IRA, that 'the army should be kept
apart from politics under separate control'.' 0
 Indeed, with the repudiation
of the Dail in larch 1922, and the introduction of a new IRA constitution in
April 1922, the IRA arrogated to itself the prerogative to act unilaterally
'to protect the rights and liberties common to the people of Ireland'."
During the civil war, following de Valera's recommendation, a republican gov-
ernment was set up in October 1922 to present a political face to the Irish
people. De Valera believed that it was necessary to 'provide a rallying
point and a centre of direction to co-ordinate various efforts in various
fields to maintain the Republic." 2
 Such a government was considered ess-
ential to try to win back the support of the people which de Valera recog-
nised was 'by far the greatest weakness of our cause at the moment.'13
Even so, the republican government was a cosmetic exercise and formed too
late to have any effect on anti-Treatyites' position. Real power continued
to reside with the IRA Executive. In any case, de Valera's civilian role in
9. Quoted in Kee, The Green Flag, p. 661.
10. R. O'Connor, Statement to press, 26 April 1922 cited in lacardle, The
fish Republic, p. 725.
11. Quoted in Jiacardle, p. 721.
12. 5. de Valera, Ieaorandum to IRA Executive, 12 Oct. 1922, reprinted in
Jitchell and O'Snodaigh, Irish Political Documents', p. 146.
13. Ibid., p. 147.
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the civil war aroused just as much suspicion within the ranks of the IRA as
it had done in the Anglo-Irish war. Rory O'Connor had even remarked that
he was 'no more prepared to stand for de Valera than for the Treaty." In
fact, the formation of the republican government made relations between the
civil and military wings worse as de Valera resented having to accept public
responsibility for the IRA while being denied any influence over its
actions.' E
The IRA's conduct during the civil war was a prime demonstration of
how the absence of overt political counsel could affect a military organ-
isation's strategy. There is no evidence that the IRA had thought much
about how to use its military resources to proceed from the Ireland of the
Treaty to the full independence of the true republic.
	 'len did not know
what they were fighting for', opined the veteran republican, Peadar O'Donnell,
about the IRA's campaign in the civil war.'	 He observed that there was no
IRA strategy worth speaking of, only a simple faith that the republic needed
to be protected. The 'devout men' of the IRA., as O'Donnell called them,
'were just not capable of coming down from the high ground of the Treaty.
On the simple ground of their allegiance to the Republic, such men would
have taken their stand and accepted martyrdom." 7
 What O'Dqnnell was sugg-
esting, was that the IRA's actions did not reflect a coherent plan of action
but rather a pre-conditioned ideological reflex to use violence to defend the
mythical republic. This was certainly borne out by the IRA's conduct in the
war which was bereft of proper planning. 	 For example, the IRA's general
headquarters had little control over day-to-day operations which were large-
ly determined by local units.' 	 Yet the IRA's confidence in the efficacy
14.Quoted in Beaslai, Xichael Collins and the Naking of a New Ireland,
p. 369.
15.Jeeson, The Civil War in Ireland, p. 184.
16.Quoted in I. Icinerney, Peadar OT)onnell (Dublin, 1974), p. 71.
17.Quoted in ibid., p. 72.
18.Hopkinson, Green Against Green, p. 174.
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of force led it to believe that the simple exertion of military pressure, no
matter how unco-ordinated, would enable it to dictate terms.'
The lack of political steering destroyed any real hope for the IRA in
the civil war, as the vague commitment to expunge British influence and
unite Ireland did not inform any readily attainable military objectives. If
there are no specific objectives in war then the terms of military success
cannot be defined, nor can a basis for compromise or negotiations be estab-
lished. In all wars individual tactical engagements provide the means to
reach intermediate military aims which are themselves the means to obtain
the ultimate objective in war. The enunciation of clear and realistic poli-
tical goals are vital to establish the relationship between the final object
in war and the intermediate stages. In this respect, the poor quality of
political guidance in the civil war unhinged the IRA's campaign as it was
never spelled out how tactical engagements related to the achievement of the
overall strategic goal,
The Decline of Political Control Over the Jilitary Instrument in the 1920s
and 1930s
Irish republican strategy, then, from the Anglo-Irish war to the civil war
evolved, in the main, independently from either internal or external poli-
tical control. Despite the disaster of the civil war, the experience was to
reinforce, rather than dilute, republican idealism in the following years.
This was exhibited in the movement's analysis of its failure in the civil
war, which focused on narrow problems of tactics and organisation rather
than reflecting on whether insufficient political support or the unrealistic
expectations of its strategy also played their part. For example, one iRA
commander criticised the movement for its use of guerrilla tactics and for
not exploiting its superiority in the initial weeks of the war by launching
19. Ibid., pp. 128-129.
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an offensive against Free State forces. In his view, the IRA failed because
It 'continued to use the methods adopted by the British to meet an entirely
changed situation', and because it lacked the 'unifying machinery', such as a
general staff, which could co-ordinate 'resources as they should have been
used.'3° So what were the elements which made the republican movement so
politically unresponsive, with all the negative effects this implied for the
IRA's strategic development over the next twenty years?
The course that the republican movement had charted after the civil war
appeared set. Its publicity reaffirmed the belief that it was in 'the armed
citizens of the broken nation that the deepest hope of the people rests', and
that the movement's duty was to build up the IRA in order 'to pick up again
the unfinished task of breaking the British connection'.21 However, there
were more politically minded elements, mainly within the anti-Treaty faction
of Sinn Fein under de Valera, who looked for other ways to advance the re-
publican cause. De Valera persuaded the movement to contest the 1923 gen-
eral election in which Sinn Fein did surprisingly well by winning 44 seats.
But the absolutist nature of republican ideology meant that the movement was
unable to scan other available options, which in itself was a manifest
expression of the lack of political leadership.	 Unity and sovereignity
could only be obtained through armed force. Therefore, the notion of
constitutional participation was foreclosed from the start, a fact which
inhibited the general fertilisation of political ideas within the movement.
Although Sinn Fain's performance in the 1923 election revealed consid-
erable sympathy for a mare nationalistic alternative to the pro-Treaty gov-
ernment of the Cumann na nGaedheal party, abstention from electoral politics
held out little prospect of progress within a functioning democracy like the
Free State.	 Xany Sinn Fain pragmatists were frustrated by the ideological
20. Captain V., 'IRA In 1922', AP, 25 Xarch 192?.
21. 'The Army and its Task', AF, 29 Oct. 1926.
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rigidities of republican doctrine. It had been evident, even after the split
over the Treaty, that sections of the anti-Treatyites were unhappy at the
IRA's inability to square its ab6olute demands for a republic with its actual
military capabalities. Dissatisfaction was expressed by de Valera when he
wrote during the civil war, in late 1922, that: 'What guerrilla warfare leads
to is a desire on our opponents' part to come to terms with us, provided
these terms do not mean complete surrender by him to us, which is unfortun-
ately what we require.' The subsequent years in the political wilderness
convinced many Sinn Rein members that the opportunities for accomplishing
republican goals through the constitutional process were sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant a tactical reassessment. Fundamentally, they believed
that force could no longer serve a useful purpose within the structure of the
Free State. De Valera argued in 1926, that 'a nation within itself ought to
be able to settle its polity so that all occasions of civil conflict between
its members may be obviated ',aa
The pragamatists view implied ditching the policy of abstention and
accepting that political flexibility would be necessary to gain popular
support for constitutional changes. Clearly, such an advocacy meant trav-
ersing the quagmire of traditional republican philosophy which specifically
rejected any move that would give recognition to what was regarded as the
illegal Southern parliament. At the IRA Convention of November 1925, the
merest hint that de Valera and his colleagues were thinking about the
possibility of entering the Irish parliament was enough to prompt the IRA to
sever its links with Sinn Rein, because, in the words of the resolution:
...the Government (Sinn Fain] has developed into a mere political party
and has apparently lost sight of the fact that all our energies should be
22. Quoted in Earl of Longford and T. O'Neill, Eamon de Valera (London,
1970), p. 210.
23. Quoted in R. Fanning, "The Rule of Order": Eamon de Valera and the IRA,
1923-40', in .7. O'Carroll and .7. Xurphy (ads.), De Valera and His Times
(Cork, 1923), p. 161.
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devoted to the all-important work of making the Army efficient so that
the renegades who, through a coup d'etat, assumed governmental powers In
this country be dealt with at the earliest possible opportunity...
The convention consolidated control in the hands of the IRA Executive which
further reduced the level of political influence within the movement.
It was inconceivable that the Siun Fein pragmatists could prosper in
surroundings which were so antagonistic to peaceful political involvement.
So In 1926, de Valera and his followers withdrew from Sinn Fein to form a
new party, Pianna Fail, which entered the Irish parliament on 12 August
1927. Fianna Fail maintained that although force was Justified: 'There are
tines, as we all know when, because the odds are too enormous, or because
the opportunity for swift blows for liberty do not exist, the use of force
does not further the cause of national independence.' The 'kernel of Fianna
Fail policy', the party claimed, 'is to keep open for the people a constit-
utional way of winning their freedom', but emphasised that the goal remained
the same as the IRA's, 'namely, the wresting of the whole of Ireland from
foreign control and the establishment there of the full sovereignty of the
Irish people.'
Fianna Fail went on to become the mainstream party of the Irish polit-
ical establishment, enjoying long periods of office under de Valera. Vhen
the party first came to power in 1932, it Immediately set about whittling
away at the Treaty's provisions.	 The oath of allegiance to the British
crown was abolished along with the office of Governor-General. In 1937 a
new constitution was introduced which claimed territorial jurisdiction over
the whole of Ireland and renamed the country Rire in place of the Irish Free
State.
The IRA's attitude to Fianna Fail was Initially ambivalent.
	 For a
while it seemed that the movement would recognise the party as its de facto
24. Draft Agenda for IRA Convention, 20 Nov. 1925, cited in Bowyer Bell,
The Secret Army, p. 53.
25, 'Force as a Xeane Towards Irish Freedom', The Nation, 14 Jan. 1928.
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electoral arm.
	 In mid-1927 the republican movement put forward proposals
which would enable the two organisations to co-operate in elections. The
IRA demanded that Fianna Fail members should pledge 'that they will not
enter any foreign controlled Parliament as a minority or a majority'.'
Instead, the IRA argued that if Fianna Fail won a majority of seats, a new
assembly should be convened which would repudiate the 1921 Treaty.
	 In
effect, this meant a continuation of the abstentionist policy.
	 Pianna Fail
spurned the IRA plan.	 In response, the IRA chose to restate its principle
belief that the goal of the republic could: 'more surely be achieved by the
means set forth in the Constitution, namely: 1 "Force of Arms."
	 2 "Org-
anising, training and equipping the manhood of Ireland as an effective mil-
itary force".'	 In addition, it was reiterated that 'the creation of a
revolutionary situation favourable for military action should be supported
actively by all Volunteers.'27
 Later, in the early thirties, the IRA openly
backed Fianna Fail in the hope that a Fianna Fail regime would be more tol-
erant of the movements' activities than the Cumman na nGaedheal govern-
ment. In actuality, though, there was little love lost between the two.
Once in office, Fianna Fail called on the IRA to disband. The IRA refused,
rejecting 'sentimental and meaningless pleas for unity', on the grounds that
'the ultimate aim upon which the Fianna Fail party was founded - the restor-
ation of the Republic of Ireland - seems to have been lost sight of.'
The rising popularity of Pianna Fail began to erode the republican
movement's support. In 1926 the movement was thought to have a membership
of around 20-25,000. By 1929 this had fallen to some 5,000.a0 The
spectre of impending political obscurity encouraged left-wing republicans,
26. 'Army Council Statement', AP, 3 June 1927.
27. Ibid..
28. See 'Oglaigh Ia h-Bireann [Irish Republican Army) - Manifesto to the
Irish People', AF, 14 Jan. 1933.
29. 'The Army Council State Basis for Unity', AP, 2 Sept. 1933.
30. Patterson, The Politics of Illusion, (London, 1989), P. 46.
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like Peadar O'Donnell and George Gilmore, to try to broaden the appeal of the
movement by hitching the nationalist standard to social policies which add-
ressed popular grievances. Socialist-republicans initially looked back for
inspiration to the writings of Liam Nellows, an IRA member executed by the
Free State in the civil war 1
 who had argued for the 'Republican political and
military outlooks to be co-ordinated.'3 '	 To that end he suggested that the
Dali's Democratic Programme of 1919, which declared the 'right of the people
of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland',
	 o be 'translated into something
definite' to ensure that the 'great body of the workers are kept on the side
of lndependenca.'	 By the mid-1920s socialist-republicans were becoming
increasingly prominent.
	 The break with Sinn Fain in late 1925 was engin-
eered in part by O'Donnell who believed that the party was a traditionalist
deadweight which would obstruct moves to radicalise the IRA. In 1931, to
facilitate his plans, O'Donnell set up a party of 'Workers and Working Far-
mers' called Saor Rire, which aimed at the 'mobilisation of the mass of the
Irish people behind a Revolutionary Government, for the overthrow of British
Imperialism and its allies in Ireland'.
	 Later in 1934 O'Donnell and
Gilmore tried to fashion a broader 'anti-imperialist' coalition called the
Republican Congrees. These developments necessitated some revision in
the role of the military instrument. By 1927 commentaries in An Phoblacht,
of which Peadar O'Donnell was editor, were beginning to question traditional
assumptions about the utility of physical force and to indicate the need for
a more politically responsive organisation. One article asserted that the
'superficial knowledge which most Irishmen have of their native country has
31. 'What Mellows Wrote in Xountioy', AP, 19 May 1934.
32. Democratic Programme of Dail Bireann (1919), reprinted in Mitchell and
O'Snodaigh, pp. 59-60.
33. 'What Mellows Wrote in Mountjoy'.
34, Patterson, pp. 28-29 and p. 44.
35. The Programme of Saor Hire (1931), reprinted in Mitchell and O'Snodaigh,
p. 185.
36. See The Republican Congress Manifesto (1931) reprinted in Mitchell and
O'Snodaigh, pp. 208-210.
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led to our boundless faith In the efficacy of guerrilla warfare as a means
of freeing this country.' 37 The article continued:
It is no uncommon thing to meet a patriotic Irishman, who, placing all of
our past heroes who fought against England in the same category, jumps to
the conclusion that as the cause for which they fought and the principles
which they held were, broadly speaking, the same, therefore the methods
of warfare which they used cannot be improved upon. The utter absurdity
of this proposition will be evident to everyone who realises that all
warfare and strategy must be placed on the living conditions of a
people.. .
The socialist-republican critique expanded into a fully-fledged advocacy to
'undo the British conquest' In all Its forms which entailed the dismantlement
of native Irish capitalism and the return of all 'wealth producing sources'
to the people.3
 All the same, the proponents of this programme were anx-
ious to retain the support of the conservative elements within the movement
by stressing that the nationalist and socio-economlc struggles were comple-
mentary, not exclusive, as George Gilmore sought to elucidate:
In answer to certain people who are suggesting that we are 'sullying the
flag' by Introducing 'bread-and-butter politics' and that we should keep
our movement on a higher and spiritual plane. I say that the spiritual
life of a nation is not a thing apart from its material welfare but that
it can be compared to a blossom growing from Its own roots.mo
By 1938 the republican movement's socialist initiatives had collapsed
in a welter of internal bickering and public indifference. 41 Both Saor Bire
and the Republican Congress were attempts to stem the flow of support
towards Fianna Fail which was becoming increasingly unsympathetic towards
the IRA, Following a resurgence in IRA activity in the South between Xarch
and April 1936, which resulted in the killings of a retired Royal Navy Vice-
Admiral and a Garda (police) officer, the organisation was declared Illegal
and its leaders arrested. Disillusionment with de Valera's Fianna Fail, and
with the failure of the movement's socialist excursions, hardened the
37. A. O'Donnell, 'Who Fights and Runs', AP, 25 Xarch 1927.
38. Ibid..
39. G. Gilmore, 'The Revolutionary Task', AP, 30 April 1932.
40. Ibid..
41. See B. Rumpf and A. Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth
Century Ireland (Liverpool, 1977), pp. 91-93.
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perception that the political road was a profitless one to travel.
	 This
feeling was strongly reflected among grass roots IRA members who were fed
up with their leaders' contorted and ineffective political manoeuvrings. It
was not altogether surprising that the leadership passed into the hands of
Sean Russell, an ardent militarist, who advocated a bombing campaign against
England. The election of Russell as Chief of Staff at the IRA Convention of
April 1938, caused the defection of people like Sean MacBride and the other
remaining politically dextrous minds still left in the movement. Even some
of the more thoughtful military elements, like Tom Barry, who disagreed with
the idea of a bombing campaign, left the movement for good.
Russell's plans came to fruition on 12 January 1939 when the IRA,
claiming the authority of the 'Government of the Irish Republic', delivered
an ultimatum to the British government which warned that unless its forces
were withdrawn from Ireland in four days, the IRA would 'reserve the right
of appropriate action without further notice'. The ultimatum was ignored
and on 16 January the bombings began. By the end of 1939 there had been
291 explosions which resulted in 7 deaths and 96 injuries. 4	The bombing
campaign was a graphic illustration of the paucity of strategic planning
induced by the loss of internal political guidance. 	 Mad there been such
firm guidance then the campaign might have at least identified some specific
military and political goals to be achieved by the bombings. As it was,
there was no co-ordinated targeting policy nor any attempt to engage in a
sustained propaganda dialogue with the British to continually remind them of
IRA demands. There is little to suggest that the IRA had any clear idea of
how its disparate bomb attacks would coalesce into an effective instrument
of pressure with which to achieve republican objectives.	 Presumably the
bombings were designed to cause sufficient panic and fear within British
42. IRA Ultimatum to British government, 12 Jan. 1939, reprinted in Mitchell
and O'Snodaigh, pp. 220-221.
43. Ireland, (Tom), Ireland Past and Present, p. 690.
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society to force the government to open negotiations on the ending of
partition. Essentially, the IRA was following along the similar sort of
lines as the unsuccessful Fenian dynamiters of the 1880s. Press reports at
the time noted that the campaign did not produce panic but merely aroused
anti-Irish feeling in Britain which helped usher in the Prevention of
Violence Act of July 1939 which permitted the deportation of IRA suspects.4'
In the seven months after the Act's introduction there were 145 expul-
sions.4 British pro-occupations with the far more threatening spectre of
the German conquest of Europe in World War II further diminished the effect
of the campaign, as was demonstrated by the muted response, both in Britain
and abroad, to the executions of two IRA men who had been convicted of
taking part in a bomb attack in Coventry which had killed five people,
Neither did the bombings generate much support in Ireland. Do Valera was
concerned to preserve Ireland's neutrality in World War II and did not want
reports of the IRA's intrigues with the Germans to give the British a
pretext to reoccupy the country.47 In a speech in Co. Cavan, in February
1940, de Valera denounced the IRA campaign by warning: 'These people may get
the country into a mess that the whole Irish people might not be able to get
out of.	 We sympathise with their ambitions, but we cannot allow that to
blind us to the consequences of their deeds.'
	 In January 1940, the Irish
government passed the Emergency Powers Act and immediately began interning
IRA members. By mid-1940 the bombing campaign had petered out under
pressure from special police and judicial measures in both Britain and
Ireland.
The absence of any real planning or direction in the bombing campaign
44. The New York Times, 11 Feb. 1940.
45. The Daily Herald, 10 Feb. 1940.
40. See The Nancheste.r Guardian, 9 Feb. 1940.
47. Fanning, pp. 169-170.
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was displayed when the IRA fell back on slogans as a strategic rationale.
With the start of World War II Russell declared, in October 1939, that
'England's difficulty-Ireland's opportunity has ever been the watchword of
the Gaol... Jaw is the time for Irishmen to take up arms and strike a blow
for the Ulster people.'° The notion of striking against Britain while she
was distracted by foreign entanglements had been elevated by the 1916 ris-
ing as It was felt that Britain's commitments during the First World War had
weakened its forces In Ireland and contributed to the rising's military
effectiveness. As a consequence, this aphorism was repeatedly promulgated
during the inter-war years as a standard for republican action: 'the simple
fact that Ireland's right to freedom imposes a duty to attempt to seize
freedom when the occasion offers... To let an opportunity to break the
British connection go by default would be a crime.., we are not free to dodge
such action when opportunity preeents.'' The military logic for such
justifications was unconvincing in the 1939 campaign because the imposition
of strict wartime security measures in Britain further hampered IRA
operations. On the political level, too, the hollowness of 'England's
difficulty- Ireland's opportunity' was also demonstrated because Britain's
immediate inclination towards Ireland in the early months of the Second
World War, as do Valera feared, was to use Ulster to invade Bire, not to hand
it over in exchange for a deal to end Irish neutrality.
Beneath the superficial catchcrys, the entire 1939 bombing enterprise
exposed the dominant influences which had come to exert themselves upon the
republican movement's thinking. Recourse to violence was evaluated not as
a method to achieve political objectives but almost as an impulse to satisfy
50. Quoted in 1. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA, 1939-1947 (DublIn,
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the ideological needs of the republican tradition,
	 Despite the political
dabblings of the 1930s, the pressure for military action had always been
there, and had been building up ever since the end of the civil war. In-
deed, in many respects, the republican tradition held little meaning without
its militarily confrontational bearing. The movement affirmed in 1928: 'The
position today is that a state of war exists between England and the Irish
Republic.., Until peace is made... Republicans will continue to work every-
where against England and English interests.' 	 These type of statements
were buttressed by constant exhortations which emphasised 'the right of the
armed manhood of Ireland to free the country' and that: 'It is not the
bargainers of relief but the soldiers of freedom that represent the wisdom
of the Irish people'.
The process by which the pressure for military action was allowed to
be vented untutored by rigorous strategic analysis can be traced back to the
concept of republican absolutism which insisted that the: 'Sovereignty and
Unity of the Irish Jation are inalienable and non-Judicable, and the irish
Republican Army cannot relinquish or surrender these fundamental national
principles, which are a sacred trust.B7 As we have noted earlier in this
study, the IRA's unfaltering devotion to these principles ruled out com-
promise on any aspect of the republican agenda and precluded involvement in
the parliamentary institutions of Ireland for fear of contaminating its
ideological commitment to the republican struggle. The republican world of
doctrinal absolutes proved an inhospitable environment for those of a prag-
matic disposition. The essence of the republican experience from the 1920s
to the late 1930s therefore reflected the gradual paring away of all the
layers of political influence, as those pragmatic elements which sought to
54. 'IRA Attitude Towards Britain', AP, 31 Xarch 1928.
55. X. Twomey, 'The Task of the IRA', AP, 3 Dec. 1932.
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challenge the movement's ideological parameters in search of more effective
ways of facilitating republican goals eventually felt compelled to disass-
ociate themselves from the movement. Beginning with the original division
over the 1921 Treaty, the process was followed later by the break with Sinn
Fein and the Fianna Fail split, with the final haemorrhage taking place after
the IRA Convention of 1938. Each successive defection enhanced the defer-
ence to republican orthodoxy of those who remained and further compressed
the movement's strategic thinking into a narrow framework from which it was
progressively harder to deviate. 	 The systematic diminution of political
influence over the IRA allowed ideological pressures to override dispass-
ionate calculations of the organisation's actual military potential. Arg-
uably, the key event in this regard was the break with Sinn Fein in 1925
which cut off the iRA from its only link with a tangible political con-
stituency. Vith all control over IRA policy centred within its own Army
Council, the steady slide towards the 1939 campaign proceeded unchecked by
any non-military source which, theoretically at least, might have been able
to align the IRA's military capabilities with more limited, but attainable,
political goals.
Besides the internal ideological dynamic which spurred the IRA to uiili-
tary action, the 1939 bombing campaign can also be seen as a symptom of the
movement's desperation to break out of the political isolation imposed by
the rising popularity of Fianna Fail. By gearing up to mount a military
campaign, the IRA could hope to out-manoeuvre Fianna Fail on the question of
Irish unification where the party's commitment seemed least convincing.
It is possible that for this reason the republican movement was at pains to
deny that it was simply an armed clique hankering after a piece of the
action. According to a statement issued by the Army Council in 1933:
58. 8. Grout, Irish Nationalism (Dublin, 1980), p. 160.
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The Irish Republican Army is not a militarist caste. It springs from
the people and arises out of their natural desire for national freedom,
and out of their intense need to be relieved from Imperial exploitation.
The Army is the leadership and the vanguard of the historic struggle for
national freedom and for economic liberation.&
Yet this statement went on to confuse the IRA's pretensions to represent the
people with its adherence to its own private morality when it added 'that
the Irish Republican Army exists to serve the interests of the Irish Nation
and to free the people from political subjection and economic exploit-
ation.'° The fact that the IRA's concept of the 'Irish Nation' patently did
not enjoy demonstrable mass support merely emphasised how much of a loose
cannon the organisation had become within Irish politics. As the Army
Council statement implied, the IRA claimed the right to employ violence in
any way it chose to achieve its objectives. Yet by defining its role so
narrowly as a military organisation dedicated to the nationalist cause, the
IRA undermined its ability to attract the necessary public support and
resources to sustain a prolonged military campaign, so reducing its power to
reach its objectives. In this sense, the 1939 bombing campaign can be seen
not as a serious attempt to advance the nationalist cause, but as a sign of
the movement reverting to type as a vehicle for preserving the doctrinal
purity of the republican vision.
	 Thus the bombing campaign underscored
that a 'militarist caste' was exactly what the IRA had become.
Towards a Self-Perpetuating Itlitary Tradition - The 1956-62 Border Var
The quality of republican strategic thinking would never prove quite so
barren as it was in the 1939 campaign. Bven so, the IRA's next military
venture in the 1950s verified that the sort of inwardly generated pressures
which gave rise to the bombing campaign were not unique to the time but
endemic to the process of republican strategic formulation.
	 During the
59. 'The Army Council Manifesto', AP, 22 April 1933.
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1940s and 1950s the same impetus to initiate hostilities against Britain was
established.	 This time the accent was placed on tackling the problem of
unification at source, Northern Ireland. Articles in the republican press
listed the iniquities of partition and focused attention on the province as
the kingpin of Britain's attempt to preserve 'her own selfish interests and
prestige'' in Ireland. Republican rhetoric on this issue was also accom-
panied by more traditional rallying calls which proclaimed that the 'time
has come in this country to again state the demand of the Irish Nation in
clear unmistakable terms.' 	 The insinuations were obvious, that the scene
was being set for another military confrontation.
Actual planning for the next campaign began in 1950 and the six years
that were to siapse before hostilities opened in 1950 did ensure that as a
technical undertaking it was a better organised affair. The ala was to
infiltrate IRA units Into the largely nationalist border regions of Northern
Ireland from where attacks could be mounted in order to paralyse the civil
administration in those areas. Promising auguries were also offered by the
large measure of popular steam built-up behind the nationalist cause. Sinn
Fein had been reactivated as the IRA's political arm in 1948 and during the
mid-1950s it campaigned vigorously in Northern Ireland. in the Westminster
elections of May 1955 the party receIved 152,310 votes which constituted
virtually the entire nationalist electorate In the North, and In the process
won two seats for abstentionist candidates. Sinn Fein hailed the vote as a
landmark in its 'campaign to organise all Irishmen into one united people to
end forever British occupation and influence in Ireland.' For these
reasons the movement was able to strike an up-beat note In its first pro-
nouncement after the campaign had begun on 11 December 1950.
	 'This fight',
the movement confidently predicted, 'will be won when the united strength of
1. P. NacLogain, 'Partition - its Cause and Consequences', UI, May 1948.
2. S. O'Xelly, 'The United Irishmen Were Republicans', UI, July/Aug. 1948,
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our people is thrown in the scales against British imperialism... The enemy's
bridgehead is weakening. We hope that in the months to come it will
crumble completely.'
From these reasonably auspicious beginnings the IRA's border war slow-
ly, but progressively over a period of five years, ran into the ground. The
tendency to elitism in republican ideology rose to the fore in the campaign
as the major factor that dulled the movement's political senses and which
helped contrive to fritter away the nationalist sympathy established in the
two years preceding the outbreak of the conflict. The first symptom of
this elitism was that it was never made plain at the start of the war
exactly what the violence was meant to achieve politically. Only a very
generalised explanation was provided some three months into the campaign in
an interview with an IRA officer who stated that the purpose of the attacks
were threefold: '(1) To spotlight... (that a] part... (of 3 Ireland is still
occupied by British troops, (2) that (the] occupation is bitterly resented by
80?. of the whole Irish people and by almost 40% of the people in the six
occupied counties', and finally, '(3) We aim to rally our people in their
resistance to the occupation forces and to make the occupation difficult,
costly and impo6sible.' It was a characteristic exposition of the repub-
lican attitude towards the role of force in politics. Violence was seen as
an agitationary instrument that would solidify public support into a cohes-
ive expression of mass opposition to British involvement in Ireland. This,
in turn, would be reflected through increased republican military activity1
with either the tacit or open backing of the Southern government and so
further embroil the British in a general conflagration in the Worth. As in
the Anglo-Irish war, the combination of financial and domestic political
pressure would, it was believed, eventually force Britain out.
64. 'Revolt in the North', UI, Jan. 1957.
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The movement's self-image as the trail-blazer of Irish nationalism
governed the way it viewed the large Sinn Fein vote of 1955. Rather than
regarding it as a manifestation of broad Catholic discontent in Northern
Ireland, a popular base to be developed and fashioned towards specific re-
publican objectives, it was seen, instead, as a straight licence for military
action. Once the campaign was underway, no effort was made to retain and
nurture nationalist confidence through, say, an effective propaganda of fan-
sive to fully explain the motives of the IRA's strategy, or the formulation
of economic and social programmes to appeal to the population at large.
Admittedly, the banning of Sinn Fein in the North in the first days of the
conflict would have undoubtedly hindered any such attempts, but the move-
ment's basic reluctance to build up a more solid political profile was
apparent in the public pronouncements of its members, as evinced in the
following comments made by Sinu Fein President, Padraig NacLogain, in his
address to the party's annual Ard-Fheis (conference) in 1957:
Quite frequently Sinn Fein is bitterly attacked because of an alleged
failure to put its policy and programme before the people and abide their
decision. Such attacks are but a further example of the quibbling in-
dulged in by the opponents of our movement. In paint of fact Sinn Fain
as a national organ isat ion puts its policy before the people on both
sides of the Border and gives them the opportunity of signifying their
attitude towards the restoration of the unity and independence of
Ireland
The tone of these remarks implied that not only did the movement take the
large vote for Sinn Fein as approval for a military campaign, but also as an
endorsement of the general 1eitmoti' of the republican tradition which itself
legitimised violence without popular consent. This assessment can be
cross-referenced with other republican statements during the campaign which
explicitly linked the two subjects.
	 For example, the IRA's Easter message
of 1957 declared:
Vs base our claim for the support of the Irish people throughout the
world on the proclamation of 1916. This is our declaration of Inde-
66. P. NacLagain, 'Presidential Address', UI, Dec. 1958.
-
- 160 -
pendence and charter of liberty... Nothing less can claim our allegiance
and we will accept nothing less... We are uplifted and encouraged in our
fight when we see the return to the old allegiance and how brightly the
torch of freedom glows. The magnificent success of the Sinn Fein can-
didates in the recent election gives us new strength, after being aban-
doned so long.7
Of course, it is not surprising that a movement with a long heritage of
revolt should seek to vindicate its actions in the present by relating them
to the events of the past. What is interesting in the above statement,
though, was how the 'allegiance' to the 'proclamation of 1916', which can be
seen as the embodiment of the whole republican tradition, was taken as the
ultimate source of authority for the movement's conduct. It was as if the
backing shown for Sinn Fein in 1955 was perceived not as a direct mandate
for armed struggle so much as a recognition of the validity - a 'return to
the old allegiance' - of the republican approach.
	 Again, this can be seen
as the product of nationalist-elitism as it clearly established loyalty to
the republican tradition above popular consent for IRA actions. What this
suggests is that, as in the 1939 bombing campaign, republican strategic
thinking was being driven by ideological symbolism without any real idea as
to what could actually be achieved through a military campaign. Perhaps
the closest the movement came to acknowledging that the military instrument
was being governed by internal impulsion free from any consideration for the
limits of public tolerance for its violence, came in 1958 when the journal,
the United Irishman, testified that: 'The policy of the Resistance movement
is made by the Novement itself. It is dictated by principle and one aim:
the freedom of our country. It takes help from no-one but the Irish people
in carrying out this mandate of history.'
The practical effect of the IRA's behaviour was to make its violence
appear politically worthless. 	 The movement again had to deflect criticism
that it was simply glorifying a tradition of violence.
	 'Xembers of the
67. 'Baster Ilessage', UI, Xay 1957.
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Novement', Padraig NacLogain averred, 'do not face death or imprisonment and
hardships just to maintain a tradition of militarism or self-sacrifice. The
struggle today is striving to accomplish the task of achieving full free-
dom'. However, the point was that although the IRA's own strategic calcu-
lations concerning the utility of armed force appeared a perfectly suitable
means to achieve Its political objectives within its own narrow, elitist
understanding of the function of violence, to many others outside the move-
ment Its strategy was incomprehensible.
	 As the campaign progressed, the
IRA increasingly tended to wallow in the mythical language of republican
Imagery. For example, in mid-1958 the movement pronounced that those
fighting for the IRA 'are in direct succession to the freedom fighters of all
other generations of Irishmen who followed the same proud road', and who
would undoubtedly enjoy entry into 'the great brotherhood of heroes and
martyrs that mark 700 years of struggle to drive British forces out of Ire-
land."° Such lofty rhetoric merely added weight to the perception that the
entire campaign had become an irrelevant self-indulgence. As a consequence,
many Northern Catholics came to resent the impositions and hardships
created by the IRA's border war and punished the movement at the ballot box
In the general election of October 1959 when SInn Fain received only 73,415
votes, a collapse of over half on its 1955 performance.
The IRA's prospects for success In the border war had really melted
away within the first year of the campaign. One of the most crucial blows
came in July 1957 when the government in the Irish Republic introduced
internment. By the end of 1958 nearly all the Army Council, GHQ staff and
SInn Fain executive were in gaol. The lose of the limited sanctury offered
by the South badly affected IRA operations. 	 By 1960 the level of IRA
attacks had fallen to just 26, down from a peak of 341 in 1957.'
	 Despite
69. NacLogain, 'Presidential Address'.
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the declining effectiveness of the campaign, throughout 1958 and 1959 the
movement was still optimistically assuring that 'Resistance is growing
stronger'72
 and pledging itself 'to intensify the Campaign, to press home the
fight, and never to desist in its efforts until British Occupation Forces are
withdrawn from Ireland'.72
 There was no truth in these avowals, they
simply underlined that the IRA had become an Inflexible, militarily auton-
omous organisation, its violence being wholly unregulated by any meaningful
sort of political authority. This point can be illustrated with reference
to the theory elaborated by Clausewitz which asserts that the character of
war is made up of the inter-relationship of three elements; the 'primordial'
violence generated by all the passions and emotions that lead to conflict;
the play of chance and probability Inherent in the manipulation of the mili-
tary instrument; and political reason, which ensures that war is controlled
to serve the ends of policy.74
 Such a theory is premised largely on, say, a
sovereign state system, where there is usually a distinct cleavage between
all three elements: that is, where the executive authority responsible for
policy making will oversee the military planners who themselves will be re-
sponsible for welding the raw violence of popular passions into an effective
instrument of policy.
	 But, within a sub-state entity like the republican
movement little or no such distinctions exist as all three elements are
often likely to be embodied in a single organisation. Where sources of
political influence over such organisations (i.e. external political parties
or internal factions, organisational bodies etc.) have been eroded, then it Is
possible that violent ideological passions may come to dominate over all
aspects of military policy.	 This sort of process appeared to be at work
within the republican movement.	 The inherent dynamic within republican
ideology, with its fervent commitment to the nationalist vision wedded to an
72. 'Britain Xust Withdraw Her Forces', UI, Jan. 1958.
73. 'Resistance Statement', UI, Jan. 1959.
74. Clausewitz, On Var, p. 89.
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an ardent belief in the efficacy of violence, seemed to be dictating the
course of the IRA's military activity apparently unhindered by any need to
reach a favourable political conclusion. The tone established within the
movement's rhetoric by the latter half of the border war bears out this
assessment.	 Even before the verdict of the 1959 elections was delivered
upon the IRA's campaign, the movement was making no pretence to justify the
continuation of the war with reference to anything else except to the elitist
themes of its ideology. According to one republican commentary of mid-
1959:
When Pearse went forth to wage his struggle, the authority he heeded was
not that of the effete Parliamentary party - which might well term itself
then the representative of the people. No
	 The authority Pearse heeded
was the authority of history, the authority of armed resistance to fore-
ign rule, the authority of the Republican tradition... There can no longer
be a debate about how best to liberate the six counties of our country
held by foreign rule. The constitutional way has been rejected. The
way of struggle has been accepted. The path of resistance has been trod
and must continue to be trod until either our people's will for freedom
prevails or our enemy destroys that will. There is no other way.Th
Needless to say, virtually all organisations, especially political
groupings, are bound together by a doctrine or series of principles which
give them their meaning and purpose and, doubtless, the adherence to a par-
ticular set of beliefs will to some degree affect the external behaviour of
all organisations in the pursuit of their objectives. What appears so
unusual in the IRA's case is the extent to which violence itself had become
an integral component of republican doctrine, seemingly employed less as a
rational instrument of policy but more to maintain the ideological Identity
of the movement. This goes to the heart of the matter concerning the lack
of political regulation of the military instrument, as the conviction that
'There is no other way' explicitly rejected the thought of any internal
political dialogue capable of continuously evaluating the effectiveness of
the military option. In this respect, the movement was not strategically
75. S. Cronin, 'The Authority of History Is Behind Fight in the North', UI,
June 1959.
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engaged at all.	 There was no ends-iieans analysis. 	 The movement had
simply become a self-perpetuating military tradition.
Again, it should be stressed that the difficulties imposed on republican
strategic formulation by the lack of political control were systemic. The
elitist attachment to violence, combined with doctrinal inflexibility, exclud-
ed all potential for either the consideration of alternative non-military
options or the modification of political goals to accommodate actual mili-
tary capabilities.	 As such, republican strategic thought was confined
largely to a few simplistic precepts. The ideology defined the political
object, a united independent republic; it defined the enemy, Britain; and it
defined the means to challenge the enemy in order to attain the object, mili-
tary action. Yet, from any detached analytical perspective, and as five and
a half years of wasted effort testified, it also defined the most likely out-
come, isolation and defeat.
The IRA Reflects - The Strategic Reappraisal of the 1960s
The IRA called off its campaign in February 1962. The ideologically elitist
prism through which the IRA viewed the world was displayed in Its final
campaign communique of 26 February. It blamed the movement's defeat on the
'attitude of the general public whose minds have been deliberately distracted
from the supreme issue facing the Irish people - the unity and freedom of
Ireland.' And in renewing its pledge of 'eternal hostility to the British
Forces of Occupation', it called on the Irish people to show greater support
in its preparations for the 'final and victorious phase of the struggle for
the full freedom of Ireland. ' Beneath the pugnacious language, far from
drawing up the battlelines for the next confrontation, the collapse of the
border war had caused the IRA to slip into a mood of despondency.	 The
76. Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (IRPB) Statement, 26 Feb., 1926,
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task of reviving the movement fell to Cathal Goulding who was made Chief of
Staff in 1962. Goulding was a veteran IRA activist but was unassociated
with the failure of the border campaign as he spent the early years of the
conflict in prison for his part in an arms raid in England in 1953. Under
his direction, the IRA instituted an extensive reappraisal of the republican
tradition to discover why the movement had been, in Goulding's words, 'unable
to succeed in spite of the fact that the people engaged in its revolutionary
activities were willing to make any sacrifice for it.' 7" The basic conclu-
sion reached by the internal debate, said Goulding, was that the 'people had
no real knowledge of our objectives'; largely because the movement did not
really have any: 'The fight for freedom had become an end in itself to us.
Instead of a means, it became an end. We hadn't planned to achieve the
freedom of Ireland. We simply planned to fight for the freedom of Ireland,
We could never hope to succeed because we never planned to succeed."'
Goulding was admitting, in a very candid fashion, that for most of the
twentieth century the republican movement had been strategically redundant.
The analysis of the failure of republican strategy developed from the
thesis that the nature of British imperialism in Ireland had been refined in
the face of nationalist resistance in the Anglo-Irish war. British control,
it was believed, no longer rested on the primitive imposition of foreign
institutions backed up by military might, but on a more subtle system of
neo-colonialism', a concept defined by Roy Johnston, the IRA's leading poli-
tical theorist, as 'a means of retaining the substance of imperial rule while
giving the shadow of independence'." So, in this way, the Treaty of 1921
ceded most of the paraphernalia of political autonomy but did not grant real
independence that would have allowed full control over Irish resources which,
instead, remained in the hands of British financial concerns. 	 'Failure to
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understand this', Johnston argued, 'led the Republicans to concentrate on the
outward trappings of alien rule in the North, ignoring the economic domin-
ation of the whole country.'° Therefore, the first extrapolation derived
from the analysis, as Goulding explained, was that if the republican leader-
ship wanted to maintain a revolutionary organisation then 'we would need to
have a policy for the next phase of the fight against British Imperialism in
Ireland.''
The spirit of republican thinking of the time was summed up by Deasun
Breatnach who contended that 'freedom is not something to be flaunted at the
national level, in the council of the nations; it must go down to all the
people. ' The challenge for the movement in this respect was to devise a
policy that could win popular support by promising social and political
emancipation to the ordinary citizens of Ireland. 'This is what we were
fighting for,' Goulding argued, 'and we had to make it plain to the people.
To do this we had to involve ourselves in their everyday struggles for exis-
tence.' 3 In 1964 the IRA gave approval to the movement's involvement in a
programme of political agitation and endorsed a plan to build up a leftist
coalition - a 'national liberation front' - which would campaign on a broad
social and economic agenda, though one recommendation to abolish the policy
of abstention was reJected. By the mid-1960s ideas were being circulated
concerning possible republican involvement in areas such as campaigns to
combat unemployment and emigration through active participation in farming
and industrial co-operatives, trade unions and so on. 	 At the rhetorical
level, too, the movement's language was increasingly using the discourse of
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class confrontation by talking about the unity of the 'urban and rural
dweller' versus 'the class of exploitation, the class of gombeenism (term
meaning usury: pejorative description of Irish business interests] the class
of slavery.'
Although the leadership's diagnosis was couched in the terms of social
revolution, the notion that the whole rethink represented an enormous Marx-
ist digression - a fundamental transformation in republican thinking - can
be over-stated. In fact the changes advocated by those like Goulding were
contiguous with the tradition of socialist-republicanism which went back to
Lalor and Connolly, and the inspiration from whom the modern leadership
frequently clted. 7	More particularly 1 the revisionists' arguments paral-
].eled those made in the 1920s and 1930s by people like Peadar O'Donnell and
George Gilmore. 	 For example, it was Gilmore who wrote in 1932 that only
when:
...the system of exploitation has been destroyed and a system based upon
the recognition of the fact that the lands and other wealth-producing
resources of Ireland are the property of the people of Ireland and not of
the exploiting class - until that has been accomplished we will not be in
a position to say the (British] Conquest has been undone.°
The language used in the 1930s may have been similar to that of the 1960s,
but more importantly, so was the analysis which underpinned it. Gilmore
believed that although republicans were motivated by the highest ideals of
service to the nationalist cause, in practice, he said, 'the IRA often
bewilders the Ireland it would serve and so loses the mass backing which
alone could make it effective.' He continued:
The Republican Movement is rich in principle but disastrously short in
policy. It is poor leadership that rests itself entirely on principles
and neglects sorting out, in all their concreteness, the conditions within
which its struggle must develop, for it is only on this sorting out that
policy can be properly based.
88. C. Goulding, 'We Can Go It Alone', UI, Nov. 1966.
87. See ibid..
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89. Quoted in Iclnerney, p. 148.
- 168 -
These were exactly the type of criticisms Goulding and his kind were making
of the contemporary IRA, But it should be noted that although the social-
repubician critique, both in the 1930s and the 16Os, led the movement in a
politically left-ward direction, it did not countenance that republicans
should be tied to any formal political doctrine. Rather, it advocated that
the movement should get away from the belief that it could operate in a
vacuum where idealised images of the republic would have a timeless attrac-
tion and should become more attuned to the ever changing political climate.
in a phrase, the struggle needed to be seen to be relevant to modern Ireland.
Undoubtedly, the IRA in the 1960s was influenced by aspects of Marxist
thinking, and also, in part, by the radicalism of the age with its anti-
authority ethos and emphasis on agitationary politics. Gerry Adams has
written tangentially of the influence of sixties radicalism as an era anim-
ated not by rigid ideologies but by 'the whole undefined movement of ideas
and changes of style', which 'produced a sense of impatience with the status
quo, allied to a young, enthusiastic and euphoric confidence.'° The most
radical move undertaken by the IRA's leadership at this time was to consult
political thinkers from outside the movement, people like Roy Johnston, who
later Joined the IRA, and Anthony Coughian, both of whom had contacts with
communist groups and radical factions. However, as Henry Patterson, who
has charted the history of republican-socialism, has pointed out, Goulding's
motive for bringing in outsiders was essentially to reimport the tradition
of radical thinking which, out of some three decades of neglect, had been all
but eradicated from the movement as a whole. 3 Avid admirer of the radical
left though Goulding was, nevertheless, he was not a slave to a Marxist
ideological obsession.
Though the radicalisation of the IRA was influenced by various external
90. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 10.
91. Patterson, p. 87.
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factors, overall, the process can be seen as largely internal to the repub-
lican tradition. Indeed, the nationalist question remained to the fore of
the movement's thinking. In enunciating his theories of nec-colonialism and
the crisis in the Irish economic system, Johnston expressly stated that all
these problems 'are in fact connected: they add up to the Irish National
Question of the Sixties.'	 Johnston went on: 'For it will be found that the
major obstacles to the satisfaction of the people's needs is the reality of
alien rule over the whole of Ireland.' 2	The remedy, of course, was the
creation of a fully united and independent state which would have total con-
trol over Ireland's economic surplus? The change from the IRk's previous
position was simply that the movement felt that it could derive a greater
level of support across the whole of Ireland by basing its appeal on a plat-
form which went wider than the single concentration on the political unific-
ation of the country. However, the leadership felt that its programme could
also transcend sectarian divisions in the North by winning over both Protes-
tant and Catholic workers to the side of revolutionary socialism.
Overall, the nec-colonial argument provided the IRA with a comforting
view of its situation.	 In the first instance, it explained why the IRA had
become isolated and had gone down to continuous military defeat since the
civil war, as the failure to participate in the labour struggle had caused
the movement to detach itself from the everyday needs of the people. Sec-
ondly, the theory painted an optimistic picture of a huge potential repub-
lican constituency; an image of the Irish masses who sub-consciously yearned
to be unburdened from the manacles of imperialism and whose revolutionary
awareness could be stimulated provided they were given the necessary organ-
isational leadership.	 In other words, the nec-colonial analysis reassured
republicans of their continuing relevance while skirting around less savoury




explanations for their predicament, such as the possibility that they, and
the cause they represented, had simply come to be regarded as an anachron-
ism in the modern era. And finally, it provided a useful hook upon which
to hang the nationalist cause. Altogether, a highly convenient explanation,
Jonetheless, the leadership's rethink did challenge aspects of convent-
lanai republican wisdom, especially by opening up the question of peaceful
political participation which confronted the traditional refusal to engage in
'partitionist' politics. Therefore, to put the reassessment of the lQCOs
into perspective, what we can say, is that the revisionist process stemmed
from a psychological change, as opposed to structural changes in terms of,
say, the age or education of the IRA's membership. The IRA's low ebb after
the demoralisation of the border war was such that socialist republicans
were able to hold sway within the leadership and assert their agenda more
forcefully than they had been able to do before. An agitatlonary socialist
manifesto was embraced, not out of the whole-hearted conviction of the move-
ment, but out of a prevailing sense of apathy as it looked like the only way
the IRA could preserve its raison d'etre.
All this is not to suggest that there was no hostility to the leader-
ship's new programme.	 Initially, opposition was muted, but it grew as the
implications of the strategic review, particularly how they would affect the
military instrument, were thought through. Concern at the leadership's
policies was aired in the pages of An Phoblacht. The journal had been re-
vived under the aegis of a group established in 1965 calling itself the Com-
mittee for Revolutionary Action (CRA) with the specific intention of 'combat-
ing deviationism and revisionism within the ranks of organised republican-
ism.' The immediate cause for discontent was the suspicion that the
movement was being controlled by a left-wing cabal based in Dublin which
was attempting to shut-out all other ranks from the decision making process.
94. AP (CRA), Jan. 1967.
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An Phoblacht argued that the debate over the movement's future should be
conducted openly amongst the membership as a whole. Instead, An Phoblacht
complained, the 'business of the Irish Revolution is but the exclusive domain
of the few who are organisationally engaged In the functioning of Irish Re-
publIcanIsm.' The CRA's real bets noire was the 'foreign directed clique'
made up of those like Johnston and Coughlan who, It was felt, were out to
manipulate the movement 'along the lines advantageous to the interests of a
foreign power', namely, 'the British Communist Party, and Its Irish sections,
which are in turn directed from Xoecow.' The Idea of a communist ploy to
subvert the movement was more imagined than reals but such allegations were
symptomatic of the resentment felt by the more traditionalist faction again-
st the Influence of those deemed to be outsiders who had been brought in to
advise the leadership. Sean XacStiofain, one of the few dissenters remain-
ing on the Army Council, believed that the course of the leadership's left-
ward drift into radical politics was depriving the movement of a proper
sense of direction. Rather than focusing the movement's attention on the
need to confront the crucial issue of British rule in ireland, the Army Coun-
ncil was getting bogged down in what he saw as meaningless nit-picking over
policy resolutions and discussion documents that had no practical value.
Meanwhile, the movement's military assets were being wasted. XacStiofain
believed that if the situation went on 'the IRA would end up as a paper
aray'. 7 The deep seated fear was that neglection of the military side in
favour of developing an agitationary organisation would eat away the move-
ment's moral fibre causing it to lose its strength, cohesion and, ultimately,
its very identity. An Phoblacht was apoplectic at the very thought:
But in addition to It being incapable of effecting what our people want,
parliamentary agitation is in a thousand ways demoralising. Even if it
could win our independence, independence so won, would do no good; for
95. Ibid..
90. AP (CRA), May/June 1907.
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freedom to do good, must be gained with difficulty and heroic sacrifice,
in the face of perils and death... Platform movements are necessarily
unmilitary, and, consequently, bad for a nation that wants to free herself
from a foreign yoke... In short, no more insane and wicked idea could
enter the brain of fools and knaves, than the notion of reviving the
system of agitation.'
The continued presence of such hardline traditionalist views, which
looked on the use of violence as virtuous for its own sake, was something
about which Goulding was well aware. He understood that unless a specific
role for the armed struggle was guaranteed, the potential existed for the
hardliners to become a law unto themselves in the worst traditions of Irish
republican militarism. As Goulding reflected: 'we had on our hands trained
physical force revolutionaries who were, to some extent, still armed. They
would decide for themselves what would happen next, if we didn't decide for
them... It was essential to stop any premature action by these people'.
The priority for Goulding was to hold the movement together during a period
of transition which meant averting any outright hardline-revisionist cleav-
age. This returned the leadership to the fundamental problem concerning
the imposition of greater control over the military instrument; how to carve
out a definitive role for the physical forcers while trying to subordinate
the IRA to more general policy objectives, without, at the same time, either
raising the ire of hardliners or encouraging those tendencies to military
autonomy?
The dual process of mollifying traditionlist elements while attempting
to shift the focus of republican military thinking took place at three
levels. The first was at the rhetorical level to reassure hardliners of the
continuing need for a military dimension to republican strategy by quashing
rumours that the revisionist programme would entail the abandonment of the
armed struggle: 'There is no thought of relinquishing the use of force. No-
one who has thought at all about the nature of the division of this country
98. AP (CRA), Jan. 1967.
99. Interview with Goulding, This Veek.
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is willing to rule out the necessity for using the gun to bring about the
realisatlon of the aspirations of the Irish people.' 10° Yet these assur-
ances were also carefully qualified by placing the military instrument within
a broader context as Just one facet amongst a range of options that the
movement could pursue, as Goulding signified when he declared: 'We have only
to look around us to see that we will have to fight on the military front,
the social front, the economic front and the cultural front."°' These
sorts of pronouncements conveyed the feeling that the armed struggle would
be retained as a matter of absolute necessity, while in fact, it was being
de-prioritised within the overall course of republican strategic formulation.
This impression was maintained at the second level - the military planning
level.	 To convince the traditionalists that the commitment to armed force
was not just idle rhetoric, the leadership authorised a degree of military
planning. According to interviews carried out by the analyst Henry
Patterson with Cathal Goulding and Sean Garland, another prominent IRA
revisionist, the movement had, since the mid-1980s, been drawing up plans
for another guerrilla campaign in Northern Ireland.'° 2 Such planning was
also supplemented from time to time by the odd operation like, for example,
the attack on a British naval vessel in 1905 and the burning of a number of
company buses in the furtherance of an industrial dispute in Xay 1908. In
fact, neither the occasional attacks nor the formal military planning Itself
heralded any full-scale campaign. 	 Goulding and his followers had no real
intention of launching a new military offensive. Goulding acknowledged
'that our whole future as a political and revolutionary force should be
geared to keeping our people out of gaol, and leading a revolution.boa It
was this primary consideration which formed the basis of the third level -
100.1. Xeade, 'No Longer Well-Neaning Political Simplicists', UI, Nov. 1900.
101.C. Goulding, 'There Will Be a Fight', UI, Sept. 1905.
102.Patterson, p. 96.
103.Interview with Goulding, This Veek.
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the actual conditions upon which the leadership believed military action
could be sustained. In a seminal article setting out the movement's atti-
tude towards the armed struggle, Tony Meade identified 'a new element in the
willingness to use force, namely that this force will be defensive." 0' The
leadership visua].ised a time when violence would have to be used against the
forces of reaction, they being the Stormont and Leinster Mouse governments
in the North and South respectively, which would inevitably attempt to crush
the republican revolution once it looked like gaining popular momentum.
'When that day comes', Neade argued, 'it is hoped that the defensive measures
adopted by the Xovement will ensure that victory will be ours."° The
declaration was vague but significant as it reversed the traditional premise
of republican strategy. No longer would the movement be a military spear-
head.	 It would remain an elitist outfit but only in the Leninist sense as
political organisers and agitators. 	 In Garland's words: 'The Republican
Army, north and south, must became the Army of the People, in fact as well
as in name.	 It must be the vanguard of all militant and radical revol-
utionary groups in this country and as the vanguard be ready to move in
defence of those struggling for their rights."° 	 The emphasis was now on
using republican resources and energies to build up mass support. Tony
Neade asserted that: 'Only in this way will we arrive at the day when the
use of force will succeed."°7 So the probability of a final military show-
down with the forces of counter-revolution was something for which the
movement had to be prepared.	 As Goulding proclaimed: 'I am not naive
enough to think that we don't have to use guns. 	 An armed proletariat is
the only assurance that they can have the rule of the proletariat." ° It
should be stressed that such a scenario was envisioned only after the IRA
104.Xeade, 'Jo Longer Veil-leaning Political Simpiicists'.
105. Ibid..
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had obtained widespread popular support.
	 In the meantime, that support
would have to be won through hard political campaigning. As if to under-
line the changes in outlook that this would necessitate, Xeade sought to
remind his colleagues that: 'Before that day comes we must be prepared to
work in a way In which many of us are unaccustomed."°
Neade's implicit appeal to IRA members to move away from the militar-
let ways of the past hinted at the scope of the changes being contemplated
by the leadership. Adopting a social revolutionary posture towards the
whole concept of Irish nationalism altered the entire substratum of repub-
lican strategic analysis. For a movement that had been bred on the belief
of violence as a first resort, the new accent upon reviewing the value of
armed force both as just one component of the republican struggle and with
specific reference to the suitability of such means to the political circum-
stances prevailing at any particular time, represented a radical transform-
ation in the movement's approach to military matters. One of the most
important features of the reassessment was the plan to assert political
control over the military instrument by gradually removing the General Army
Convention, the supreme authority of the IRA, from the policy making process.
For a number of years Goulding was circumscribed about what he could say in
public on this issue for fear of alienating the hardliners, but a confident-
ial document seized by Irish police in hay 1966 clearly established where
the intentions of the leadership lay. The document revealed that in the
long term, decision making power would be transferred to the Sinn Fein
national conference while the IRA Convention would contract to a 'specialist
conference of certain people in the hovement for examining technical prob-
lems connected to the military aspect of the revolution." '°
109.Xeade, 'Jo Longer Vell-heaning Political Simpliciste'.
11O.This document Is reprinted in Lord Scarman, 'Violence and Civil
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Yhat these restructuring proposals demonstrated was that, in the end,
the revisionist and hardline perspectives wars irreconcilable. Notwithstan-
ding Goulding's efforts to bring as many hardliners as he could along the
socialist-republican road, the plans to reduce the IRA's influence, the stress
on gaining public confidence as the first priority of republican policy, the
rejection of military vanguardism and the willingness to be open-minded
about the mix of methods to achieve the movement's objectives, all repelled
traditionalist assumptions concerning the pre-eminence of military means.
Primarily, the leadership was interested in obtaining real political power.
This meant disposing of the encumbrance of the apostolic succession. The
revisionists did not want a movement that was merely capable of sustaining
Itself through myths and martyrs. Sean Garland, in his Bodenstown oration
in June 168, was adamant on this point. Re argued that the republican
movement was not sacrosanct but simply a vehicle to achieve tangible
political goals:
Let no mealy-mouthed sentimentalist tell us that we must preserve the
movement as traditionally constituted if this proves impractical and hand
on these impracticalities to the next generation. The struggle for the
emancipation of the Irish people is inevitable and by saddling the next
generation with useless tools and tactics we are not helping them but
destroying their chances of success by binding them to a line of thought
and action that was a failure with one generation and must Just as surely
be a failure with the next."1
Such forthright language displayed the strength of feeling amongst the
leadership. Although the sixties rethink by no means surveyed all of the
options and the strategies open to the movement at the time, there Is little
reason to suspect that the republican leaders simply and cynically latched
onto the nearest passing political fad to save the movement from what might
otherwise have been its inevitable demise. Their conversion to the
socialist path was genuine and they reflected carefully on how this would




commitment to the socialist approach was underlined by Tomas XacGiolla, the
President of Sinn Fein, who in 1969 declared: 'We do not regard socialism as
a fashionable cloak to be worn or discarded as popular tastes dictate. I
think we can say that no-one is today in any doubt where a Republican
stands ideologically." 2
	Of course, whether social revolutionary maxims
had any real relevance in a deeply religious and politically conservative
country like Ireland is debatable. What we can say, though, is that the
outcome of the IRA's self-examination did help to contain the military inst-
rument within what strategic analysts would recognise as a more satisfactory
theoretical framework. Yet the main problem is precisely that we only have
theory to pronounce upon, chiefly because although the way the leadership
thought about the relationship between ends and means certainly underwent a
transformation, in practice, very little was done in this period to implement
the recommended changes. For most of the decade the movement hardly par-
ticipated in any sustained agitationary activity.
	 In fact, it barely had
any political profile whatsoever. Sean IacStiofain's allegation that the
IRA was being allowed to atrophy while the leadership debated abstract
policy positions was substantially correct. Xoreover, Goulding admitted it:
'By 1967 the Xovement had become dormant. It wasn't active in any poli-
tical sense or even in any revolutionary sense. Itember-ship was falling off.
People had gone away. Units of the IRA and the Cumainn (local branches] of
Sinn Fein had become almost non-existent."
	 When an IRA conference was
called in August 1967 to evaluate the movement's overall strength, the
republican leaders 'suddenly realised that they had no lovement at
The conference recommended that the IRA should 'openly declare for a social-
ist republic."	 This was the first time that the movement had decided to
112.T. MacGiolla, Bodenstown Speech, UI, July 1969.




act on the proposals endorsed by the IRA's rethink begun in 1964. The
leadership was to pay for this laxity as events in Northern Ireland in the
late 1900s reopened the whole debate on the future role of the armed
struggle in republican strategy.
Tension and Division over Republican Strategy in the Jorth - The Road to
Rupture
During the early years of the IRA's introspection the rise of the civil
rights movement in Northern Ireland largely passed it by. The original
civil rights organisation, the Campaign for Social Justice, was founded by a
Dungannon couple, Conn and Patricia XcCluskey, in 1964 to campaign against
anti-Catholic discrimination in the province. By the late 1960s the IRA's
interest in civil rights had been firmly engaged, but republicans remained a
minority group within the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)
which had superceded the Campaign for Social Justice in 1907. NICRA was
composed mainly of trade-unionists, left-wing activists and students. The
republican leadership believed that NICRA could be used as a vehicle to 'help
get the Protestants involved, and get away from the old divisions." '
Republican thinking held that in order for the unionist political establish-
ment to maintain power, behind which lay its British imperial sponsor, it
was necessary 'to divide the Protestant people from their Catholic fellow-
countrymen and protect M them behind a sectarian border." 17 It was rea-
soned that the introduction of civil rights reforms and the establishment of
political equality in the North would break down sectarian barriers, thereby
undermining the basis of unionist government. Released from their sectar-
ian blinkers, Protestant workers would combine with their Catholic brethren
to collectively resist British colonial rule.	 The 'North is imperialism's
strongest bastion in ireland,' claimed the United Irishman, 'Weaken imper-
116.Goulding Statement in Sweetman, p. 143.
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lalism there and the winning of civil liberties would be such a weakening -
and its hold on Ireland is weakened all over.'1 s
Because the aim was to build a cross-community movement capable of
uniting Catholics and Protestants, the principle of non-sectarianism was
considered paramount. As a consequence, republican leaders were keen to
play the civil rights issue with caution. They were particularly anxious to
avoid the impression that NICRA was a stalking horse for the IRA to revital-
ise the nationalist cause. Any such impression, it was felt, would antagon-
lee and repel Protestants. The emphasis was to be on peaceful political
participation to win the confidence of Protestants by proving that repub-
licans 'were the best champions of the needs of the ordinary people." '
For this reason, when the large scale civil rights marches got under way
individual republicans were allowed to act as stewards but not to adopt any
corporate IRA profile. The role of the stewards was to try to steer the
marchers away from any trouble with the police. However, the IRA's leader-
ship was increasingly concerned at the participation of a number of extreme
left-wing activists, with no connections to the republican movement, who
were placing themselves at the head of the marches in order to manufacture
violent confrontations with the police in the belief that this would expose
the elemental brutality of unionist power. According to one of these activ-
ists, Eamonn McCann, the intention was 'to provoke the police into over reac-
tion and thus spark off mass reaction against the authorities'.'° After
the first march from Coalisland to Dungannon in August 1968, the movement
voiced criticism that 'some marchers should have tried to break through the
cordons of police', arguing that 'this was just what (William] Craig (Stor-
mont Home Affairs Minister], and the police would have liked, for then they
118.'Civil Rights Jow!', UI, Sept. 1968.
119.'Republican Clubs Plan Future Action', UI, Oct. 1968.
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could have represented the whole thing as a sectarian riot.'11
As the civil rights marches progressed, so the iRA's fears were borne
out, as the number of clashes with the police increased. One march in Jan-
uary 1969 from Belfast to Derry, led by the student based People's Democracy
party, gained particular notoriety. When the marchers reached the village
of Burntollet Bridge, Co. Londonderry, they were attacked by a loyalist gang.
The police stood aside and it later emerged that some of the attackers were
off-duty members of the police auxiliary force, the B Specials. However,
IRA leaders like Roy Johnston were annoyed with the march organisars whom
he called an 'immature ultra-leftist element'.
	 The march itself he describ-
ed as 'ill-advised and provocative'.
	 'Burntollat need not have happened',
Johnston said, 'It achieved nothing except to inflame sectarian hatred."
From the beginning of 1969 Northern Ireland imploded. The disruption which
accompanied civil rights marches developed into riots and running street
battles between the police and Catholic and Protestant mobs. Events cul-
minated in August 1969 with the introduction of British Army units onto the
street of Derry and Belfast to restore law and order.
Northern Ireland's plunge into violent chaos severely damaged the IRA's
design to peacefully transform the civil rights campaign into a broad non-
sectarian movement. Where the republican leadership had perhaps been mis-
taken was in assuming that sectarian conflict could, in the long run, ever
have been avoided. The depth of communal hostility was always likely to
transcend any latent feelings of cross-community working class solidarity,
if such a thing ever existed in the first place. The IRA tacitly admitted
that the violent reactions of the authorities to the civil rights marches had
dented its faith in the ability of the Stormont administration to reform
itself when it called on the British government to impose civil rights
121.'Unionists Fear Civil Rights', UI, Oct. 1968.
122.Quoted in Cronin, p. Irish Nationalism p. 190.
- 181 -
reforms on Ulster.'	 In fact, by late 1969 the IRA's entire strategic
construct had been unravelled. The prospect of Catholic-Protestant working
class unity had disappeared. Furthermore, in the process of trying to
preserve its non-sectarian stance, many republicans felt that the IRA had
abrogated its traditional role in the North as the defenders of the Catholic
population, so leaving nationalist areas at the mercy of Protestant rioters.
The sight of Catholics in the Bogside area of Derry welcoming the arrival of
the British Army as protectors was especially galling. Responsibility for
this humiliation was laid at the door of the leadership, with the result that
Goulding and his cohorts presided over an increasingly divided movement,
Such was the background to the split in the IRA's ranks which occurred
towards the end of 1969. The events which led to the split have been well
covered elsewhere and require no detailed elaboration here. The rift was
sparked by the decision to resurrect the proposal to end the policy of abst-
ention in order to allow republican candidates to take their seats, if elect-
ed. The leadership claimed that it was a necessary move to stop 'political
opportunists' from capitalising on the iRA's agitationary activities and to
enable the movement to 'use the tactics best suited to the occasion to smash
the power of the establishment, North and South.' 4
 An extra-ordinary
Army Convention, meeting in December 1969, agreed to the lifting of the
restraints on electoral participation and also to the formation of the so-
called national liberation front. 	 For the opponents of the leadership,
these ideas were a fanciful distraction and the final straw for those like
NacStiofain.'' After the Convention, XacStiofain and his followers met
under the banner of a new body, the Provisional Army Council, to repudiate
the IRA resolutions and to pledge 'allegiance to the 32-County Irish Republic
proclaimed at Easter 1916, established by the first Dail Eireann in 1919,
123.See 'Resistance', UI, Sept, 1969.
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overthrown by force of arms in 1922 and suppressed to this day by the
existing British imposed Six-County and 26-County partition states."
The break was formalised at the Sian Fein Ard-Fheis held on 11 January
1970.	 When the resolution to abolish abetentionisa was pushed through
about one third of the delegates walked out. There were now two Irish
Republican Armies - one under Goulding, referred to as the Official IRA
(OIRA), and the other led by XacStlofain, the Provisional IRA (PIRA).
Because the rupture occurred over the issue of abstention, the events
from late 1969 onwards can appear as a straight traditionalist-revisionist
split.' 27
 This is too simple. While abstention was certainly the immed-
late cause for contention the roots of the division went deeper and concern-
ed the whole course of the 1960s rethink, the nature of the IRA leadership's
policy towards developments in the Jorth and the movement's non-performance
in the riots of August 1969. Those who broke from OIRA were not, there-
fore, members of one single faction, more a coalition of forces who, for one
reason or another, opposed the IRA leadership. This coalition can be
categorised into three groups. By looking at the motives of each group in
turn 1
 not only can we gain a more precise picture of the split, but we will
be able to see the centrality of the argument concerning the role of the
mill-tary instrument In the whole controversy.
The first group can certainly be described as the traditionalist fact-
ion. They were by no means the most numerous group, but they were predom-
inant within the Provisionals' leadership. They were people mainly from the
South, often veterans of the 1956-62 border war. They had been hostile to
Goulding's new thinking from the outset, hence they were the most organised
of the three groups. As has been mentioned above, opposition during the
sixties centred on the Committee for Revolutionary Action. Although the
126.Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (IRPB), Statement 28 Dec. 1969,
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Committee remained a shadowy and indistinct contingent, it is plausible to
suggest that its members were those who comprised the Provisionals' first
echelon, people like Daithi O'Conaill, Ruairi O'Bradaigh and his brother Sean,
and possibly XacStiofain as well. The fact that the CRA's newsheet, An
Phoblacht, became the Provisionals' chief mouthpiece in the South lends
weight to this supposition. As self-proclaimed guardians of the republican
heritage, the CRA saw Goulding and his cronies as reformiets and
compromisers who were diluting the IRA's struggle with their fangled ideas
of political campaigning. The CRA asserted that 'the traditional programme
of Republicanism is revolutionary, and therefore can only be realised through
unqualified revolutionary aotion." In case there was any doubt over what
was meant by the term 'revolutionary action' the CRA spelled out that:
'Force is the mailed fist of revolutionary principles."
Vhat differentiates the traditionalists above all from the rest, was the
probability that they would have broken away irrespective of whether the
Jorthern situation had erupted or not. Over two years before the actual
break took place An Phoblacht had openly canvassed the possibility of a
split If and when the Sinn Pein IIProgreesivesNs, as they were labelled, made
their 'final move to Integrate with Free State politics'. 1 ° The CRA coun-
selled against any premature action which could shatter the movement into a
welter of splinter groups, but warned that 'real revolutionary Republicans'
should be in a 'position to swiftly regroup Republican activists In a new
organisation when events dictate that this is essential to the perpetuation
of Republican objects."' For the traditionalists, abeteutionisa was an
emotive subject and its proposed abolition represented the crowning betrayal
of republican orthodoxy. MacStiofain declared that the choice was 'between
128.AP (CRA), Xay/June 1987.
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130.AP (CRA), Oct. 1907.
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accepting the institutions of partition or upholding the basic Republican
principle of Ireland's right to national unity." Developments in the
North added a new element to the traditionalists' case. They believed that
the civil rights campaign could be manipulated to allow eventually the IRA
to undertake 'offensive action... on the main national objective of ending
British rule." Frustrated both ideologically and practically by the IRA
leadership, the traditionalists decided that their ambitions could be best
served in a separate organisation.
The second group, and almost certainly the largest component within the
Provisionals, can be classified as the Northern republicans. Kany were
young enthusiasts who were to provide the majority of P1RA's foot-soldiers.
At their head were a group of older, mainly Belfast based republicans like
Joe Cahill, Francis Card and Billy NcICee. Although the Northerners undoubt-
edly shared many of the traditionalists' aspirations, they were lees polit-
ical in the sense that their paramount concern was not national unity but to
obtain guns to secure the defence of Catholic districts. The older repub-
licans especially, had been deeply depressed by the IRA's failure to safe-
guard Catholic areas in August 1989 for which they blamed Goulding's leader-
ship. Commenting on the welcome accorded by Catholics to the British Army,
Joe Cahill said, 'people were glad to see them because the IRA had betrayed
them."	 In particular, anger was directed at a statement from Goulding
which claimed that IRA units had been sent to the North and had played
'their part in defensive operations in Bogside, Derry'.'
	 This was a
fabrication.	 There had been virtually no centrally co-ordinated IRA
132.XacStiofain, p. 134.
133.Ibid., p. 113.
134.Quoted in P. Bishop and E. Nallie, The Prov'lsion,l IRA (London, 1987),
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135.C. Goulding, IRA Statement, UI, Sept. 1969. The original report was
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activity during the August riots.' It transpired, according to
XacStiofain, that the statement had been concocted by the Dublin GHQ to pre-
empt the British governilent from stepping in to abolish Stormont by giving
credence to unionist claims that the riots had been fomented by the IRA.'
The reasoning was that as Stormont was an Irish parliament, it could be
democratically reformed and would evolve into an anti-imperialist body. 	 If
direct British rule was imposed any such prospect would be lost. By this
time, many republicans felt that the leadership's thinking had slipped into
the realms of absurdity and that the non-sectarian approach had become
incredible. Goulding and his followers had believed that the rise of the
civil rights movement signalled the success of the initial stage of their
Northern design - 'the first effective political weapon which has been
forged by the anti-unionist forces', as Tomas XacGiolla called it' - when
in reality it was the prelude to Northern Ireland's political disintegration.
For many Northerners, the Dublin leadership's vision of inter-communal
harmony rang hollow while Protestant mobs were on the rampage through
Catholic neighbourhoods. The IRA leaders themselves were caught in a vice.
If they stuck to their policy of doing as little as possible to antagonise
the Protestants, they would lose much Catholic backing. Conversely, by
moving to the defence of Catholic areas, they would undermine their anti-
sectarian image which had been one of the main pillars of their thinking
since the mid-1960s. 	 Within the ranks of the Belfast IRA disillusionment
was so strong that in September 1969 they made up their own minds about the
quality of the leadership they had been receiving by withdrawing their
allegiance to the Dublin GHQ. This pre-existing split set the tone in the
months after the formal break had occurred with many Northern IRA units and
136.See .1. bunter, 'Doubts on Role of IRA in Belfast Gun Battles', The Times,
2? Aug. 1969.
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new recruits flocking to PIRA's aide. Yet for OIRA, although the Northern
tumult had provided an unwanted catalyst for the split, the logical end-game
of its socialist-republican philosophy was the eventual eradication of the
Catholic-defender tradition from its doctrine.
	 Ultimately, the Officials
ware probably glad to see the backs of their erstwhile colleagues in the
belief that they had got rid of a conservative-militarist millstone. But
the price for this was the forfeiting of the support of many in the North
who wanted protection, not some distant illusion of a workers' paradise.
Cahill summed up the basic nature of PIR.A's appeal: We receive our support
from the Nationalist people and it is our Job to defend them."
The third group were those like the young Gerry Adams who were sym-
pathetic to many of the ideas contained in the 1900s rethink, but who funda-
mentally disagreed with the IRA leadership's analysis of events in the North.
Adams has written approvingly of the 'small, politically conscious organis-
ation' that was beginning to emerge from the 1900s review and of the need
for agitationary work to 'enlist mass support.ltmo Adams has also claimed
that the depiction of the 1970 rift as a traditionalist-revisionist split
resulted in the 'simplistic projection of the uStickiesw (Provisional slang
for the Officials] as politically conscious radicals with the "provisionalsTM
as nationalist militarists." This group of mainly Northern radicals felt
that the leadership had gravely under-estimated the reactionary nature of
the Northern Irish state. Since sectarianism, they argued, was a phenom-
anon deliberately cultivated to pit irish people against each other in order
to maintain British rule, then the unionist establishment could always man-
ippu].ate the sectarian issue to keep the Protestants on side.
	 ipso facto,
the Northern state was inherently irreformable.
	 The implication of this
interpretation was that as long as the British connection lasted, so the
139.Quoted in Cronin, p. 204.
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notion of cross-community working class solidarity would be unattainable.
Therefore, the leadership's faith in the reform process was felt to be mis-
placed and merely constituted 'temporising in front of the Orange
ascendancy' which could only lead 'to a total dilution of Republicanism."
The radicals felt that their assessment had been confirmed by the authori-
ties' violent reaction to the civil rights marches and, consequently, shared
the same resentment at the leadership's complacency during the August dis-
turbances. The radicals were undoubtedly the smallest and least important
faction at the time of the split, but being highly motivated politically they
were to move swiftly through the Provisionals' ranks to positions of influ-
ence in the years ahead.
Vhen the Provisionals issued their first statement detailing the rea-
Sons why they had broken with OIRA, the areas of overlap between the various
shades of opinion within PIRA were defined more precisely. The statement
listed five areas of disagreement; 1) the ending of abstention and the rec-
cgnition that this was deemed to confer on the Vestainster, Stormont and
Leinster House parliaments; 2) the failure to offer adequate protection to
'our people in the North' during August 19O; 3) the controversy over the
leadership's insistence that Stormont should be preserved; 4) the movement's
tendency to 'an extreme form of Socialism'; and finally 5) the methods used
by the leadership to counter dissent through the expulsion of members who
objected to the politicisation process.' There were Slight incongruities
here and there. For instance, the reference to extreme socialism and the
description of PIRA's own brand of socialism as being based on 'Christian
values' may well have jarred with the more secular minded radicals. In
this sense, the statement reflected a largely traditionalist perspective,
though the movement strenuously resisted the militarist-traditionalist tag.
142.Ibld..
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However, there is little doubt that the belief in the value of armed force,
both to sever the British connection and to protect Catholic areas, was the
central unifying thread which bound the factions together. There was no
outward expression of the willingness to open up a military campaign, though
it was conveyed by inference, for example, by stating the preference for a
'direct confrontation with the British Government on Irish soil'.' There
were, naturally, different qualititee of commitment to the use of force. The
traditionalist faction, with the Catholic defenders in tow, were the most
instinctively affiliated to the armed struggle, whereas the radicals were
probably inclined to view military action in more functional terms, though
they were no less convinced of its necessity at the time.
What emerges about the OIRA/PIRA split was that it was not the result
of a violent spasm in August 1909, but was a process that had a long lead
time extending back to the very early stages of strategic review in the mid-
1900s. Nevertheless, it is perhaps somewhat ironic to note that, hitherto,
the only consistent attempt in republican history to develop a more politic-
ally conscious strategy which sought to separate the military instrument
from, and subordinate it to, policy requirements should have come undone so
quickly when it was placed under strain for the first time during the August
riots. The organisation which had done all the talking about the obligation
to b. responsive to popular needs manifestly failed to react to the calls
for help from the people who were its natural supporters in the North. As
a result, Catholics turned increasingly to the Provisionals who were willing
to offer them the practical assistance which OIRA leaders seemed intent on
denying.	 For many Northern Catholic 'workers', OIRA's new model strategy
was not simply doctrinally inflexible; it was irrelevant.
Meanwhile, on the flipside, hardly any Protestants trusted the Officials
either. The sincerity of OIRA's commitment to build a mass movement that
144. IbId..
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could genuinely span the sectarian divide cannot be disputed.
	 But the
process by which it was believed this could be achieved was presumptuously
mechanistic. The assumption, which to varying degrees the Provisionale
also shared, that Protestants would discover their true national conscious-
ness once the 'terrorising political conformity forced upon them" ' by the
imperialist tool of unionism had been lifted, was certainly a condescending
argument, if not an actual sectarian view in itself.
	 Occasionally, when
socialist-republicans of the sixties inveighed against what was termed 'the
Scotch- Irish nonsense',' meaning a separate Protestant- Irish identity, they
sometimes seemed to blur even further the line between criticism of a spec-
if Ic philosophy of loyalism and the more atavistic responses generated by
inter-communal suspicion and hostility.
The Theory and Practice of Political Control - The Officials Finally Tame
the Jilitary Tiger
Attempting to review the IRA's military experience from the 1920s through to
the early 1970s Is a difficult task, not only because of the extensive time
frame, but also because the period traverses some of the most complex devel-
opments in the movement's history developments which help dispel what might
otherwise be attractive, but inaccurate, suppositions about the republican
strategic tradition than if one had merely studied, say, the events from the
1970 split onwards.
It is evident that from the early twenties until the end of the border
war in 1962, the military instrument in republican strategy had become an
Independent dynamic, almost entirely disconnected from any serious consid-
eration as to whether such means were appropriate to the attainment of the
movement 's political goals. The employment of force was based lees on
realistic calculations of its utility, given the resources at the IRA's
145.'Unionism and Paisley - An Analysis'.
146. Ibid..
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disposal, and more by the inclination to fulfil the doctrinal imperative to
engage in military action. This restraint on the proper application of
violence to aid the achievement of political objectives made the republican
movement an impossible place for the more politically sighted elements, like
de Valera and his followers. In effect, republican military thinking defied
the very concept of strategic rationality, as the military instrument ended
up serving the ends of ideology, not the ends of policy.
The abject failure of the 1958-62 border campaign brought home the
futility of IRA militarism to its leaders who resolved to try to restore
some semblance of political authority over the use of violence. To a casual
observer it may have been easy to assume that republican strategic thinking
was entrenched and immobile. The 1960s reassessment disproves this, show-
ing that the movement was neither impervious to self-criticism nor unable to
challenge key republican tenets, like abstentionism and the primacy of the
armed struggle, though admittedly, only under the threat of extinction, as
Garland accepted: 'It was only when we were beaten to the wall and almost
annihilated as a political force that the true meaning of revolution began to
dawn on us"7
 Ye can question the validity of the leadership's Ideas
about social revolution, but the reassessment did attempt to critically exam-
ine the correlation of ends and means In republican strategy. In this way,
the social revolutionary concept set out the theoretical context in which the
military instrument could be subjected to greater political control by redef-
ining it as a single tactical component within a far wider political frame-
work aimed at winning popular support.
The real fly in the ointment for the IRA's leadership was the outbreak
of the Northern conflagration in the late 1960s. It is possible to spec-
ulate endlessly about the course of the social revolutionary approach had
events not flared up when they did. As it happened, the situation in the
147J. (Sean) Garland, 'Building Revolution', UI, Nay 1971.
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North provided another compelling reason for the anti-leader-ship coalition
to break away. However, what the early years of conflict demonstrated, was
the tension between the theory and practice of OIRA's new strategy. It was
one thing to devise a mechanism to control the military instrument in the
abstract, quite another to implement it in the midst of the violent turmoil
that had engulfed Northern Ireland. In particular, these years illustrated
the difficulty that the Officials had in trying to escape their militarist
past.	 OIRA was trapped between its formal non-sectarian, gradualist pol-
icies and the highly charged atmosphere of the times which seemed to call
for a more traditional military response. In mid-1971 Garland warned the
movement against allowing itself to be swept up by the gathering momentum
of PlEA's violence: 'Unfortunately, because of our history as a movement
committed to force, we are liable to be brought down along with these
elements'.'	 At the beginning of 1972 OIRA reaffirmed its position
towards Northern Ireland:
It has never been and is not now our intention to launch a purely mili-
tary campaign against British forces In the North, We have seen the
failures of past campaigns based on military action only and have set our
faces against such campaigns which are doomed to failure. We do not
see, nor do we want a repetition of the fifties."
Such sentiments seemed discordant when matched with OIRA's actions both in
late 1971 and early 1972. 	 Disregarding Garland's warnings, the Officials
were sounding increasingly bombastic. In a speech in mid-1971 Goulding
had declared that the only answer to the repressive actions of the 'forces
of imperialism and exploitation' must be 'in the language that brings these
vultures to their senses most effectively, the language of the bomb and the
bullet'.'° This belligerence was later to manifest itself In a series of
actions which put its non-sectarian credentials at risk with the killing of
the unionist politician, Senator Jack Baruhill, in December 1971, followed by
148.Ibid..
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an assassination attempt on another unionist, John Taylor NP, in February
1972. The worst incident also happened in February when an OIRA bomb
planted at the Aldershot headquarters of the Parachute Regiment killed 7
people, including 5 women canteen workers and a Catholic priest. The
Officials' justified the Aldershot bombing as retaliation for the 'Bloody
Sunday' shootings, Derry, 31 January 1972, when 13 people were killed by
paratroopers during a civil rights demonstration.1B1	 Overall, the bombings
and shootings left OIRA's image severely tarnished. All the innovatory
ideas of a non-sectarian, non-militarist, all-Ireland agitatlonary movement
appeared to have fallen by the wayside in favour of a violent preoccupation
with the Northern conflict.
It is almost inconceivable that OIRA's descent into a frenzy of des-
truction reflected the true wishes of Goulding and his partners. In truth,
OIRA's violent spree represented less of an ideological reversion to full-
scale militarism and more a desperate attempt to curb the flow of support to
the Provisionals. Viewed in this light, we can see how important military
symbolism was to the republican tradition in general and how crucial the
Officials believed to be the preservation of a military role, not so much for
its political instrumentality, but as a means to sustain their legitimacy.
In this battle for the moral high ground of republicanism, OIRA's attempts to
'out-militaries' the Provisionals were never likely to succeed.
	 By 1972
Goulding was prepared to concede this point. 'What helps the Provos most
in the North', he claimed, 'was that every Catholic youth is a Provo at
heart."
Throughout larch and April 1972 the Official IRA's campaign continued
at full-ewing. On 21 Nay, OIRA shot dead William Best, an off-duty soldier
on home leave in Derry. The killing produced widespread anger against the
151.'Para HQ Blasted at Alderehot', UI, larch 1972.
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Officials and led the OIRA Army Council to reconsider its campaign in
Northern Ireland. On 29 Nay 1972, OIRA announced a ceasef ire, though it
reserved the right to act in self-defence and undertake defensive operations.
The announcement was made only after much acrimonious debate inside the
organisation. Opposition to any cessation of hostilities came from a mili-
tant ultra-leftist faction led by Seaiius Costello and from OIRA represent-
atives in Belfast and Derry who feared that a ceasaf ire would be both diff 1-
cult to enforce on local activists and would allow the Provisionals to extend
their influence at OIRA's expense. 15° At the practical level, the ceasef ire
appeared to have little effect. After all, the reservation of the right to
take defensive action had been OIRA's officially stated position all along.
The organisation had never formally declared an offensive. OIRA operations
simply persisted on through 1972 and 1973. The true significance of the 29
Nay announcement was that it marked the start of Goulding's push to put
theory into practice by once and for all reining-in OIRA's military elements
under his own authority. The problem, as leading Officials in the North
had already identified, was that OIRA's violence was being driven along more
by the fervour of local operatives than official sanction. In this respect,
the ceasef ire order was a clever balance between the reality of local auton-
omy on the ground and the longer term intentions of the leadership. Allow-
ing local units to continue their operations under the defensive clause pro-
vided a theoretical Justification for OIRA's violence while giving Goulding
the scope to disengage progressively the organisation from the military
struggle.	 The ceasefire announcement served the first stage in this pro-
cess as a rhetorical cut-off point, beyond which the leadership ceased to
back openly military initiatives. Further attacks were sanctioned by the
Dublin GHQ after the ceasef ire, but from Nay onwards permission for oper-
ations was gently scaled down while front line units in the North were
153.Patterson, pp. 140-141.
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slowly deprived of the resources and equipment necessary to keep the
campaign going.' Through shrewd bureaucratic manipulation, Goulding was
able to apply a steadily more stringent interpretation of the terms of the
ceasefire. In effect, by the end of 1973, OIRA's military campaign had
been defused by stealth, finally fulfilling the essential desideratum of the
sixties' strategic reappraisal.
The gradual winding down of OIRA's military activities did not pass
without imposing further strain on the organisation. The militants under
Costello remained implacably opposed to the ceasef ire. This faction event-
ually broke away to form the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) in
December 1974. Along with its military arm, the Irish National Liberation
Army, the IRSP went on to enjoy an extremely violent history (lILA's most
notable exploit was the killing of the Conservative Northern Ireland spokes-
man, Airey leave in larch 1979) but its influence waned when lILA descend-
ed into bitter factionalism in the mid-1980s. Any other objectors either
drifted off to join PIRA or simply dropped out of republican politics alto-
gether. Once the IRSP faction had removed itself, the Officials had no real
internal military constituency to answer to, freeing them to develop their
political programme by directing the movement's efforts ostensibly towards
the South where its prospects seemed brightest. During the 1970s the Off i-
cials were to become embroiled in a number of violent feuds both with PIRA
and lILA (OIRA assassinated Seamus Costello in 1977) but the military inst-
rument was never employed as the main arm of policy, and by the end of the
decade OIRA had largely faded from the scene. There were periodic reports
in the 1980s of the Official IRA's continued military activities,' but by
this time, the crown of physical force republicanism had long since passed
to the Provisionals.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NIL hART IISTRUJIEIT 11 THE ASCEIDAIT - THE PROVISIONAL IRA 01 THE
OFFENSiVE, 1970-1972
The fracturing of the republican movement in early 1970 left the Provis-
lonals in a distinct minority. Although PIRA more or less cleaned up in
Belfast, obtaining the allegiance of 9 of the 13 IRA units in the city,'
elsewhere in the province its membership was patchy. In the country areas
the Officials tended to hold sway. The division of 1970 had caused as much
confusion inside republican ranks as outside, and so units untouched by the
turbulent events of 1969 on the whole remained cautious and stayed with the
Officials, even though their sympathies may have lain with PIRA.	 In spite
of being a 'one-town' organisation, PIRA's position at the beginning of 1970
was fortuitous.	 It was Belfast which was the focus of attention because it
was there that sectarian tensions were most inflamed. In the months of
inter-sectarian rioting ahead, it was the Provisionals who were to gain most
in publicity terms. In the space of a year the Provisionals had effectively
superceded the Officials as the main republican driving force in Northern
Ireland.	 From these origins, the Provisional IRA was to embark on a sys-
tematic campaign of military confrontation.
	 The years between 1970 and
1972 were to see PIRA's military activity reach a scale of intensity that
has never since been matched. The aim of this chapter is to explore in
detail both the theory and practice of PIRA's offensive. The chapter begins
by setting out how the Provisionals first consolidated their bold in Cath-
olic areas by acting as a community defence force and then moved off onto
the offensive, launching an all out assault against the structures of North-
ern Irish government and society. Attention will be focused on exploring
the theoretical mechanics of PIRA's offensive and how they worked out in
practice, particularly in relation to the fall of the Stormont government in
1. XacStiofain, Kemoi.rs of a Revolutionary, p. 138.
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1972 which proved to be a landmark in the Provisionals' campaign. The
enquiry then looks at how the Provisionals sought to mix their violence with
political initiatives to induce the British government to talk to them. The
latter part of the chapter examines how a combination of internal factional-
ism and ideological rigidity prevented PIRA from capitalising on its poli-
tical advantages and impelled the movement to take military risks which
undermined its bargaining position with the British.
The Provisional IRA Army Council met in January 1970 to decide on the
outline of the movement's strategy. The Council agreed that its first pri-
ority was to devote the movement's resources to establish an adequate defen-
sive force. Ensuring that PIRA was equipped to protect Catholic neighbour-
hoods was to be only the first step in the gradual build-up to an offensive.
It was Sean XacStiofain's intention that: 'As soon as it became feasible and
practical, the IRA would move from a purely defensive position into a phase
of combined defence and retaliation.'
During the first few months of 1970 the Provisionals remained very
much in the shadows. Catholics were not automatically drawn towards the
organisation. lost were content to place their faith in the ability of the
British Army to protect them from the visitations of loyalist rioters.
laturally, committed republicans saw the Army not as benign guardians but as
the enemy whose job it was to underwrite unionist rule. XacStiofain felt
that 'with its imperial mentality'3
 the Army would be unable to retain
Catholic confidence for long.
As the inter-communal strife continued to boil over onto the streets of
Belfast, the Army increasingly resorted to heavy-handed methods to suppress
the disturbances. The use of CS riot gas and baton charges became common-
place and all helped to fulfil the predictions of those like IacStiofain by
2. IbId., p. 146.
3. IbId., p. 146.
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eroding Catholic support for the Army. Two incidents in particular helped
swing Catholic opinion. The first happened in late Xarch when troops tried
to disperse a crowd of young Catholics on the Ballymurphy Estate in West
Belfast.	 Soldiers used CS gas and then charged the crowd causing mayhem
all over the Estate.	 This event was followed by further large-scale
clashes in the area over the next few days as the Army battled it out with
Catholic and Protestant rioters. It was during this time that barricades
started proliferating, both in Ballymurphy and other Catholic districts.
The barricades, some of which had been up in the Creggan and Bogside areas
of Derry since the riots of August 1969, were largely an instinctive res-
ponse by Catholic residents to prevent incursions by loyalist mobs. The
Army allowed the barricades to remain in place and tried to co-operate with
the local citizen defence committees which manned them in the belief that
this would help defuse the tension. 4
 Because these districts were left
alone by the Army they became effective 'no-go' areas for the security
forces. The result was to permit the Provisionals to take root behind the
barricades and to eventually control the areas. From these areas they were
able to recruit and build up their organisation. The second major incident
of 1970 came in early July when the Army imposed a curfew on the Lower
Falls district of Vest Belfast in order to search the area for weapons.
The curfew, which was in fact illegal, was carried out with particular
severity. Four men were shot dead by the Army during the operation. In
both instances, the harsh reaction by the Army cemented nationalist solid-
arity and boosted support for the Provisionals, providing them with their
first big influx of recruita. The Lower Falls curfew was an especially
notable blunder as the district was a stronghold of the Officala who had
been following a strict policy of non-confrontation with the Army.
4. See D. Mamill, Pig in the Kiddie (London, 1985), pp. 72-73.
5. See The Sunday Tines Insight Team, Ulster (London, 1972), p. 204.
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There was a widespread feeling in the early 1970s that the rioting and
general street disturbances of this period had been orchestrated by the
Provisionals as a part of a deliberate strategy to weaken the relationship
between the Army and the Catholic community. PIRA was certainly hoping
for such a breakdown, and doubtless there were some agent provocateur's
involved, but there is little to suggest that confrontations with the Army
had been intentionally provoked from the start. 	 Usually, the Army was
sucked into the violence by inter-sectarian feuding. For example 1 in the
Ballynurphy disturbances the Army had intervened to prevent the Catholic
youths from ambushing an Orange parade which the authorities had allowed to
march through the area.' Although the Army's rough treatement was handed
out to both Catholics and Protestants in equal measure, it had an especially
alienating effect on Catholics who grew to share the Provisionals' perception
of a force trying to protect, not the Catholic population, but the repressive
Unionist party government at Stormont.
P IRA's stock within the Catholic community rose in proportion to the
decline of the Army's popularity as the movement increasingly made its name
as an energetic defence force. Understanding PIRA's defensive role helps to
explain how it was able to mount such a formidable politico-military chal-
lenge in the years to come. The Provisionals derived genuine popular kudos
from fulfilling such a practical function. For example, in June 1970 PIRA
units were able to repel an invasion by thousands of loyalists of the Cath-
olic enclave of the Short Strand in East Belfast while the Army was seem-
ingly nowhere in sight. Caner Cruise O'Brien has remarked that PIRA's most
potent asset 'was its simple relevance to the situation.' 	 PIRA was not
advocating stoic pacifism as the civil rights movement and the Catholic
6. See for example R. Nose, 'The Security of Ulster', in Conflict Studies,
Nov. 1971 (London, Institute for the Study of Conflict), p 18.
7. Bishop and Nallie, The Provisional IRA, p. 114.
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Church were both tending to do, nor waiting around for the Officials' non-
sectarian conditions to materialise, but offering to resist actively any
transgressions against the Catholic community. PIRA's popularity, in the
main, was not forced but rested on the legitimacy acquired from its protec-
tive role.' Accordingly, one newspaper reported that in some ghetto areas
of Belfast PIRA 'enjoys almost total support from ordinary people and is not
as isolated as the Government believes." 0 Although its popular base was
often to prove conditional on the continuing perception of the Provisionals
as a defensive force, PIRA had nevertheless, succeeded in establishing a firm
wedge inside the Catholic community on which it could work to expand its
struggle.1'
As NacStiofain'e plans displayed, the Provisional IRA was never con-
ceived solely as a defensive organisation. The Provisionals regarded them-
selves as the rightful heirs to the republican historical tradition and ard-
ently maintained the idea of the incomplete national revolution, as Ruairt
O'Bradaigh stated: 'Our Novement bases itself on Ireland's Jational rights,
and the right of the Irish people to the ownership of Ireland... That is the
main basis on which we rest our case. We also rest it on the natural and
historic right of resistance to British rule'. Yet, in public at least,
the Provisionals were coy about what form the resistance would take. The
only action to which they had openly committed themselves was to the vague
proposition to 'support all efforts to defend our people In the Six Coun-
ties." 3	They were prepared to hint at possible violent consequences, but
only in the context of Army provocation, as for instance, when Daithi
9. See F. Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy (London, 1978), pp. 68-127,
especially p. 108.
10. 'IRA versus the Provisionals', The Observer, 14 Feb. 1971.
11. D. Xansfield and 1. Rogerson, 'IRA in Jorthern Ireland', in B. O'Jeill, et
al, (eds.), Political Violence and Insurgency (Arvada, Colorado, 1974),
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O'Conaill warned the British that: 'The more your troops impose their will,
the nearer you bring the day of open rota4 The plans for pro-
active military operations were, for the time being, kept firmly under wraps.
Even so, the Provisionale' adherence to republican orthodoxy, with its stress
on the colonial interpretation of Ireland's relationship with Britain, pre-
disposed them to see the route to Irish unity lying through military action.
The belief that Northern Ireland was a product of British imperialism
influenced the way PERk looked on the Protestant population. The Provis-
ionals subscribed whole heartedly to the view that the Protestants were
simply being used as collaborators to maintain Britain's control of Ireland.
It was assumed that once Britain had withdrawn from the North, the Protest-
ants, being 'hard-headed, sensible' and 'very realistic', (though not appar-
ently as hard-headed or sensible to realise that they were the witless dupes
of the British) would soon come to terms with the situation and accept 'that
the best thing to do would be to participate in the building of the new Ire-
land."	 Ever since 1969 there had been speculation about an overwhelming
Protestant backlash against the Catholic community.' Apart from the loy-
alist riots, there was no all-engulfing onslaught. Consequently, the Prov-
Isionals were content to play down the prospect of mass Protestant resist-
ance, describing the possibility of a backlash as 'over-rated'. 17 The Prov-
isionals paid lip-service to secular adages about how the 'movement must be
based on the common working people of Ireland, North and South, Protestant,
Catholic and Dieseuter', but in practice, the notion that the Protestants
should be concilated, at least in the terms envisaged by the Officials, was
resolutely squashed, in XacStiofain's words: 'You've got to have military
14. D. O'Conaill, Bodenstown Speech, AP, July 1970.
15. Belfast Telegraph interview with R. O'Bradaigh, reprinted in AF, Sept.
1971.
16. See for example, 'Protestant Dog Ready to Bite', The Sunday Times,
24 Aug. 1969.
17. Belfast Telegraph interview with O'Bradaigh.
18. 'Our Aims and Nethods', AP, larch 1970.
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victory first and then politicise the people afterwards. To say you've got
to unite the Catholic and Protestant working class is just utter rubbish."
So, although for the greater part of 1970 PIRA kept a low profile by
avoiding direct military contact with the British Army, the movement was
gearing itself up for the opening of hostilities.
	 Feelings amongst PIRA's
ranks had been running high for some time.
	 'I would dearly love to have a
go at the British troops', said one activist, but added with caution: 'We will
go on the offensive at the right time.
	 Our policy at present is not to
take the initiative.'20
 By October, however, the movement felt sufficiently
prepared to begin the third phase of )(acStiofain's strategy - the launching
of 'all-out offensive action against the British occupation system.'21
The Shift to the Offensive - The Theory and Practice of Psychological
Attrition
In October 1970, P1RA began a systematic bombing campaign, directed osten-
sibly at commercial targets. 	 By the end of the year there had been 153
explosions.	 At the beginning of 1971 the Army Council authorised attacks
against the British Army, and on 8 February the first British soldier was
killed.	 The attacks increased, though a Provisional spokesman, Leo Martin,
insisted that operations were 'still confined to acts of retaliation against
the British Army.'
	 It was only in October 1971 that XacStiofain formally
announced that PlEA's fight had shifted to an 'offensive campaign of resist-
ance in all parts of the occupied area.' During 1971 there were 1756
shootings, 1515 bombing incidents and 174 deaths. The violence rose dram-
atically the following year to 10,828 shootings and 1853 bombings which left
19. 5. )tacStiofain, Statement in Sweetman, On Our Knees, p. 156.
20. Quoted in The Times, 7 April 1970.
21. MacStiofain, Kemoirs of a Revolutionary, p. 146.
22. Bishop and Mallie, p. 135.
23. Quoted in The Irish Times, 18 March 1971.
24. S. MacStiofain, Statement from Army Council, RN, 30 Oct. 1971.
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46? dead, 208 of which were the result of known PIRA activity.
The nature of the political objective that the Provisional IRA set it-
self was, for a relatively small, minority based movement, a formidable task.
To achieve the complete removal of the British presence and the integration
of Northern Ireland into a wholly new unitary political entity would require
a highly potent strategy. Propaganda exhortations aside, the Provisionals
were realistic enough to accept that, given the disparity of resources bet-
ween themselves and the British, they would be unable to defeat the British
Army in any conventional military sense. Nor could they hope to achieve
victory in Naoist terms through the slow accumulation of small military vic-
tories eventually to outmatch and defeat the security forces. However, they
did believe it would be possible to wage a limited form of war 'until Britain
is forced to sit at the conference table' to negotiate on PIRA's terms.
To this end, the Provisionals utilised a multi-layered strategy which was
composed of a series of distinct intermediate and long-term political and
military goals which would enable the Provisionals' offensive to progress-
ively attain its overall objective. This can be expressed diagrammatically
as in Figure 1 (page 204).
Theoretically, the Provisionals strategy started from a premise put
forward by Robert Taber that an insurgent victory was possible in any
scenario where, for whatever reason, the enemy was unable to apply euff 1-
cient force to wipe out any revolutionary movement. 7 In such circumst-
ances, the insurgent has the opportunity to manipulate individual military
engagements to generate a degree of coercive psychological pressure out of
25. Figures for shootings and bombing incidents (including devices defused)
from Irish Information Agenda (London, 1987), Table B7i. For deaths:
Table Bivi p. 1 and Table 1 in V. Flackee and S. Elliott, Iorthern
Ireland: A Political Directory, (Belfast, 1989), p. 411.
26. 'Resist, Resist, Resist', RN, 4 Sept. 1971.
27. H. Taber, War of the Flea (London, 1972), p. 11.
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Overleaf _____
all proportion to their destructive consequences. A sustained rate of
small-scale military operations can, therefore, help to engender a high level
of duress, which might lead the controlling power to concede to its opponent
due to the inordinately high economic and political price incurred in trying
to retain the contended obJect.	 It is a process frequently referred to in
insurgency theory as the 'asset-to-liability shiftl.ao One of the most
important elements of an insurgent's military action in this respect is to
challenge the authorities to respond without infringing the accepted moral
norms of its own domestic polity. Responses which violate those norms
may, particularly in liberal democratic societies, lead to a widespread belief
that the authorities are over-reacting to the threat. The use of excessive
repression may further devalue the former asset by de-legitimising govern-
ment actions in the eyes of its own population, and so increase domestic
pressure to yield to the insurgents.1
The asset-to-liability shift is both a complex and subtle strategy.
It is a useful formula as it allows us to understand the role of force in
low intensity strategies. Where military actions are not intended primarily
to alter the balance of forces in any materially significant way, engage-
ments will be used to demonstrate resolve. Insurgent violence will be
aimed at exerting political leverage on the enemy actor. The point is that
the insurgent cannot itself effect a decision, it has to induce the enemy to
choose a course favourable to the insurgent's aims by using force, and the
threat of force, to recast the atmosphere in which the enemy's political
calculations are made.
28. See B. Xorris and A. Roe, Terrorism: Threat and Response (London:
198?), p. 25.
29. See J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla (New York, 1971), p. 55.
30. See I. Tugwell, 'Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA', in
P. Wilkinson (ed.), British Perspectives on Terrorism (London, 1981),
pp. 14-16.
31. See V. Vaugh, International Terrorism (Salisbury J.C, 1982),
pp. 107-113.
32. See Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 3.
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This type of theory of insurgent warfare reflects the experiencee of
many minor wars during the era of decolonisation after Vorld Var II, when
rebel campaigns succeeded in altering perceptions in the colonial metropolis,
thereby forcing the imperial powers to forsake their possessions in order to
minimise public opprobrium on the international stage as well as to avoid
the escalating costs of retention. To this extent, the basic theoretical
mechanics of PIRA's strategy were little different from the IRA's campaign in
the Anglo-Irish war fifty years previously, itself in many ways the proto-
type anti-colonial campaign of the twentieth century. It was entirely con-
sonant with PIRA's outlook, with its image of Britain as the foreign oppres-
sor, that it should seek to construct its strategy along the lines of the
classical anti-colonial wars of the past. According to Xaria NcGuire, who
was close to Army Council circles in the early 1970s, the Provisionals had
keenly studied recent conflicts like those in Palestine, Cyprus and Aden
where guerrilla campaigns had resulted in a British evacuation. She also
claimed that the Army Council set an initial target to kill 36 British sold-
iers because it was thought that this figure matched the number of troops
killed in Aden and would supposedly impose enough pressure on the British to
oblige them to negotiate.
PIRA's strategic construct was not simply a retread of the Anglo-Irish
war. There were three important differences which influenced the particular
context of PIRA's campaign. 	 First, PIRA's military operations were wholly
confined to Northern Ireland. Second, PIRA had secured a political foot-
hold amongst the Catholic populace, something that it had failed to achieve
during the 1950-62 border war, which it could use to sustain a prolonged
campaign.	 Finally, Northern Irish unionism was in crisis. 	 The ruling
Unionist party at Stormont, which had been in power since Northern Ireland's
33. N. XcGuire, To Take Arms (London, 1973), p. 74.
34. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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creation, had proved incapable of dealing with the civil rights Issue when it
blew up in 1968 and was now in the grip of a paralysing split between re-
formists and hardliners. The Unionist party and government was teetering
on the brink of disintegration and appeared highly vulnerable to further
destabilisation. All of these factors helped map out the direction of
PIRA's strategy as they presented the movement with a prime opportunity to
exploit the Northern crisis in order to engage the attention of the poli-
ticians and public In Great Britain - the key actors who it was felt had the
real power to affect the political destiny of the province.
In summary then, the Provisional IRA was attempting to use its limited
resources to wage a war of psychological attrition against the British. A
constant level of military activity would transmit the political message that
PIRA would continue operations until the British authorities acceded to its
demands. The impression of chaos and instability in Northern Ireland would
eventually exasperate public opinion which would increasingly demand to be
extricated from the morass. Eventually, the British government's resolve
would fail, causing it to finally relinquish political control of Northern
Ireland.
PIRA's Strategy and the Fall of Stormont
The Provisionals believed that they could only embark on the final phase of
their struggle to end British rule in Northern Ireland by getting the British
government to intervene directly in the administration of the province.
From PIRA's standpoint, so long as the Stormont government remained, the
British could look on at a distance without involving itself on any sig-
nificant scale.	 Noreaver, in PlEA's view, Stormont's existence obfuscated
the nature of its campaign. 	 Nany in the Provisionals' ranks believed that
because PIRA's attacks, particularly those against the security forces, often
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resulted in the deaths of Protestants, they were at war with the Protestant
community. One Provisional admitted that many new recruits 'joined because
they hated Protestants'. PIRA spokesmen, though, were anxious to deny the
sectarian label and to stress the real nature of their fight as they saw it:
'We have no fight with the Protestants, in fact we detest these terms "Prot-
estant" and utholicN... Our fight is with the English for our God-given
right to nationhood.'	 The Provisionals argued that to bring about such a
face-to-face fight with the Bnglish It was necessary, as an 'intermediate
objective', to aim for the 'suspension of Stormontl.a7 This would open the
way to the final offensive, because with Stormont gone, the 'British forces
of occupation could then be clearly seen as forces of Invasion on Irish
soil.'	 In other words, abolition would break the unionist power structure,
and unambiguously expose the colonial relationship between Britain and Nor-
thern Ireland. The loyalists would then be able to see their true position
as mere cogs in the British imperial system. Abolition would, as a conse-
quence, 'establish the lines of demarcation.., between those whose wish would
be to sell their birthright and nationality and those who would strive to
maintain it and defend it.' 	 Direct rule would turn the conflict into a
straight forward confrontation between PIRA and the British, along with any
remaining native collaborators. In turn, this would render the Westminster
government susceptible to the pressure of public opinion over its policies in
Northern Ireland.
To bring down Stormont and effect the asset-to-liability shift, PIRA
needed to cause sufficient instability in Northern Ireland in order to create
the perception of chaos and ungovernability. If Storiiont was seen to be
unable to deal with the political crisis, then the pressure on the British
35. Quoted in Bishop and Nallie, p. 140. See also Burton, p. 82.
36. Quoted in The Times, 30 July 1971.
37. Belfast Telegraph interview with O'Bradaigh.




government to intervene would be great. Concurrently, the image of a prov-
ince in perpetual strife, paralysed by PIRA's operations, would help wear
down mainland opinion.'0
 Therefore, PIRA's initial political goal was, in
O'Bradaigh's words, to 'rock Stormont and to keep it rocking until Stormont
comes down."'
The cutting edge of PIRA's strategy was its bombing campaign, PIRA's
most potent weapon was, in fact, its own invention, the car-bomb.
	 It was
introduced into PIRA's arsenal in early 1972.
	 The capacity of a mobile
platform to transfer large bomb loads over a wide area had a devastating
impact on the province. 'The strategic aim', of the car-bombings
NacStiofain said, 'was to make the government and administration of the
occupied North as difficult as possible, simultaneously striking at its
colonial infrastructure."2	 The rationale was to restrict the province's
economic base by hitting commercial and business premises to drive away
investment and force the British to pay compensation.' This would drive
up the financial costs of holding Northern Ireland and reinforce the
impression of an ungovernable liability and accentuate, in the British
public's mind, the relief to be had from a withdrawal.
In tandem with the economic war, the bombings served a number of tact-
ical objectives. The Provisionals believed that the bombing threat could
divert the security forces from counter-insurgency operations by tying down
large numbers of troops in static positions guarding potential targets. In
addition, by 'stretching the British Army to the limits of its resources', the
Provisionals felt they could 'keep pressures off the nationalist areas.'4'
By reducing the Army's presence in Catholic areas, the Provisionals could
40. Boyce, 'Water for the Fish', in Alexander and O'Day, Terrorism in
Ireland, p. iCC.
41.Quoted in K. Kelley, The Longest War (London, 1982), p. 153.
42. XacStiofain, p. 243.
43. Ibid., p. 243.
44. PSF, Freedom Struggle by the Provisional IRA (n.p., n.d. c. 1973), p. 34.
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hope to enhance their credibility as defenders. In practice, this propo-
sition was untenable. Liautenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo, the British Army's
commanding officer in Northern Ireland, pointed out in late 1971 that the
mere fact of PIRA's existence caused the security forces to concentrate their
efforts on the Catholic community. 	 At times PIRA's bombings may well
have deflected the security forces' attention, but such distractions were
always likely to prove temporary.	 In due course, the security forces were
bound to resume their activities in Catholic areas; patrols, house searches,
round-ups, interrogations etc.. Some Catholics suspected that the Provis-
ionals were not really aiming to keep away the security forces at all, but
more interested, instead, in drawing them into Catholic areas so that PIRA
could mount attacks, using the population as a shield, while benefiting
politically from the Army's excesses which tha Provisionals themselves had
partially provoked. There is no direct evidence to suggest that this is
what PIRA had intended, though it was a natural consequence of its actions.
As the sociologist, Frank Burton, has argued, this problem turned on the def-
inition of what was meant by defence. Since the Provisionals ultimately
believed that only in the framework of a united Ireland could Northern Cath-
olics be properly protected, then they may have seen little contradiction in
the provocation of the security forces in this manner.47
Although the heart of PIRA's strategy was directed at an audience in
Great Britain, it was also the case that its campaign was, to an important
degree, inner directed towards affecting political and military conditions in
Northern Ireland. In this sense, PIRA was able to practise a limited policy
of terrorism aimed at demoralising the unionists, in effect, making them
more pliable to its demands. By 'terrorism' we refer to the deliberate
creation of fear, through the use, or threat of use, of individual acts of
45. The Irish Times, 20 Dec. 1971.
46. Burton, pp. 82-83.
47. Ibid., p. 83.
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physical violence, for political and military ends. The constant attacks on
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUG) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) per-
sonnel were an attempt to deter local people from joining the security
forces.	 Between 1970 and 1972, 58 RUG and UDR men had been killed and
over 1000 injured. Success in this sphere would have improved tactical
conditions for the Provisionals but their campaign, then and since, has had
no discernible impact on the level of recruitment into the local security
forces. Figures for RUG recruitment show that on average applications for
places have been some 11 times over subscribed (in the late 1980s places
were 20 times over subscribed). 	 Jore significantly in this regard, PIR&'s
violence was also aimed at sustaining a high level of public anxiety among
the populace in Northern Ireland in general. Maria McGuire claimed that
although it was no part of PIRA's strategy to deliberately cause civilian
casualties, the creation of a feeling of terror as a by-product of the
bombing campaign was intentional: 'By causing such terror we demonstrated
that whatever steps the army took, the Provisionals could continue the mili-
tary campaign; half a million people in Belfast would be kept wondering
where the Provisionals would strike next and would be forced to tell the
British to make peace with us.'° There is no indication at all whether the
fear of bombs had the desired effect of cowering the population into submis-
sion. However, the Protestant community as a whole remained surprisingly
subdued in the face of P IRA's onslaught. Even the loyalist paramilitaries,
like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), had been relatively inert during the
very early 1970s. The Provisionals were in no doubt that their campaign
was responsible in large measure for Protestant quiescence, and made no
48. RUG Statistical Information, RUG Information Office (Belfast, 1989).
49. RUG information supplied by letter, 14 June 1990. Yearly statistics on
recruitment are published in the Chief Constable s Annual Report
(Belfast). See also C. Ryder, RUG: A force Undar Fire (London, 1989),
p. 127.
50. XcGuire, pp. 34-35.
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secret of their contempt for loyalist fighting abilities. 	 According to a
senior PIRA spokesman:
You would get a large number (of Protestants] who would attack a defence-
less nationalist community as in August, 1969. But I think only a
small minority would fight now. We took on the UVF in June 1970 and
we taught them a lesson in hard defensive fighting. You'll notice there
has been no sectarian fighting since then."
In other areas, the effects of PIRA's campaign were more easily quant-
ifiable. Inevitably the violence had an impact on the Northern Irish econ-
omy. Economic growth in the first half of 1971 was only 1%, down from a
projected 10%, while the fear of bombs had depressed inner-city trade by as
much as 30%.B2	 Even so, the effect on employment appears to have been
marginal. From 1968 to 1971 unemployment increased by 2% which was
slightly lower than the rise in Great Britain (2.1%) over the same period.a
There is no doubt that the financial cost to the central exchequer of main-
taining the high level of security and economic support was considerable.
Up to 1979 the average cost arising directly from the violence was put at
£182 million per year while the total annual bill for financial assistance to
the province was running at approximately £1 billion.' Therefore, along
with the general confusion and violence, between 1971 and 1972 there aver-
aged 17 shooting incidents and nearly 4 bombings per day, we can assume
that PIRA was successful in attaining its intermediate military goal of
creating and sustaining the impression of Northern Ireland as an unfath-
omable political and economic burden. This was reflected in opinion poll
evidence which gave PIRA cause to believe its campaign had been able to con-
vince people that withdrawal was the only realistic option. The Provision-
ale made much of a Daily Nail poll in September 1971 which indicated that
over 80% of the British public favoured the withdrawal of the British Army:
51. Quoted in J. NacAnthony, Gun Glory', The GuardIan, 14 Aug. 1971.
52. N. Turner, 'Living With Bombs', Fortnight, 1 Oct. 1971.
53. See table in T. O'Hanlon, The Irish: Portrait of a People (London,
1976), p. 241.
54. T. Coogan, The IRA (London, 1987), p. 471.
- 212 -
It is refreshing to hear the sweet voice of reason and common sense
expressed by the ordinary people after all the inane prattle and
inconsequential ramblings of the politicians... The effects (of the
military campaign] are becoming apparent on all sides. Economically
the Six Counties is tottering. Politically Stormont is about to
collapse and now we are seeing the first chink in the enemy's armour.
Towards the end of 1971 these initial political gains convinced the
Provisionals that their campaign was dictating the course of events.
They were sufficiently buoyed up for Republican News to proclaim 1972 'The
Year of Victory.iBv The year was certainly to prove crucial for PIRA. The
most significant sign that its strategy was proceeding to plan was the
suspension of Stormont on 24 March 1972.
	 The imposition of direct rule
from Westminster was a major political success for the Provisionals who
claimed full credit for the fall of 'the puppet parliament in Belfast.'
Xacstiofain maintained, not all that surprisingly, that he had 'yet to meet a
single person who ever thought that Stormont fell for any other reason than
the armed struggle of the Republican movement.' Wore objectively, it can
be said that PIRA's campaign pushed Stormont over the edge by highlighting
its inability to cope with the deteriorating security situation or to respond
to the need for substantive political reforms. But the Stormont regime had
already been fatally weakened by the civil rights movement back in 1968 and
1969. In the meantime, the Stormont administration, with its own internal
divisions, was proving adept at destabilising itself. The best illustration
of this was the botched introduction of internment without trial on 9 August
1971, which dealt a great blow to Stormont's credibility. The initial swoop
was based on inaccurate and out-dated intelligence and 105 of the 342 arres-
ted had to be released within 48 hours.
	 Most PIRA operatives had been
forewarned and had gone into hiding. Only in Derry were the Provisionals
55. 'Bring Our Boys Home', RN, 2 Oct. 1971.
56. The Daily Telegraph, 11 Oct. 1971.
57. RI, 2 Jan. 1972.
58. R. O'Bradaigh, 1972 krd-Fheis Address, in R. O'Bradaigh, (Air People: Our
Future (Dublin, 1973), p. 24.
59. MacStiofain, p. 241.
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hit badly by the arrests. 	 The introduction of internment instantaneously
united all shades of Catholic opinion against the authorities. 	 Far from
stemming the violence, internment provided PIRA with an enormous propaganda
victory which boasted recruitment.	 In the 4 months preceding internment
there had been a combined total of 8 civilian and military deaths. The 4
months after the introduction of internment saw the deaths of 30 soldiers,
11 RUG officers and 73 civilians.°
Overall, it would be true to say that PIRA's violence applied the stim-
ulus which opened up the tensions and contradictions that existed between
Stormont and Veetminster. The British government was placed in an invid-
ious position. It was reluctant to prorogue Stormont due to a general dis-
inclination to become embroiled in the complexity of the province's affairs
and also because the dissolution of an elected assembly, no matter its many
imperfections, was basically an anti-democratic step. Yet in trying to
defend Stormont, the world saw the British government propping up a dis-
credited sectarian regime that did not command any degree of support
amongst Northern Ireland's substantial Catholic population.
In no small measure, PIRA's strategy up to early 1972 had proven high-
ly successful. PIRA had skilfully implanted itself within the Catholic
community from where it was able to launch a military campaign that turned
what had originally been a quest for protection and the redress of social
and economic grievances into a far wider political debate concerning, not
just the competence of the Stormont regime, but the legitimacy of the Nor-
thern state as a whole. This was a major political victory for the Provis-
lonals. PIRA had demonstrated the potency of a campaign comprising of
small-scale military actions designed to pressurise a more powerful oppon-
ent. On the other hand, the attainment of PIRA's main intermediate object-
ive emphasised the delicate nature of its strategy. PIRA had not 'bombed
60. See Plackee and Elliott, pp. 402-404 and Hamil]., p. 65.
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down' Stormont.	 It had been the British who had actually dismantled the
Stormont edifice and, to this extent, it was with the British that the
political initiative continued to reside.
	 PIRA's military operations had
been able to elicit a response which was amenable to its long-term object-
ives.	 But this did not mean that PIRA was now in the political driving
seat.	 For the Provisionals to achieve their final goal of a British with-
drawal they would have to convert their military position Into political
influence. This called for the formulation of a coherent political pro-
gramme and definite negotiating proposals with which tempt the British. To
establish a firm bargaining position required close political and military
co-ordination and It was in this regard that the real test of PIRA's strat-
egy was yet to come.
The Politics of PlEA's Offensive
In any conflict the tactical efficiency with which military operations are
executed will be meaningless unless they form part of a co-ordinated plan to
achieve political ends, because the success of a strategy can only be judged
with reference to the attainment of the overall political objective. By
1972, few could doubt the technical ability of PIRA to mount limited military
engagements against both the security forces and the Institutional and econ-
omic infrastructure of the Northern Irish state. For PIRA's strategy to be
truly effective, though, these engagements had to be converted into the means
to fulfil political ends. The problem for the Provisionals was the correl-
ation between the nature of the goal sought and the resources available with
which to achieve it.
The objective of the Provisionals' strategy can be described as one of
direct control in the sense that it required a complete change in the status
of the territory of Northern Ireland through the removal of any kind of
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British presenca. 1
 As has been elucidated in previous chapters, the only
way such a change in political control could be guaranteed was through the
physical destruction of the resources that Britain was prepared to commit in
order to keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.
	 Yet the total
strength of the Provisionals in Northern Ireland just after the introduction
of internment in August 1971, was estimated at a little over 1000.
Opposing them were a regular British Army presence of 14,000 troops, the RUG
at 6000 and an expanding UDR with over 8000 members. In this type of
scenario, where one belligerent is clearly limited in its capacity to inflict
damage on its opponent, the efficacy of its direct control strategy can only
be assessed at any point in the conflict by the political effects generated
by its military campaign. The physical consequences of the tactical engage-
ments will not be decisive in affecting the outcome of the conflict as it is
unlikely they would be able to significantly alter the overall ratio of
forces in favour of the inferior belligerent.	 So, the challenge for PIRA
was to exploit what could only be positions of temporary military and psy-
chological advantage for maximum political gain. The logic of PIRA's
position meant that if it was to stand any chance of achieving its political
objectives, the movement would have to confront Britain, not in the field of
battle, but over the negotiating table. Irrespective of the success of its
military actions, eventually the Provisionals would have to persuade the
British that they were a serious political force with substantive and real-
istic proposals for the future of Ireland.
The initial problem for the Provisionals was to surmount the tradit-
ional republican reluctance to get involved in politics. The nature of the
61. See L. Freedman, 'Terrorism and Strategy', in L. Freedman, et al,
Terrorism and Ii terna tional Order (London, 1986), p. 60.
62. See Institute for the Study of Conflict, 'The Balance of Military
Forces', in The Ulster Debate, (London, 1972), p. 53.
63. P. Janka, 'Ulster: A Decade of Violence', Conflict Studies, No. 108,
June, 1979, pp. 18-19. See also Appendix 1 in N. Arthur, Northern
Ireland: Soldiers Talking (London, 1987), p. 255.
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1969/70 spilt dictated that PIRA was primarily a military organisation with
little concern for the political machinations of the Official IRA. In any
case, the Provisionais already enjoyed widespread backing from the Catholic
community 1
 there seemed little overwhelming reason to draw up a precise pol-
itical manifesto. nevertheless, there was general acceptance, even amongst
the most hardline elements of PIRA's leadership, that if the movement was to
establish a firm negotiating agenda then it would have to clarify its pout-
Ical ideas. According to lana XcGuire's testimony: 'The lilitary campaign
was vital; and we knew as we achieved success after success that the British
would have to talk to us. But when XacStiofain came into the Kevin Street
office (Dublin HQ of PSF] and announced, Ve've got to have a pouicyN, it was
for him a change of emphasis indeed.'
The first tangible sign of the Provisionals' Intent to give its cam-
paign a political dimension came with the issuing of the Hire Ntm (Jew Ire-
land) programme in June 1971. The programme set out PSP's thoughts on the
creation of a federal administration in a post-united Ireland. The plan
envisaged an Ulster parliament (Dali Uiadh) comprising of the original nine
counties of the province. The federal solution was PSF's way of trying to
soothe Protestant animosity towards Irish unity by guaranteeing them a major
Influence within a regional asseably. 	 This was supplemented In September
1971 when PIRA announced a five-point plan for the suspension of hostili-
ties; the end to the violence of the British forces, abolition of Stormont,
free elections to a new Ulster assembly, the release of political prisoners
and compensation to victims of British violence.	 Given the scale of the
demands, and the fact that PIRA's offensive was barely a year old, there was
little prospect of the plan being accepted. 	 However, it could be seen as
the opening gambit in an Implicit bargaining process which was attempting
64. iIcGuire, pp. 110.
65. 'Dali Uladh - IRA: Step Towards a Political Solution', AP, Sept. 1971.
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to set a negotiating agenda with the British. The plan was coupled with an
explicit threat to Intensify the campaign if the British did not comply
within four days.
PIRA's next political Initiative came on 10 larch 1 q72, with the decl-
aration of a 72-hour truce. This was accompanied by a moderated ceasef ire
plan which called for the withdrawal of the Army from the streets, an ack-
nowledgement of the right of the Irish people to determine their own future,
the abolition of Stormont and an amnesty for political prisoners. This
move was seen as a further attempt by PIRA to gain political credibility and
to pre-empt the Impending British proposals for the province, which were
widely expected to include the abolition of Stormont. 'Ye were by now
sure', XcGuire said of the 10 1(arch proposals, 'that the British government
would be compelled to ask where we stood politically, such was the success
of our miliary campaign.' To increase the pressure on the British gov-
ernment, the expiration of the truce was followed by the resumption of wide-
spread bomb attacks all over the province.
Stormont's demise later In larch posed the first real problem for PIRA.
Abolition had rectified one of the major Catholic grievances. As a result,
there was heavy pressure on PIRA from within the Catholic community to call
a ceasef ire.	 Nany Catholics were tired of the hardships Imposed by the
conflict.	 There was also a growing concern at PIRA's increasingly casual
regard for civilian casualtIes. Incidents like the killing of two people
in the bombing of the Abercorn restaurant on 4 larch, which PIRA has always
denied, and the killing of six people in a car bombing in Belfast, were seen
as especially reckless.
PIRA Ignored the calls for a ceasef Ire and decided to continue with its
66. See PSF, Freedom Struggle by the Provisionals, p. 44.
67. The Irish Times, 11 larch, 1972.
68. lcGuire, p. 100.
69. See The Observer, 26 larch 1972.
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campaign. The reasons for the decision were broadly ideological and strat-
egic. The tradition of the nationalist vanguard never inclined hardliners
to take more than a passing interest in popular opinion. For NacStiofain,
any peace now, with or without Stormont, would still be peace under colonial
rule.	 It would not end the suffering of the nationalist people. 	 It would
merely result in a loss of military momentum and allow the initiative to
pass to the constitutional politicians.	 He scorned the demands for an
immediate ceasef ire:
Laying down arms with no guarantee would amount to surrender, leaving
Republicans wide open to arrest and wholesale round-ups by the military
...(the] struggle was not to play politics or to grab momentary praise
from the media and the middle class. It was to liberate the country and
get the British out of it once and for all.7°
As if to indicate that the much greater goal of British withdrawal was now
in sight, as well as to allay Catholic opinion, the Provisionals assured
their supporters that they were 'now entering the final phase of the
struggle'.7 ' MacStiofain was certain that: 'If we could continue to inflict
high British causualties and step up the sabotage campaign it would be dif f-
icult for them to bear the strain and the drain on their economy, and no
government could be prepared to continue indefinitely in such a situation.
They were really in no position to sneer at a truce.'72
Two months later PIRA's calculations seemed to pay off. PIRA announ-
ced that a ceasef ire would take effect from 26 June. In response, the
Northern Ireland Secretary, Villiam Vhitelaw, agreed to meet a PIRA deleg-
ation in London. The main medium-term objective of PIRA's military cam-
paign had been achieved. Through a blend of coercive military pressure and
limited political manoeuvre, PIRA had been able to lever itself into a
position where it had the chance to shape future British policy towards
Northern Ireland. As an example of an insurgent strategy aimed at
70. XacStiofain, p. 241. See also p. 258.
71. AP, April 1972.
72. XacStiofain, p. 281.
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asserting influence over a more powerful adversary, PIRA's conduct had been
a of its kind. Anxious to maintain the tacit bargaining process to keep
the pressure on the British, XacStiofain ordered the continuation of oper-
ations up to the last minute before the ceasef ire. XacStiofain concluded
that 'Irish Republican resistance had demonstrated to the British, the
Unionists, to our own rank and file and to the whole world that after three
years in battle against imperialism the movement was as tough a fighting
force as ever and was speaking from strength.'7
low that the military instrument had fulfilled its political task it
was up to the Provisional delegation to use their political technique to
extract the concessions that would help them realise their overall object-
ives. The meeting with Whitelaw was arranged for 7 July.
The PIRA-Vhitelaw Talks
Notwithstanding the impeccable strategic logic and the undoubted operational
skill of the military campaign which had placed the Provisionals at the neg-
otiating table, a number of questions about PIRA's strategy still lingered,
Was, for instance, PIRA's strategy designed to suit the prevailing political
circumstances, or did the circumstances happen to suit its campaign? Did
it really take all that much planning to make Northern Ireland appear ungov-
ernable? After all, in the age of world-wide telecommunications violence of
all kinds tended to be amplified. A few selectively covered incidents could
easily convey the televisual impression of a mass killing ground. Horr-
ible though the suffering was, the violence between 1969 and 1972 still
claimed only half the lives lost in road. accidents in the province over the
same period 7m
	And we have already suggested that Storiaont, for all its
bastion-like facade, was really an anachronism waiting for its own downfall.
73. Ibid., p. 269.
74. Deaths through violence, 1969-72: 679. Deaths through road accidents,
1969-72: 1205. Source: RUC Statistics.
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Therefore, the collapse of the unionist power structure cannot be regarded as
having provided the supreme test of PIRA's strategy.
	 Needless to say,
P IRA's campaign was certainly not inconsequential.
	 No government agrees
lightly to treat with those it has branded terrorists. However, the point
is, that by placing themselves within the tradition of militant republican-
ism, the Provisionals were conditioned to respond to the ettus quo in a
pre-determined way. As Bishop and Nallie have argued, by initiating their
offensive the Provisionals 'were simply resuming hostilities against anyone
in the Queen's uniform in a war they had never declared over.' 75
 As evin-
ced by all the disastrous campaigns since the end of the Anglo-Irish war,
careful evaluation of the utility of armed force has just not been an his-
torical pre-requisite for IRA action.
Nonetheless, whatever doubts over the quality of PIRA's political and
military analysis, the talks with Whitelaw would provide an ideal opportun-
ity for the Provisionals to show how far their strategic thinking had advan-
ced. To reach the final goal of a British disengagement would require a
high degree of political sophistication and negotiating skill. For it would
be in the political arena that the real test of PIRA's abilities would lie.
What was to make negotiations with the Provisionals problematical was
the unaccommodating nature of republican ideology. We have noted through-
out this study that this belief manifests itself in the absolute demand for
the realisation of an independent, united republic. As the Provisionals saw
it, any compromise would be a betrayal, as acStiofain declared in April
1971: 'concessions be damned we want our freedom."
The uncompromising commitment to the republican ideal meant that the
Provisionals, like their predecessors who resisted the Anglo-Irish Treaty,
held a different conception of the term 'negotiation' from the British.
75. Bishop and Itallie, p. 132.
76. Quoted in R. Fisk, 'Both IRA Wings Say: "We Fight On"', The Times,
3 April 1972.
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Although the Provisionals may have had a basic grasp of the notion of
bargaining through military pressure, it is clear that they had little com-
prehension of political bargaining. To them, negotiation was not about the
lengthy process of teasing out common ground through proposal, counter-pro-
posal, tactical concessions and so on. As demonstrated by the controversy
of the 1921 Treaty 1
 the concept of negotiation was, in many respects, alien
to the republican tradition. How could there be any common-ground with the
never failing source of all Ireland's political evils? Instead, 'negotiation'
was about demand, threat and coercion - in other words, a complete British
surrender. This image of th political process was evident in the months
preceding the truce. In April 1972, RepublIcan News argued: 'it is the
British, not we, who still refuse to negotiate. We have made very few, very
simple and very reasonable demands, the granting of which would lead to an
immediate truce.'77
	Yet these 'reasonable demands' referred to PIRA's
unconditional terms as contained in the plan announced during the 72 hour
truce on 10 larch, namely, a wholesale British withdrawal. Likewise, when
the Provisionals put forward their truce proposals of June 1972 they deman-
ded that the meeting with Vhitelaw should take place soon after the implem-
entation of the truce: 'in order to discuss and secure acceptance of the IRA
peace plan (author's italics) viz: (1) A declaration acknowledging the right
of the Irish people to self-determination; (ii) A commitment to withdraw
from Ireland by a specific date; (iii) A general amnesty for all political
prisoners in Britain and Ireland.' 7
 Being so bold as to pre-Judge the
outcome of the talks, suggests the Provisionals believed that simply because
Whitelaw had agreed to a meeting Britain was willing to acquiesce to their
basic demands. When XacStiofain put these demands to Whitelaw ha made it
plain that the Provisionals were not prepared to compromise on the substance
77. 'Jo Truce on these Terms', RN, Easter Sunday, 1972.
78. PSF, Freedom Struggle by the Frovislonals, p. 67.
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of their plan.
	 They were willing only to discuss issues such as the
announcement of further meetings and the timing of a British withdrawal.7
Having presented their terms, the Provislonals were unimpressed by
Yhitelaw's equivocal attitude.
	 Whitelaw was not looking for a way to
withdraw from Northern Ireland.	 Whitelaw himself claims he was persuaded
that a refusal to meet PIRA during the ceasef ire might have left the Provis-
ionals with a propaganda victory. If the talks failed, then at least he
could justify an increase in security measures, particularly to those in the
Catholic community like the SDLP, who had been pressing him to meet PIRA so
that no opportunity for ending the violence would be missed.° The preten-
sion of the Provisionals' demands was obvious since they plainly had no idea
of the legal constraints under which the British were compelled to operate.
For example, PIRA expected the British government to brush aside the consti-
tutional obligations under the Ireland Act of 1949 which guaranteed the
position of Northern Ireland within the UK with the consent of the popula-
tion.	 In addition, PIRA's proposals appeared to assume that the British
government could override the sovereignty of the Republic of Ireland. It
was quite erroneous to think that the British could agree off-the-cuff to
Irish unity, which would have entailed the disbandment of the Southern state,
or to the release of political prisoners in Irish jails. The British simply
had no legal authority in either matter. As Whitelaw recalls dismissively:
'The meeting was a non-event. The IRA leaders simply made impossible
demands which I told them the British Government would never concede.
They were in fact still in a mood of defiance and determination to carry on
until their absurd ultimatums were met.''
What is more, the talks seemed to reveal that the Provisionals still
had only the most rudimentary understanding of the relationship between
79. Iacstiofain, pp. 281-283.
80. V. Vhitelaw, The Vhitela pi Memoirs (London, 1989), pp. 99-100.
81. Ibid., p. 100.
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politics and violence. In particular, they appeared unaffected by any
notion that their own restricted military potential might have some impact
on their ability to attain their extensive political demands. The inconsis-
tency in PIRA's thinking was exhibited in a speech by Joe Cahill in 1971 in
which he initially concurred with the view expressed by Lt. Gen. Tuzo that
the conflict would eventually be settled through a political solution, rather
than any outright military victory by either side, but went onto say:
If there is to be a political settlement in Ireland, there must never be
another sell-out. We must ensure that the politicians who have betrayed
the cause of Ireland for the past 50 years are not allowed to sit on any
conference table. It is cur duty to ensure that Republicanism is a felt
force and that when a settlement is arrived at, that the last vestige of
British Imperialism is driven from our shores.
By arguing that the only acceptable terms for a political settlement could
be those that granted PIRA exclusive negotiating rights, and by seeking the
total extirpation of British influence, the Provisionals were, in effect,
demanding all those things which could only be obtained as a function of
military victory - a probability that they had already discounted.
The jumbled signals put out by PIRA's leaders suggested that while they
appreciated that they could never physically eliminate Britain's military
capabilities, they could still, somehow, induce the British to capitulate.
In actuality, what these signals added up to was customary republican zero-
sum thinking, which precluded the possibility of a settlement based on
mutual compromise and blinded the movement to the realities of the political
and military circumstances. Xartin XcGuinness, one of the PIRA delegates
to the talks, later claimed: 'I learned in two hours what Irish politicians
still haven't learned: that the British don't give easily.'
	 Yet a brief
reconnoitre of the prevailing political situation would have shown that the
British had little spellbinding reason to give anything at all.	 The
82. J. Cahill, Bodenstown Speech, AP, July 1971.
83. Quoted in IC. XcCool, 'Valuable Lesson in British Duplicity', AP/RI, 6 Aug.
1987.
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conflict in Northern Ireland was unpopular in Great Britain but it was
sufficiently removed from most people's lives for any discontent to be
translated into a significant political issue in mainstream British politics.
Also, British politicians made it clear that the situation, in the words of
Reginald Xaudling the Home Secretary, could be tolerated so long as the
violence could be held at 'an acceptable level'.' So far as the British
Army's attrition rate was concerned, XacStiofain recounted that British
officials let it be known to the PIRA delegates that the level of casualties
was not especially worrisome.
PIRA's strategic position raised the question about how far a strategy
of low intensity attritional warfare could be employed in pursuit of desig-
nated ends? Vas there a time to recognise the limits of the military inst-
rument and pursue the ends through other, non-violent, means? The trouble
was that the persistence of ideological absolutism within the movement's
thinking inhibited any serious understanding of these sorts of questions.
The essence of the Provisionals poetion was summed up in an article in An
Phoblacht in 1970, entitled 'The Republican Ethic'. It stated that the
movement's primary concern should not be with politics, which was described
as the 'the science of the possible', but with the preservation of the purity
of republican principles: 'The truth, the entire truth: that is what we mean
by a republican ethic, a republican code. As long as republicanism lives,
there will be people prepared to live by that code and, if necessary, to die
in its defence. So long will the nation survive.' This tract exempli-
fied the nature of the internal dynamic contained within republican ideology,
which dictated that any solution which failed to live up to the absolute
truth of the 'republican code' would be a violation of the movement's birth-
right.	 Therefore, the fate of the June 1972 talks were more or less
84. Quoted in Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army, p. 384.
85. XacStiofain, p. 285.
88. D. Breatnach, 'The Republican Ethic', AP, July 1970.
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pre-ordained, as XcGuinness explained:
The only interest that we had in going to meet Vhitelaw wasn't to talk
about side issues, this element or that element. Our aim was - and it
would be a failure if we didn't get it - to secure a binding agreement
from the British declaring their intention to leave Ireland at some date
in the future. That was the only interest. The attitude of republicans
to the ceasef ire was that it was going to be short-term. At the meeting
we were going to identify very quickly whether or not we were being
played along. We had a single-minded approach to it. If the British
weren't going to come up with a declaration of intent to withdraw, then
the truce was over.7
The resumption of P IRA's campaign took place two days after the talks
on 9 July after PIRA accused the British Army of contravening the truce
following a relatively minor conflagration on the Lenadoon housing estate in
West Belfast. Although the timing of the breakdown was not altogether to
the Provisional leadership's liking, it was, given the basic nature of PIRA's
ideological perspective, an inevitable eventuality.
It was the unyielding character of republican maxims that ware res-
ponsible for the Incoherence of PIRA's strategic thought. The main damage
this caused to the Provisionals prospects was that the movement was rend-
ered Incapable of exploiting the potential political benefits that its mili-
tary campaign had created. PIRA's willingness to continue the fight for the
absolute republican ideal, regardless of whether the circumstances were
propitious for its attainment, was both a symptom and a cause of what was
perhaps the most fundamental problem which afflicted, not Just the strategy
of the Provisionals, but those of generations of physical force nationalists
before it as well - the inability to come to terms with the reality of Brit-
ish power. PIRA's subsequent actions in the days ahead would prove the
point.
87. Quoted in XcCool, 'Valuable Lesson In British Duplicity'.
88. 'Provisionals Call Of f Ceasef ire After Army Clash In Belfast', The Times
10 July 1972.
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Unlimited Ideology in Limited Var - The Fallacy of Nilitary Escalation
Following the breakdown of the truce 1
 FIRA decided to escalate its campaign.
XacStiofain declared that the renewed offensive would be 'of the utmost
ferocity and ruthlessness.'	 Only 3 days after the resumption of hostil-
ities PIRA actions had claimed the lives of 8 soldiers and a policeman. By
the end of July the monthly death toll had reached 95, the highest monthly
figure recorded in the conflict.	 PIRA believed that while the British may
have been willing to reach an agreement, they had begun backsliding due to
growing loyalist unrest.	 Protestants were worried and resentful at the
truce. Even more so when news broke of PIRA's meeting with Whitelaw.
The main loyalist paramilitary organisation, the Ulster Defence Association
(UDA), took to the streets and put up its own barricades to match the 'no-
go' areas controlled by PIRA in nationalist districts of Belfast and Derry.
Senior UDA leaders were quoted as saying they would now 'take steps to
eliminate the gunmen.' 9°	 The random assassination of Catholics Increased.
The reasoning behind the renewed offensive, XacStiofain said was:
...to re-establish a strong IRA presence throughout the North. This
pulled the attention of the British back from the Unionist blackmail
move with the UDA, reminding them that the IRA remained the hard central
factor in the whole Northern situation. The feeling was that if the
offensive could be maintained in sufficient strength it could lead to
renewed contact regarding a solution...1
'On Friday, July 21', IacStiofain explained, 'a concerted sabotage
offensive was carried out'. 	 The Provisionals planted 22 bombs in Belfast
city centre.	 All were timed to explode in the space of an hour.
	 The
purpose was to 'impose a sudden and severe load on the British-Unionist
system'. 2 	 In all, nine people were killed in the explosions (initial
reports put the figure at 11 due to the difficulty of counting the shattered
remains of bodies).	 The atmosphere in the city that afternoon was
89.Quoted in The Irish Press, 9 July 1972.
90. 'lam: UDA Puts Loyalists on Var Footing', The Guardian, 11 July 1972.
91.XacStiofain, p. 294.
92. Ibid., p. 295.
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described in press reports: 'It was impossible for anyone to feel perfectly
safe, As each bomb exploded there were cries of terror from people who
thought they had found sanctury, but were in fact just as exposed as
before.'	 Public opinion was outraged.
	 One woman at the scene said:
'This is the end.
	 Kr. Whitelaw should take his coat off and mop up the
blood.'	 'Bloody Friday', &5 it became known, was a turning point for
PLRA's strategy.	 Vhltelaw had been planning an Army operation to regain
control of the 'no-go' areas since the breakdown of the ceasef ire.
	 'Bloody
Friday' provided the final impetus. Hitherto, the 'no-go' areas had been
tolerated for fear that any move would alienate Catholic opinion at a
sensitive time when their support was crucial to sustain any new political
initiativa.
On 31 July, under the code name of 'Operation Motorman', the British
Army reoccupied the areas of the Creggan and Bogeide known as 'Free Derry'
and the barricaded districts of Belfast. There was little resistance. The
Provisionals decided not to try to take on the Army during the operation
which involved thousands of troops. Kotorman represented a decisive blow
against PIRA. Not only did the Provisionals lose the propaganda value of
the 'no-go' areas, which often took on the appearance of PIRA mini-states,
but, more importantly, the movement's operational capacity was severely
reduced.	 These areas were a considerable military asset. They provided
the Provisionals with safe havens from where they could mount operations
and remain effectively immune from the security forces. The 'no-go' dis-
tricts were also the crucible of a great deal of low level violence; casual
shootings, stonings, riots and so on, which did much to keep the city areas
in a state of constant turmoil. Kotorman also broke up the hard core of
93. S. Vinchester and S. Hoggart, '11 Dead, 100 Hurt in Hour of Bombs',
The Guardian, 22 July 1972.
94. Quoted in The Daily Telegraph, 22 July 1972.
95. Hamill, pp. 107-113.
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PIRA operatives in Belfast and Derry, most of whom were dispersed into the
countryside over the border.
	 The rate of attacks fell sharply. 	 in com-
parison with the 3 week periods before and after Notorman, the statistics
show a decline in explosions from 180 to 73, shooting incidents declined
from 2595 to 380 and the number of soldiers killed fell from 18 to 11.'
Thereafter, the rate of violence continued on a downward curve for the next
ten years.
The loss of military momentum devastated the military bargaining
strategy that the Provisionals had striven to maintain. A high level of
military activity had been the key to maximise the psychological pressure on
the British to respond to the violence in a manner which PIRA could hope to
gain politically. From a strictly theoretical standpoint, and exercising
hindsight, PIRA's achievements may have been greater if it had called a halt
to its campaign in the summer of 1972 and had either allowed PSF to emerge
as a legitimate political party (at the time PSF was little more than a
nominal political front group for PIRA) or forged alliances with existing
constitutional nationalist parties, like the SDLP. Being at the height of
their prestige and able to claim credit for the fall of the old sectarian
order at Stormont, the Provisionals could have become a major political force
with considerable influence over British policy.
	 After 'Bloody Friday', the
Provisionals were politically untouchable. 	 There was no way back to the
negotiating process.	 Whitelaw publicly vowed that he would never again
meet with the Provisionals and promised to toughen up security measures by
increasing troop levels and expanding the UDR and police?" Primarily
though, 'Bloody Friday' had given the British Army the pretext it needed to
remove the 'no-go' areas - perhaps the most significant military factor
which had made PIRA a potent threat. Reflecting on the period, Whitelaw
96. P. Chippindale, 'Xotorman's Slow Drive', The Guaz-riian, 20 Aug. 1972.
97. 'Whitelaw: I Won't Xeet IRA Again', The Sunday TImes, 23 July 1972,
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believes that in a political sense he was 'extremely fortunate over the
ceasef ire episode:
If as a result of deciding in favour of a secret exploratory meeting, I
had become involved in further discussions with IRA leaders, I would
eventually have landed myself in great difficulties. Clearly, those
ought to have been the IRA tactics. As it turned out, by returning to
violence almost at once, they presented me with a considerable advantage.
They proved that they were intransigent and that it was the British
Government who really wanted an end to violence.'
By refusing to play the kind of diplomatic game to which Yhitelaw was allu-
ding, that is, using the meeting with him to manoeuvre the British into sub-
stantive negotiations, the Provisionals undid much of the potential advantage
created by their military efforts. Above all, by refusing to accept limited
goals in a limited war scenario, the Provisionals had torpedoed their own
strategy, thus illustrating a clear example of over-escalation in a low
intensity conflict.
It was mentioned in the introduction that war in the abstract will have
a tendency to escalate towards a theoretical absolute because each side will
continually seek to raise the tempo of the war in order to force its adver-
sary's defeat. For small insurgent groups, like PIRA, which seek to attain
their goals through the exercise of coercive psychological pressure, as
opposed to the destruction of enemy forces, the temptation to escalate is
going to be equally acute because, by its very nature, psychological pressure
is difficult to quantify. 	 The insurgent will be unable to gauge what level
of coercion will induce the enemy to concede to its terms.	 If the enemy
refuses to yield, the inclination to increase the scale of military activity
to secure enemy compliance will be considerable. 	 It is clear from
XacStiofain's account that this was how PIR.A viewed the renewal of its
offensive after the collapse of the truce. The intensification of the
campaign was intended to compel the British to reopen negotiations in the
belief that one final push would assure victory.
98. Vhitelaw, p. 101.
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In every sense, these sorts of low intensity coercive strategies can be
described as a war of wills fought out on a psychological battlefield where
the outcome will be determined, not by who physically prevails over who, but
by the resilience of stronger side to withstand the mental knocks inflicted
by a protracted campaign of guerrilla attacks. PIRA could have learnt from
the history of the Irish civil war that the utility of this type of insurgent
warfare will invariably rest on a degree of restraint practised by the more
powerful combatant, because, in the end, it will always have the power to
deny the psycho-military arena where these strategies can be effective. If
the enemy wants to conceive a conflict scenario purely in terms of brute
military force, then there is nothing an insurgent can really do about it.
So, if an insurgent escalates its military campaign beyond a certain thres-
hold of enemy tolerance, then the enemy's perception of the danger to its
own security may outweigh considerations of self-restraint. This may bring
forth an enemy counter-escalation which seeks either to r-econtain or exting-
uish the insurgent threat.'
Xost Provisionals recognised that the military odds were heavily in
favour of the British. Xyles Shevlin, a member of the PIRA delegation that
met Vhitelaw, admitted: 'They (the Provisionals] can, of course, be beaten,
If the British Army puts the boot in they could be flattened. But will they
do It?"°° PIRA's strategy was premised on the belief that the British
would restrict the full employment of their military resources because, in
the long run, the aim of holding Northern Ireland within the UK would not be
considered worth defending. As Shevlin, again, put it:
But to me its the mentality of the thing that's incomprehensible. A
people that would put up with this sort of thing night after night.
Knowing that there were four British soldiers killed last night - all of
whom, I'm sure, if you met on your local darts team, would be 'the boys'.
99. See V. Laqueur, 'Terrorism - A Balance Sheet', in V. Laqueur (ed.), The
Terrorism Reader (Philadelphia, 1977), pp. 284-205.
100.Quoted in G. XcKnight, The Nind of the Terrorist (London, 1974),
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What sort of people will accept that? And for a useless cause? That's
my answer to 'is it worth it?' Is it worth it to them - the British?'0'
So if it was believed that the British people would not consent to a full-
scale commitment to a 'useless cause', then the Provisionals could assume
that an escalation in their military actions would increase the desire for a
withdrawal from Northern Ireland, rather than provoke a counter-strike. In
this regard, the Provisionals seriously misinterpreted official British
perceptions of the conflict. The British government ultimately saw PIRA as
an anti-democratic challenge to a freely consenting part of the realm. The
escalation of NRA's campaign merely convinced the British that the Provis-
ionals constituted a sufficient threat to warrant the physical denial of
certain operational assets which, until Xotorman, it had enjoyed without
hindrance. This illustrates the point that it is of critical importance for
an insurgent to take account of its adversary's position. It will be neces-
sary to understand the sorts of pressures that might limit the enemy's cap-
acity for concession, and to gain an estimation of how the enemy will react
to an increase in military activity. These issues need to be addressed so
that the insurgent can build up a realistic picture of its own strategic
position relative to that of its opponent. Only through an appreciation of
the weaknesses of its own strategy can the insurgent truly define what will
constitute a position of political advantage and begin to identify the areas
of opportunity that it will be able to exploit. Above all, it requires an
understanding that an insurgent's military/political strength is likely to
reflect a relative, not an absolute, position at any particular point in time,
and that simply upping the ante may prove counter-productive. This may
mean that the insurgent will have to accept more limited political goals
commensurate with its military potential and pursue any further objectives
1OI.Ibid., p. 75.
- 232 -
through other, non-violent, means.102
There is little evidence, notably in XacStiofain's memoirs, to suggest
that the Provisionals gave any serious thought as to how the British might
react to the escalation of their campaign following the collapse of the
truce. We can infer that the Provisional IRA fell victim to the escalation
fallacy in limited war due to an inaccurate assessment of the dimensions of
the conflict in which it was fighting. This caused it to ignore the
relationship between the psychological and physical elements in war and,
consequently, to over-estimate the power of its own strategy v'is-a-vis a
militarily superior opponent.
	 But why did such a fundamental aisfudgement
occur? kore intriguingly, why did the Provisionals choose to persist with
their campaign even though, after 'Bloody Friday' and Xotorman, it had lost
its premier negotiating opportunity? Surely, it must have been obvious to
the Provisionale that, with the declining impetus of their campaign, it would
be virtually impossible to regain the political initiative? The explanation
that emerges reveals a darker side to PIRA's internal machinations regarding
the military instrument which were seemingly untouched by any real strategic
rationale.
P IRA's lilitary Recidivisa - lana IcGuire versus Sean JtacStiofain
One indirect consequence of the carnage of the Summer of 1972, was that it
led to the revelations of aria NcGuire, She had been a member of the
movement (probably of PSP) had become a confidant of a number of Army
Council members. She left the movement in disgust after the 'Bloody Friday'
episode. The recollections of her experiences, first in a series of
newspaper articles in September 1972 and later in her book, To Take Arms,
published in the following year, threw light onto the debates within the
102.See J. Garnett, 'Limited War', in J. Baylis, et al, Contemporary Strateffy,
pp. 125-120.
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leadership over strategic policy. Her memoirs also provide a useful foil to
J(acStiofain's autobiography which appeared in 1975. Together1 they con-
stitute the only detailed accounts we have of the movement's thinking during
this period, or any other period for that matter.
The crux of XcGuire's testimony, so far as it dealt with strategically
related matters, was that the main issue of contention within the leadership
was the extent to which the armed struggle could continue to be exploited
for political benefit. In other words, at what point should the Army
Council accept that it had secured the maximum advantage from the military
campaign?	 XcGuire says that the argument was split two ways, between
hawks and doves. 	 The dovish faction, led by Ruairi O'Bradaigh and Daithi
O'Conaill, with whom XcGuire most sympathised, argued that armed force
should be complemented by a strong political campaign. This faction,
XcGuire said, 'saw that ultimately the struggle would have to be translated
into political terms, and that how successfully to do this depended on the
size of the movement they built up and the basis for unity it had,hboa Set
against such a course were those like XacStiofain, the Chief of Staff, and
the commander of the Belfast Brigade, Seamus Twomey, who conceived the
struggle almost wholly in military terms.
The first outward sign of tension between the two factions came after
the fall of Stormont when O'Bradaigh publicly hinted that the movement might
be prepared to call a truce.'° 4 Any such thought, though, was immediatately
quashed by MacStiofain who quickly declared that the military campaign would
go on.'° XcGuire paints a pallid portrait of XacStiofain: an imperious,
self-obsessed, politically inarticulate power-seeker, virulently anti-Protest-
ant and constantly mistrustful of the politicos around him, especially
103.XcGuire, p. 73.
104,See D. Coyle, 'Provisional IRA Hints at Wodifiad Truce Conditions',
The Financial Times, 5 April 1972.
105.IcGuire, pp. 104-105.
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O'Conaill who he feared was out to replace him as Chief of ° As it
was 1
 having subsequently fought his way to a meeting with Whitelaw,
NacStiofain could feel vindicated by his decision in April 1972 not to bow
to his political doves.
	 However, once at the negotiating table, the Prov-
isionals were quite literally fluminoxed when Whitelaw was not tempted to
submit to their demands. 	 What the July ceasef ire revealed, was that once
the fighting stopped, the Provisionals lost any kind of power to control
events.	 Without a solid political machine capable of exploiting the oppor-
tunities opened up by a period of peace, PIRA found itself unable to extract
even the most modest political advantage from its military efforts. Inst-
ead, it had to watch as other parties like the SDLP rushed in to fill the
political void. After the debacle of the meeting with Whitelaw, the Prov-
isionals were left to drift around rather meaninglessly in the wake of their
own political emptiness.
The key players in the aftermath of the Whitelaw talks were the Belfast
Provisionals under Twomey. For them, even agreeing to the July truce was a
bit of a wrench. They were anxious not to lose military momentum and
regarded truces with suspicion, especially since the unilateral ceasef ire of
September 1971 had given the security forces an opportunity to arrest PIRA
activists.' 07
	lore fundamentally, most of the Belfast members had joined
in the whirlwind years of 1969 and 1970 when the emphasis had been on
building up a Catholic defence force. Consequently, the level of political
refinement amongst the grass roots was low, as one member remarked: 'Volun-
teers were reacting to their hatred of the Brits and the RUC and the feeling
that they stood between us and a united Ireland. We never thought of poli-
tics."°	 In deciding what should be done after the Yhitelaw meeting,
100.1. XcGuire, 'I Accuse Sean XacStiofain', The Observer, 3 Sept. 1972.
107.See S. Winchester, 'Belfast Provisionals Want 1 Truck with a Truce',
The Gurd1an, 20 July 1972.
108.Quoted in Bishop and Nallie, p. 152.
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XcGuire says that the 'poverty of thought within the Belfast command',
largely dicated the future course of events:
All along they believed - as I had - that by terrorising the civilian
population you increased their desire for peace and blackmailed the
British government into negotiating. But now it seemed Belfast could
not deviate from its course. A political judgement was needed which
would determine the nature of the Provisionals' selective response; but
all the Provisionals knew was to bomb.'°
XcGuire also alleges that XacStiofain himself was getting agitated at
the continuation of the truce because the longer it went on, so he feared the
more politically minded elements would gain the upper hand in the Army
Council." 0 The breakdown of the truce gave him the chance to reassert his
authority by throwing his weight behind the Belfast Brigade and the reopen-
ing of hostilities. This was one of the main reasons XcGuire claims she
lost heart with the Provisionals, in her words: 'I saw the power play itself
was having a decisive effect on the campaign as NacStiofain sought to
confirm his position by using those very methods of which his rivals
saed'
So, there were a multitude of forces that caused the Provisionals to
resume their offensive; ideological pressure which prevented the bulk of the
movement from entertaining compromise, XacStiofain's internal power-struggle
against O'Conaill and O'Bradaigh, the ebbing away of the political initiative
to the SDLP and the UDA,' ' but above all, the simple fact that without the
armed struggle, the Provisionals were deprived of any purpose in life. Den-
ied the opportunity to practise violence, the movement looked like disinteg-
rating or being totally eclipsed as any kind of political force. 1(aria
XcGuire summed up the near-pathetic desperation of the Provisionals' dilem-
ma: 'With the end of the truce we were almost relieved to be getting back to
what we understood: but we also knew that the breakdown of the truce was
109.XcGuire, To Take Arms, p. 145.
llO.Ibid., p. 128.
111.Ibld., p. 147.
112.See N. Holland, 'Why IRA Broke the Truce', The Observer, 18 July 1972.
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likely to be tragic for all of us."'3
All this 1 made the return to the military offensive far more disquiet-
ing. 'Bloody Friday' was only the worst in a line of atrocities in the
following six weeks after the breakdown of the truce, as PIRA gave full vent
to its fury.
	 Some 25 civilians were killed, mostly by crossfire in gun
battles with troops. There was also a renewed car-bombing campaign which
devastated town centres all over the province. In one car bomb attack on
the village of Claudy, Co. Londonderry, on 31 July, 8 people were killed.
Even in the months after Operation Xotorman, when it was clear that PIRA's
political fortunes were receding, MacStiofain was still indulging in loud,
threatening histrionics. 'Let it be placed on record', he said, 'that the
Army Council is determined to continue the armed struggle until total vic-
tory, regardless of the cost to ourselves or others, (and] that there will
not be another truce until our demands have been
There appeared little real strategic reasoning behind all the havoc.
Even if the resumption of the military campaign was Just a rash piece of
escalation rather than undertaken to satiate internal organisational pres-
sures, there was little it could have achieved, certainly nothing on the
grandiose scale MacStiofain still envisaged. 	 The fact remained that PIRA
had blown its best political opportunity.	 The resumption could only have
had a most marginal impact on PIRA's overall bargaining position. In any
case, the British government, which had already taken a political gamble by
meeting the Provisionals, were in no mood to be led back into direct negot-
iations. The natural conclusion we come to, is that PIRA was simply out of
control, as XcGuire commented when the movement exploded back onto the mu-
itary scene: 'Soon we were becoming prisoners of a new situation. We were
being carried along by a series of senseless killings that only XacStiofain
113.cGuire, 'I Accuse Sean XacStiofain'.
114.'Sean JlacStiofain Reads Nessage from Provisional Government', RN,
10 Nov. 1972
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and Twomey could stop: but they had no idea what else to do." ' Years
later, one Provisional confessed that he was still at a loss to explain the
psychosis which gripped the movement in those few months in 1972: 'It just
seemed that something snapped. There was death everywhere in the North in
those days. I guess it Just rubbed off on the lads.111
By the end of the summer of 1972, PIRA could barely be described as a
coherent political organisation with clearly attainable goals based on the
cultivation of popular support and possessed of the flexibility of means and
outlook to advance progressively towards its objectives in measured steps.
The level of tactical skill it had exhibited was indisputable, and the think-
ing governing how these small military engagements could be manipulated to
entice the British into a negotiating position, was initially sound. Yet,
due to a powerful mixture of ideological pressure to resist compromise and
unerring reliance, not to say dependence, on armed force, the Provisionals,
or at least those who held sway like MacStiofain and his cohorts, were
unable to recognise that their expansive objectives could not be achieved by
military means alone. 	 The outcome was that PIRA was psychologically
unequipped to convert its military campaign into any kind of political
currency. Instead, the movement slipped back into a form of violent
recidivism which merely concentrated on the narrow search to preserve the
military modality of its struggle, regardless of how its ability to achieve
Its objectives was affected. 	 Overall, the unpoliticised nature of the
Provisionals left the movement Incapable of observing restraints on the use
of force and, therefore, prone to ill-considered acts of escalation. One
newspaper article of mid-1972 encapsulated the fundamental character of
PIRA's strategic pre-disposition: 'too few ideas chasing too many guns." "
115.XcGuire, 'I Accuse Sean XacStiofaln',
118.Quoted in Kelley, p. 188.




THE EROSION OF PROVISIOJAL IRA STRATEGY, 1972-1977
Despite the setbacks during the summer of 1972, PIRA still looked a formid-
able organisation. The continuing shock and destabilisation generated by
PLRA's violence over the preceding two years still left it in a position to
influence the political atmosphere in Northern Ireland, Over the longer
term, however, PIRA's decision to persist with its campaign was to prove
catastrophic for the organisation. By 1976 PIRA had exhausted its military
options, brought to the brink of defeat, not just by the technical improve-
ments in the efficiency of the security forces, but by the faulty assumptions
of its own strategy.
This chapter will explore the reasons for the descent of PIRA's strat-
egy from the high point of 1972 to the ruination of 1976 and 1977. During
this period the Northern Irish conflict was made up of three distinct, but
over-lapping, stages: the emergence of the Protestant paramilitaries and the
outbreak of a bitter sectarian war; a bombing campaign launched against the
British mainland; and a prolonged ceasef ire between PIRA and the British
authorities beginning in February 1975. By examining PIRA's conduct in
each of these stages it is possible to flesh out in detail the specific prob-
lems which afflicted PIRA's campaign.	 This analysis will seek to demon-
strate how PIRA's violence was to become more overtly terroristic in nature
and increasingly regressive in relation to its stated objectives. 	 These
problems, which were first evident in the summer of 1972, became more
exposed over time. Although PIRA was seen to falter in this period, all
that it was doing was encountering the contradictions which had been
inherent in its military thinking since the beginning of its offensive in
1970.
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The Provieiona].s' Dilemma in the Sectarian War
If there was one key phase in the conflict which destroyed much of the cred-
ibility of PIRA's strategy it was the sectarian war which gripped Northern
Ireland for most of the mid-1970s.	 From the Spring of 1972 onwards, the
rise in the murder of Catholic civilians marked the beginning of the much
talked about Protestant backlash. The backlash was the product of fear and
despair at what Protestants saw as PIRA's relentless assault on their people,
towns, businesses and way of life. The height of loyalist disillusionment
was reached in mid-1972 following the imposition of direct rule and later
the British government's truce with the Provisionals. 	 Tommy Herron of the
UDA explained the sense of frustration:
Remember, we waited three and a half years. All that time we just
didn't believe the security forces would let us down - would leave us so
exposed. But when they started, literally sheltering them and harbour-
ing them in the ghetto areas... and at the same time arranged a ceasef ire
...I think that was the point that broke the back of some and put heart
into others... Don't forget we didn't ask for the violence. The mistake
the loyalist population made was to show too much restraint and compass-
ion in the beginning. It was taken for apathy and cowardice... From now
on, we'll do whatever's necessary.'
In 1972 loyalists were responsible for 102 deaths, mainly through
shootings and bombings. 	 By 1977, total loyalist killings would reach 531.2
The two main agencies behind the backlash were the UDA's military wing, the
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). From
the outset, the loyalist paramilitaries tended to regard all Catholics as
potential rebels.2 Consequently, most of the loyalists' victims were Cath-
olics who had nothing to do with the republican movement. The intention of
the killings was to choke-off support for the Frovisionals by terrorising
the nationalist population.	 The killings did generate great fear and
1. Quoted in IcKnight, The Kind of the Terrorist, p. 68.
2. Irish Information Agenda, p. 2 of Table Blvi.
3. See Guelke, Northern Ireland: The International Perspective, p. 64.
4. For a survey of loyalist paramilitary strategies see A. Aughey,
'Sectarian Conflict, 1972-1977', in K. Jeffery (ed.), The Divided
Province (London, 1987), pp. 80-85.
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anxiety within the Catholic community. Jartin Dillon and Deals Lehane, who
carried out the most intensive study of the early years of the sectarian
war, have suggested that the 'profound sense of shock' in the Catholic
community resulted from 'the change in a postion where Catholics had been
led to believe they were "winning TM
 to one where their vulnerability had
become apparent. The Catholics had been vulnerable all of the time, but
while the initiative was held by, and all the running made by, Catholic
groups, many Catholics failed to realise this.'6
Whether the Protestant paramilitaries had planned it or not, their
campaign of sectarian attacks challenged the whole basl of P IRA's strategic
thought. The Provisionals were placed in a dilemma. The killings were
undermining PIRA's claim to be the defenders of the Catholic population. If
PIRA failed to react to stop the attacks it risked losing much of its cred-
ibility amongst nationalists.	 The Catholics, desperate for protection,
might be driven to the British side. Realistically, all PIRA could do was
to retaliate equally randomly against Protestants. Yet to respond in kind
would confute the republican principle of non-sectarianism, which the move-
ment had sought to observe since the days of Tone.
	 The Provisionals
believed that beneath the artificially induced veil of sectarianism the
Protestants were just as Irish as the Catholics. 6
	The notion that the
Protestants could be reconciled to the Irish nation caused the Provislonals
to take a relaxed attitude to future loyalist intentions. A typical view
was expressed in one Provisional publication: 'If the average Protestant knew
that Britain was withdrawing on a certain date and if such a withdrawal
would cause him no financial loss (through social services etc.) and no loss
of civil liberties, he would not strenuously object to some form of united or
5. X. Dillon and D. Lehane, Political Murder in Northern Ireland
(London, 1973), p. 101.
C. See S. Loughran, 'The Working Class of the Falls and Shankill Are All
Irish', RN, 23 Feb. 1973.
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federally united Ireland." In consequence, when the murders of Catholics
reached a more worrying scale, the Provisionals found it incomprehensible
why any Protestant 'would want to murder their fellow Ulstermen at this
stage of the conflict?'	 Instead, the killings were ascribed to British
Army death squads:
The Brits then took the only course they know. They had to attempt to
lower, the by now sky-high morale of the people. They had to try and
discredit the freedom fighters and protectors of the people. They did
this, not by trying to 'flush' out the IRA nor by 'hot pursuit', but by
the lowest of Black and Tan terror tactics. After making sure that a
couple of areas, were 'cleared' of any form of protection, they sent in,
their mobile murder squads. With orders, not just to shoot anyone, but
instead, to shoot, the youngest people that they could find, and so
strike fear into the hearts of the fathers and mothers in all areas.
According to Dillon and Lehane's investigations, only 2 of the 200 deaths
they examined could be blamed on the Army.'° The Army's role in the
assassinations, they concluded, was 'statistically insignificant."
Protestants remained sceptical of PIRA's non-sectarian incantations.
In their view, PIRA's attacks, particularly those against the RUG and UDR,
had always been sectarian In form.
	 PIRA strongly denied the charge: 'It
never mattered whether it was RUC, BA or UDR. Once they donned those
uniforms they became symbols of repression... The fact that they were
Catholic, Protestant or Hindu didn't matter, we never allowed religion or
personalities to deter us from the task in front of us.' 12
 The image of
non-sectarianism was necessary to sustain the theory of the single nation
and to reassure Protestants that they would not be discriminated against in
a future united Ireland. But the nature of the emotional drives that
powered the Provisionals clashed with the commitment to the non-sectarian
ideal of republicanism and revealed the tangle of contradictions which
7. O'Rian, Frovos: Patriots or Terrvrists?, p. 17.
8. 'lotiveless lurders Work of British Army Squads', RN, 9 larch 1974.
9. 'British lurder Gangs Step-up Campaign', RN, 2 Feb. 1973.
10. Dillon and Lehane, pp. 292-318.
11. Ibid., p. 318.
12. 'Invitation to the UDA, RN, 16 Feb. 1973.
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underlay P IRA's strategic thinking.
In spite of what PIRA's leadership said, it was clear that from mid-
1972 onwards, Provisional units were killing Protestants in the same indis-
criminate fashion. During the 14 days of the 1972 summer truce, 10 Prot-
estants were killed, 6 of the deaths were almost certainly the work of PIRA
units.' 3
	The leadership formally denied any PIRA involvement in the kill-
ing of Protestants and would only go so far to accept the existence of what
they termed 'freelance' elements.' 1
 The reality was that at local level
there was considerable anti-Protestant sentiment. One volunteer in Belfast
remarked: 'Naybe you can't bomb a million Protestants into a united Ireland
but you could have good fun trying."
	 Such antagonism was symptomatic of
more elementary sectarian feelings which often extended to the highest
levels of the movement. For example, Xaria McGuire alleged that at one
particularly fraught meeting of the Army Council, Sean XacStiofain blurted
out: 'What does it matter if Protestants get killed. They are all bigots
aren't they?" Usually, though, sectarian threats were communicated more
euphemistically in the Provisionals' rhetoric, when, for instance, they spoke
of their aim being the 'Withdrawal of the British way of life from this
island'," or arguing that: 'The Anglophiles must be removed from power and
the Ulster-British prevented from frustrating - as they have done hitherto -
the self-determination of the Irish nation." Even O'Bradaigh, one of the
more conciliatory figures in the Provisional leadership, occasioned to warn
Protestants, somewhat ominously, that: 'If you do not want to liberate
yourselves then we will liberate you."
One of the most intriguing pieces of evidence of institutionalised bias
13. Dillon and Lehane, pp. 75-90.
14. D. O'Conaill, quoted in The irish Times, 14 July, 1973.
15. Quoted in Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy, p. 101.
16. I. XcGuire, 'I Accuse Sean XacStiofain', The Observer, 3 Sept. 1972.
17. Interview with S. Loughran, Andersonstown News, 18 Jan. 1975.
18. 'Freeman' (D. Fennall), 'For Whom Is the Revolution', AP, 14 Xarch 1975.
19. Quoted in The Daily Telegraph, 19 April 1978.
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within NRA came in iLay 1974 when a number of PIRA documents were seized
during a raid on the safe-house of the organisations' commander in Belfast,
Brendan Hughes. According to government officials, the documents purport-
edly revealed PIRA's intentions to foment huge civil disorder through indis-
criminate violence.	 The idea was to provoke so much inter-sectarian anar-
chy throughout the province that NRA would be able to pose as the only true
protectors of the Catholic population.2°	 The Provisionals admitted the
authenticity of the documents but denied the interpretation put on them
(according to the former Army information officer Cohn Wallace the inter-
pretation was slanted as part of an Army disinformation exercise 21 ), arguing
that it was purely a contingency plan 'in the event of civil conflict occur-
ing.'	 Even so, the documents stated that in such an event: 'the IRA has
no alternative but to employ its full resources to the defence of its people
in the face of the armed offensive against the Catholic working clasa.'
The reference to 'its people' being the 'Catholic working class' clearly
identified the sectarian nature of the Provisionals' thinking. This was
further reinforced by the plans' specific instructions to place car bombs in
'P. areas', presumably Protestant districts.24
The contradiction between PIRA's theoretical adherence to non-sectaria-
nism and the latent anti-Protestant prejudice of many of its members stemm-
ed from NRA's role as a Catholic defence force which was still a primary
motivation for many members. Consequently, sectarian assassinations were
publicly rejected but implicitly accepted. For this reason PIRA never ack-
nowledged responsibility for any sectarian killing.
	 They were either left
unclaimed or claimed under cover names. For example, in the Autumn of
20. S. Hoggart, 'Wilson Blows Open IRA Battle Plans', The Guardian, 14 Kay
1974.
21. The ledia Programme, Channel 4, 29 April 1990,
22. 'Republican Plans', Feople's Jews (PSF, North Belfast), 19 Kay 1974.
23. Quoted in P. Hetherington, 'Scorched Earth Key to Terror Tactics',




1974, PIRA's third Belfast battalion based in the Ardoyne and Jew Lodge
areas of the city, claimed a series of sectarian murders under the name of
the Red Flag Avengers.tm
Within PIRA's rank and file sectarian feeling could be an all-consuming
force, satiating a certain need to indulge in violence largely for its own
sake. In the very early years of the conflict all civilian killings had to
be authorised by brigade commanders after a full report had been carried
out. Following the introduction of internment, and with the general im-
provements in the intelligence apparatus of the security forces, which netted
the more senior PIRA operatives, such rules governing civilian assassinations
tended to be overlcioked.tm This produced a movement that was often volat-
ile and unmanageable.	 Reflecting on her own experience in the movement,
Maria XcGuire recounted:
Once we could say this brigade was doing this and this brigade was
doing that, but we could not at the end. We were saying, My God, is
this one of ours', because in May and June (1972] we lost control comple-
tely... All the real IRA men are in jail now. Who's left? Eighteen-year
dde control the battalions with a few fanatics. That is the organi-
sation.In fact It broke down when the IRA men were pulled in. Command
had to be given to people who would normally never have a command.27
Itchy trigger fingers proved especially difficult to restrain during
ceasfiree. The frustration at being unable to attack the security forces
meant that the aggression of the volunteers was often re-channelled onto the
Protestant community. During the 1972 ceasfire, the involvement of PIRA
units in sectarian attacks rose dramatically, while the 1975 truce saw the
worst period of inter-communal warfare the province has known. The most
notorious of PIRA's renegade groups was the South Armagh Republican Action
Force (SARAF), a flag of convenience for PIRA's units in the border areas of
counties Armagh and Down. These units never accepted the 1975 truce and
25. J. Holland, 'The Third Battalion at Home', Hibernia, 2 July 1976,
26. Dillon and Lehane, p. 247.
27. Quoted in 0. Wansell, 'Defector Who Finds Life Too Quiet', The Times
22 Feb. 1973.
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were responsible for a spate of sectarian murders in the area, including the
worst single incident of its kind when ten Protestant workmen were shot
dead near the village of Kingemills in January 1976.
The participation of PIRA units in the sectarian war confirmed many
Protestant fears about their future in a united Ireland, making them more
determined to resist such a prospect. An editorial in Fortnight noted in
the early days of the troubles that PIRA's activities merely fueled Protest-
ant suspicion: 'They don't even bother to make any attempt to persuade Prot-
estants that they are really wanted in the new Republic... Virtually every-
thing they do is directly geared to increase rather than decrease Protestant
separation.' This went to the heart of the conflict in PIRA's thinking
between the explicit acceptance of the Protestant tradition as part of the
irish nation and the assumption that unionists were tools of British imper-
ialism whose will to defend their position would collapse once colonial pat-
ronage was removed. In effect, the Provisionals ruled out the Protestant
opinion as a factor which had any significant bearing on their strategic
position. The efficacy of PIRA's strategy therefore rested on the presump-
tion of Protestant passivity. PIRA believed that because it was fighting a
colonial occupier it could reach an agreement with the British over the
heads of the Protestants who would simply accept what Britain told them.
The problem for PIRA was that the closer it came to achieving success,
the more restless the loyalist paramilitaries became. Once the paramil-
itaries initiated their widespread and determined campaign against Catholics,
PIRA's strategy was fatally exposed as 'the talk shifted from "fear of the
backlash" to "the danger of civil war",' For the loyalists, this ensured
that the simple, cheap option of a quick deal to get rid of Jorthern Ireland
was unavailable to the British government. The political implications of
28. Fortnight, 29 Oct. 1971.
29. XcGuire, To Take Arms, p. 95.
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the rise in sectarian killings during the summer truce of 1972 produced
alarm in PIRA's leadership, as XcGuire made evident:
It was of course in their (the loyalists) interests to destroy the accom-
modation the British government had come to with the Provislonals, to
demonstrate that any attempt at reaching agreement with us was bound to
fall... But clearly, too, some members of the Republican movement were
retaliating in the same senseless way, and the slide Into outright sect-
arian warfare seemed to be continuing. This could wreck the position we
had reached.°
By late 1972, even XacStiofain was forced to admit that it was diff i-
cult to dismiss the loyalist paramilitariee, claiming: 'Only a fool would do
so.''	 Yet this was exactly what he had been doing a few months previous-
ly.	 In early 1972 XacStiofain said of the unionists: 'I can't see these
people preparing themselves for a protracted guerrilla war.
	 It's just not
in them,' It was symptomatic of PIRA's superficial understanding of the
loyalist perspective that caused it to ignore potential Protestant power.
The Protestants had proven, ever since 1912 and the Rome Rule issue, that
they had sufficient cohesion to resist inclusion in an all-Ireland political
framework.	 The Provisionals chose to gloss over this point because their
ideology had difficulty entertaining the idea that many of their countrymen
did not want to be 'liberated' from British rule.
	 The sectarian war con-
fronted the Provisionals with this historical fact.
	 It was one of the most
deep-seated inconsistencies in PIRA's strategic thinking. Far from the
Protestants having to reconcile themselves to the inevitability of a PIRA's
united Ireland, it was the Provisionals who had to face-up to the reality
that Protestant opposition could sabotage their plans.
It has been alleged that once the Provislonals had become used to the
fact of the loyalist killings, they themselves sought to exploit the conflict
for political gain. At certain times it did appear that PIRA was trying to
stoke-up sectarian violence. For example, by mid-September 1974 the UFF
30. Ibid., p. 135.
31.Quoted in The Daily Teleffraph, 25 Nov. 1972.
32. XacStlofain Statement, in Sweetman, On Our Knees, p. 157.
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and UVF had considerably restricted their attacks. Yet on the 16 Sep-
tember, PIRA touched off another round of sectarian killings by assass-
inating 2 magistrates. Within a month there had been over a dozen sectar-
Ian killings with the Provisionals implicated in the deaths of at least 2
Proteetants.	 Theoretically, the fostering of sectarian tension, could
assist PIRA in two ways. First, by provoking loyalist attacks, Catholics
would continue to seek PIRA's protection and second, communal hostility
polarised society and eroded the political middle ground which destroyed any
hope for an internal settlement within Northern lreland.
	 It was a low
risk option for the Provisionals. They could hope that political sterility
and the threat of civil war would encourage exasperation amongst mainland
opinion and raise calls for withdrawal, while being assured of sufficient
political instability to give the movement sustanance,
	 There was little
doubt that PIRA could be a beneficiary of the distress created within the
Catholic community. For instance, In early 1973 journalistic sources
reported that: 'The terror of the local people increased by every murder and
its inevitable reprisal, has given the Provislonals a new authority,'
One of the most substantive indications that PIRA at least contrived to
turn a blind eye to sectarian attacks carried out by Its own members, can be
seen by looking at the relationship between PIRA and the SARAF during the
1975 ceasef ire. This period illustrates the complexity and ambiguity that
surrounded PIRA's involvement in the sectarian war and the quandary in which
the leadership found itself when confronted with rogue elements that would
not obey Army Council directives. On 5 June 1975, Francis Jordan, a local
33. 'Behind the Assassinations', Hlbernia 25 Oct. 1974.
34. D. Brown, 'Why Sectarian Blood Greases the Provisionals' Path',
The Guardian, 7 Jan. 1976.
35. See R. Ned Lebow, 'The Origins of Sectarian Assassination: The Case of
Belfast', in A. Olson and D. Buckley (ads.), International Terrorism
(Wayne, N.J., 1980), pp. 43-44.
36. P. Eddy and C. Ryder, 'Seven Bloody Days in Ulster', The Sunday Times,
4 Feb. 1973.
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Provisional commander in South Armagh, was shot dead by the British Army
while planting a bomb outside a Protestant pub in Besebrook. PIRA's lead-
ers were embarrassed at such a clear-cut affirmation that its members had
been engaging in blatantly sectarian attacks.
	 They could not deny that he
was a member as it might have encouraged the border units to break away
completely.	 Neither could PIRA attempt to crush these units without admit-
ting that it had lost control over sections of the movement.
	 Even if the
movement did dissipate its energies trying to put down an internal rebel-
lion, there was no surety that regular PLEA forces would have been able to
beat such tough border units.
	 According to an informed article in Fort-
night, the leadership reached a quid pro quo with its border units. So long
as the name of the SARAF was used to claim for the more brutal sectarian
assaults, then the leadership would condone the autonomy of its units in the
area. In return, the leadership would publicly claim on behalf of PIRA any
other SARAF operations which could be justified either as legitimate retal-
iation against the UDR and regular Army, or as measures against loyalist
paramilitaries in defence of the local Catholic population. Thus, the
Fortnight article concluded: 'It is a case of the Provo dog being waved by
the (SA)RAF tail into civil war, which many of the Provos in fact believe Is
the only realistic way to a united Ireland.'37
There is no absolute proof that PIRA intentionally triggered sectarian
killings as a matter of official policy.
	 Unofficially, though, it is a
different matter.	 The bulk of the circumstantial evidence suggests that
some Provisionals were deeply involved in the sectarian war.
	 Attacks
against the Protestant community can be seen as a natural consequence of the
underlying sectarian motivations of many members of the movement. The
loss of PIRA's military ascendancy caused by the appearance of the loyalist
paramilitaries, undermined its strategy. No longer could it expect to reach
37. 'MacMoney', 'Bandit Country', Fortnight, 23 Jan. 1970.
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a decision in Northern Ireland through force of arms without the compliance
of the Protestants. Although the leadership did not openly approve of
retaliation against Protestants, it did, at least, seem adept at fishing in
the troubled waters of inter-communal strife. In this sense, the sectarian
conflict did help revive PIRA's flagging fortunes as it renewed its defensive
mandate with the Catholics, even though the unofficial reprisals meant
admittting, de facto, that there could be no rapprochement with the
Protestants. Victory for PIRA appeared even less certain once the loyalist
paramilitaries arrived on the scene, but at least the Provisionals could
ensure a protracted stalemate in Northern Ireland by working the cycle of
sectarian violence to block any political moves in which they were not
involved.	 By participating in the sectarian war, one might say, PIRA
condemned its strategy but saved itself.
Horizontal Escalation - P IRA's Bombing Campaign in England
The sectarian war was perhaps the main factor which stalemated the Provis-
lonals' campaign in Northern Ireland. Of course, PIRA's limited capacity
for military manoeuvre had already been revealed after the 'Bloody Friday'
and Operation Xotorman episodes.
	 Now, PIRA could not even begin to make
the military running without being immediately checked by loyalist counter-
violence. Additionally, the growing efficiency of the security forces was
succeeding in confining PIRA's activities largely to certain areas of Belfast,
Derry and the border regions. By late 1972, the constraints on PIRA's abil-
ity to retain the political initiative by increasing the rate of military
operations - what one may call 'vertical escalation' - was glaringly obvious.
So far as PIRA's strategy was concerned, the violent crucible of Northern
Ireland could no longer be regarded as the decisive area of operations.
The nature of PIRA's analysis did, however, provide a route out of the
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impasse in the North. The Provielonals saw no need to alter the basic
tenor of their strategy because loyalist resistance was regarded as a func-
tion of colonial rule which would collapse when the British prop was with-
drawn. At most, the loyalists were seen as a tactical inconvenience because
the theory of British imperialism eliminated them as a strategic barrier.
There was certainly no reason, therefore, why PIRA should have wished to
defer to loyalist violence by reaching some sort of internal accommodation
with the Protestants. This would just be a British inspired ruse to main-
tain imperial control: 'The subtle use of the phrase "Settle their differ-en-
ces" is an attempt to shift the onus of responsibility from her own should-
ers where it rightly belongs, on to the shoulders of the Northern Gaels and
Planters.'
Ultimately, then, it did not matter to the Provisionals if the Protes-
tants could fight them to a standstill in the North because their strategy
had always up-held that the power to change the political status of Northern
ireland did not lie in the province, but in the hands of British politicans
in London. The pivotal element in PIRA's thinking had been, first and fore-
most, directed at using the military instrument to affect British opinion as
a lever on the politicians. As Gerry Adams put it: 'the English people have
a responsibility for Ireland's British problem.	 They have the power to
persuade their Government to withdraw'. In this respect the attempt to
hold the military initiative by mounting a campaign in England, represented
an extension of PIRA's strategy, not a complete change in direction. We can
term this, 'horizontal escalation', as it sought to promote PIRA's cause by
shifting the focus of the conflict to another theatre.
As the Fenian and 1939 bombing campaigns demonstrated, the idea of
38. L. XacLiam, 'Republicans Ilust Rely on Their Own Strength and Unity of
Purpose', RI, 6 Xarch 1976.
39. 0. Adams, Peace in Ireland: A Broad Analysis of the Present Situation
(Long Kesh, 1976), p. 14.
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taking the struggle to English soil exercised a powerful allure for repub-
licans. In the Provisionals' view, the British people were ignorant and
apathetic about Ulster because they were untouched by the violence and
because they:
...were informed by the British propaganda machine that the Ulster prob-
lem was simply one of religious conflict, that the British Government (by
some miracle) were really no part of the conflict, that it was simply the
mad Paddies killing each other and it would soon cool down with the help
of the British Army.4°
'English people should be interested in what their country's army is doing in
Ireland', Adams opined, 'Sadly this interest had only come when the problem
had involved them directly.'' By 'involving them directly', Adams was
referring to a campaign on the mainland which, it was believed, would knock
the Bnglish out of their complacency: 'England has to waken up and realise
that the sooner she removes her troops from Ireland, the better it will be
for everyone concerned.' It was in propaganda terms that a mainland
campaign was considered most valuable because actions in Great Britain would
gain far greater publicity - the idea that one bomb in Britain was worth ten
in Belfast. The effects of such publicity would ensure that the mainland
populace could never feel immune from the conflict in Northern Ireland,4
It was assumed that the feelings of insecurity would translate into political
pressure for withdrawal because people would start 'to question the role of
the British Army in Ireland and whether continued British rule in NI helped
the continuation of the conflict.'
In other words, the main theoretical thrust of PIRA's mainland campaign
was an advocacy of terrorism, as the intention was to manipulate violent
incidents to create a disproportionate sense of fear relative to the actual
40. 'Uleterisation', The Volunteer (PSF, Lurgan), 7 Xay 1977.
41. Adams, p. 11.
42. 'London Bombings', The Voice (PSF, Vest Belfast), 5 Feb. 1977.




damage caused. The pronouncements of PIRA leaders also indicated that this
was the intellectual motive, Seamus Twomey, for instance, one of the main
proponents of extending PIRA's campaign to Great Britain, said: 'But every
war has a psychological side. We must be careful the people don't get used
to war.	 We increase the fear of war, when we think it is right, and we
reduce it for the same reason.' The character bath of Twomey's remarks
and of the earliest phase of PIRA's campaign in England with its attacks on
civilian premises like tourist sites, pubs, stations etc., certainly seemed to
accord with the theory of terrorist action which holds that it is the inde-
terminate nature of the threat that can make a political actor more compli-
ant to the demands of its adversary. So, a measure of indiscrimination in
targeting policy will be essential to maintain the sense of unpredictability
in order to heighten the feelings of insecurity and fright.46
Beyond a straight terrorist motive, PIRA's attacks could also be used
in a more precise way to manipulate the political agenda. Indeed, it was an
openly stated aim to use the military instrument to intervene in the poli-
tical process so that, 'at every stage of every British political initiative,
of every British political failure In the background and often in the fore-
ground will be that predictable, consistent act of IRA violence."7 The
Provisionals acknowledged that their first attack on the mainland, on 8
larch 1973, when 3 car-bombs exploded outside the Old Bailey, killing one
person and injuring 147 others, was timed to coincide with the border
referendum in Northern Ireland, also held on 8 Xarch.'	 The referendum
antagonised many Catholics as there could be little question that the out-
come would be a conclusive vote in favour of retaining the union. For that
45. Der Spiegal interview with 5. Twomey, reprinted in The Daily Express,
20 Nov. 1973.
40. See T. Thornton, 'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation', in
H. Ecketein (ed.), Internal War (New York, 1984), p. 81.
47. P. Arnlis, 'Nature of Strategy, Politics, Revolution, British
Withdrawal', RN, 27 larch 1978,
48, Ibid..
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reason, the Army Council determined on a show of strength on the mainland
both to undermine the impact of the poll and regain Catholic support. In
similar fashion, the Provisionals said they bombed a London hotel in Sep-
tember 1973 to correspond with the negotiations between the constitutional
parties in Northern Ireland to form a power sharing government. 50 These
examples ware indicative of the Provisionals' attempts to underscore the
psychological attrition strategy by demonstrating at each turn of events the
irrelevance of any proposed solution which sought to exclude them.
Later in 1975, a new twist was added to PIRA's campaign with a spate
of attacks on exclusive hotels and restaurants in the Vest End of London, as
well as on prominent individuals. Two people were killed by an explosion
at the Hilton Hotel on 0 December. This was followed by attacks on banks
and tube stations. Between October and November, 4 people were killed in
restaurant blasts while Professor Gordon Hamilton Pairley was killed in a
car bomb intended for Conservative lIP, Hugh Fraser, and Ross XcWhirter, co-
editor of the Guinnees Bo,k of Records, was shot dead on the doorstep of his
home. These attacks were specifically designed to intimidate wealthy and
influential members of society in the belief that if these people were
affected by the violence PIRA's message would be sure to get through to the
highest establishment circlee.' In 1977 Twomey confirmed the thinking
behind these attacks: 'By hitting MAyfair restaurants, we were hitting the
type of person that could bring pressure to bear on the British Govern-
In certain respects, the targeting of supposedly select, 'establishment'
figures, was a measure of the desperation which had crept into PIRA's
49. P. Chippindale, 'The Time Bomb that Blew Up IRA', The Guardian, 15 Nov.
1973.
50. Arnlis, 'Nature of Strategy, Politics, Revolution, British Withdrawal'.
51. See P. Chippindale, 'Gunning for the Upper Classes', The Guardian,
29 Nov. 1973.
52. Quoted in Kelley, The Longest War, p. 242,
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campaign by the latter part of 1975, as it had become increasingly evident
that its previous attempts to intimidate the general population were not
producing the intended effects. The bombing campaign in England thus-
trated many of the false premises upon which PIRA based its calculations of
the efficacy of the military instrument within the context of low intensity
warfare.	 The bombings did raise public apprehension, especially when they
were directed against overtly civilian targets. However, the success of
the mainland campaign was contingent on the fear and publicity generated by
the attacks initiating a specific set of responses from the British popu-
lation that would advance PIRA's cause. PIRA's thinking began from the
hypothesis that having created a general level of fear through a systematic
campaign of violence, the public reactions would proceed from cause-to-effect
In a very exact manner: first, people would detect the source of their fear
which they would trace to the political situation in Northern Ireland;
second, this would cause the British role in the conflict to come under
scrutiny: third, the people would recognise the justness of PIRA's cause, or
simply want to remove the source of fears and fourth, this would lead to
popular pressure for withdrawal from Northern Ireland.
All told, this was a highly presumptuous strategy based on a series of
wholly unproven suppositions about human behaviour under stress. Simply
creating a sense of fear through a certain level of military activity could
not guarantee to trigger such a precise chain reaction. The Provisionals had
only to look at the effects of their campaign on the Protestants in Ulster
and the rise of the loyalist paramihitaries, to see that a community's will
to resist could be fortified when placed under threat, It is probably true
to say that societies, like individuals, have some psychological breaking
point when subjected to enough hardship. But thresholds of tolerance can
be enormously high as can be gathered from the failure of city bombing to
53. See P. Chippindale, 'Capital Punishment', The Guardian, 19 Xarch 1976.
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crack civilian morale in World War II. Therefore, a campaign of small-scale
military attacks may have little real impact. People simply adapt to a new
level of threat. For example, the political scientists Peter Knauss and
D. Strickland, remarked on the stoicism of ordinary citizens they found in
London during the bombings of the seventies:
It does attest to an ability to adjust to everyday terror and, to some
degree, to strengthen one's faith in, and reliance on, the state. That
is, contrary to the familiar diagnosis that terrorism immobilises and
confuses the general public, in this case - it seemed, if anything, to
have the opposite effect.&4
The capacity of societies to withstand high levels of physical threat
suggests that the notion of a strategy of psychological attrition within the
framework of low intensity warfare can be a contradiction in terms. All
strategies which seek to administer an unacceptable level of violence to
disrupt the normal processes of political and social discourse of a society
in order to achieve political ends, are likely to be inexact Instruments of
war. A terrorist campaign, for example, may be effective in the short term
if It Is sudden, brutal and Indiscriminate; the aim being to shock, disorien-
tate and psychologically bludgeon a target group into submission. If the
campaign becomes extended it may allow the target population to reorientate
and adapt to a new level of violence. The repetitious nature of the terr-
orist attacks against a narrow range of targets will make the pattern of
violence Increasingly predictable.	 The moment terrorism loses its unpre-
dictability the strategy becomes meaningless as It is deprived of the very
component which makes It terrifying. Therefore, a campaign of psycho-
logical attrition is not a timeless strategy as its terms imply. It will be
susceptible to a law of diminishing returns as its ability to sustain levels
of fear and disturbance in the public mind will tend to decline the longer
the conflict goes on. Far from sustaining a climate of terror, a campaign
54. P. Knauss and D. Strickland, 'Political Disintegration and Latent Terror'
in X. Stohi (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism, (Jew York, 1979),
pp. 87-88.
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can, instead, simply give rise to a climate of indifference because the
continual exposure to low levels of military action may mentally anaes-
thetise the public to a point where they are prepared to tolerate an extra
degree of violence just as they may tolerate a degree of crime, deaths
through road accidents etc..5
The ambiguity of strategies which rely on the evocation of various psy-
chological responses to circumvent the power of a superior opponent, illus-
trates the main difficulty which afflicted PIRA's campaign both in England
and lorthern Ireland. In a conventional war, where each belligerent is
trying to defeat the other through force of arms, it is relatively straight
forward to determine who has prevailed after each engagement has been con-
cluded.	 In a war of psychological attrition, the outcome of tactical
engagements are more problematic. The fact that PIRA's attacks often
resulted In the deaths of security force personnel or the destruction of
buildings and so on, did not mean that such attacks automatically related to
the attainment of the strategic goal because individual operations were not
aimed at the equalisation of power with Britain. The killing of individual
soldiers and policemen is immaterial to the military balance. Instead,
PIRA's operations sought to stimulate certain reactions amongst the popu-
lation at large; fear, alarm, agitation, In the belief that the cumulative
Impact would wear down Britain's resolve. But trying to gauge the effect-
iveness of military actions with reference to elusive psychological factors
is itself an unpredictable business. For example, It will be recalled from
the previous chapter that XcGuire claimed the Provisionals originally
estimated that British tolerance would be exhausted after 36 soldiers had
been killed. When this figure was reached, she said, the number was raised
to 80, still to no effect.	 The truth was that the Provisionals had no
55. See G. Vardlaw, Ft'littcal Terrorism (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 35-36.
56. McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 74-75.
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idea of 'how much' would prove unacceptable to the British, so they just had
to kill more soldiers and plant more bombs in the hope that this was having
the desired effect of grinding down the will of the public. In reality, it
seemed that the culminating point of public stress caused by PIRA violence
had passed relatively quickly, both in Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Thereafter, the continuation ofPIRA's campaign merely further desensitised
popular opinion to the effects of violence. This was the very opposite of
what was intended because a feeling of disinterest made the public potent-
ially less receptive to PIRA's political message.
The Provisionals were aware of the extent of public indifference to
their campaign, and it was a source of frustration and bewilderment to them
that their attacks could, in the words of one republican spokesman, be:
'Front page news one day and forgotten the next.' 7
 The conclusion that
the Provisionals reached, however, was not that the premises of their cam-
paign had been incorrect, but that they had failed to turn the military
screw hard enough. A good example of the impulsive desire to step-up the
violence produced by the 'frustration factor', was provided by Daithi
O'Canai].l in this excerpt from an interview with the journalist Nary Holland
for the 'Weekend World' programme, broadcast on 1? November 1?4:
O'Conaill: ...Vhat have we got from the British public, what have we got
from the British people? Total indifference. They can't wash their
hands. We said last week in a statement that the British Government
and the British people must realise that because of the terror they wage
in Ireland they must suffer the consequences.
Holland: Will you escalate that campaign?
O'Gonaill: We Vill.
Four days later, the Birmingham pub bombings occured which killed 21 people.
The bombings were widely seen as the Provisionals acting upon OConaill's
warning .
57. Quoted in Chippinda].e, 'Gunning for the Upper Classes'.
58. This interview was reprinted in RI, 30 Nov. 1974.
59. See 'Why Provos Brought Terror to Britain', The Sunday Times, 23 Nov.
1974.
- 258 -
Whether or not the Birmingham bombings represented an intentional
piece of escalation, they did show how public reactions could diverge from
what was required by the Provisionals to help them move towards their ob-
jectives. The anger and revulsion engendered by the bombings found expres-
sion not in demands for withdrawal from Northern Ireland, but in calls for
sterner security measuree.° A few days after the bombings a package of
security measures, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), was rushed into
law. Among other things, the Act extended the powers of arrest and deten-
tion and placed strict controls on the movement of terrorist suspects be-
tween Great Britain and Ireland. The Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, summed
up the reasoning for introducing what he admitted was 'the most draconian
programme of security measures we've ever had', thus: 'During my visit to the
Birmingham hospitals on Friday and before that to Guildford in October and
to the victims of the Tower of London explosions in July, I saw injuries I
had hardly dreamt of since the war and I abandoned any attempt to under-
stand the minds of people who can do this.' 1
	Jenkins expressed the pop-
ular perception of the Provisionals by emphasising the incomprehension at
something that was seen as pschyopathic. The immediate public reaction,
therefore, was to seek protection from these outrages, not to empathise with
the cause of the people who perpetrated them.
We now know, of course, that those charged with the Birmingham and
also the Guildford pub bombings were wrongly convicted. We can also debate
the merits and demerits of the PTA as an effective instrument of counter-
terrorism.	 The point about the PTA and the Birmingham episode as it
relates to the context of this study, is that like the 'Bloody Friday' bomb-
ings 2 years before, the Provisionals had merely provoked the British into
60. See for example, 'Angry IPs Pledge Support for MJ Appeasement TM
 Promise',
The Times, 23 Nov. 1974.
61. Home Secretary's Broadcast on Emergency Neasures, 25 Nov. 1974,
London Press Service (Verbatim Service), 228/74, 26 Nov. 1974.
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more counter-measures which further hampered their ability to carry out
their operations. The Provisionals found out that the fickle nature of
public opinion meant that while NRA's attacks might just about be tolerable
at a 'nuisance' level, the moment the violence looked like becoming a real
menace to society, through such actions as indiscriminate civilian bombings,
then the extent to which the public was prepared to indulge the Provision-
ale' licence for action could be very limited.
In fact PIRA never admitted any part in the Birmingham bombings,
though there can be little doubt that its unite were responsible for the
attacks. At the time, there was a widespread assumption that the indis-
criminate 'bombing of the English public into a new level of terrorist
reality' was an entirely deliberate course of action.' According to the
republican sources of the journalist Peter Chippindale, there were many PIRA
recruits who were 'quite prepared to try to force a solution to the Irish
problem by deliberately and without warning killing large numbers of people
in England.' 4 In the aftermath of the Birmingham pub bombings O'Conaill
was quick to reiterate 'that it is not, and never has been the policy of the
IRA to boab targets without warning to ensure the safety of civilians.'5
Nevertheless, by the end of 1974, with the possibility of a ceasef ire being
aired, the Provisionals might have had some reason to believe that their
mainland campaign, atrocities and all, were making the British position more
pliable. It was a feeling that PIRA did little to dispel. Despite the
O'Conaill'e prevaricatory attitude over the Birmingham bombings, his faith
that the campaign was making its mark remained unstinting as he promised to
uphold PIRA's policy of 'taking the war to the mainland of Britain.'
62. See 'The Guilty Men', Fortnight, April 1991.
63. D. Brown, 'Taking Stock of the Provos', The Guardian, 3 Dec. 1974.
64. P. Chippindale, 'Army Fears that More is to Come', The Guardian,
23 Nov. 1974.
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By the beginning of 1975, the concept of bombing Britain had undoubt-
edly become a firmly established element in the Provisionals' military trad-
ition, regarded as a key weapon able to remind the British of PIRA's perman-
ent interest in all matters affecting the politics of Northern Ireland,
Although it might have seemed that the campaign had helped pressurise Brit-
ain into the truce of 1975, it is questionable whether it had any real impact
on its timing. To this extent, the apparent success of the Provisionals in
reaching the ceasef ire may have obscured the more limited strategic effects
of the campaign. 	 It was certainly not a decisive weapon as the Provision-
ale' may have originally thought. 	 For it to have been so, PIRA would have
had to continuously intensify its campaign to prevent the public adjusting
to new, higher levels of conflict. But the contradiction here would have
been that if PIRA had ever possessed such escalatory power to inflict intol-
erable levels of violence on British society, then it probably would never
have needed to practise a strategy of terrorism in the first place. As it
was, the Provisionals had to try to challenge the psychological thresholds
of public tolerance with far more limited resources, which as they had
already discovered after the Birmingham affair, could be a risky and para-
doxical proposition.
The Ceaseffre and the Recurring Themes of Republican Strategic Thought
The actual process that led to the truce of 1975 came quite suddenly follow-
ing a meeting between a group of Protestant clergymen and top Provisionals
in the village of Feakle, Co. Clare, on 10 December 1974. The Churchmen
provided an informal line of communication between the PIRA and the British
government. The Army Council declared a Christmas ceasef ire on 22 Decem-
ber while contacts continued.	 After a brief resumption of hostilities from
16 January 1975, PIRA suspended its operations against the security forces
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on 10 February.	 The terms of the truce were never formally agreed, but in
return for a halt to PIRA's operations the British undertook to phase out
internment and to reduce the Army's presence in Catholic areas. In addit-
ion, a number of incident centres staffed by members of PSF were established
to monitor the truce and liaise with the Northern Ireland Office (NIO).
From the British point of view the truce offered a breathing space to
concentrate on the latest political Initiative, the setting up of a Const-
itutional Convention, to work out a devolved form of government for the
province (this followed the collapse of the Power Sharing Executive earlier
in 1974). Furthermore, in January 1975, the Gardiner Committee, set up to
examine the legal issues involved in the suppression of the violence In
Northern Ireland, recommended the abolition of internment and the ending of
special category status for prisoners which had been in place since June
1972. This formed a key part of the government's overall aim to return the
province to a sense of normality. According to the then Secretary of State,
Nerlyn Rees, the ceasefire could help this process by creating the conditions
which could weaken the Provisional's military organisation and possibly draw
them into peaceful political action.
PlEA's motives are more difficult to decipher.
	 It seems that there
was agreement between hardliners and moderates on the advantages of a
ceasef Ire, though for divergent reasons. The peace-feelers via the Feakle
intermediaries came at an opportune moment for PLEA just when its stock
within the Catholic community had been diminished by the Birmingham bomb-
ings.	 The background to the truce had also seen PIRA's military campaign
continue to lose momentum in Northern Ireland. In 1974, 50 members of the
security had been killed compared with 79 in the previous year.
	 Shooting
67. N. Rees, Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective (London, 1985),
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incidents declined from 5018 to 3206 and explosions from 978 to C85.'
The hardliners on the Army Council, still led by Twomey, remained convinced
of the necessity to raise the military tempo, but recognised the value of a
ceasef ire to replenish its reserves prior to the relaunching of hostilities.
On the other hand, the moderates under O'Conaill felt that a truce could
offer a chance to test the political waters by getting the British involved
in negotiations.7° Either way, the two factions could at least agree that a
truce gave PIRA the chance both to extract further concessions from the
British over issues like internment and to re-establish its popularity
amongst Catholics.7' Even so, PIRA's shilly-shallying over the Christmas
and New Year periods did indicate that a vigorous internal debate was going
on. Initially, the movement extended its Christmas ceasef ire 'to enable the
British Government to establish proper communications with the Republican
leadership and thus begin negotiations which will lead to the removal of the
English way of life from this island.'7
 The Army Council then called off
the ceasef ire because the British failed to respond to PIRA's terms, 73
 but
still left the door open by publicly regretting the breakdown and saying
that they were 'sincere about negotiationg for a just and lasting peace.'74
PIRA's eventual acceptance of the February ceasef ire was the clearest
sign that O'Conaill's moderates were now in command. The concessions PIRA
obtained from the ceasf ire also strengthened O'Conail].'s hand. The release
of internees and the reduction in the Army's presence on the streets were
popular with Catholics for which PIRA could claim credit. Xoreover, the
immunity of PIRA members from arrest and the establishment of the incident
centres conferred a degree of official British recognition onto the
69. Flackes and Elliott, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory, p. 412
and 415.
70. 'IRA Split by Struggle for Power', The Sunday Telegraph, 22 Dec. 1974.
71. 'Death of a Ceasef ire', The Sunday Times, 19 Dec. 1974.
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Pravislonals' position. 	 Beyond this, lay the prospect of full-scale negot-
iations with the British. Presented with these opportunities, however, PIRA
failed to consolidate its political ground as the recurring themes of the
republican tradition were once again to demonstrate the movement's inability
to cope with a period of peace. The paucity of political thinking, the
refusal to conceive republican objectives in anything other than black and
white terms, and the Indiscipline of many PIRA units, were all features of
the movement's conduct during the truce.
For the Provisionals to capitalise on their positive image engendered
by the ceasef ire agreement, required them to demonstrate the extent of their
support to the British through the electoral process. Since the British
government had lifted the ban on PSF in 1974, it had been hoped that the
Provisionals might be tempted to stand in the Convention elections due in
Jay 1975.	 This was a vain hope. As in previous elections, the Provis-
ionals were resolute in their opposition to the ballot box:
Anyone who stands in this convention election, who works in polling
stations or votes, is giving assent to intimidation and accepting that
the orange fascists have a right to lay down the terms under which the
six counties can be governed - any vote is a vote for a return to the
old loyalist sectarian domination.7
By ignoring the elections, PIRA simply allowed their constitutional rivals in
the SDLP a free run. The SDLP captured 23.7% of the vote on a 64% turn-out
which underlined the failure of PIRA's boycott campaign.
NRA's objective in the ceasef ire was not to participate in what was
seen as the phoney internal politics of the province but, as O'Bradaigh
spelled out at the end of 1974, to get the British to pull-out. 'This
requires firstly', O'Bradaigh said, 'talks with the British Government for a
phased withdrawal, and then talks with Loyalists would have to follow to
discuss the sort of political arrangement that would come afterwards.' 77 It
75. Rees p. 248.
76. RN, 19 April 1975.
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was the same old list of PIRA demands. Like the summer truce of 1972, the
Provisionals fell into the trap of believing that they had forced Britain
into the ceasefire, and were, consequently, in a position to exact everything
they wanted:
It must be remembered that the Republican Leadership did not agree to the
Truce for the sake of limited peace but for the cause of progress so nec-
essary at the time... the English must declare their intention to withdraw
and have the final solution among Irishmen of all political creeds and
religious denominations... Republicans have faced some thirty thousand
Crown troops and police and were not only successful but stronger milit-
arily than ever before and fully prepared for all future contingencies.7e
This sort of exaggerated view of P IRA's military prowess was to prove highly
detrimental to the psychological fabric of the organisation. The strident
calls for the complete fulfilment of republican demands while being so obvi-
ously deprived of the power to achieve them was a recipe for humiliation.
The British, who had no intention of being drawn into direct negotiations,
were quite happy to ignore the Provisionals' diatribes, with the result that
the movement slid into disarray.
The problems began when O'Conalll was arrested in the Spring of 1975
in the Irish Republic and Jailed for a year for PIRA membership. His loss
was critical for the movement. He had been the prime mover behind the
ceasef ire on the republican side and was the one leader with sufficient
stature who might have been able to steer the Provisionals in a more flex-
ible direction. O'Conail].'s departure clearly affected the make-up of the
Army Council. The hardline and moderate factions were now deadlocked, each
cancelling out the influence of the other. The hardliners were always wary
of O'Conaill's political leanings. 'If they stand for elections they will
get well and truly bloody hammered,' one hardliner warned.° Vith the main
politico gone, the hardliners seemed satisfied to sit out the truce, assured
that they could block any political move which might either degrade the
78. 'Peace By Ordeal', RI, 5 July 1975.
79. See Rees, pp. 154-155.
80. Quoted in 'Death of a Ceasef ire'.
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military structure or endanger republican orthodoxy. Xeanwhile, the lead-
er-ship of the moderates fell to O'Bradaigh, the President of PSF. He was an
uninspiring figure who appeared to carry little weight within the movement
and so was poorly placed to offer any imaginative political leadership in
the face of the strengthened position of the hardliners. The upshot was
that the Provisionals subsided into a state of insipid listlessness, seem-
ingly content to peddle sterile propaganda to which few outside the movement
paid much attention.
Xilitarily, the Provisionals also had their problems.	 In July 1975,
Republican News claimed: sAc for the IRA, the Truce has shown their military
strength and discipline unique, in the world of guerrilla war and revolu-
tion.'	 Since the beginning of the ceasef ire PIRA had shown some re-
straint against the security forces.	 In other areas, the claims of self-
control were less than convincing. 	 The ceasef ire had immediately raised
the suspicions of the loyalist paramilitaries which sparked another outbreak
of vicious sectarian murders.	 lost of the 216 civilians killed in 1975
were Catholics, but as mentioned earlier, PIRA units also engaged in tit-for-
tat killings throughout the ceasef ire. The lack of respite for the Catholic
community was compounded in February when a bitter feud broke out between
OIRA and the newly formed IRSP. Although the IRSP criticised PIRA's lack
of commitment to the 'Socialist Republic', both organisations agreed on the
principle point of a British withdrawal.	 'To the extent that the Provis-
ional policy runs parallel to ours,' said IRSP leader Seamus Costello, 'we are
prepared to co-operate with them. ' 	 The co-operation took the form of a
few Provisionals joining in with the IRSP to defeat OIRA's attempt to destroy
the breakaway group.	 The Officials came off worst, losing 3 men, includ-
ing their respected Belfast commander, Billy Iclillen. Yet this was only a
81. 'Peace by Ordeal'.
82. Interview with S. Costello, The Starry Plough, April 1975.
83. Kelley, p. 232.
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prelude to an even bloodier feud between OIRA and PIRA in October which left
11 dead.	 The origins of the feud resided in a host of territorial and
personal resentments stretching back to the split of 1970. According to
the authoritative journalist, Jack Holland, the Provisionals saw the truce as
an opportunity after 4 years of fighting the British both to settle some old
scores with the Officials and to assert their ghetto supremacy.
The point about PIRA's participation, both in the quarrels with OIRA
and the sectarian war, is that it demonstrated yet again how the apolitical
nature of the republican tradition could give rise to a self-sustaining
military dynamic. For many volunteers the ceasefire was an irrelevance.
Having been promised constantly over the years that victory was staring
(them] in the face'? they were certainly not going to give up their
struggle for the sake of a few incident centres. Indeed, the Iewry incident
centre was closed down after a few months due to the lack of interest of
PIRA units in the area.	 The ceasef ire became increasingly ductile the
longer it went on.
	 Some 30 members of the security forces were killed
during 1975, mainly by the rogue units near the border.
	 Even discounting
the sectarian killings and ghetto feuds, the Belfast Brigade stretched the
truce to its limits by attacking buildings and police stations. The rhet-
orical justifications for such attacks, that they constituted retaliation
'against breaches of the truce by the British, i.e. Cold Blooded murder of
innocent civilians, harassment of the community and indeed torture', 7 were a
thin disguise for the basic frustrations of many PIRA members. To illus-
trate the point, as early as April, 1975 PIRA bombs destroyed £500,000 worth
of offices in Belfast in retaliation for an allegedly violent British Army
raid on two houses in North and West Belfast. An independent assessment
84. See 'The Republican Feud', Fortnight, Nov. 1975.
85. J. Holland, 'Provo Police In Action', Hibernia, 14 Nov. 1975.
86. RN, 23 Feb. 1974.
87. 'Congratulations to the IRA', Hire Og (PSF, Vest Belfast), 18 Oct. 1975.
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put the repair bill for both the homes at £2O.
At the end of 1975 the Provisionals restated their belief that 'the only
way to bring peace in Ireland is the full acceptance by the British Govern-
ment of the demands made by the Leadership of the Republican movement', and
added: 'We still honour the truce, fragile though it may be, but if it becomes
apparent that our basic demands are to be rejected, then we have no alterna-
tive but to renew the armed struggle with an ever greater resolve, ferocity
and intensity than ever before.' 	 In fact, the truce was already dead
having petered out with the growing indiscipline of PIRA units. The lack
of firm leadership from the Army Council meant that many PIRA members had
taken matters into their own hands, believing that the reactivation of mili-
tary operations was the only way they could claw back any political relev-
ance.° In a sense, no one could blame them. The absence of peaceful
political tactics to absorb the efforts of PIRA's activists during the truce
meant that the ceasef ire, certainly in the minds of many grass-roots volun-
teers, was nonsensical. To this degree, PIRA's descent into the welter of
sporadic and uncontrolled sectarian violence and factional feuds was merely
the logical expression of the movement's basically militaristic ideological
drives.
PIRA's predicament was compounded by its growing unpopularity within
the nationalist community. Quite apart from the threat from sectarian
killers, PIRA's heavy-handed policing of the ghetto areas and its violent
vendetta against OIRA, created a mood of despondency from which PIRA's
political immobilism gave no foreseeable prospect of relief. The extent to
which many ordinary Catholics, especially the women, blamed PIRA for the
depressing situation was revealed the following year with the rise of the
88. 'Ceasefire Crumbles as IRA Blasts Belfast Buildings', The Daily
Telegraph, 10 April 1975.
89. 'Christmas Xessage from the Belfast Brigade, RN, 28 Dec. 1975.
90. 'XacXoney', 'Bandit Country'.
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cross-community Peace People.
	 In the meantime, the ceasef ire out-lived its
usefulness to the British. On 11 November, Rees announced the closure of
the incident centres and broke off all contacts with PSF in early 1978. To
cap a period of almost complete disaster for the Provisionals, when they
resumed full-scale hostilities they discovered that many of their operations
had been blown by informers. The British had used the truce to increase
their surveillance and infiltrate PIRA's ranks, and in the first 5 months of
1975 over 400 people were charged with violent offencee.'
The ceasef ire trauma was to have a marked effect on the movement, In
1981 a member of PIRA's GHQ staff declared:
There is no foreseeable prospect of another truce or of any cessation
along the lines that obtained in the last two bilateral truces... Because
the British were not serious, honest or in any way forthright about
their intentions, and because they were Just trying to divert the IRA
into a demoralising and damaging ceasef ire situation, I cannot foresee
any circumstances in which the army will get involved in that situation
again.
Although the ceasef Ire revealed the effects of PIRA's political vacuity on
its conduct during the truce, it still begs the question, why did the Prov-
Isionals, both moderates and hardlines alike, allow themselves to be ensnared
In a 'demoralising' and 'damaging' truce for so long? Theoretically, they
could have called off the ceasef ire at an hour's notice, yet they persisted
even after It was clear, in the first few months of 1975, that the British
were not interested in talking to PIRA and were busily pursuing their own
political agenda with the Constitutional Convention. There are few con-
clusive answers, but some sort of insight can be gained by looking at the
relationship between PIRA's strategy and propaganda, and the impact this had
on the movement's self-perception.
The previous chapter pointed out that although the Provlsionals admit-
ted they could never overcome British military strength, they did believe
91. The Observer Foreign News Service, No. 34800, 1 lay 1978.
92. 'IRA Interview', Iris, April 1981.
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they could fight in such a way as to force Britain to the conference table.
The role of force in this process, as an article in Republican News explained
in i74, was to 'bring about suitable conditions to enable political persua-
sion to operate under more favourable conditions than those prior to the
commencement of hostilities.' This was a sound statement of strategic
principle but the article proceeded to confuse the issue by adding: 'The aims
of the IRA are clear cut and decidedly straight forward. They seek not to
defeat the English, but to compel them (author's italics], through their poli-
tical leaders, to disengage so as to have the way for their eventual with-
drawal." Persuasion and compulsion are diametric opposites. One cannot
persuade an adversary to feel compelled. Re is either compelled or he is
not; that is, when he is forced under extreme duress to take the only avail-
able option. In other words, compulsion is a function of defeat. As we
have emphasised throughout this analysis, a stronger belligerent is unlikely
to give into a full set of demands under the limited military duress of a
lees powerful opponent.	 PIRA's strategy could entice compliance but it
could not enforce it. As the quotations above indicate, there existed a
fundamental misapprehension in republican strategic thinking which seemed to
blur the relationship between military power and political demands, so that
minor British concessions were equated with an admission of defeat. In the
run up to the truce, for example, the Provisionals believed that the British
were ready to negotiate a withdrawal. The impression was reinforced
because the Provisionals' had openly stated in the days beforehand that a
British pull-out was 'our first pre-requisite for a permanent truce'.' So
when the truce ended, the Provisionals had felt that the British, in the
words of the i981 PIRA statement, had been neither 'honest' or 'forthright
about their intentions'. 	 As there was never any written ceasef ire
93. L .XacLiam, 'IRA Aims Are Clear Cut', RN, 29 Kay 1974.
94. Interview with S. Loughran, Andersonstown News. See also Bishop and
Nallie, The Provisional IRA, p. 220,
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agreement, there is no way PIRA's claims can be verified. One likely
explanation of the situation was that the Provisionals managed to convince
themselves that Britain was withdrawing while the British themselves
remained ambiguous over the issue of face-to-face talks in order to keep the
ceasef ire going.	 The important aspect here is how the Provisionals
perceived their own position at this time, The incident centres, contacts
with British officials, release of internees, acceptance of PIRA's quasi-
policing role in the ghetto areas; all might have given the Provisionals
sufficient evidence to confirm own their opinion that they were close to
victory, As a result, PIRA could confidently proclaim in Xarch 1975: 'Our
military action had the desired effect. The British Government indicated a
willingness to give serious consideration to the three basic demands of the
Republican Novement for a lasting peace in our land.' The fact that PIRA
seemed entranced by the prospect of talks with the British can help explain
why it held to the truce for as long as it did in the absence of any negot-
iations. The paraphernalia of the truce appeared to endow the Provision-
ale with a powerful self-image which over-rode any previous caution they had
concerning the ability of their strategy to score an outright military vic-
tory. The idea that British rule was on its last legs filled the Provision-
ale with a belief that they had literally beaten the British in battle which
could now enable them to hammer home their advantage. 	 An Phc'blac.ht drew
this parallel, and this moral:
if we look back half a century we will see that Republicans having
brought England to her knees on the fighting front, were not able to
follow through on the political front - consequently what was won in the
military field was lost on the Conference Table... no-one can prevent us
achieving the ultimate aim but oureelves.7
95.See I. Rowan, 'Vhy Rees Xoved to Reassure the Provisionals', The Sunday
Telegraph, 27 July 1975.
96.PIRA Easter Statement 1975 (Dublin), Xarch 1975.
97. AP, 28 Feb. 1975.
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The statement was symptomatic of the Provisionals' misreading of their own
position. They were tailoring their demands, not in relation to what could
be feasibly achieved given the prevailing balance of forces, but in accord-
ance with their own exaggerated sense of power. This raises a more funda-
mental question. Was the inflated self-image Just a by-product of the
ideology, mere propaganda bravado, or was it also an intrinsic element of
PIRA's strategic thought, indicative of a more systematic process of self-
deception which affected the movement's military thinking?
The Process of P IRA'S Strategic Analysis - Still Looking for the Year of
Victory
We mentioned in the preceding chapter that the Provisionals proclaimed 1972
to be 'The Year of Victory'. Two years later the banners read, 'Victory
to the IRA 19?4'? and in early 1977 PIRA's leadership declared: 'We are now
confident of victory as we face the final phase of the war with England."°°
For sure these statements and many others like them which adorned the
republican press throughout the period, were intended as rousing propaganda,
but there is no reason to suppose that the movement did not take seriously
its own confident assurances of victory. Such confidence was understand-
able up until 1972, but from then onwards the predictions of victory became
less credible for external observers, though seemingly not for the Provision-
ale themselves. Why did they choose to deceive themselves by continuing to
assert unfounded expectations of triumph? The explanation provides a link
between all the problems experienced in the sectarian war, the mainland
bombing campaign, the 1975 ceasef ire, and the overall process of the move-
ment's strategic formulation.
In any insurgent war, the particular conditions which affect the
98. RN, 2 Jan. 1972.
99. AP, 4 Jan. 1974.
100.'Provisionals Confident of Victory', IRIS, 3 Feb. 1977.
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conflict scenario are going to have a major bearing on how the instrument of
violence will be employed.	 Against whom?	 For how long?	 To achieve
what?	 In essence, this is a contextual issue which concerns the quality of
the insurgent's analysis. It is incumbent upon the insurgent to gain an
accurate appreciation of the circumstances in which it chooses to fight, and
on that basis, select the most appropriate strategic option. The Provision-
als' own assessment of the context in which they fought can be summarised
concisely along the following lines: 1) Ireland has a right to self-determin-
ation and it is PIRA's aim to bring this about; 2) the aspiration to self-
determination is denied by the British who seek to maintain their rule
through the artificial division of the island; 3) while this situation
prevails there can be no prospect of peace and justice in Ireland; 4) the
constitutional arena has shown itself to be an ineffective environment in
which to pursue British withdrawal; 5) force, practised within a guerrilla
war framework, as in the Anglo-Irish war, has proven the only method guar-
anteed to shift the British; 6) therefore, force should be concentrated on
what has always been the weakest link in the British design, namely, the
relationship between the colony (Northern Ireland) and those who underpin
the position of the colonial policy-makers (the British public). These are
the terms of reference in which the Provisionals sought to construct their
strategy, evaluate the military instrument and develop their tactics. We
can call this, for want of a better phrase, PIRA's strategic paradigm.
Leaving aside the debate on the desirability of republican objectives or
the validity of PIRA's mandate to act in the manner it did, neither of which
are the concern of this thesis, how cogent was PIRA's strategic paradigm as
a model upon which to devise a realistic military policy? First, let us try
brief ly to challenge the pivotal element which held the paradigm together,
the notion of Northern Ireland as the artifical product of British imperial-
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ism.	 The central justification to sustain the charge of imperialism, an
economic motive, is missing.
	 Historically, Northern Ireland has had the
highest percentage unemployment of any part of the United Kingdom.
	 For
most of the twentieth century it has had a declining industrial sector and
an impoverished agricultural sector.
	 It has no mineral sources in abund-
ance and is a net drain on the central exchequer.
	 Beyond the economic
motive, the argument that Britain has security interests in retaining
Northern Ireland is also unpersuasive. The only conceivable advantage of
the province is as a naval asset, but at best this is marginal since the
Northern Irish seaboard faces the wrong way to guard the Atlantic
approaches. PIRA's campaign in the 1970s merely went to underline that
Northern Ireland detracted from, rather than enhanced the UK's overall
security position.
Apart from the intellectual case against the colonial interpretation,
more empirical evidence in the form of attitude surveys conducted in the
late 1970s and early 1980 also negated PIRA's analysis. The findings
revealed the extent to which Catholic opinion appeared to diverge from trad-
itional republican perceptions of Britain, with substantial majorities indic-
ating that they found British influence to be a neutral and, to some degree,
even a positive element. In a series of polls 67% of Catholics thought that
the British did not care what happened to the province, 69.9% believed that
the British treated Protestants and Catholics equally, while 60% agreed with
the proposition: 'Were it not for the British Government, the situation in
Northern Ireland would be worse than it is."°' And, of course, the most
significant piece of empirical refutation, as PIRA's parlous state in the
aid-1970s provided adequate testament, was that the movement's strategy had
completely failed to secure its objective. 	 Bven so, when the prolonged
101.Source: Northern Ireland Attitude Survey, in B. Noxon-Browne, Nation,
Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldarshot, 1983), p. 116.
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truce officially expired In early 1978, the Provisionals reiterated their
demands for a wholesale British withdrawal, and affirmed:
Until these demands are met in full, the Irish Republican Army will con-
tinue to resist British rule with sustained military pressure... Ye pledge
ourselves to strike at all variants of imperialism in Ireland in the
struggle for a Socialist Democratic Republic... The capability of the Irish
Republican Army to develop the war of liberation is unquestionable.'°2
Yet in renewing the armed struggle, all the Provisionals were doing was
persisting with something which had, after 5 years, demonstrably not worked,
and with little prospect that it would be any more successful in the next 5
years. Could it be that PIRA's faith in its ability to 'strike against all
variants of imperialism' remained undaunted because the colonial analysis
conspired to bolster the perceived potency of its strategy? For a start,
the advantage of forming the problem of Northern Ireland within a colonial
context was that it fed an image of an inwardly flawed opponent; the notion
that although outwardly stronger than republican forces, the British were
psychologically weak, without the stomach for a fight, and unable to with-
stand the continuous assault on the inherently brittle colonial link with
Northern ireland.
	 The following extract from Republican Jews exemplifies
the point:
The Brits are beaten... and final victory is within our grasp... Britain
is the sick man of Europe. Her economy is virtually bankrupt, her Tory
Prime Minister tries to encourage his unfortunate citizens not to see
themselves as the fifth rate power they are... Britain cannot afford the
money, the humiliation and the public shame she is perpetrating here..,
SHE CAN GET OUT NOV ON OUR TERMS AND THAT MEANS UNCONDITIONAL SURREN-
DER ON HER PART BECAUSE SHE CANNOT MAINTAIN THIS POLICE STATE FOREVER
...the whole point is that we have proved we can go it alone and bring
her to her knees. Britain is a paper tiger.'°
The paper tiger syndrome juxtaposed a clapped-out imperial edifice against a
confident and vigorous protagonist, thereby transforming a campaign of
small-scale guerrilla raids into a potentially decisive weapon of victory.
The belief that the British were an eminently beatable enemy was pressed
102.'Republican Army Pledge - We Fight On', RE, 13 March 1976,
103.'Ve Want Our Country, RN, 2 June 1973.
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relentlessly in the republican media with cries of 'English Withdrawal Any
Week Now' (1974)10* 'British Disengagement Now Invavitable' (19'?5),'°
'Brits About to Withdraw' (1976),b0 and '1977 Onward to Victory'. 107
 The
extent to which the Provisionale believed in the potential of their strategy
to surmount superior odds can be seen in the following passage from PIRA's
1977 Easter Nessage. The passage Is replete with ringing declarations of
imminent victory. What is especially notable is how the movement used the
lexicon of conventional war, wholly inappropriate to a guerrilla scenario, to
rub in the supposed power of its strategy:
IRA successes which have routed the enemy on many fronts are Victory
signs... We Are Winningt We are fighting courageously, with determin-
ation and with great success on all fronts against British Occupation of
Ireland. That the risen Irish People have withstood such a long strug-
gle, that the People continue to go forward and not retreat, that the
People not only resist but HIT BACK, and continue to do so, has stunned,
frightened and demoralised the enemy.'°
As the excerpt above implies, the corollary of the Provisionals' convic-
tion that their strategy was capable of smashing Britain's rule in Northern
Ireland, was that their superior inner-moral strength must also make them a
formidable and revered opponent in the eyes of the British and outside
observers. This was reflected in the Provisionals' own self-laudatory
prose: 'The world recoguises that the Provisionals are the greatest guerrilla
fighters the world has ever saen,"° or, slightly more modestly; 'The People
have the strongest, most admired and most respected guerrilla force in
Europe.' 11 ° Another intriguing facet here is the way the Provisionals used
the term 'the People' to suggest that its strengh and fortitude derived from
mass public backing. Again, this contributed to PIRA's inflated self-image
as it allowed the movement to justify its actions without recourse to any
104.l?N, 24 Aug. 1974.
105.R. O'Bradaigh 'British Disengagement Now Inevitable', IRIS, 24 Oct. 1975.
106.Iatlon (PSF, West Belfast), 4 Jan. 1976.
1O7.The Volunteer (PSF, West Belfast), Dec. 1976.
108.'Ve Are Winning', RN, 9 April 1977.
109.'Victory For the IRA', AP, July 1972.
11O.'We Are Winning'.
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quantifiable source of public support. After all, If a political actor is
apparently so close to its objectives, having all but vanquished the enemy,
then by implication it must have 'the People's' support: 'The British military
withdrawal... is a complete victory for the heroic determination and resist-
ance shown by the anti-imperialist people and their army, the Provisional
IRA'.' 1 1
Perhaps most importantly from PIRA's own standpoint, was that the col-
onial analysis upheld the prinicpal republican aspiration that once the Brit-
ish were expelled, the main burden preventing Ireland from fulfilling her
potential would have been lifted:
Things will never be right, can never be right, while this ultimate
source of hatred and division continues. Britain has never brought
freedom, never brought peace, never brought justice or respect for
humanity to ireland. Everybody knows that what British power has
brought has been war and strife, slavery and servility, shame and
disgrace and cruelty.'
There is a discrepancy here. How can one have a paper tiger opponent who
is prepared to inflict all manner of 'strife', 'servility' and 'cruelty'? A
regime which imposes a regime of repression 'more vicious than any seen in
Budapest or Prague" ia
 is not exactly the stereotype of a crumbling and
irresolute adversary. This paradox is one which PIRA's literature does not
care to enlighten. We can postulate, though, that having an enemy to which
one can subscribe every kind of malicious intent automatically endows one
with a morally virtuous self-image. In PIRA's case, the delineation of a
malevolent antagonist could also boost its self-perception, enabling it to
portray itself as a bold, determined force capable of facing down the mass-
ive repressive efforts of its foes. Such a postulation is lent weight by
assertions like those of Daithi O'Conaill who told the 1973 Ard-Fheis that:
'Despite the naked military terror in the north and the vicious Free State
111.'British Army Starts Withdrawal', RN, 8 Dec. 1974.
112.Efre Iua (PSF journal), Jan. 1977.
113.'We Want Our Country'.
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oppression in the South, the Movement has held its own and forges ahead in
the struggle for freedom." 14	 In effect, the Provisionale wanted it both
ways.	 They wanted the image of a weak opponent to show that their strat-
egy could prevail over the British.
	 Yet they also wanted the image of
stronger, more dangerous opponents to explain why they still had not won.
All this seemed to amount to a self-deluding basis upon which to define
a coherent strategy. PIRA's strategic paradigm appeared less a means to
analyse objectively the value of the military instrument, more a way of
mentally framing the conflict to its own advantage by building in a process
which ran from unfounded assumption to unfounded assumption, like so: 1)
PIRA's strategy has proved effective which means it is going to win; 2) this
means it is a powerful entity; 3) this means it has the support of the
people against a common enemy; 4) this means it does not have to pay much
attention to other potential obstacles (like the prospect of mass Protestant
opposition) in its way. In this respect, the theory of colonialism reflect-
ed not so much a dispassionate assessment of Northern Ireland's political
status, but rather an attempt to divert PIRA around hard strategic realities,
The fact was that howsoever Great Britain's relationship with Northern Ire-
land was defined, the British were not a structrually flawed enemy and were
prepared for a long term political and military commitment to the province.
The colonial theory was also vital to circumvent the question of Prot-
estant hostility as a barrier to PIRA's objectives by linking the severance
of the British connection to the collapse of unionism. 'We believe when the
time comes, the Protestant people will accept a united Ireland for peace
sake,' was PIRA's considered opinion, 'We know a lot of Protestants who would
privately agree to a united Ireland." Besides the improbability that
PIBA did know that many Protestants, there is no substantive evidence to
114.Quoted in 'Victory is Ours for the Taking', AP, 19 Oct. 1973.
115.Quoted in The Ulster Newsletter, 20 Sept. 1976.
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suggest that loyalist resistance would disintegrate after a British with-
drawal.' This perception is also backed up by survey findings
whichindicated that a majority of people in the Irish Republic (59.4%) and in
Northern Ireland, both Protestants (87.5%) and Catholics (67.4%), felt that a
British withdrawal would lead to a large increase in violence." 7 Indeed,
the bulk of evidence points to the fact that loyalism has been largely
independent of British policy and predicated on the suspicion of, rather than
reliance on, the British government. In the mid-1970s Protestant oppos-
ition to the concept of Irish unity in general, and PIRA in particular, had
been exhibited in the border poll in 1973, the Ulster Yorkers Council strike
in 1974 which brought down the Power Sharing Executive 1 and in its most
violent form, in the activities of the loyalist paramilitaries. 	 All this
made little impression on the Provisionals. Peter Arnlis, a republican
theorist, was moved to say: 'I ignore Loyalist violence because it is patho-
logical and parochial and unlike IRA revolutionary violence is devoid of
major political considerations."
The fact that the Provisionals were so nonchalantly unconcerned at the
capacity of both the Protestants and the British government to obstruct the
attainment of republican goals, suggests that PIRA's strategic paradigm was
no more than a seif-rationalising mechanism which existed to screen out
information which clashed with key assumptions. Discrepant information
was not allowed to enter the paradigm to challenge or modify the parameters
of PIRA's strategic thought because these parameters, so it seemed, had
become as sacrosanct as the ideology itself.
That ideology and self-image influence perception and behaviour is
axiomatic. PIRA remains no different in this respect than any other
116.Sea Guelke, p. 205.
117.5. Davis and R. Sinnott, Attitudes in the Republic of Ireland Relevant to
the Northern Ireland Problei (Dublin, 1979), p. 88.
118.Arnlis, 'Nature of Strategy, Politics, Revolution, British Withdrawal'.
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political actor. 	 Nevertheless, PIRA's calculations of the efficacy of armed
force did appear to represent an inversion of the process of strategic
formulation which one might expect within a rational actor model.	 The
rational actor model can be depicted in the following way:
Ideology	 , Analysis	 , Strategy
(basic motivation	 (evaluation of military	 (employment of
& the definition	 instrument within context military instrument in
of objectives)	 but inevitably affected by policy to achieve ends)
normative influences and
values of ideology)
In PIRA's case, either at the point of departure, or at some point during
its campaign, this process appeared to have become inverted, like so:
Ideology -	 Strategy -	 Rationalisation
(basic motivation) 	 (employment of military	 (retrospective
instrument to suit ideology explanation of military
not circumstances of	 instrument)
conflict)
Under the inverted model, the strategy becomes dictated directly by the
ideology and the 'analysis' merely a form of ex post facto explanation of
pre-conceived ideas about the role of the military instrument. The Provis-
ionals have described their armed struggle as 'a war not of their choosing,
it is a war because there is no alternative method of winning Irish free-
dom." Also, they have said: 'Republicanism.., clearly gave us the method
to use against the British." 20 Pronouncements like these are indicative of
the involuntary submission of the military instrument to the ideology, and
reflected also in the rationalising techniques of disparaging the enemy -
'The morale of British soldiers has never been lower" 31 - and the vocabul-
ary of imminent victory - 'The Provisionals are proving that military vic-
tory is inevitable." 32 Expressions such as these strongly imply that the
employment of the military instrument was already a pre-chosen path, this is
to say, that the concept of violence as the means to republican goals was as
119.1). Xccusker, 'No Future Without Freedom', RN Evening Editon, July 1973.
120.'Dustin', 'The Neology of a Nilitary Campaign', RN, 10 April, 1976.
121.C. Lambe, 'British Go Home', RN, 23 June 1973.
122.AP, 14 Sept. 1973.
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much enshrined in the ideology as republican goals themselves.
Again, it should be emphasised that PIRA is not unique in having its
policies formed and rationalised by ideological principles rather than ser-
ious contextual analysis.
	 Arguably, this phenomenon affects every political
actor to some degree.' 23
 It is also difficult to prove conclusively that
PIRA's violence between 1972 and 1977 was governed by a process similar to
that described in the inverted model because it takes place at an unconsc-
ious level.	 Rarely will any political actor set out deliberately to mis-
apply the military instrument, still less admit it.
	 When the Provisionals
discuss the armed struggle in their publications they usually describe its
instrumentality, not its emotional appeal. Neither Is it clear whether the
inverted process of strategic formulation was present at the outset of PIRA's
attempts to fashion its strategy in 1970 or whether it developed over time.
It is sometimes the case that a strategy properly formulated at the start
can, over time, become internalised In an organisation's belief structure.'2'
In PIRA's case, it did seem in the early years of its struggle that its stra-
tegy had been well-judged. The successful destabilisation of Northern Ire-
land made it seem plausible that PIRA might just accomplish its objectives.
As time wore on, its strategy became less convincing, particularly In the
light of extensive loyalist antagonism to PIRA's aims and methods. Yet
the rigidities of PIRA's strategic doctrine prevented It from modifying Its
campaign to take account of the changing nature of the conflict. Moreover,
PIRA's persistence in practising armed force with reference to an anti-col-
onial warfare model, resulted in its campaign becoming not only increasingly
increasingly ineffective, but actually regressive in relation to its stated
goals.	 For example, although the mainland bombing campaign had the
123.See R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International
Politics (Princeton, N.J., 1976), asp., pp. 288-315 and pp. 382-408.
124.See for example D. Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological
Explanation (Princeton, N.J., 1985), pp. 46-47.
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potential to sway public opinion in the short run, the ephemeral nature of
its impact in terms of its ability to sustain high levels of fear, meant that
over the longer term It could have only a marginal impact on British atti-
tudes and policy. PIRA's only real hope, then, was to pursue political
change in Northern Ireland itself by prevailing upon the population to
conform to its views either by peaceful persuasion or through coercion.
Since the Provisionals did not believe in the value of the former, they ended
up with the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, PIRA's energies contin-
ued to be misdirected on a mainland bombing campaign which was lust not
successful in its aim of wearing down public tolerance to a point where the
question of a British withdrawal became a serious political issue. On the
other hand, PIRA's violence in Northern Ireland was not widespread enough to
bulldoze the Protestants into submission, yet quite sufficient to alienate
and embitter them, and to stimulate the rise of the loyalist paramilitaries.
Similarly, PIRA's unoffical, though nonetheless, quite obvious participation
in the sectarian war, merely confirmed Protestant suspicions, making the
question of loyalist compliance even more problematic.
As a general observation, the tone of PIRA's headline rhetoric became
more clamorous and bombastic through the mid-1970s. However, one final
aspect to be noted in the evolution of PIRA's strategic thought from 1972 to
1977, was that it was increasingly possible, especially towards the latter
half of this period, to detect remarks in the republican press such as: 'The
basic strategy of the guerrilla fighter is to stay alive and keep fight-
ing','	 and: 'the Provos have fought hard and long and their survival alone
is a political victory." Remarks like these imply the beginnings of a
shift in nuance, suggestive of the first, tentative admission that the
overblown claims to be able to win by vanquishing the enemy in battle were
125.T. Jelis, 'Guerrilla Warfare', RI, 13 July 1974.
126.'The Provos', Hire Og, 16 Oct. 1975.
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inapproriate and unobtainable.	 But stressing that somehow 'survival alone'
was a 'political victory', was also symptomatic of defective strategic
thinking. While it is true in the tautological sense that surviving is a
necessary requirement to achieve one's objectives, PIRA's idea that surviving
meant winning provides the clearest indication that the basis of its strat-
egic formulation amounted to a set of contrived rationalisations aimed at
preserving the purity of republican ideology simply by permitting the move-
ment to endure through military expression. It was this state of affairs
that allowed the movement to languish in the 1975 ceasef ire which, once
again, proved that PIRA was incapable of making political capital out of its
military campaign.
This brings us to the central puzzle of PIRA's strategic position during
this period. The Provisionals' perception of British colonial interference
in Ireland provided them with means to legitimise their campaign of violence
free from any political dimension, because in their view, there could not,
literally, be any politics so long as the colonial relationship lasted.
	 As
O'Bradaigh stated, there could be 'no Ulster government, no partnership and
no reconciliation while British rule remained." 27
 The problem here was
that while this provided an internal intellectual mechanism to justify PIRA's
existence, externally, in the real world, PIRA's existence was being threat-
ened, as shown by continued decline on the military level.	 Between 1976
and 1977 the number of shootings fell from 1908 to 1181 and bombings halv-
ed from 766 to 3C6.' Ironically, the very mechanism for rationalising
PIRA's survival was directly responsible for its survival being jeopardised.
The continuing use of violence without any political consideration was
detaching PIRA from the roots of its support in the Catholic community and
so making it far more vulnerable to the security forces.
127.Quoted in The Ulster Newsletter, 2 Feb. 1976,
128.Flackes and Elliott, Table 5, p. 415.
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As we have stated at the top of this section, a good strategy is under-
pinned by a rigorous and dispassionate assessment of the conflict scenario.
Proper contextual analysis enables the selection of the strategic option most
likely to maximise political interests. It appears that PIRA forewent such
an assessment seemingly to avoid confronting some of the more difficult
obstacles which stood in its way. 	 The Provisionals paid the penalty for
this deficiency in the form both of a stagnating military campaign and dec-
lining popular sympathy. In effect, by basing a strategy on a specific and
inflexible interpretation of the conflict scenario as a psychological




THE EVOLUTIOI OF PIRL'S TOTAL STRATEGY, 1977-1983
The disillusionment experienced by the Provisional IRA during the 1975
ceasef ire coincided with a shift in British security policy towards Northern
Ireland. This policy, referred to as Ulsterisation, involved reductions in
the overt presence of the regular British Army and turning over greater
responsibility for security to the locally recruited forces of the RUG and
UDR. The purpose was to restore an atmosphere of normality to the prov-
ince. The Provisionals viewed the reductions of regular Army personnel as
a 'withdrawal, forced upon them by the IRA's success', but emphasised that it
was a 'pragmatic withdrawal with no gains intended for the IRA.' The Prov-
isionals believed that because the 'Brite' will to beat the Irish Republican
Army by military means had diminished', so they had 'resorted to political
strategy as a means of weakening resistance." Part of this political
strategy involved the criminalisation of PIRA by the phasing out of intern-
ment and ending Special Category Status for all prisoners convicted of para-
military offencee after Xarch 1976.
IJlsterisation/criminalisation struck deep at PIRA's strategy as it
sought to portray the troubles as a conflict between the forces of law and
order versus a self-serving criminal outfit lacking popular legitimacy. The
extent to which the Provisionals were vulnerable to this perception was
revealed in 1978 and 1977 at the hands of the Peace People, a cross-commun-
ity movement which called for an end to paramilitary activity. The rate at
which the Peace People picked up support from the traditionally hardline
nationalist areas jolted the Provielonals. It underlined the war-weariness
of many in the community and though the influence of the Peace People was
short lived, its rise signified the final demise of all the early hopes
invested in PlEA's campaign.
1. P. Arnlie, 'The Brit Withdrawal', RI, Jan. 1977.
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With the demoralisation of the ceasef ire, PIRA's strategy came under
close scrutiny from those whom we identified in Chapter 3 as the younger
group of Northern radicals within the Provisionals. This group, composed
of those like Gerry Adams, Joe Austin, Danny Morrison and Tom Hartley, were
increasingly critical of the Southern based leadership. They believed that
the leadership had been hoodwinked by the British who had used the bilateral
truce to speed up the Uleterisatlon process and to end political status in
the prisons. The Northern radicals were determined that PIRA's campaign
would not be allowed to drift into history as just another republican stand
which burned itself out through unthinking military zeal. They planned to
reshape the movement and to construct a more viable basis upon which to
develop their strategy. By 1976 the Northerners were rapidly gaining
prominence and by 1977 were able to establish a commanding influence within
the movement. Over the next few years they were to challenge many of the
precepts of traditional republican thinking.
This chapter will focus on a number of specific themes between 1977
and 1983 that were to have a crucial influence on the implementation of the
military instrument. The chapter will first set out the reasoning behind
the re-evaluation of PIRA's strategy and explore the impact this had on
republican ideology.	 This will be followed by a close inspection of the
revised role of the military instrument within the re-evaluation. The
analysis will then appraise the successes of the new strategic approach in
practice by looking at the electoral rise of PSP in the early 1980s.
Although the movement entered the late 1970s in a state of dejection, they
exited the decade with renewed vigour and with their political fortunes on
the upswing as they progressed through the early years of the eighties.
Therefore, the specific thrust of this chapter will be to analyse how the
organisational changes and intellectual shifts enabled the movement to
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construct a more adequate basis upon which to define its strategy. Despite
the optimism engendered by these changes, this did not mean that the rapub-
lican movement ceased to face serious problems over the process of strategic
formulation. Indeed, these were to become increasingly apparent towards
the late 1980s. The next chapter examines these problems as they emerged
in greater detail. Therefore, these two remaining chapters can be taken to
represent an overall critical assessment of PIRA's currant strategic posture.
eorganisation and Politicisation
The first significant changes in the structure of the movement came in late
1976 when a separate Northern Command, was created to co-ordinate operat-
lone across Northern Ireland. The Northern Command was largely autonomous
of the Army Council, which was a sign of the increasing influence of the
young Northern leaders who had been pressing for a greater say In the run-
ning of the movement. 	 The arrest of leading PIRA commanders allowed the
Northerners to move into vacant positions. Xartin J(cGulnnese, the first
commanding officer of the Northern Command, became Chief of Staff following
Seamus Twomey's arrest in December 1977 and was himself probably succeeded
by Gerry Adams in 1979.2
The most urgent task facing PIRA's leaders during the mid-1970s was to
stem the number of arrests caused by the security forces's infiltration of
PIRA's ranks and by intensive interrogation methods. In 1977 PIRA's GHQ
staff commissioned a report to examine both the structure and long-term
military plans of the movement.	 The Staff Report, as it was known,
possibly written by Adams, was found in the possession of Seamus Twomey
when he was arrested.	 The document recommended a 'reorganisation and
remotivation' of the IRA, emphasising that it should 'return to secrecy and
2. See Bishop and lallie, The Provisional IRA p. 250.
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strict discipline.' 3
 To that end, tougher anti-interrogation training was
recommended along with the dissolution of the old system of battalions and
companies to be replaced by a network of cells, or Active Service Units
(ASUs), which would operate independently from each other and receive infor-
mation through an anonymous hierarchy. 	 This would limit the scope for
infiltration and restrict the damage that could be done by informers or
interrogations. The cell system idea was not new. A variant had been
operative with same of PIRA's Belfast units since mid-1973,4
 but as a matter
of necessity the system had to be extended across the entire organisation.
The system was successful in stopping the haemorrhage of arrests. In 1978
there were 465 fewer charges for paramilitary offencee than the previous
year.	 As part of the restructuring process, the organisation was slimmed
down to a core of 300 or so activists. PIRA's increasing efficiency was
noted by a secret British Army assessment in 1978 compiled by Brigadier
James Glover, and subsequently leaked to the Provisionals, which claimed that
the ASU's were:
...for the most part, manned by terrorists tempered by up to ten years of
operational experience... They are continually learning from mistakes and
developing their expertise. Ye can therefore expect to see increased
professionalism and greater exploitation of modern technology for terror-
ist purpasee.
By itself the reorganisation of PIRA ensured merely that the military
arm could continue to function with less manpower and less dependence on
public support. As such, it was an admission of weakness. The main
preoccupation of the Northern leaders was how to develop their campaign so
that the movement could became a real political force, not just a small,
violent entity. This was the key to the movement's future if it was to
3. Staff Report, (PIRA, c. 1977) reprinted in L. Clarke, Broadening the
Battlefield (Dublin, 1987), pp. 251-253.
4. See 'The IRA Shifts to Jew Type of Terrorism', The Christian Science
Aonitor, 6 Aug. 1973.
5. Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends (Jinistry of Defence, 2 Nov.
1978), reprinted in Cronin, Irish Nationalism, p. 342.
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remain a strategically rational organisation. 	 Much of the impetus to
address this issue came from the republican prisoners.
	 Away from the
heady mixture of action and conspiracy they were able to reflect on the
problems now afflicting the movement.	 In Danny Morrison's words: 'Ye had
to work out why the struggle was not all over and done with as quickly as
we thought it would be. The jail experience, the lengthy debates which I
suppose could be defined as politicisation, and the experience on the streets
all went into the melting pot.'
The basis of the radicals' critique was that the Provisionals lacked
the necessary political consciousness to exploit the momentum created by the
military campaign. Vith no clear idea of how the progression of republican
politics related to the armed struggle, few political advances could be made.
As a consequence, the Provisionals ceded ground to their political rivals
like those in the SDLP? So under these circumstances, sole reliance on the
armed struggle was not only ineffective but highly damaging. Inside the
prisons, PIRA men had been able to study other conflicts like Vietnam, as
well as the writings of guerrilla war theorists like Mao, Giap and Guevara.
Although it would probably be true to say that their conclusions were reach-
ed independently of such theorists, there is no doubting the coincidence
between the republicans' analysis of their experiences over the previous
couple of years and the views expressed by those like Abraham Guillen, who
criticised exclusive reliance on the use of force in the context of a revol-
utionary war. Guil].en argued that in such circumstances the military com-
ponent can become an all-consuming force, while other facets of a revol-
utionary struggle like political agitation are ignored. This situation
results in what the later writings of the revolutionary theorist, Regis
6. D. Morrison, in N. Collins, (ed.), Ireland After Britain (London, 1985),
p. 84.
7. See Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p .150.
8. See Coogan, The IRA, p. 603.
9. Guillen, The Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, pp. 264-265.
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Debray, refers to as 'operational discontinuity', whereby military actions
appear unrelated to the objectives being sought by the revolutionaries.'0
Debray's notion of operational discontinuity approximates to the self-sus-
taining military dynamic which we have observed in the preceding chapters
as one of the most notable features of republican strategic history.
Fundamentally, the Northerners felt that the primacy accorded to the
armed struggle was a distraction from the task of mobilising political sup-
port behind republican goals. Their views corresponded with those of Lenin
who argued that reliance on symbolic acts of revolutionary violence retarded
the establishment of a powerful, popularly based movement. Such acts rele-
gate people to the sidelines of the revolutionary process by encouraging the
belief that military action can circumvent the need for the organisation of
the masses. Lenin believed that 'single combat', as he called it, 'has the
immediate effect of simply creating a short lived sensation, while indirectly
it even leads to apathy and passive waiting for the next bout." An app-
reciation of this sort of analysis was reflected in Provisionals' assessment
of the weaknesses in their own strategy. In his asseesmemt of the 1975
ceasef ire, Gerry Adams declared: 'When the struggle was limited to the armed
struggle the prolongation of the truce meant that there was no struggle at
all.	 There was nothing but confusion, frustration and demoralisation
resulting from what I call spectator politics."
The price for PIRA's increasing political irrelevance was a contracting
political and operational base. The excessive dependence on the military
instrument meant that the attraction for many recruits had been the cosmetic
appeal of action and adventure. As one Provisional leader admitted: 'People
were joining for all the wrong reasons, hundreds simply because they wanted
10. R. Debray, A Critique of Arms, Vol. I (London, 1977), pp. 151-154.
11. V. Lenin, 'Revolutionary Adventurism' in V. Laqusur (ed.), The Terrorism
Reader (Philadelphia, 1978), p. 213.




a gun to defend their immediate area.hla	 When they ended up 'behind the
wire' their self-doubt and lack of commitment to the republican cause was
exposed.	 This was exhibited in the low levels of reinvolvement. 	 PSF
estimated that only 10 to 12% of those released from internment became
reinvolved in violence.' 4
	According to Joe Austin the number of internees
who returned to any form of involvement in republican politics was barely
1%, 4 out of 400.' 	 What these figures meant was that PIRA was running
into the sand both politically and militarily. In any guerrilla conflict,
the declining effectiveness of the military campaign and consequent receding
prospects of success, is unlikely to inspire others to support, let alone
join, the insurgency.' The result for the Provisionals was that they ended
up, in the words of Regis Debray: 'Fighting to survive rather than eurviving
to fightf"
The Northerners concluded that the military campaign could not bear the
sole burden of the Irish republican struggle. This may seem a straight
forward deduction, but given the weight of traditional republican thinking
about the primacy of the military instrument, it was a significant landmark.
For example, in 197?, even though the problems facing the Provisionals over
Uleterisation and criminalisation were accepted by republican commentators,
some still asserted the old solutions. 'Sheer revolutionary determination
is what is needed to defeat the latest British phase,' said Peter Arnlis.
'The military struggle must be intensified: The Brits must withdraw under
pressure."	 The conclusions reached by the Northerners put an end to such
barren advocacies. The Staff Report was explicit about the necessary
13. Interview with Xember of PIRA leadership, Nagill, Aug. 1978.
14.Text of the PSP Xemorandum to the Gardner Committee, reprinted in
FortnIght, 10 .Jan. 1975.
15. 3. Austin, interview with author, 0 Sept. 1989.
16. 1. Klonis, Guerrilla Vorfare: Analysis and Projections (New York, 1972),
p. 195.
17. Debray, p. 134.
18. Arnlis, 'The Brit Withdrawal'.
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alternative: 'Sinn Fein should come under Army organisers at all levels...
Sinn Fein should be radicalised (under Army direction) and should agitate
about social and economic issues which attack the welfare of the people."
In many ways this was a corollary of the adoption of the cell system, which
reduced contact with the nationalist community, so an attempt to cultivate a
broad republican constituency was deemed essential if PIRA was to remain a
potent force. This formed the core belief of the new thinking and was
developed in a series of articles in Republican News by Gerry Adams under
the pseudonym of 'Brownie', many of which he wrote while Inside the Maze
prison during the mid-lQ7Os. Ha argued that there was a need for repub-
licans not only to spell out their vision but to actively involve themselves
in local issues which affected day-to-day life in the community. Only by
these means could PIRA's campaign have any relevance for the people on whose
behalf it was meant to be waged. Adams criticised conventional republican
thinking on the issue: 'Who are we fighting for?	 There is a lot of talk
about "The People" as if they are a thing. 	 A8 if the people we fight for
are, as yet, unborn, as if they will fit into the new order of things in our
new Ireland.szo In later articles he continued to expand on this theme:
'Without the people we are nothing; we must be prepared to listen to their
ideas, their visions and to structure our struggle so that it satisfies their
needs and overcomes their oppressions.'2'
The ideas elaborated by the Northern radicals were distilled in what
became PIRA's standard training manual known as the Green Bcs.'k. By leading
the recruit through the new wisdom of republican thought, the Green Book
aimed to produce highly politicised volunteers who would be fully committed
to the political as much as the military side of the struggle. More of its
19. Staff Report, in Clarke, p. 253.
20. 'Brownie' (G. Adams), 'Active Republicanism,' RN, 1 lay 1976.
21. 'Brownie', 'Revolutionary Rules,' An Fhoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN),
7 June 1982.
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content will be examined later in the chapter. 	 It is worth noting at this
point, though that many of the ideas regarding political involvement pre-
dated the Staff Report and the Green Book by a number of years. During
1975 and 1976 letters began to surface in the republican press, some gen-
uine, others possibly orchestrated by the Northern faction, condemning PIRA's
disproportionate dependence on the armed struggle and the lack of involve-
ment in working class politics. One correspondent in Republican News,
T. Ennis, wrote: 'Left wingers are often accused of being automatically
stickies by the Provos who feel the ultimatum of "Britain must go" is
politics enough to sustain an anti-imperialist struggle in its fullest
sense.' Even farther back in 1974, an internal PSF document warned that
'the "closed circuit" mind which develops from moving in a narrow circle is
a danger to the effectiveness of republican propaganda' and urged greater
participation in community politics in order to expand the base of PIRA's
support. These pre-echoes of the sea-change in PIRA's thinking show that
sections within the organisation were conscious of the political hole in the
movement's campaign. One can speculate, therefore, that with or without the
disastrous 1975 ceasef ire, whenever the Northern radicals moved into posi-
tions of authority they would have embarked on the road of politicisation,
The first act of politicisation, as enunciated by the Staff Report, to
allow PSF to emerge as a distinct identity, represented the first real
attempt to restore a sense of balance within the Provisionals. PSP's new
role was to inject political meaning into PIRA's campaign in order to depict
the violence as a direct outgrowth of public discontent, rather than being
independent, or merely a cursory reflection of it: 'IRA Volunteers, because
they live with the people and among the people, are directly responsible to
the people for their actions.	 Their level of support and shelter is
22. See RI, 28 Feb. 1976.
23. PSF, A Broader Base: The Need for Local Involvement (Dublin, 1974), p. 2.
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dependent upon public approval for their actions.'4
By building up a strong political machine, the Provisionals believed
they could capitalise on the impact generated by PIRA's violence in order to
establish a separate political dynamic which could embrace all republican
sympathisers. According to Adams, support for PIRA tended to fluctuate,
rising in periods of tension over issues like internment, or else people were
part-time republicans who supported PIRA's campaign but voted for the
SDLP. By welding a political movement onto the military campaign, the
Provisionale aimed to capture and hold those who otherwise might have
hovered on the fringes of the movement without actually joining it. This
would enable the Provisionals to both survive and grow. The British had
shown that they could isolate and nearly destroy a military conspiracy. If
PIRA was part of a wider, popularly based movement then, Adams said, 'the
Brit must remove everyone connected, from school-children to customers in
the co-ops, from paper sellers to street committees, before he can defeat
us •
The Impact of Politicisation on Republican Strategic Th1ik1ng
Becoming a more politically relevant organisation presented the Provisionals
with many difficulties. In particular, the radicals had to resolve the
tension between what revolutionary theory sometimes describes as 'theory and
praxis'. How does one develop a practical political programme without
compromising deeply held ideological principles? Too much concentration on
the everyday problems of the masses can lead to the neglect of revolutionary
goals.	 Too much ideological theory can turn a movement into a remote,
ineffective clique. Too much emphasis on a programme of revolutionary
24. PSF, Notes for Revolutionaries, (Belfast, 1982), p. 45.
25. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 58 and p. 150.
20. 'Brownie', 'The Republic a Reality', RN 29 Nov. 1975.
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action can lead to a preoccupation with military technique. 7 The Northern
radicals were aware of these difficulties and anxious to stress that the
theory and practice of politicisation should be a unified process, each help-
ing to inform and temper the other, because: 'Political theory is something
that should expand as practical experience is gained.' An essential pre-
requisite to the building of a new, viable republican strategy, free from the
structural weaknesses of the past, entailed a revolution in the way the Pray-
isionals evaluated the various components of their struggle. This meant
developing a more flexible attitude towards the process of strategic formul-
ation and, as such, an end to elitism and ideological exclusivity.
The first sign of a transformation in PIRA's thinking came in June 1977
when the veteran republican, Jimmy Drumm, delivered the Wolfe Tone commemor-
ation speech at Badenstown. Druma argued that the British were not about
to withdraw. They were 'committed to stabilising the Six Counties' by large
financial support. It was admitted that the decline in the province's
industrial base was due mainly to economic recession but had been wrongly
attributed to PIRA's campaign and, therefore, could not be treated as a symp-
tom of withdrawal. 	 Part of Drumm's conclusion was that 'a successful war
of liberation' could not revolve: 'around the physical presence of the British
Army. Hatred and resentment of the army cannot sustain the war.' The
speech, no doubt written for Drumm's benefit by the Northern radicals, cata-
logued a series of flawed assumptions and strategic failure. It was all the
more remarkable given PIRA's previous sense of self-belief, It contained an
implicit recognition that military acts were not intrinsically politicising
and to rely on them as such could produce the sorts of negative, isolating
effects of the kind which Debray and Guillen had warned. Effects which the
27. See N. Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla, (Chicago, 1969), p. 59.
28. 'Vindicator', 'Theory and Practice', RI, 26 Feb. 1977.
29. J. Drumm, Bodenstown speech, A?, 15 June 1977.
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Provisionals had already discovered could endanger a movement's survival.
Most significantly, the speech represented a rejection of the view, held by
many republicans, about the nature of the campaign, that it could be sus-
tained simply through ideological assertion. No longer could the people be
harangued in the manner of Maire Drumm in 1973 who branded all those who
did not support the Provisionals as 'moral cowards' who 'should be haunted
by the ghosts of the Irish dead.'2° Nor could there be any more bland
pronouncements by PIRA spokesmen who claimed that the movement enjoyed 'the
full support of the people'.21
 The aim now, as proclaimed in Drumm's
speech, was to create 'an irrepressible mass movement' through active
participation in 'the everyday struggles of the people.'
If the efficacy of PIRA's strategy could no longer be justified with
automatic reference to the old republican dogmas, borne of the nationalist-
vanguard mentality, then the movement required an entirely new framework to
define and construct a campaign of action. For the more pragmatic North-
erners, this meant taking a more functional attitude towards strategic form-
ulation which rejected any notion that the means of PIRA's campaign should
be elevated to a point of principle, as had been the case in the past. In
the main, the constituent elements of any strategy were to be viewed as
tactics and assessed by their capacity to advance PIRA's cause, and not
simply because they conformed to some traditional republican odus aperandi.
All of the components of the strategy were to be subject to constant scru-
tiny. This explicitly analytical approach was reflected in the republican
press from the mid-1970s when Danny Morrison and Tom Hartley became joint
editors of Republican Jews. In 1979, An Phoblacht, which circulated mainly
in the South, was merged with the Northern based Republican Jews to produce
a uniform Provisional perspective on events, and in 1981 was complemented
30. Quoted in The Christian Science Janitor, 6 Aug. 1973.
31. RN, 30 April 1975.
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by the periodical Iris, established with the same purpose in mind. The
general tenor of the articles which appeared in these publications was more
intellectual and less prone to repetitious sloganising. Emphasis was placed
on continuous evaluation and tactical flexibility which mitigated the Prov-
isionals' previous sense of infallibility.
	 Xore stress was now laid on
eiipathising with the people and adapting the strategy to take account of the
specific context in which it was to be practised.
	 In one of his 'Brownie'
articles, Adams summed up this position:
...we should not suppose that we have the monopoly on truth. We should
avoid Jargon, we should remember that despite everything suffered by
them [the nationalist community in general], new ideas must be carefully
digested by many of our people and, finally, we must never forget that
our ideology must be so shaped that it meets the needs of the Irish
people and is not some pie-in-the-sky theory which bears no resemblance
to Irish conditions or needs.
Part of the Northerners' approach to gain greater public support was to
be nore specific about the nature of their political goals. They began to
articulate an overtly socialist viewpoint, declaring their aim to create a
democratic socialist state which would ensure that the irish people gained
'complete political, cultural, economic and national control of their own
country and all its resources.' The Provisicinals were careful to deny the
Narxist label, instead, Adams argued that such views embodied a more literal
interpretation of the 1916 Proclamation 'which in itself was a radical docu-
iient', because, Adams said, 'It talks about the wealth of Ireland belonging to
the people of Ireland.' 	 This view still represented only the vaguest of
aspirations, but the way to clarify the republican vision, it was felt, was
by active involvement in community based politics. Additionally, to stand
any real chance of fulfilling the movement's objectives, the radicals believed
that the politicisation process had to be extended beyond Northern Ireland.
This was implied in Drumm's speech when he said that the conflict could not
32. 'Revolutionary Rules'.
33. Army Council Statement, RI, 28 Jan. 1978.
34. Hibernia interview with G. Adams, reprinted in APIRN, 3 Nov. 1979.
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be 'fought exclusively on the backs of the oppressed in the Six Counties.'
Two years later at Bodenstown, Gerry Adams was more explicit:
Today's circumstances and our objectives dictate the need for the building
of an agitational struggle in the twenty-six counties... It needs to be
done now because our most glaring weakness to date lies in our failure to
develop revolutionary politics and to build a strong political alternative
to so-called constitutional politics .
Therefore, the Provisionals felt that if they were ever to be serious conten-
ders for power, then the process of politicisation would have to be an all-
Ireland affair.
	 The Provisionals now aspired, again in the words of Adams,
to be more than 'merely a Brits-Out Novement.'3
One of the main features of the Northern radicals' perspective, as out-
lined in Chapter 3, was their scepticism towards any thought of political
accommodation with the unionists because they would always 'be loyal to
Britain as the guardian of their privileges.' 7
 To an extent, one could say
that the Northerners were more realistic, more honest, about recognising the
intractability of loyalist hostility by accepting that there would, according
to the republican commentator Peter Dow].ing:
...necesearily (be) increasing Protestant and Catholic disunity before the
freedom struggle can be successful. There is no ducking the unfortunate
fact of political life in Ireland today that the loyalists will become
increasingly enraged as they see their Orange etatelet of Protestant
privilege being destroyed by Republican successes.
Alternatively, these views could also be said to represent a more prejudiced
and emotional reflection of the Northern nationalist experience which was
resentful at the injustices they felt they had suffered at Protestant hands
over the previous 50 years. Either way, the overt enmity towards the
loyalists appeared to manifest itself in practice with allegations that the
Provisionals were now deliberately out to spread sectarian discord to
maximise support in nationalist areas.	 For example, during the tense
35. G. Adams, Bodenstown Speech, AFIRE, 26 June 1979.
30. Ibid..
37. P. Dowling, 'This We Will Xalntain', RI, 20 Nov. 1977.
38. P. Dowling, 'The British Presence, Partition and Protestant Privilege,
AP/RI, 22 Oct. 1981.
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atmosphere of the Maze hunger strikes of 1981, the Provisionals were accused
of exploiting, if not manufacturing, rumours of loyalist plans to overrun
Catholic neighbourhoods.' There is little doubt that the Provisionals did
seek to satiate some of the sectarian emotion generated by the hunger
strikes by killing the Unionist Member of Parliament, Robert Bradford, in
November 1981 because the Provisionals said he was a 'propagator of anti-
Catholic sectarian hatred,'4° and 'a prominent motivator of attacks on Cath-
olics.'4'	 The Provisionals produced little hard evidence to substantiate
these claims.
The more strident view of loyalism, the greater emphasis on a socialist
programme and the demand for increased political participation, all brought
the Northerners into dispute with the Southern leadership. Differences
between the two factions were openly displayed in early 1979 when An Phob-
lacht/Republlcan News declared: 'Ye are out to set up a unitary, socialist
Republic'. This brought a terse rebuke from the leaders in Dublin who
stated that the movement's objectives were 'clearly defined as the setting up
of a Democratic Socialist Republic on Federal lines', and added that 'person-
al views to the contrary are not Republican policy.' The point at issue
was the concept of federalism as contained in the Hire Nua programme, PSF's
official policy document. The idea of an Ulster parliament was anathema to
many Northerners. Having experienced unionist rule, they did not want it
perpetuated under a different guise. The scheme was viewed as a relic of
the early years of PIRA's campaign, a political quick-fix to attract the
Protestants into a united Ireland, but now an anachronism. The Northerners
believed any compromise with loyalism would merely impede progress towards
39. See D. XcKittrick, 'Atkins Accuses IRA of Fomenting Sectarian Conflict',
The Irish Times, 1 Kay 1981. See also Clarke, pp. 150-151.
40. 'Var News', AP/RI, 19 Nov. 1981.
41. 'IRA: Vhy We Shot Bradford', AP/RI, 19 Nov. 1981.
42. 'Struggle on All Fronts', AP/RI, 10 Feb. 1979.
43. PSF Press Release (Dublin), 12 Feb. 1979.
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a socialist state.
	 In any event, it was reasoned, the Protestants would no
more accept a nine-county parliament in a federal state than a unified
socialist republic, so why bother offering concessions at all? As Adams
sought to stress: 'We must recognise that loyalists are a national political
minority whose basis is economic and whose philosophy is nec-fascist, anti-
nationalist and anti-democratic. We cannot, and we should not, ever
tolerate or compromise with (by government structures or any other means)
loyalism.
It was a mark of the declining influence of the Dublin leadership that
the provisions of Hire Kim had in fact been under siege from the late seven-
ties onwards and modified increasingly to reflect the leftist interpretation
of the lorthern radicals. 4.
	The commitment to federalism was voted down
at the 1981 Ard-Pheis and officially abandoned the following year. The
quarrels over federalism, however, were a cover for an infinitely more divi-
sive issue which stemmed from the idea of a 32-county struggle. In North-
ern Ireland PSF already had a significantly disaffected section of the popu-
lation from which it could try to carve out a political constituency. This
was not so evident in the South which enjoyed a stable, functioning demo-
cracy. There was no question of military operations against the Republic.
The IRA's Standing Order No. 8, which had been in force for over 30 years,
prohibited such actions in acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the Southern
state in the eyes of most of its inhabitants. If PSF was to become a poli-
tical organisation of any relevance in the South, it needed to work within
the system. This raised the possibility of ending the policy of abstention
from the Irish Republic's national assembly. For the radicals, who tended
to view all means as tactics rather than principles, this posed no great
problem, but with all the symbolic connotations of the 1969/70 split, the
44. Quoted in AP/RI, 5 Nov. 1981.
45. See 'The Move to the Left', Nagill, Sept. 1980.
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subject remained taboo for some years. What changed the situation were the
hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981. Protests at the removal of political
status had been going on inside the prisons since 1976, but had received
only scant attention from PSF.	 It was not until a non-Provisional group-
ing, the Relatives Action Committee (RAC), was formed to co-ordinate outside
support did the protests gain PSF's backing.' The success the RAG had in
generating public support, in particular getting the hunger striker, Bobby
Sands, and later his agent, Owen Carron, elected to the seat of Fermanagh
and South Tyrone, demonstrated the degree of latent sympathy for the repub-
lican cause. This convinced the radicals that there was a sufficient basis
for electoral participation, not just for the purposes of intervention to
spotlight a particular issue, but as part of a long-term aim to build a
strong political party 'as a necessary part of the revolutionary procees.'
PSF's Ard-Pheis in 1981 took the first step towards unwinding republican
policy on abstention by voting to contest local elections in Northern
Ireland and to take whatever seats won.
The tensions that the twin issues of abstention and federalism produced
were considerable. The more traditional Southerners felt that too much
politicisation would dilute republican ideology and even aid Britain's
attempt to normalise the North. These fears were stimulated by the North-
erners' deviations from the official policy, as for instance when Republican
News announced that 'a revolutionary strategy does not rule out - as a sec-
ondary feature - the demand by people for state funding of jobs, housing, -
transport, education and health faci1ities'. An idea of the antagonism
which existed between the two factions was provided in November 1979 when
the PSF leadership in Dublin issued a harsh statement declaring that 'a
concerted campaign to distort the aims and objectives of Sinu Pain has been
46. See 'The Politics of the H-Block', Kagill, Dec. 1980.
47. IRA Spokesperson, 'We Are Hare to Stay', AP/RI, 1 April 1982.
48. RI, 10 June 1978.
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prosecuted by the enemies of the Republican Movement.'	 The animosity
continued to deepen. At the 1983 Ard-Pheis delegates voted for PSF to
contest the 1984 European elections and endorsed a proposal that would open
the way for discussion on ending abstention. Having been rebuffed on both
of these issues, O'Bradaigh and O'Gonaill resigned from the PSP Executive.
Both men had been fighting a rearguard for nearly 8 years and their resig-
nations marked the end of Southern domination of the movement.
On the surface, the more traditional elements seemed to have reason for
their concern. All the talk of community politics and electoralism appeared
to signify a slide into the sort of reformism of the despised Officials.
Official Sinn Fein proclaimed that 'there was more to the struggle than get-
ting rid of British troops,' and that 'the struggle should not just be con-
fined to the North' or become 'an elitist military struggle.'° To the
traditionalists, the ideas emanating from the PSF radicals sounded ominously
similar to such slogans. The Northerners were at pains to stress that they
were not embarking along the road of compromise and apostasy.
	
In their
view, the British would never leave of their own accord and the loyalists
would always resist moves towards Irish unity. 'For this reason', Danny
Morrison asserted, 'republicans cannot subscribe to constitutional politics
as the sole panacea for Ireland's major ailments or as a substitute for the
political effectiveness of force.''
The Role of the Military Instrument in the Politiclsatlnn Process -
The Long War and the Total Strategy
An appreciation of the Northern radicals' perspective, as outlined above, is
vital for any understanding of how they saw the role of the military
49.PSP, Statement of Aims (Dublin), 25 Oct 1979.
50. T. MacGiolla, The Struggle for Democracy, Feace and Freedom (Official
Sian Fein) (Dublin, 1975), p. 2.
51. D. Morrison, 'The Provos Will Not Lay Down Their Arms', Fortnight, Dec.
1982.
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instrument within the political process.
	 The way they interpreted the
conflict changed the premises upon which calculations of the utility of force
were to be made. Theoretically, the military instrument was put in the
same basket with all the other potential means at PIRA's disposal and eval-
uated on the basis of its functionality. As Adams declared: 'there is now a
realisation in republican circles that armed struggle on its own is inade-
quate and that non-armed forms of political struggle are at least as import-
ant.'	 There is little reason to think that the radicals ever doubted the
value of armed force. Coming from the Jorth they bad been the ones most
exposed to the militarising effects of the conflict and as a matter of tamp-
erament were likely to be committed to violence. In addition, the nature of
their analysis inclined them to believe that Britain's presence could only be
dislodged through arms.	 In 1976 Adams stated in the clearest terms that
Britain had to be fought: 'The enemy allows us no choice. It Is an armed
struggle, because the enemy Is armed. Because he protects and establishes
his vested interests by force of arms... we must insist that freedom cannot
be obtained and when obtained, maintained except by armed men.' This was
the one line of republican thought which continued to be expounded in the
same belligerent fashion that had characterised much of the rhetoric of the
early 1970s. For example in Nay 1980 the front page of An Phoblacht/Rep-
ublicon News, proclaimed: 'There is only one message Thatcher and her Brits
understand and that is the automatic type which comes out of the barrel of a
gun.'' The intrinsic value of the armed struggle was never questioned.
Yhat was new in the Jortherners' thinking concerned how this military com-
ponent fitted into the overall context of the movement's strategy.
The factor which was to most affect the implementation of the military
instrument was the notion of the 'long war'. On the surface it appeared a
52. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 64.
53. 'Brownie', 'Active Republicanism'.
54. 'Only One Neesage', AP/RI, 24 lay 1980.
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simple and straightforward approach but was, in fact, a complex idea which
embraced many facets and implicit assumptions. It was the central concept
around which PIRA's strategy was formulated. The first, basic, assumption
it embraced was the belief that due to the rigidity of British imperialism,
PIRA's campaign would inevitably be protracted: 'the , war to liberate and
unify this country will be a bitter and long drawn out struggle. There is
no quick solution to our British problem.'	 Therefore the Provisionals
added: 'We are committed to and more importantly geared to a long term
war.' U	 The first recommendation to prepare for a 'long term armed
struggle' was contained in the Staff Report of 1977.0 The overhaul of
PIRA along cellular lines into a tighter and more efficient force was the
initial step in the development of an organisation more suited to the
rigour-s of a prolonged campaign. Even so, the long war idea was not a
specific blueprint which delineated intermediate objectives to be achieved
within an extended time span:
The stress on the long term nature of the struggle was necessary to
counter any complacency which was creeping in. So while the army is
geared to a long struggle it is not necessarily pacing itself in the
long term, It is seeking the complete demolition of British rule by
the shortest possible routa.7
So the long war idea acted as an internal stabilising device in order
to prevent demoralisation by recognising that it was impossible to predict
the data of a British withdrawal. But the long war approach was much more
than this. It was a looser, though more flexible and comprehensive arr-
angeement, which enabled information to be admitted into PIRA's strategic
paradigm, the concept of which was outlined in the previous chapter, and
allow it to influence, and be accommodated within, the movement's thinking.
For example, the notion of the long war enabled the Provisionals to accept
that armed force was not a decisive weapon and would have to be relocated
55. 'IRA Geared to a Long War', RI, 9 Dec. 1978.
56. Staff Report, in Clarke, p. 252.
57, 'IRA Interview', Iris, April 1981.
- 304 -
within a broader plan. 	 It was argued that to fight on a single military
front against the superior resources of the British would be 'contributing to
the isolation and eventual defeat of the republican struggle.' By
accepting that the nature of the campaign would be both lengthy and not
exclusively reliant on the military instrument, the Provisionals had made
available to themselves other avenues of resistance which could be mani-
pulated to advance their cause, as the following statement implies:
...it needs to be said loudly and unequivocally that freedom unity and
the creation of conditions by which we can proceed to the democratic
socialist republic will not be achieved by armed struggle alone, and
that armed struggle of a revolutionary nature cannot even be sustained
without popular, logistical back-up and support.
The first important attribute of the long war idea in this respect was that
it enabled the Provisionals to sustain a consistent level of military activ-
ity while providing time to develop these alternative forms of resistance,
subsequent to their incorporation into the movement's strategic programme.°
Up until the reorganisation and politicisation of the movement, PIRA's
strategy had been very much a mono-military approach. It was assumed
miliitary actions could themselves be politicising, stimulate support and
generate propaganda, as well as have a direct pressurising effect on the
British government. 	 All these elements were considered to be linked and
flow from the source of military activity rather than as independent
variables which deserved individual attention. The emergence of the long
war approach marked a shift away from this position towards what one may
describe as a 'total strategy' where every facet of resistance was dealt with
as a separate battleground to be exploited within the same war, thereby
maximising the coercive pressure on the British government. The intention,
as the 1980 Easter Statement from PIRA's leadership declared, was to 'tie
58. 'Build and Consolidate', AF/RI, 3 June 1982.
59. Ibid..
80. See 3. Barton, 'Long Kesh and the Long War', The Leveller, No. 26, May
1979.
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together all aspects of nationalism and socialism and all the strands of
rural and urban discontent into a surging wave of Republicanism.' By
treating different facets of the struggle as distinct units, the Provisionals
could hope to mobilise the greatest amount of resources and involve the most
number of people:
Our resistance must be military, political, cultural, social and economic,
at the same time. In that way we can involve all the people in our war
against the British and collaborationist forces. Within that spectrum
of resistance there is a place for everybody, and everybody can find his
or her place. Everyone is equal in the struggle no matter what job they
are doing: selling papers, collecting, picketing, leafletting, carrying out
an operation...
The long war was the natural theoretical framework in which all the
components of PIRA's strategy could be maintained. 'ore specifically, it
provided a mechanism to hold together the military and political elements to
ensure that the two worked in tandem with each other. The military arm
would work to keep the political situation in Northern Ireland in a state of
flux, 'to frustrate the British aim of making the six counties governable
through power-sharing type Inst itut ions.' Xeanwh lie, other non-violent
forms of involvement would be used to exploit the political vacuum created
by the military campaign. For example, participation in elections would be
designed to 'show clearly that people support radical republicanism and re-
sistance to the British presence more than they support the collaborationist
tendency.'	 The Provislonals believed that the long war scenario would
give them the opportunity to build up a non-constitutional alternative to
those parties like the SDLP.	 Over time they could begin to undermine the
SDLP's claim to be the 'sole voice of the nationalist people'. So by
chipping away at the SDLP'e electoral base, they hoped to 'deny them (the
SDLPI positions which they have used consistently to collaborate with and
61. AP/RI, 12 April 1980.
62. Interview with PIRA spokesperson, Iris, July/Aug. 1982.
63. Interview with PIRA spokespersons, Nagill, July 1983.
64. 'The IRA Attitude to Elections', Iris, Nov. 1981.
65. 'Peace and War', AF/RI, 7 Oct. 1982.
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give credit to the British administration.' The interlocking political
and military sides of PIRA's campaign into a mutually supporting symbiosis
was summed up neatly by Danny Korrison at the 1981 Ard-Pheis: 'Who here
really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone
here object, If with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite In this
hand, we take power In Ireland?'7
Although PIRA's campaign was now conducted on a wide range of fronts,
the Provlsionals stressed that for those who were concerned that electoral
involvement heralded a 'new tendency or departure, they can be assured that
the military struggle will go on with all the energy at our dispoeal'.'
Indeed, if one traces the specific role of the military instrument, it is
clear that it remained at the heart of PIRA's strategic plans.
PIRA's campaign objective was still to wage a war of psychological
attrition intended to 'disenchant the British people with their government's
involvement in Ireland'. The Green Book outlined the main military Items
of the campaign which were a 'war of attrition against enemy personnel' and
'a bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy's interest in our country un-
profitable.'	 The immediate purpose was to make the 'Six Counties... ungov-
ernable, except by colonial military rule.' 7°	 So PIRA's basic strategic
concept of trying to demoralise British public opinion into accepting with-
drawal, remained intact. The concept was merely redefined within the
framework of the long war in a way which recognised that grinding down the
resolve of the British government and public did not always have to centre
around the effects of military action.
The pattern of PIRA's military activity from 1977 to 1983 reflected
this change in emphasis. In this period, PIRA was known to be responsible
66. Quoted in The Irish News, 3 Nov. 1981.
87. Quoted in 'By Ballot and Bullet', AP/RI, 5 Nov. 1981.
68. 'The IRA Attitude to Elections'.
69. 'IRA Interview', Iris, April 1981.
70. Quoted in Coogan, p. 693.
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for 298 deaths compared to 598 between 1971 and 1976. The total number of
shooting incidents for these same periods declined from 24,319 between 1971
and 1976 to 4793 between 1977 and 1983, and bombings from 5232 to 2406.
There was a trend away from the massive bombing campaigns that had charac-
tensed the early 1970s towards greater concentration against the security
forces. The total number of security force personnel killed from 1977 to
1983 remained high at 279 while the total number of civilian deaths fell to
328, compared to 1235 over the preceding period. During this time, PIRA
injected a wide diversity into its targeting policy ranging from, for exam-
ple, businessman, prison warders, to off-duty members of the security forces.
Targets for PIRA's bombs included commercial premises, RUG stations, govern-
ment offices and the occasional blasting of town centres.
The aim of this sort of campaign, according to Joe Austin, was to keep
Northern Ireland on the political agenda, highlighting it as an unstable
factor in UK politics.7' Explaining the rationale for the bombings in the
province, a Provisional spokesman argued that it 'irritates our enemies' by
forcing the British to pay compensation, driving away foreign investment,
and garnering propaganda value by demonstrating PIRA's 'determination and
co-ordination'.72
 These explanations reveal a significant divergence from
the previous emphasis within PIRA's thinking. Jo longer was the military
campaign directed at making Northern Ireland an unbearable financial and
psychological burden. The accent was now placed on keeping military oper-
ations ticking over to sustain the 'irritation' factor. Although the costs
may not be prohibitive, the hope was that they would be considered an annoy-
ing, inconvenient and, ultimately, unnecessary affliction.
While the belief that it was public opinion in Great Britain which
could act as the main lever over the British government remained the main
71. .1. Austin, interview with author, 6 Sept. 1989.
72. 'IRA Interview', IRIS, 11 Aug. 1979.
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constant in PIRA's strategy, the Provisionals sought to add greater def in-
ition to this point. They argued that because the 'Brite are an imperialist
army... there is little effective link between their demoralisation and the
British public's attitude to the war.' For this reason, the 'necessity to
bring the war in Ireland home to the British people' through periodic main-
land bombing campaigns remained a critical component of the strategy.7a
Also, PIRA sought to extend its attacks beyond the British Isles to the
continent, in particular, against British Army bases and personnel in
Germany. These operations were to be geared primarily towards creating
propaganda in order to keep 'international attention focused on Britain's
dirty war in Ireland.'7' Occasionally these operations were supplemented
by spectacular attacks against prestigious targets. Perhaps the best known
'spectacular' of recent times was the assassination of Lord Xountbatten along
with a number of friends and relatives when a bomb destroyed his boat off
the coast of Xullaghmore, Co. Sligo, on 27 August 1979.	 The shock caused
by this incident was heightened by the killing of 18 soldiers on the same
day in a double-bomb ambush at Varrenpoint, Co. Down. Spectaculars were
intended to be more than Just dramatic protests against the British presence
in Northern Ireland, as a PIRA spokesman explained In the wake of the
Aountbatten killings: 'When they've finished cursing, of course, and damning
us, they'll have to question the value of continuing with their occupation of
Ireland. Because that is why he died.'7
This type of statement signified a subtle, though important shift in
PIRA's use of armed force. Nilitary action was no longer regarded as a
method of total coercion aimed at terrorising the British out of Northern
Ireland but as an instrument of armed propaganda.	 In other words, once
73. PSF, Notes for Revolutionaries, pp. 45-48.
74. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
75.Quoted in N. Kirby, 'IRA Say Xountbatten Killing Will Not Be the Last',
The Irish Times, 1 Sept. 1979.
76. See Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 64.
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the military act had drawn the attention of a potential audience, the Prov-
isionals could then attempt to focus it on all the other manifestations of
the nationalist rejection of British rule. The Provisionals could hope to
point to the popularity of community politics, participation in cultural
affairs, economic resistance and, most importantly, political endorsement of
the armed struggle through the ballot box. The implication of statements
like the one above concerning the Xountbatten killings, was that after the
furors surrounding an operation would come, what one could almost describe,
as an appeal to the 'good sense' of the public who would see that PIRA's
violence was not the work of a few unrepresentative criminal elements but
symptomatic of a wider, mare popularly based discontent. Through these
means, the Provisionals might establish their political credentials with
other groups such as those sections of the British Labour Party sympathetic
to PIRA's aims and who could have some influence over a future Labour admin-
istration.	 By the early 1980s It was clear that this was the direction In
which the Provisionals were moving.7'
The central assumption of PIRA's thinking was that, eventually, all the
individual elements of the total strategy would coalesce into a critical mass
that would produce a British decision to withdraw, as O'Conaill specified,
the aim was now to apply sufficient 'pressure onto the point where the Brit-
ish will see that to break the log jam the declaration of intent to withdraw
is the really important thing." Disaffection with the financial cost of
the propping up Northern Ireland, the inability to eradicate PIRA, the lack
of consensus for internal solutions, loyalist recalcitrance, continual embar-
rassments inflicted on Britain's reputation abroad and sympathetic politi-
clans in office would, together, constitute a favourable political constella-
tion for the Provisionals. The notion of unacceptable cost in this context
7?. See B. Moloney 'Vhere Are the Provos Going?', Fortnight, May 1983.
78. Quoted in O'Ialley, p. 284.
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does not arise solely from the expense and deprivations caused by a low
level campaign of isolated military engagements but amounted to the prospect
of simple relief from all the petty aggravations associated with the reten-
tion of Northern Ireland within the UK. The potential efficacy of this
multi-faceted strategy as it might reveal itself to the strategic theorist,
can be depicted diagrammatically as in Figure 1 (page 312). This can be
contrasted with the previous strategic formulation in Figure 2 (page 313).
Figure 1 displays the complexity of the total strategy, spanning a whole
series of measures designed to increase the pressure on the British, whereas
in Figure 2, the military instrument was virtually the only mode of oper-
ation. As Figure 1 indicates, although the armed struggle is treated as one
method along a continuum of insurgency resistance, it can still be seen as
the motor of the entire strategy as it functions both to publicisa the
conflict and as a coercive Instrument in its own right, albeit on a limited
scale, as well as remaining the most symbolic expression of republican
resistance.
One of the main features of the total strategy was that it enabled the
military instrument to be governed by calculations of its efficacy rather
than ideological tradition. Joe Austin insists that republican symbolism
does not affect PIRA's military decisions. For example, PIRA does not con-
sciously plan attacks to coincide with significant dates in the republican
calendar, such as at Easter time or on the anniversary of the introduction
of internment. The long war means PIRA plans its attacks with care and In
Its own time? To restrict operations to either symbolic targets, such as
the British Army, or symbolic dates, would not only seem an exercise In
self-indulgent ideological posturing, but would allow the security forces to
predict the nature and extent of PIRA's attacks. The security forces could
take counter-measures and PIRA could suffer increased losses as a result.
79. J. Austin, interview with author, 13 Sept. 1989.
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Figure 1. The Provisinnal IRA's Tatal Strategy, 1977 onwards
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More fundamentally, to allow military activity to be dictated by the tokens
of republican doctrine would inhibit the proper functioning of armed force
within the long war framework. Although attacks against the most obvious
manifestations of the British presence, like the Army, may have previously
satisfied certain desires for revenge, the Provisionals now recognise that
'there is no guarantee that such a singular strategy would mean the realis-
ation of all the factors instrumental in creating withdrawal.'° In other
words, merely focusing on a narrow range of targets would dissipate the
aovement's stamina and actually diminish the pressure on the British.
The Provisionals have emphasised that one of the consequences of the
reorganisation into a smaller cell based force geared for a long war, was
that there would be lulls in military activity for up to month8 at a time.
The Provisionals acknowledge that these have been caused mainly by prob-
lems of supply and intelligence.' The advantage of the total strategy is
that when lulls occur the momentum of the overall campaign can be carried
by other aspects of the strategy.	 This is a fundamental point which the
Provisionals have been keen to highlight.
...it should be stressed that while there is a natural ebb and flow caused
by logistical problems etc., it is a mistake to judge the intensity of the
struggle using solely the level of operations as a guideline. While
operational levels will fluctuate, political work in IRA base areas, educ-
ation, recruitment, expanding the support base, all continue on a daily
basis .
If the armed struggle could now oscillate freely between periods of
high and low activity without harming the impetus of the movement, then it
was conceivable that the military arm could be consciously synchronised to
suit the particular political circumstances. By the late 1970s there was
already some evidence that PIRA was tailoring its operations for this
purpose.	 The Glover report noted that the move away from large-scale
80. PSP, Notes for RevolutionarIes, pp. 48-49.
81. 'IRA Interview', IRIS, 11 Aug. 1979.
82. Interview with PIRA spokesperson, frIs, July/Aug. 1982.
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commercial bombings, which often entailed a high risk to civilians, was
probably undertaken because such attacks were politically damaging and
alienated Catholic opinion. The strongest indication that the military
and political components were being alternated in order to derive maximum
political advantage came in 1981 and 1982.	 During 1981, the laze hunger
strikes absorbed most of the republican movement's attention. Adams has
said that despite 'considerable popular demand for the IRA to take punitive
action', PIRA eased back on its activities so as not to divert attention away
from the growing political support the protests were receiving.' The Pro-
visionals acknowledged the frustration felt by their supporters 'who believe
that the IRA should pay the British government in kind for the deaths of
comrades', and in lay 1981, after the deaths of the last hunger strikers,
seemed to respond to this pressure in a burst of violence which left 22 dead
by the end of the month. In the October, with the laze protests drawing to
an end, further retribution was dispensed with a series of bombings in
London. In Northern Ireland between September and November, 30 people lost
their lives, among them Robert Bradford IP. The next 10 months saw
another downturn in the violence with only 50 deaths compared to almost 100
in the previous 10 months. Similarly, the number of shooting incidents in
1982 fell dramatically to 382 from 815 in 1981 and explosions were down
from 398 to 219. These figures can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce
the level of violence in order to conserve the political support already
gained in the run-up to the Assembly elections, due in October, in which PSF
was fielding candidates.
There is some debate as to whether the low levels of violence in 1981
and 1982 were attributable to a deliberate policy of restraint or to a more
involuntary lapse caused by an increase in the number of arrests and the
83. Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends, in Cronin, p. 347.
84. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 80.
85. 'IRA Attitude on H-Block', AP/RI, 5 Sept. 1981.
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fact that the Xaze protests had sapped most of the movement's energy.
There is also doubt as to whether the reduction in operations during the
hunger strikes has set a precedent for the co-ordination of political and
military action (see Chapter 7 for a detailed evaluation).	 However, as the
early years of the 1980s had demonstrated, by allowing the political face of
the Provisiona].s to become more prominent, forward momentum could be re-
tained despite a decrease in the level of military activity. Whatever the
exact reasons for the lulls, the total strategy did enable the Provisionals
to mobilise their resources more fully and to develop a more effective
interchange between military and political tactics. This indicated both a
more efficient use of armed force and a marked improvement in the quality of
P IRA's strategic analysis.
From Fermanagh and South Tyrone to Veetminster - The Success of the Total
Strategy
Just over a decade after the Provisionals' prospects appeared to have
receded from the high watermark reached in the early 1970s, the early 1980s
was now also to prove a time of great trepidation for the movement. This
time the effects would be felt on a political rather than a military front
and, as such, would pose a wider, more serious threat to PIRA's opponents.
The years from 1981 to 1983 indicated the potential of the total strat-
egy by marking the Provisionals' successful entry into electoral politics.
The stimulus was provided by the victories of Bobby Sands and Owen Carron
in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-elections of 1981. As mentioned
above, this convinced the Northern leaders, who had been working towards
electoral participation, that a sufficient reservoir of alienated Catholic
opinion existed to sustain a long-term political challenge. The elections
in October 1982 to a new assembly as part of Secretary of State James
86. See Bishop and Wallie, p. 294.
- 316 -
Prior's 'rolling devolution' initiative, provided the first chance to see how
PSP's vote would fare. The outcome was acclaimed as a substantial advance
for PSF which had 5 of its 12 candidates elected on 10.1% of the vote
(64,191 first preference votes).
	 PSF's impact was confirmed in the June
1983 general election when Gerry Adams was elected as abstentionist XP for
Vest Belfast.	 The party raised Its share of the vote in the province to
13.4% (102,701 votes).
The two results were a triumph for PSP, especially as they represented
a clear erosion of the SDLP's hold on the nationalist vote. PSP's result In
1983 constituted 42% of the nationalist vote and led O'Bradalgh to predict
that PSF would overtake the SDLP within two years. 7 The common percep-
tion of PSF in this period was of a young, energetic and election-hungry
party, a world away from the suspicious and lack lustre attitudes that had
characterised the movement's previous approach to most political matters.
Moreover, its message of uncompromising nationalism contrasted favourably in
the minds of many Catholics to the SDLP'S continuing failure to deliver any
power into nationalist hands. A MORI poll conducted in June 1984 revealed
that those who voted for PSP perceived the party to be well-led, community
based, and in touch with local feelings.
	 Significantly, 84% believed that
one of PSF's main electoral assets was its ability to make the British take
notice of nationalists. In this regard, the duality of force and politics
was highly pertinent for PSF supporters, 70%. of whom agreed that violence
could be justified to bring about political change.
The degree of support for PSF not only gave the Provisionals themsel-
ves a huge boost in confidence but succeeded in attracting renewed external
interest. Contacts with members of the British Labour Party had been
87. R. O'Bradaigh, 'Election a Turning Point', AP/RI, 16 June 1983.
88, See B. Noxon-Browne, 'Alienation: The Case of Catholics in Northern
Ireland', in N. Slann and B. Schecterman (eds), Nulti-Dimensiozial
Terrorism (Boulder, Colorado, 1987), p. 105.
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increasing since the 1981 hunger strikes.
	 In July 1983 Gerry Adams was
received in London as a guest of Ken Livingetone, leader of the Greater
London Council.	 Adams saw this as an opportunity to establish a dialogue
with the British people so that republican ideas could be 'put to an audience
ignorant of these views.'	 These developments caused palpitations in
government circles both in London and Dublin.
	 James Prior stated publicly
his fear that the 'revolutionary' image of PSF might help it displace the
SDLP.°	 This admission was a sign of how far the governments in Britain
and Ireland had been thrown back on the defensive.
	 For the first time in
the current phase of the troubles they were faced with a counter- insurgency
problem which extended beyond the bounds of mere security provision. A
situation where there was no nationalist majority for any form of constitu-
tional politics in Northern Ireland threatened to have a serious destabilis-
log influence, because the basis for an internal solution would be rendered
untenable. Adams declared that by undermining the SDLP, PSF could hope to
establish 'a sort of republican veto'. 1
 Concern at such a prospect led the
London and Dublin governments to embark on a search for a political frame-
work to contain the growth of PSF which was eventually to lead to the
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.
The reasons for PSP's success at the polls resided in a wide histori-
cal, political and socio-economic context which lies outside the scope of
this study. However, the progression of the Provislonals to this point was
a testament to the mix of violence and politics contained in the long
war/total strategy plan. The Provisionals have maintained this strategic
format more or less intact to this day. So, what can be said about the
improvements in the way the Provisionals now evaluate their strategy?
In abstract terms one can say that the reorganisation and politici-
89. G. Adams, In Collins, Ireland After Britain, p. 2.
90. 'Prior Fears Rise of Sinn Fein', The Financial Times, 14 Nov. 1983.
91. Interview with G. Adams, Nagill, July 1983.
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sation of the Provisiona].s has closed the gap between the notions of absol-
ute rationality and absolute irrationality - the two polar opposites of
strategic theory.	 PIRL's previous attitude to the use of violence tended
towards the latter end of the spectrum. For most of the 197 Os physical
force was regarded as functional, but it was also seen as an all embracing
symbol of republican struggle and, as a result, largely autonomous of all
other considerations. The attempt to connect the struggle with a semblance
of popular legitimacy has enabled PIRA to move away from the overt reliance
on doctrinal, symbolism to justify its existence. 	 low the republican atti-
tude is to increase support for the movement and to ensure that P IRA's posi-
tion is understood within the nationalist community. For example, the
Green Book states that 'we do not employ revolutionary violence without
being able to illustrate that we have no recourse to any other means.'2
The recognition that violence should be treated more as a direct ex-
pression of political purpose has helped to redress the previous deficiency
in contextual analysis. The most significant step forward in this sense
was the acceptance in the late 1970s that with the protraction of the
struggle a change in direction was necessary which would, as a matter of
course, affect the employment of the military instrument. This demanded an
overhaul not just of the organisation, but more importantly, of the repub-
lican mentality itself.	 It meant an end to ideological elitism, a willing-
ness to be more self-critical and to acknowledge that the struggle could no
longer be built solely upon an armed conspiracy. Therefore, widening the
struggle to include political participation presented a new set of challenges
for the Provisionals. The essence of this position was summed up by Adams
in one of his 'Brownie' articles:
Vhile it may be possible to struggle on without mass support, to be
successful we must strive towards mobilising the maximum amount of
people and enlisting their support, in a structured manner based on their
92. Quoted in Coogan, p. 888.
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needs and geared towards republican people's objectives. We cannot gain
the republic without the people. We cannot do it on our own.'3
These sorts of views represent a greater inclination to engage in a
more sober assessment of the situation in which the movement finds itself.
As we have mentioned already, this has been seen most clearly in the Prov-
isionals' attitude to the Protestant community which now recognises that
loyalism is wholly incompatible with republican objectives. Also, the
Provisionals have come to accept that loyalism will not automatically fade
away after a British withdrawal. 	 The possibility of further extensive
conflict Is admitted, but they argue that just 'how much blood is shed
depends entirely on the British government'.'4
	Less realistically in this
respect, the Provisionals believe that a commitment to withdraw should also
require the British to disarm all loyalist forces.
	 In Morrison's words: 'We
want a commitment that they will get out lock, stock and barrel. If they
leave behind 30,000 armed loyalist in the UDR and RUG, that's a recipe for
disaster." This tends to miss the rather obvious point that the existing
security forces have enough trouble trying to disarm a couple of hundred
republicans.	 To put it mildly, disarming '30,000 armed loyalists' could
prove slightly more problematic.
Overall, though, the long war has made the Provisionals more sensitive
to the dimensions of the conflict and more mindful of the limitations of
their strategy. They have striven to point out that PIRA's military
strength should not be exaggerated or be subject to excessive rhetorical
bravado, as the Grsen Bk insists, 'we do not claim that we are going to
escalate the war if we cannot do just that'." This contrasts with some of
the wilder claims made for PIRA's military capabilities earlier in the 1970s.
93. 'Brownie', 'Revolutionary Rules'.
94. Quoted in O'Malley, p. 284.
95. D. Morrison, interview in Xarxlsm Tcday, Dec. 1981, cited in A. Aughey,
'Political Violence in Northern Ireland', In H. Tucker (ed.), Combating
the Terrorists (New York, 1988), p. 90.
96. Quoted in Coogan, p. 688.
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The experience of the 1970s has underlined the basic reality of the rela-
tionship between PIRA and its more powerful adversary. The assessment of
Britain's performance in the Falklande in 1982 rammed home the message to
any wishful thinkers left in PIRA's ranks. One of the mast lucid exposi-
tions of PIRA's strategy to have appeared in the republican press, 'Lessons
of Xalvinas' by Peter Dowling, put it succinctly: 'Given the obviously perm-
anent (if slightly shifting) IRA/Britain imbalance of personnel, firepower
and technology, the idea of getting rid of the British by purely military
means is totally unrealistic.'
The awareness of the extent of British military strength reveals the
essence of the long war approach as a highly cautious strategy which aims
to avoid the provocation of counter-measures that may harm PIRA directly or
further restrict the conditions in which it can operate, as happened with
Operation Notorman for instance. This is why, for example, the killing of
UDR and RUG members, on or off duty, is such an attractive military option.
They are low risk operations which the security forces can do little to
stop. They do not transgress any scruples PIRA has about appearing sect-
arian.	 Yet such actions are sufficiently disparate and removed from the
experience of people in the rest of the UK not to contribute to anything
which might incite the authorities into a crackdown. At the same time,
these operations have aided PIRA's purpose by keeping the military pot boil-
ing in Northern Ireland while stirring up the Protestants. With sharpened
feelings of contempt for the loyalists, the Provisionals believe they can
play them off against the British by goading them into backlashes which
will alienate opinion in Great Britain. Referring to the protests organised
by Ian Paisley after the killing of Robert Bradford, Richard IcAuley of PSP
said: 'Provided the protests do not lead to civil war, they are not unwel-
come. We believe they could bring forward a British withdrawal by three or
97. P. Dowling, 'Lessons of the Nalvinas', APIRJ, 8 July 1982.
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four years, and in that sense they are useful.'
The long war highlights how attenuated the military instrument has
become, certainly in comparison to the high level of operations in the early
1970s.	 Nowadays, PIRA's operations, even against its most favoured targets
like the Army and the RUG, are conducted at a relatively low level. The
fascinating aspect of this situation Is the extent to which the phenomenon
of tacit bargaining appears to be at work within the military dimension of
the conflict. The notion of tacit bargaining deals with the idea that In
war combatants may come to a mutual, though implicit, understanding to
observe a degree of restraint to keep the conflict within certain bound-
aries.	 In Joe Austin's view, the British and PIRA have reached a level of
military confrontation which both sides can tolerate without endangering
their interests.	 PIRA cannot escalate for fear it would provoke the Brit-
ish.	 The British cannot do likewise without incurring domestic and inter-
national opprobrium. This view is also confirmed on the British side. A
former British Army officer with experience In Northern Ireland has remark-
ed: 'If an unwritten rule is put Into play such as: stay with legitimate (i.e.
security force] targets and we will play the game but go outside those then
it is open season on the key men. This can have a useful effect of serving
to contain the mad dogs."°° In Austin's words, both sides have 'fought
each other to a standstill' with the resources each are prepared to com-
mit.'° 1 The most intriguing angle here is that the most crucial battlefield
now appears to take place below the military threshold.
The pivotal question for P IRA's strategy is can it affect the correl-
ation of forces between the two sides? The Falklands war provided a good
foil to PIRA's campaign. The war was short and the moral issues relatively
98. Quoted in 'Paisley's Action Day Cheers Republicans', The Daily Telegraph
23 Nov. 1981.
99. See Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 53-67 and pp. 74-77.
100.Quoted in J. Adams, et al, Ambush (London, 1988), p. 89.
1O1.J. Austin, interview with author, 8 Sept. 1989.
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clear cut.	 As a consequence, the government enjoyed high levels of public
support for its actions. These factors helped Britain to victory in 1982.
The Provisionals' intention has been to deny such favourable circumstances.
By mounting a systematic campaign of minor military engagements, PIRA
believes it can sufficiently lengthen the duration of the war to drive a
psychological wedge through British society. Faced with so many political
difficulties in dealing with a low level military threat, it is hoped that
the authorities will be unable to avoid becoming embroiled in controversy.
Eventually, dissensions over 'shoot-to-kill' allegations, hunger strikes,
issues of civil liberties, law and order etc. will adequately muddy the
waters concerning the legitimacy of British involvement in Northern Ireland
to destroy domestic consensus, and so undercut Britain's political will to
stay.
Greater acceptance of the wide power differential with Britain has been
reflected in the moderation of the once frenetic tones of the movement's
public language. Gone are the ideas of a fundamentally flawed opponent, and
the more fanatical sense of inevitably, it is now accepted that nothing
PIRA can do on its own can bring about the movement's objectives and that,
at best, it can only exert indirect leverage over its adversary. The real-
ity, as Dowling emphasised, is that: 'however contradictory and unpalatable
it may seem, the struggle to remove the British from here will only be
brought to a successful conclusion at the behest of British public opinion
stirred by the successful military actions of Irish republicans.' 10
 The
Provisionals now seem to have a firmer grasp on the simple, but essential,
strategic axiom that the extent of the goals sought through warfare are
usually made in proportion to the effort and resources devoted to the
conflict. The Provisionals are under no illusions that the ambitious nature
of their objectives requires a concerted long-term collective effort on all
102.See Dowling, 'Lessons of Walvinas'.
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fronts: 'There is work to be done. 	 There is no magic formula. Only hard,
intelligent building, consolidating and building again'10
The most notable aspect of the total strategy is that it at least tries
to address the problem of material inferiority. PIRA's philosophy is, as
Morrison has said, 'to keep all tactical options open, provided it never
loses sight of the end result."°' In this way, the Provisionals can put
far more factors into play and fight it out in arenas where the British do
not possess any obvious pre-eninence. Using the military effort to under-
mine the stability of Northern Ireland, the movement can attract notoriety
which it can use to further publicise its social, economic and cultural
policies. Support for these policies, and by inference PIRA's armed
struggle, as expressed through elections, can generate propaganda which can
be used to gain sympathy abroad and discredit British involvement in North-
ern Ireland. In so doing, the Provisionals believe that the passage of time
will gnaw away at the British psyche, and culminate in a decision to with-
draw through exasperation.
The Provisionals can now see more clearly that the political effect of
the campaign Is the most crucial element which makes the strategy effica-
cious, rather than the direct repercussions individual engagements may have
In the military field. Dowling's article 'Lessons of Malvinas', stressed
that every tactic should be scrutinised in the light of this requirement,
adding: 'All actions should seek to unite and maximise nationalist support,
and should be comprehensible to those supporters in the South who do not
daily experience repression.sbos	 It is to serve these goals that in 1978
PSP emerged as an overt organisation ready to publicly advocate republican
policies.	 Previous to that, Morrison said, 'our politics had always been
103.'Build and Consolidate'.
104.Morrison, in Collins, Ireland After Britain, p. 93.
105.Dowling, 'Lessons of the Malvinas'.
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talked about and sold below the counter.hboG	 PSF is now integral to the
republican struggle.	 Adams has stipulated that the 'party must be ideo-
logically united on radical republican objectives and capable of formulating
and implementing long-term and short-term strategies.' 107 Allowing PSF to
campaign independently of the armed struggle, while being supportive of it,
enables the republican movement to move forward on a wide front and its
message to be disseminated to the widest possible audience.
The advantage of the restructuring process is that Provisionals are now
able to be more precise about exploiting the propaganda effects of their
campaign.	 This enhances the overall strategy by allowing the movement to
pack a greater political punch behind each military action. The total
strategy does not overcome PIRA's deficiency in power, but it at least
maximisee its options, to make it a more potent coercive weapon than if it
had to rely purely on the military instrument. In this sense, the total
strategy acts as a substitute for the risky pursuit of military escalation.
By letting political initiatives back up military action, the Provisionals
can portray themselves, both inside and outside Ireland, as a strong and
popularly based movement. Thus, the Provisionals have the opportunity to
build up their credibility and project an image of power without running the
risk of either provoking damaging counter-measures or alienating public
opinion, both of which are inherent in any decision to escalate.
The Evolving Strategy
By way of conclusion to this chapter, and looking in a longer historial
perspective, we can say that the most significant feature about the adoption
of the total strategy is that it represents an attempt to re-establish a
sense of fluidity to Irish republican thinking. The movement itself has a
106.Iorrison, in Collins, p. 89.
107. 'Brownie', 'Revolutionary Rules'.
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fertile history of thinkers; Tone, the Young Irelanders, Mitchell and Lalor
through to Pear-se, Connally and Mellows. Yet this tradition 1 which had
developed consistently since the late eighteenth century, had been halted in
its tracks in the early 1920s.
The period from 1916 to 1921 was the golden age of republican struggle
- a period of gallant sacrifice and military achievement. But It was
swiftly followed by the disillusion of the Treaty settlement. The trauma of
the civil war effectively froze the movement in a time warp which curtailed
any further ideological development. Gerry Adams reckons that the movement
had been intellectually decapitated by the executions of 1916 which delivered
the leadership into the hands of 'non-republicans', like Collins, Griffith and
de Valera, and left the IRA a traditionalist rearguard fighting against the
betrayal of the ideals of 1918.'° The more politically conscious social-
ist-republicans had always been present of course, but until the mld-1900s
they were largely eclipsed by the traditionalists, and in any event, the bulk
of them remained with the Officials when the movement split In 1969/70.
While the Officials became a fully-fledged constitutional party, later in the
1980s dropping all references to its republican past and becoming simply the
Workers' Party, the traditional intellectual enfeeblement of non-constitution-
al nationalism lived on in the Provisionals.
In many ways, the Northern radicals saw their dwindling fortunes in
the mid-1970s as a symptom of the movement's general vacation of the poli-
tical field to their opponents five decades earlier.'° They wanted to
reverse this trend and reinvigorate the movement. They believed this could
be done by elaborating a republican doctrine that was relevant to contempor-
ary circumstances and, therefore, capable of attracting popular support.
Essentially, the radicals wanted to make the strategy evolve once again in
108.Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 39.
109.Ibid., p. 47.
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recognition that the politico-military battlefield upon which PIRA would
continue to fight would be one of constant flux, demanding different solu-
tions In response to changing conditions. In effect, it meant lifting the
republican tradition out of being just that, a tradition, and moulding it into
a developing political philosophy. 	 Needless to say, this did not mean the
collapse of the republican tradition. The radicals have continued to draw
on it for inspiration and legitimacy. For example, the Green Book stresses
the Provisionals' 'direct lineal succession with the Provisional Government
of 1918, the first Dail of 1919 and the second Dail of 1921."° Similarly,
the radicals have reiterated that the doctrines enunciated by past vision-
aries need to be built on, not abandoned. At the 1979 Bodenstown commem-
oration, Adams declared: 'The teachings of Lalor, of Connolly, Xcswiney,
Xellows, Pearse and Theobald Wolfe Tone, up-dated if needs be to suit today's
conditions, are the teachings of the Republican lovement'."
Establishing an evolving strategy meant accepting that the context of
the conflict would affect the employment of the methods of republican
struggle, Including the military instrument. This required all aspects of
the strategy be placed under constant review in order to ensure that the
strategy would be analysis led and not dictated by slogans or dogmas which
had been elevated to positions of explicit Importance within the republican
tradition to a degree where they interfered excessively with the process of
strategic formulation.
To place the changes of the previous six years into context, the re-
evaluation of the the Provisionals' strategy undertaken by the Northern
radicals could be said to have marked the rejuvenation of the movement from
a period of decline and failure. The reassessment did not, however, resolve
all of the anomalies in republican thinking. Although the Northern leaders
11O.Quoted In Coogan, p. 685.
111 .Adaas, Bodenstown Speech.
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succeeded in establishing the ascendancy of their brand of radical repub-
licanism, the new strategy remained a careful and sometimes precarious
balance between innovation and tradition. The crucial aspect of the
reassessment was that it brought far more coherence to the Provisionals'
strategic paradigm. The evolving strategy undoubtedly produced a more
sophisticated and flexible base upon which the Provisionals could conduct
their campaign. It also ensured that the movement could endure, and may be
prosper, into the next decade and beyond without suffering from the kind of
wholesale political dislocation experienced in the mid-1970e. The essential
point to be addressed, though, is now that the Provisional IRA can endure,




THE COITEADICTORY DYJAIICS OP THE TOTAL STfiTEGY, 1983-1990 -
TUB COlT JIUIIG NIL ITARY EJIGIA
The preceding chapter examined the revisions within the strategic thinking
of the Provisional IRA that have taken place since the late lQ7Os and pres-
ented an explanation as to why, from a theoretical point of view, it can be
said to represent a more satisfactory framework upon which to define the
role of the military instrument. The examination of the total strategy
endeavoured to explain why this represented a better strategic construct and
to convey the sense of optimism which pervaded the Irish republican move-
ment during the mid-1980s.	 Indeed, during the early 1980e, there seemed
little to be critical about from a republican view. The reward for the
strategic reassessment was a confident, politically vigorous movement which,
along with a more efficient military organisation, was enjoying a degree of
electoral success sufficient to cause serious worry to its adversaries in
Britain and Ireland.	 From a nineties vantage point, the Provisionals can
perhaps look back on the period from 1980 to 1983 as the halcyon years of
their rejuvenated movement. The weight and complexity of the republican
tradition has ensured that they cannot escape from their past difficulties
quite so easily. The direction in which the new strategy has propelled the
movement since the early 1980a has raised new challenges and sharpened old
ones. The purpose of this chapter is to get behind the rhetoric and
reasoning of the total strategy in order to analyse the extent to which the
employment of the military instrument has continued to diverge from strat-
egic norms, The chapter begins by surveying the criticisms made by some
members of the old leadership against the new political emphasis in repub-
lican strategy. The analysis then explains why it has proved so difficult
to co-ordinate the political and military elements of the Provisionals'
campaign in the way that the present leadership would like and the negative
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impact this has had on the movement's electoral fortunes. This is followed
by an assessment of the persisting ideological tensions within the Provis-
ionals' strategic thinking which continues to place a questionmark over the
exact locus of authority over the military instrument. The enquiry shows
how these tensions have reinforced the ambiguities in republican military
thought. The chapter rounds off by demonstrating how such ambiguities have
exhibited themselves through contradictory rhetorical statements and the
reluctance of the Provisionals to accept the logical implications of their
own strategic formula in relation to the power differential which exists
between themselves and their British adversaries.
Aside from the public squabble between the radical and traditional
elements in PSF in the early 1980s, it was an open secret that the upheavals
in the organisation also caused a few ructions in PIBA's ranks. Personality
and generational differences inevitably played their part, as did the percep-
tion of a Jorthern 'takeover', but dissension over practicalities centred on
the relationship between the political and armed struggles. As PSF took on
a more active role and rose to a position of more equal status with PIRA, it
became clear that the two organisations would be in close competition for
resources. The streamlining of the military organisation had reduced PIRA's
operational costs, but PSF'e political activities made heavy demands on the
movement's finances. Bishop and Nallie have said that by 1983 the cast of
the party's advice centres was in the region of £300,000 per annum while the
general election campaign of that year had cast £30,000.' Other estimates,
believed to emanate from British intelligence sources have put the figure
for the election at more like £137,000. Either way, the financial burden
has been considerable. Suspicion of the politically go-ahead radicals was
greatest among local PIRA activists who feared that the armed struggle would
1. Bishop and Nallie, The Provisional IRA, p. 312.
2. See J. Adams, The Financing of Terror (London, 1986), p. 166.
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be run down and resources diverted to cater for PSF'G schemes. According
to Liam Clarke, this caution was reflected in the Spring of 1Q83 when a
meeting of ASU operatives in Belfast gave the Jorthern radicals two years in
which to demonstrate the continued effectiveness of their approach. In
the intervening years there were periodic press reports of arguments within
PIRA about the lack of money to maintain a guerrilla war and particularly
about the diminishing level of operations In Belfast.' In April 1Q85, four
activists, Including Ivor Bell, a former Army Council member and delegate to
the 1Q72 talks with William Vhltelaw, were expelled from PIRA after alleged-
ly opposing the diversion of funds away from PIRA operations to finance
PSF's campaign in the up-coming Nay local council elections, and for sub-
sequently trying to mobilise support against the armalite and ballot box
etrategy. There was even a suggestion that the explosion outside Harrods
in December 1Q83, which killed 5 people, was the work of a faction deliber-
ately out to disrupt contacts with the political left In Britain which Adams
was trying to cultivate. 	 Speculation was raised when PIRA said that the
attack was 'not authorised by the Army Council'. In fact, there is little
proof that this or any other attack was intended to undermine Adams'
position. PIRA later claimed that Its statement was meant to convey that
the Harrods bomb was a mistake caused by 'extremely difficult
communications' and was not a repudiation of the bombing team concerned.7
The PSF leadership has always been careful to stress that the 'tactic
of armed struggle Is of primary Importance'. Martin XcGuinnees outlined
the position thus: 'We recognise the value and limitations of electoral
3. Clarke, Broadening the Battlefield, p. 22.
4. See N. Holland, 'Why Did IRA Attack Brighton?', The Sunday Press, 7 Oct.
1Q84.
5. 'Prow Split', New Hibernia, Nay 1985. See also Adams, The Financing of
Terror, p. 165.
6. PIRA Statement, reprinted in The Irish Times, 19 Dec. 1983.
7. Interview with PIRA spokesperson, AP/RI, 5 Jan. 1Q84.
8. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 64.
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success.	 We recognise that only a disciplined armed struggle by the IRA
will end British rule.' Outright hostility within PIRA towards PSF appears
to have been sporadic rather than co-ordinated and therefore not symptomatic
of any widespread feeling of antagonism against the radicals. By 1986 any
major doubts within PIRA had been sufficiently dispelled for an Army Council
spokesman to announce that the movement 'has overcome many of the genuine
fears that increased political activity would lead to a downgrading of the
armed ru°
Tensions within PSF did not dissipate so rapidly. Problems grew with
evidence that PSF had reached its electoral peak in Northern Ireland. After
three years of steady gains at the polls, the party's vote in the 1984 Euro-
pean election slipped to 91,476, down 11,000 votes on its performance in the
1983 general election. The decline was confirmed by the local elections in
1985. Despite winning a respectable 59 council seats, PSF's showing fell to
11.8% of the vote (75,686 first preference votes) •
	 Adams described the
1984 result a 'useful injection of reality'." 	 It was clear that the talk of
overtaking the SDLP had been far too optimistic.	 Having reached this
stage, the PSi' leadership now set its sights on electoral expansion into the
Irish Republic. Ever since the early 1980s it had been PSP's intention to
campaign on a 32-county basis, but events in Northern Ireland had, until
then, absorbed its attentions. In the South, the party remained organisa-
tionally sluggish and devoid of real leadership.	 The situation was com-
pounded by a widespread perception of PSi' in the South as a single issue
fringe group. Norrison admitted that PSi' had 'to recognise... that the vast
majority of people in the 26 counties consider the institutions of the state
as being legitimate." 	 This meant that if PSi' was to be of any relevance
9. I. McGuinness, 'We Will Never be Slaves Again', APIRN, 28 June 1984.
10. Quoted in 'The Ballot and the Bomb', Nagill, July 1986.
11. Interview with 0. Adams, AP/RI, 21 June 1984.
12. Interview with D. Norrison, Ngi11, Sept. 1984.
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in the South it would need to lift its policy of abstention from the Irish
Dail, Leinster Mouse, and campaign in the mainstream of Southern politics.
Vith memories of the 1969/70 split still sharp, it was an emotive issue,
especially for older republicans who believed that abstentionism formed the
cornerstone of the Provisionals' identity. PSF's leaders carefully prepared
their ground. A NRA Convention, held between September and October 1986,
the first since 1970, renewed its commitment to the 'armed overthrow of
British rule in Ireland', and endorsed the radicals' plans by amending PIRA's
constitution to allow the organisation to back non-abstentionist
cadaes3
The PIRA Convention's support bolstered the PSF leadership when the
motion to drop abstention came up for discussion at the 1986 Ard-Phels.
Following an emotional, and sometimes acrimonious debate, the motion receiv-
ed the two-thirds majority necessary to permit the taking of seats at Lein-
ster House. After the vote was taken, a number of those opposed to the
change, amongst them O'Conaiil and O'Bradalgh, walked out to form a new
party, Republican Sinn Fein (RSF). RSP officially based its opposition on
moralistic grounds about upholding allegiance to the 1916 Proclamation, the
declaration of independence by the first Dali in 1919 and the non-recog-
nition of 'British created institutions', which included the Dublin parlia-
mant.' The dimensions of the split should not be over-played. The scale
of the radicals' victory in the abstention debate, 429 votes to 161, was
emphatic and displayed a real shift in opinion throughout the movement. In
any case, it was widely known beforehand that a traditionalist rump would be
unlikely to accept any decision to end abetentionism.
Vhat became of RSF and the controversy over the split are matters for
the historical record and of no immediate concern here. However, for all
13. AF/R1, 10 Oct. 1986.
14. Republican Bulletin (RSP), 2 Nov. 1980.
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RSP's dogmatism and seeming concern for the preservation of the idealisii of
the past over progress in the present 1
 did not mean that some of the more
practical arguments RSF levelled against the Provisionals' electoral policy
were invalid. lany of those who objected to the end of abetentionism could
see the benefit that elections had brought in undermining the policy of
criminalisation and in restricting the SDLP'S room for manoeuvre, but their
view was that the moment they gave recognition to the Southern state the
movement would be fatally compromised. Inextricably they would be drawn
into the system of wheeler-dealing which would eventually result in the
implicit acceptance of all the panoply of the state they despised the
police, the courts, security co-operation with Britain etc.. O'Bradaigh put
it this ways 'They will be signing their own extinction as revolutionaries
not because they want to but because it cannot be otherwise." The bottom
line was that electoral participation and an armed campaign were incompat-
ible, as O'Bradaigh argued: 'You cannot ride two horses at the same time."
One of the risks of dropping abstentionism is that once the Southern
state is recognised as having legitimacy where electoral participation is
permissible, while the North is regarded as irreformable where armed
struggle is a necessity, then PSF is in danger of creating two different
parties to suit two different political systems.
	 In effect, a de facto
recognition of partition. Naturally, the radicals deny these accusations.
'We need to keep our republican gut' and 'must never lose sight of our
national objectives,' Adams reminded his audience at the 1986 Ard-Pheis.'7
The radicals' line, as expressed by An Phoblacht/Republican News, was that
'Leinster House d	 corrupt. It corrupts corruptible people... the weak and
15. Quoted in G. Barry, 'The Bullet or the Ballot?', The Sunday Tribune,
26 Oct. 1986.
16. Quoted in 'In the Shadow of the Gunmen', The Guardian, 28 Jan. 1989.
17. G. Adams, 'Presidential Address', in PSFD The Politics of Revolution
(Dublin, 1986), P. 13.
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vain, the insincere and the gombeen. 	 It cannot corrupt a revolutionary.'
But this, as the opponents point out, is self-refuting. If one professes to
be a revolutionary who will refuse to participate in the political process,
then why bother taking seats in parliament? 'I cannot see what they would
do if they were elected to Leinster House', pondered one pro-abetentionist
councillor before the 1980 Ard-Fheis.'	 At the time of writing, we have
yet to find out.
Whatever the impediment to PSF'S political progress, abstention had
been a vehicle for reducing some of the anomalies within republican
thinking. Abstention was the hand-maiden of absolutism as it ensured that
republican ideals remained untainted by influences in the wider political
world. Once this principle was banished, republican ideology theoretically
became more vulnerable to dilution by outside forces. Adams knew all along
that there would be difficulties in the Provisionals' new approach. In 1983
he admitted: 'there are contradictions between our struggle and the political
structure in the same way there are contradictions in Irish society'.°
Adams was perhaps more prescient than he might have wished, because the
evolution of the military instrument from the early 1980s largely reflects
the movement's attempts to grapple with the increasing rhetorical and
practical contradictions that have emerged following the adoption of a
higher political profile.
The Armalite versus the Ballot Box
When the Provisionals abolished abstention in 1980 they claimed that simple
vote-catching was not their specific intention. They recognised that sup-
port for violence would dissuade many peop1e from voting for PSF. This was
18. AF/RI, 0 Nov. 1980.
19.Quoted in 'The Armalite and the Dail', The Sunday Tribune, 14 Sept. 1980.
20. Quoted in B. Noloney, 'Gunmen Were Doing Their Duty - Adams', The Irish
Times, 19 Dec. 1983.
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not seen as a barrier but as an opportunity both to develop the party organ-
isation and to get their message across by using election campaigns and
parliamentary seats as political platforms. As An Phoblacbt/Republican
lews elucidated, the electoral intervention was seen as consistent with their
overall plans:
Initially our solidarity with the armed struggle may cost us support
among some sections of the non-republican populace. However, rather
than compromise or be evasive, republicans must explain the origins and
correctness of physical force. We can then learn to live without the
support of those to whom the armed struggle is an insuperable difficulty.
It is something we have assessed. But we will also educate many into
republicanism, into our analysis of the crisis in Ireland, into supporting
republicanism and the republican etruggle.1
Nevertheless, constant exhortations, not least from Adams himself, 'to
move into the mainstream of political relevancy,' has required there to be
some compromise between the armed and political sides of the struggle. It
Is no goad entering the electoral arena only to end up with a miniscule
number of votes.	 Poor performances would hardly be consistent for an
energetic organisation which believed itself capable of breaking the mould of
Irish politics.	 In order not to alienate potential sympathisers it has
proved necessary for the armed struggle to be 'acceptable to the people on
whose behalf it is carried out.' Tables 1 and 2 (pages 338 and 339)
demonstrate how, since the late 1970s, PIRA has concentrated its attacks on
security forces personnel. This has been accompanied by a corresponding
decrease in the number of bombings in urban areas and against commercial
property which place civilians at greatest risk. This is reflected in both
tables in the decline in civilian fatalities as a percentage of the total
number of deaths recorded up to the mid-1980s. Table 3 (page 340) indi-
cates that there is little in PIRA's operational profile to signify that the
level of attacks has been adjusted to coincide with the elections which took
21. AP/RI 6 Nov. 1986.
22.Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 152.
23. XcGuinnese, 'Ye Will Never be Slaves Again'.
- 336 -
place in the period. There are no depreciations in the rate of explosions
or deaths of security force personnel in the run up to, or appreciations
following, each of the elections concerned. Only in Nay 1985, the month in
which local elections were held in Northern Ireland, is there a dip in the
figures, but this is insufficient to establish any trend. The bulk of the
statistical information up to the mid-1980s suggests, that with the excep-
tion of the hunger strike elections in 1981 when there was a reduction in
the level of operations, the refinements in the employment of the military
instrument apply oniy to PIRA's targeting policy.
One explanation for the absence of any co-operation between PIRA and
PSP during elections could be that having reached an electoral ceiling in
Northern Ireland, the movement feels that there is limited political mileage
to be gained in further constraining PIRA's operations to facilitate PSF's
electoral progress. PSF's vote now appears stable at about 80,000 to 90,000
votes. If this is the case, then there seems little to confirm the sus-
picions of the traditionalists that the military campaign will become subor-
dinate to the needs of the political struggle. Although the primacy of the
military arm does not appear under threat, certain intellectual incongruities
have emerged. This has been most noticeable in PSP's attitude towards the
Anglo-Irish Agreement, or Hilisborough Accord, concluded between the British
and Irish governments in November 1985. The main provision of the Accord,
in so far as it affected nationalists in Northern Ireland, has been to grant
Dublin a consultative role in the affairs of the province. Although PSP
opposed the Agreement as yet another doomed attempt at an internal settle-
ment, Adams stated in late 1985, that the Agreement's introduction had shown
that the British could be moved by republican pressure: 'The equation is
therefore a simple one: support for Sinn Pain equals concessions from the
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Table 1: Yearly Civilian Patalities and Percentage of Total Fatalities Bach
Year, 1969-1985


























































•Excludee deaths of paramilitary suspects, political activists, elected
representatives, prison officers, former members of security forces and
unclassified deaths.
Compiled from data contained in Irish Information Partnership (lIP), Irish
Information Agenda (London, 1987), Table Biviti, p. 4.
Statistical source for all tables: RUG information.
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Table 2: Yearly Security Force and Civilian Fatalities Caused by Republican
Paramilitaries and Percentage of Total Fatalities in Each Year,
1YF9-198
Security Farce Fatalities































Coapiled from lIP, Table Bili, pp. 3-4.
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Table 3: loathly Fatalities of Security Forces and loathly Rate of
Explosions, 1983-86
1) loathly Fatalities of Security Forces
Jan. Feb. lar. Apr. lay June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
	 Total
1983	 3	 3	 2	 3	 2 2a 4	 1	 1	 5	 7	 1	 34
1984	 5	 1	 3	 2	 8 2b 2	 2	 1	 2	 0	 1	 29
1985	 0 13	 3	 1	 4c2	 0	 0	 2	 0	 3	 2	 30
1986	 3d 2	 2	 2	 4 0	 7	 1	 0	 3	 1	 0	 24
ii) loathly Rate of Explosions
1983	 5 15 19 12 19 46a 23 18 44 17 26 22
	 266
1984 26 2? 22 21 15 12b 16 19 13 11
	 4	 7	 193
1985	 7 11	 8 14	 4c 11 14 32 32	 8	 5 17	 163
1988 13d 7	 5 13 15 7
	 5 25	 9 26 22 26
	 172
iii) loathly Rate of Explosions of Inown Republican Paruilitary
Origin, 1984-1985
1984 26 25 22 20 15 12b 16 19 13 11
	 4	 7	 190
1985	 7 11	 8 14	 4c 11 14 31	 8	 8	 5 17	 162
1986 13d 7	 5 12 15 6
	 4 25 25 25 22 26
	 169
Compiled from ZIP, Table B711i, p. 1.
a)Xonth of Veetminster General Election.
b)lonth of European Community Elections.
C) lonth of Local Elections, Northern Ireland.
d) Xonth of Unionist (anti-Anglo- Irish Agreement) By-elections.
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British.'2' This argument was duly incorporated into PSF's campaign liter-
ature: 'Siun Fein recognises that the Rilleborough Agreement has come about
as a direct result of the electoral advances of Sinn Fain and the successes
of the Republican Xovement.' This represented a straight trawl for votes
with little regard for doctrinal consistency. By trying to claim credit for
concessions to improve a system which the movement has always said needs to
be destroyed comes dangerously close to undermining the argument that the
Northern state is jr-reformable. There was some internal criticism of PSF'e
'confused pastion of on the one hand opposing the Hilisborough Agreement but
at the same time trying to claim credit for the benefits which might arise
from it.'	 This attempt to play it both ways was probably one reason why
PSI' failed to stimulate its electoral fortunes. After all, why should
nationalists who favour the Agreement vote for PSI' which is, at heart,
opposed to the Agreement when others like the SDLP are wholly supportive?
In the British general election of June 1987, PSI' remained more or less
static with 11.4% of the poll in Northern Ireland, while in the Southern
elect ion in February the same year, PSI' received a truly dismal 1.9%.
The awkward balance of maintaining a revolutionary party on the one
hand, while trying to juggle with the politics of popularity with the other,
Is one previously unknown area into which PSI' has been led since Its
decision to enter electoral politics. PIRA's emphasis on attacking members
of the security forces is part of the process to make the movement more
palatable to voters, as it is assumed that such attacks can be passed off as
legitimate military targets. Such Intentions count for little if attacks go
wrong and end up killing large numbers of civilians as has happened since
1987. The most notorious of recent times was the Enniskillen bombing on
24. Interview with G. Adams in PSI', The Hillsborough Deal: Stepping Stone or
Xiii Stone? (PSI' pamphlet), Dec. 1985.
25. PSF, Sinn Fein Policy Dument, (Dublin, 1987), p. 14.
26. 'Dents the Nenace', 'Needs of the Struggle', Irish Bheag, (internal PSI'
discussion journal), No. 4, Nov. 1987, p. 3.
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Remembrance Day in november 1987 which killed 11 Protestants. The
sectarianism evident in the choice of target and the overtones of mendacity
in trying to blame the explosion on British Army scanning equipment, com-
pounded a public relations disaster for the Provisionals. The political
effect of PIRA's mistakes has been to restrict PSF's capacity to expand
beyond its core of support, as one PIRA spokesman commented after Ennis-
killen: 'Our central base can take a hell of a lot of jolting and crises.
But the outer reaches are just totally devastated.' 	 In 1988 civilian
fatalities comprised 31% of PIRA's victims. 	 They rose to 39% in 1989.
The cost in terms of lost support for PSF was revealed in the local elec-
tions of Xay 1989. Although PSF's share of the vote at 11.3% was only 0.1%
down on the 1987 general election, the party received 6500 fewer votes than
the 1985 local election and lost 18 of its council seats. PSF councillor,
Xitchel McLaughlin, acknowledged that 'IRA operations that went wrong did
have an effect because in a sense Sinn Fein is held accountable at local
level for all aspects of the republican struggle.' This sort of statement
is indicative of a degree of PSF irritation with the regularity of PIRA's
errors and well illustrates the tension between the armed struggle and PSF's
desire to maximisa its electoral potential. On a number of occasions since
the early 1980s Adams has reproved PIRA for its operational laxity.
Following the European election in 1984 he warned:
...there are varying degrees of tolerance within the nationalist electorate
for aspects of the armed struggle... I think there is a need to refer to
what I said at the 1983 Ard-Fheis. That is that revolutionary force
must be controlled and disciplined so that it is clearly seen as a symbol
of our people's reeistance.ao
Adams has never publicly condemned any PIRA operation, but his criti-
cisms of PIRA have become less coded since the late 1980s as the frequency
27. Quoted in D. XcKittrick, 'IRA's Toll of Civilian Deaths Grows Despite
Public Stance', The Independent, 13 April 1989.
28. Fortnight, March 1990.
29. Interview with I. McLaughlin, AP/RI, 25 May 1989.
30. Interview with G. Adams, AFIRE, 21 June 1984.
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of mistakes continued to grow and their negative impact on PSF's electoral
prospects became evident. During his speech to the 1989 Ard-Pheis, he
addressed some of hi. remarks to members of P IRA: 'You have a massive
responsibility.	 At times the fate of the struggle is in your hands. You
have to be careful and careful again.'' 	 The problem for PSF is that PIRA
does not actually dissent from anything Adams has said. According to a
member of the GHQ staff: 'We will always be striving to place the struggle
on ground which republicans can unhesitatingly, and without great difficulty,
defand.'	 The main reasons for the high rate of mistakes are historical
and structural.	 Traditionally, PIRA units, particularly those in border
areas, have enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, more so since the intro-
duction of the cell structure. 	 ASTJs are able to plan their actions with
little reference to the higher echelons of PIRA's command. 	 This was
probably a strong factor in the Bnniskillen bombing. Being an illegal
conspiritorial organisation, PIRA finds it hard to train recruits and test
equipment while financial constraints prevent it from obtaining the most up-
to-date and reliable weaponry.	 As a consequence, there is an in-built
propensity for mistakes to occur.
The inherent risk of mistakes is one reason why the internal opposition
theory does not measure up. There remain some doubts over the wisdom of
PSP's approach but there is no indication that these are prevalent enough to
suggest that blunders have been manufactured by factional dissent to sabo-
tage PSF's political line. This explanation also helps to dispel the idea
that PIRA operations are designed to undermine specific diplomatic initia-
tives. There is a tendency, in both the British and Irish press, to attri-
bute motives of political timing to each major action. 	 For example, the
attack on the Conservative Party Conference at Brighton in October 1984 was
31.G. Adams, Presidential Address, 84th Ard-Pheis, (Dublin, 1989), p. 4.
32. 'IRA Interview', AP/RI, 26 Jan. 1989.
33. B. Moloney, 'Mistaken Strategy', Fortnight, lay 1989.
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said to be intended to destroy the prospects for increased co-operation in a
forthcoming summit between Jiargaret Thatcher and Irish Prime Ninister,
Garret Fitzgerald.3'	 Such attributions are highly speculative and credit
PLRA with a sense of omnipresence which it does not possess. 	 PIRA is a
small organisation, possibly 300 activists at most, which has to function in
conditions of strict security.	 Attacks can take weeks, if not months, to
plan. Kany of them have to be called off. For example, PIRA admitted
that out of 18 bombing missions carried out between February and Nay 1983,
8 had to be aborted either because the bombs failed to detonate properly or
because they were located by the security forces. 	 In any case, spectac-
ular operations, whether they go wrong or not, have tended to spur rather
than hinder Anglo-Irish co-operation against PIRA. 	 The Bnniskillen bomb-
ing, for instance, enabled the Irish government to push a contentious extra-
dition bill through the Dail. 	 It is opportunism, not political coincidence,
which can be said to be the guiding motive behind PIRA's attacks.
Fundamentally, the long war approach explicitly rejects such notions as
offensives or political timing. Ever since the introduction of the long war
concept in the late 1970s, the aim has been to sustain a continuous level of
attacks irrespective of political developments within or between the govern-
ments of Britain and Ireland. The following extract from an interview with
a PIRA spokesman illustrates this point. It refers to two series of bomb-
ing and shooting incidents conducted by PIRA in Northern Ireland, the first
in November 1978 and the second in April 1979, the month before the British
general election.
These attacks (the November 1978 attacks] were inaccurately described by
the media as part of a winter offensive, as if we were trying to realise
a short term goal or aim. This was not so. Similarly, what is happen-
ing now is not a pre-election blitz but is just a period of concerted
34. See for example, The Guardian, The Irish Press, The Irish News, 13 Oct.
1984 and The Sunday Press, 14 Oct. 1984.
35. 'A Constant Level of Resistance', Iris, July 1983.
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activity in our overall struggle to destabilise British rule in Ireland.
There are two deductions one can make both from an examination of
PIRA's operational profile and from statements like those above. Firstly,
PIRA is unable to fight to prescription, that is, to make its attacks coin-
cide with individual political events, and secondly, it is impassible to
fight an antiseptic, voter-friendly war. The second point in particular
highlights the underlying tension within the armalite and ballot box strat-
egy. Can PSF credibly campaign on a range of economic and social issues,
like houses, jobs, investment, health, while PIRA helps destroy them? There
have been two telling incidents that underline this query, both involved PIRA
bombing attacks on the Andersonstown Road RUG station, West Belfast, in
which a number of surrounding houses were damaged. The first, in June,
1983 happened the night before the Westminster election, leaving PSF activ-
ists to answer for PIPA's action and advise residents on state compensation.
Apparently, when Adams was canvassing the following morning he saw the
bombing unit returning from the mission and shook his fist in anger at
their car.
	 The second incident occurred the following year while PSI' was
leading a delegation to the lorthern Ireland Housing Executive to complain
about housing conditions in West Belfast. These sorts of embarrassments
do mark out certain lines of divergence between P1RA and PSI'. They stem
from differing perceptions rather than elementary disagreements over the
movement's direction. As Ed loloney points out, being at the sharp mili-
tary end of the struggle, PIRA is inclined to see operations which go wrong
and kill civilians as technical mistakes, resulting from faulty equipment,
inadequate warning times and so on.
	 PSI', on the other hand, tends to see
such actions as conceptually flawed, believing that operations should never
36. Quoted in 'Unprecedented Casualties', AP/RI, 21 April 1979.
37. Clarke, p. 227.
38. 'Big Test For Ballot Box Supporters', New Hlberiiia, April 1985.
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be carried out in areas, like towns and cities, where there is a high risk to
civilians.' For example, when asked in an interview whether he could
really have been surprised that the Bnniskillan bomb had caused civilian
deaths after it had been placed in a position where civilians had always
congregated, Adams replied: 'I think that was the stupid mistake, planting it
there in the first place, the fact that it was a memorial service, the fact
that all fatalities bar one were civilians'. tm0
 It is clear that PSF does
not count the cost of mistakes as missed opportunities to hit the security
forces but in terms of damage to its political reputation and election
prospects.	 On the other side of the coin, PIRA has occasionally seen the
restrictions it feels obliged to observe as posing a reverse propaganda
threat. For example, in 1985 PIRA launched a series of bombings against
Belfast city centre. PIRA felt that the British had used the reduced level
of violence in urban areas as a 'propaganda platform' to attract investment
and promote a 'facade of normality'. The intention of the bombings, as the
Belfast Brigade's statement claiming responsibility for the attacks read, was
to destroy these cla1ms 'There is no unormalityN. Such propaganda claims
are false and today's attack is a potent demonstration of our determination
to continue our struggle against the British colonial presence wherever and
whenever the opportunity presents itself.'4'
Sentiments such as those expressed in the quote above stand in direct
contravention to the political interests of PSF. Adams is aware of this
difficulty. In 1987 he reminded PIRA that it had 'a major responsibility to
ensure that the armed struggle was geared to republican goals.' He contin-
ued: 'Its when the IRA, as in Enniskillen, omits to take this into account
that tragedies take place.'42
 Yet organisational, historical and tempera-
39. Moloney, 'Nistaken Strategy'.
40. Interview with G. Adams, The Last Post, Dec. 1987.
41. 'IRA Shatter Nlormalityu Facade', AP/RE, 20 June 1985.
42. Interview with G. Adams, The Irish Press, 23 Nov. 1987.
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mental factors have shown PIRA's inability to fine tune the armed struggle
to advance republican goals in the manner which Adams suggests. It is
precisely this point, the fact that Adams and PSF do not have any direct
influence over PIRA's operational planning, which emphasisee the central
problem for Irish republican strategy, a theme which has been under constant
scrutiny in this analysis, the issue of political control over the military
instrument.
The Contradictions Over Political Control of the Nilitary Instrument
The question of political control over the use of violence has been suggested
in previous chapters as a major reason why republican violence has some-
times been misapplied in the past. With the advent of the total strategy
and the rise of PSP to a position of equivalence with PIRA, one might have
expected some of the problems which existed in this area to start moving
towards resolution. As the military instrument is now considered incapable
of shouldering the republican struggle alone, and therefore, to be accom-
panied by increased political activity, it follows that there should be some
co-ordination of military and political means in order to optimise the level
of resistance. This raises the larger question of how this co-ordination
should be formed and controlled? The foundation of strategic theory is
that war is an expression of political purpose to achieve certain ends
through violence. The attainment of the political goal remains the para-
mount concern in war. Policy will, therefore, affect the employment of the
military instrument to ensure there is maximum movement towards the poli-
tical objective. In theory, this should mean that the PSF leadership over-
sees all aspects of the struggle. Although PSP would not necessarily take
any interest in day-to-day military decisions, it would define the general
thrust of military policy by laying down the boundaries of permissible
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action in war. PSF would thus be able to instruct PIRA on what military
objectives it should seek and when to refrain from actions which may inhibit
the advance towards the overall goal.
The complication here is in trying to establish the exact relationship
between PIRA and PSF. 	 Ever since 1919 Sinn Fain and the IRA have main-
tamed that they are both separate organisations which share the same aspir-
ations. Nutual agreement on aims, according to one PSF pamphlet in 1973:
'does not mean Sian Fain has any control or say in Army policy and vice
versa.	 Sina Fein is simply a political organisation whose policy is the
establishment of a 32-county socialist republic.' Similarly, in the late
1980s, Adams declared: 'There isn't any organic relationship... Sian Fain
supports the right in particular circumstances to take up armed resist-
ance.' Such claims do give some ground for scepticism. One might ask
what was the rumpus over abstention all about? Why did the PSP leadership
need to reassure its members that ending abstention would not lead to any
diminution of the armed struggle? 	 If there are no formal ties with PIRA,
then PSF is in no position to answer for PIRA, as no PSF decision on abst-
ention could by itself alter PIRA's commitment to violence? The fact that
PSF does answer for PIRA, that PIRA statements are issued through PSF's
offices and that PSF seems well versed in the vocabulary of PIRA strategy,
implies a link which goes beyond mere coincidence of objectives. In part-
icular, there have been numerous allegations of dual membership, though, as
yet, none legally proved.
Uncertainty over the nature of the connections between PIRA and PSF
leads to the more serious accusation that PSP is not only linked, but sub-
ordinate to PIRA. Historically, there is no doubt that the IRA has been the
senior member in the partnership. Adams denies the 'monkey and organ
43. 'Why Sian Fein?', The Volunteer (PSF, Lurgan), 2 Feb. 1973.
44. Interview with G. Adams, kagill, Aug. 1988.
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grinder relationship with the IRA.' 'The 8uggestion that Sinn Fein would be
running off to the IRA to ratify tactical and political decisions is non-
sanse." Yet it was the Staff Report of 1977 which stated: Sinn Fein
should come under Army organisers at all levels... Sinn Pein should be
radicalised (under Army direction)' (author's italics].	 This testifies to
the fact that the modern PSF organisation had its original terms of refer-
ence shaped by the Army Council.	 Although this does not prove that PSF
continues to be submissive, there have been instances in the recent past
which indicate that PSF still occasionally bows to PIRA's influence. For
example, Bishop and Nallie say that in 1985 the Belfast Brigade engineered
the selection of their favoured candidate, Alex Jiaskey, for a Belfast council
by-election, over Adams' first choice. One might also point to the terms
PIRA appear to have extracted in return for endorsing the abolition of
abstention, which included the over-turning of a pro-abortion motion passed
in 1985 and a general toning down in PSP's socialist rhetoric.7
It is possible that the denials of association are mere legal niceties
to prevent PSP's proscription. It is also clear that over the past ten
years PSF has moved out of P IRA's shadow and gained greater control over its
own affairs, though whether this has made it wholly independent of PIRA is
still a matter for debate. The closest that the available evidence permits
us to say is that there are probably a number of unofficial links and assoc-
iations, possibly based on personal contacts, which result in a degree of
mutual understanding and informal co-operation. Certainly, the distinctly
ad hoc fashion in which PSF believes it can rely on PIRA's assistance, lends
weight to this interpretation. In hoping that PIRA would help PSF at elec-
tion times by reducing the number of operations, Xorrison has said: 'We
would like to think that the IRA would appreciate when to take an expedient
45. Ibid..
46. Bishop and Rallie, p. 304.
47. Clarke1 p. 231.
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holiday for a week." At other times, Adams has sought to emphasise PSF's
separation by distancing the party from PIRA: 'Sinn Fain does not unambig-
uously support the IRA, we support their right to engage in armed struggle.
No-one should give unambiguous support to any organisation or institution."
Either way, separate or subordinate, PSF does not appear to receive the
close co-operation it may wish from PIRA, as evidenced by the failure of
Adams' strictures on avoiding mistakes to modify PIRA's operating procedures
to any noticeable extent. Nor, from the information contained in Table 3,
does PIRA seem to have paid much attention to Morrison's call for undeclared
ceasefiree come elections. The political damage that this lack of co-ordin-
ation can inflict on PSF's progress, and the movement's prospects generally,
is immense. The Harrods bomb, and later the Brighton bombing, did a great
deal to erode the contacts which PSF had been trying to build up with the
British left. Outright support from the broad left could never have been
expected so long as PIRA's violence continued, but the sympathy of some on
the far left could be preserved if PIRA waged a restrained campaign.
Although the far left never extended its influence into government during
the 1980s, which seemed a possibility early in the decade, such contacts
could still have proved a useful bridgehead into British politics. Clumsy
operations like Harrods have placed sympathisers in a moral quandary over
whether to support a movement that carries out operations which kill
civilians. The Brighton bomb, on the other hand, had the effect of
strengthening the Conservative government's image, something guaranteed to
bring the Provisionals into contempt in the eyes of virtually all those on
the left of British politics.'0
The lack of any apparent co-ordination between PSP initiatives and PIRA
48. Quoted in P. Bishop, 'A Gunmen Cleans Up His Act', The Observer 17 April
1983.
49. Interview with Adams, The Last Post.
50. See K. Toolie, 'The British Left After Brighton', Fortnight, Nov. 1985.
-350-
operations, has helped squander opportunities to expand the movement's base
of sympathisers in Great Britain.	 In lorthern Ireland the consequences
could also be acute. In the by-elections of 23 January 1986, prompted by
the mass resignations of Unionist XPs in protest against the Hillsborough
Agreement, PSF contested 4 constituencies (Fermanagh and South Tyrone, lid-
Ulster, lewry and Armagh and South Down) and received only 6.8% of the vote.
A contributary element in PSF's poor performance appeared to lie in the fact
that for the previous year PIRA had been engaged in a campaign of attacks
against RUG stations and British Army barracks, in the main using highly
inaccurate home-made mortars which invariably damaged neighbouring houses.
In the 8 months leading up to the by-elections, PIRA had carried out 21
attacks on such establishments. 	 learly all occurred in the four constit-
uencies in which PSF chose to stand.'
The evidence presented above suggests that there is little political
guidance of the military instrument, either because PSF is a subsidiary arm
of PIRA, or more likely, because PSF is a semi-detached organisation without
any direct say in the use of violence. If this is the case, then it blows
away the entire rationale concerning the armed struggle's relationship with
the total strategy. How can the armed struggle be considered merely as one
tactic to be used or discarded in accordance with its functionality if there
is no political control over the application of force in the first place?
Therefore, if we take people like Adams at their word, and accept that there
are no formal PSF links with PIRA, then why should anyone bother listening
to such a minor party and fellow traveller of the Provisional IRA? There
is no point in talking to PSF about political settlements or ceasefirea if it
has no influence, apart from moral suasion, over PIRA. Bven if PSF wanted
an end to violence there is nothing it can do to ensure PIRA would stop.
Instead, the regulation of the military instrument appears to remain in the
51. See 'Guerrilla Var', AFIRE 18 Sept. 1986. See also Clarke, p. 232.
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hands of the shadowy Army Council which is free to employ violence wherever
it so chooses unaccountable to anyone beyond its own organ isat ion.
The confusion at the heart of Provisional strategy leaves a series of
questions about the movement's underlying attitude towards the practice of
violence. Is the inability to impose control over the armed struggle, for
all the talk of calculating it on the basis of its utility, symptomatic of a
continuing romantic attachment to physical force? Adams pronounces the
armed struggle to be a 'morally correct form of resistance.' Be also sees
it as an effective form of resistance:
...the British Government rarely listens to the force of argument. It
understands only the argument of force... Armed struggle, however, is not
merely a defensive reaction by an oppressed people. It sets the politi-
cal agenda. Thus armed struggle can advance the overall struggle to the
advantage of those in whose interest it is waged.
This combination of moral approval and assertion, though rarely explanation,
of the instrumentality of the armed struggle, intimates at an emotional
affinity with the use of force. Physical force is not only one of the most
important unifying factors in the movement, it is really the only feature
which preserves the Provisionals' notoriety and identity. Indeed, Adams has
emphasised the commitment to the armed struggle as a means of differentia-
ting the Provisionals from their rivals in the Officials: 'For anyone who has
eyes to see, it is clear that the Sticky leadership had abandoned the armed
struggle as a form of resistance to British rule... For our part, this leader-
ship has been active in the longest phase of resistance to the British pres-
ence. Our record speaks for itself.' When the Provisionals use the
armed struggle in this manner to distinguish themselves from their political
rivals, it casts doubt over whether the efficacy of physical force can ever
be seriously challenged under the aegis of the total strategy without causing
huge internal disruption. It suggests that force is still regarded as an
52. Adams Presidential Address (1989), pp. 3-4.
53. Adams, 'Presidential Address' (1986), in PSF, The Politics of Revolution,
p. 11.
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unimpeachable facet of republican resistance. A contribution to the
confidential PSF journal, Iris Bheag, a good guide to the feelings of local
activists, argued: 'Vithout the war there would be no cutting edge... This
means calling off the armed struggle is not an option open to the Irish
revolution.'	 Such views, assuming they are prevalent in PSF, exhibit an
air of permanence regarding the military instrument. It is possible to
speculate whether the loyalty to the campaign of violence professed by PSP's
leaders is genuine or simply an implicit admission that they have no auth-
ority over PIRA and that the military instrument is, therefore, inherently
uncontrollable. XcGuinness once said: 'Sinn Fein would never consider any
suggestion that it should dictate operational conditions to the men and
women who engage in the legitimate armed struggle against the forces of
British imperialism,u thus leaving open the question as to whether this
was a statement of voluntary restraint on the part of PSF, or merely, as
seems more probable, confirmation of a pro-existing fact?
The questions posed are difficult to answer with precision due to legal
smoke-screens and clashing or insufficient evidence. The commitment to
violence no doubt remains a complex mixture of motives, and with all the
emotional energy invested in the symbol of physical force in the republican
tradition it is perhaps too much to expect even the radical politico-Prov-
isionals to treat the subject on a purely practical level. Yet the distinct
impression persists that there is still no meaningful political management
of the use of violence. Although PIRA may not willfully ignore PSF's advice
on military matters, it is evident that PIRA is free to reject it, if it so
wishes. Along with differing organisational structures, the traditionally
dominant role of the IRA over Sinn Fein and the difficulty of imposing firm
control over local ASUs, it is patent that PIRA remains independent of any
4. Sean Doite, 'After Enniskillen', Iris Bheag, Jo. 5, Dec. 1987, p. 13.
55. XcGuinness, 'Ve Vill Never Be Slaves Again'.
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external authority. On more than one occasion this has been openly stated.
In 1983, for example, a member of PlEA's leadership proclaimed: 'The military
struggle will not slow down to relate to Sinn Fein's political activity. If
anything, subject to logistical considerations, the war is likely to be
stepped up'. lore implicit assertions of autonomy from political con-
straints lived on through the 1980s in PlEA's continuing tendency to issue
belligerently worded statements to 'carry on the struggle through 1984 until
victory's" and by emphasising that the 'armed struggle will continue and
continue while finding ways of intensifying the war.'
The question of military autonomy has been stressed as a recurring
problem in Irish republican strategy and was explained in some detail in
Chapter 3. PlEA is by no means unique in comparison with other small
conspiritorial insurgent groups, especially those which sprang up in Western
Europe during the 1970s. However, the lack of a definite political-military
nexus within republican strategy underlines the curious nature of the move-
ment with regard to the degree to which the military arm has consistently
prevailed over political considerations and continues to regulate the repub-
lican struggle. To reiterate what Adams says, the armed struggle 'sets the
political agenda'. But can the agenda itself be regulated? The balance of
the evidence suggests that this is not possible as the military instrument
under PIRA alone cannot be guaranteed as a functional element in war to be
deployed in a measured way under politically controlled conditions.
Contradictions in the Rhetoric of British Vithdrawal
The issue of political control is not something which exists in the abstract
as a debating point for strategic theorists. Failure to accurately define
the role of force in the political process can prevent the military
5C. Interview with PIRA spokesperson, Nagill, July 1983.
5?. Interview with PIRA spokesperson, AF/RJ, 5 Jan. 1984.
58. 'Until Britain Tires', Sceal, (PSF, Newry), 29 Sept. 1988.
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instrument from being properly directed to achieve appropriate ends. At
worst, this can lead to the indiscriminate application of violence in a
manner which can hinder the attainment of objectives. Because low intens-
ity warfare strategies often seek to use military engagements as a means of
pressure rather than physical denial, their practitioners have to exercise
considerable political caution in order to avoid both the wastage of scarce
military resources and the provocation of enemy counter-measures which
restrict the freedom to operate. Although the contemporary Provisional
movement may not fit the worst case example, the lack of effective political
stewardship of P1RA still makes it difficult to discern the exact purpose of
armed force in relation to the main objective of effecting the removal of
Northern Ireland from the UK.
The chief task in resolving this difficulty lies In trying to detect,
from private and public pronouncements, the decisive point at which the
Provisionals believe military pressure should be applied to get the British
to concede to their will. PIRA's Green Book appears explicit. It categ-
orises the 'main enemy' to be 'the establishment', which is defined as 'all
those who have a vested interest in maintaining the present status quo In
politicians, media, judiciary, certain business elements and the Brit war
machine comprising the Brit Army, the UDR, RUG, Screws (prison officers],
Civilian Searchers.' The interests which this group has In perpetuating
the status quo is seen to range variously from personal gain and economic
exploitation to the politicians' obsession with the Russian threat and the
desire to protect British security interests on the Western flank.° On a
number of occasions the Provisionals have tried to be more specific about
the nature of their political enemy. In 1981 O'Bradaigh proclaimed: 'What's
meant by the expression NEnglandu is the English ruling classes who have
59. Quoted in Coogan, pp. 691-092.
00. See Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedo3, pp. 90-97.
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dominated and exploited the Irish people, and indeed, much of the world in
their time and have also exploited their own working people as is clear from
those who wish to study it.1 According to PIRA's leadership: 'we do not
intend to hold the British people responsible for their government's crimes
in Ireland.	 Any attacks will be limited to the British political estab-
lishment and to military targets.'	 In the main, PIRA's actions have
remained consistent with such statements. Attacks in Northern Ireland are
usually designed to intimidate those categories of people listed in the Green
Book to desist from supporting the institutions of the state. Striking at
figures in the political establishment is one of the ways in which the Prov-
isionals believe they can have an impact on governmental decision making.
In the aftermath of the Brighton bombing, Adams declared that the operation
had been successful in forcing the British to apply 'attention once again to
what's happening in the Six Gounties', while Xorrison argued that if the
cabinet had been killed it would have produced a 'rethink in British polit-
ical circles which would have led to a British withdrawal in a much shorter
period.
Doubtless, attacks against prestige political targets remain a priority
for the Provisionals, but because they are mostly well protected it is
unlikely that PlEA can focus sufficient military pressure on this area to
force a fundamental shift in British policy. For these sorts of reasons
the pivotal factor in dislodging establishment interests in Ireland in PlEA's
view, resides, not in altering the opinions of those in government, but in
changing the perceptions of the British populace as a whole. 	 During an
interview in 1984, a PIRA spokesperson stated:
61. Interview with R. O'Bradaigh, Iris, April 1981.
62. Interview with PIRA spokespersons, Nagill, July 1983.
63. 'Adams Says Bombing had Calculated Aim', The Irish Times, 15 Oct. 1984.
64. Quoted in 'RUG Vithhold Comment on SF Interview', The Irish Times
15 Oct. 1984.
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Such a strategy relies on the premise that the British people do not
support British government sponsored murder in Ireland, that they want
their troops withdrawn from Ireland as indicated in opinion polls, and
that they have the potential to eventually force the British government,
because of the cost of the war or the attrition rate or because of denor-
alisation and war weariness, to withdraw from Ireland. Such a strategy
requires the belief that if the British people really knew what was going
on in their name they would support the right of the Irish people to
eelf-determination.
At first glance, all the above quotations appear to express a logical
account of the function of the armed struggle within the total strategy
framework. On closer inspection, they can be revealed as confused, contra-
dictory and, in some cases, self-refuting. In the first instance, if the
argument runs that Britain is governed by an exploitative ruling class which
maintains entrenched interests in Ireland, then why should the political
establishment take any notice of what their own people say? The very
notion of a ruling class means that the views of the majority have little or
no influence on those who govern. Therefore, what is the point in hoping
that public opinion will be able to affect policy towards Northern Ireland?
The Provisionals themselves seem implicitly to admit the dubiousness of this
proposition in the passage quoted by complaining that the British government
is defying popular feeling as expressed through opinion polls. In order to
rationalise this analytical problem the Provisionals contradict themselves
by conceding that Great Britain Is internally democratic, so ending up in
even more of a rhetorical mess. By asserting that public attitudes can
affect the definition of the national interest, the Provisionals are acknowl-
edging that the British people are responsible for the situation in Ireland
as it is they who allow the action of the political establishment to be
perpetuated through disinterest if nothing else.
It follows that if the British polity is underpinned by democratic
consent, then it is the British people as much as their rulers who are the
enemy. In spite of the diasavowals, it is apparent that the Provislonals do
65. PIRA interview, APIRN, 5 Jan. 1984.
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harbour certain notions of mass British culpability. This is often reflect-
ed when describing the rationale for mainland bombing campaigns: 'It's only
when strikes are carried out in Britain that the complacency and indif-
ference of the British people themselves becomes broken.' Although the
Provisionals are anxious to avoid civilian casualties, there is little doubt
that a basic antipathy towards the British in general lurks beneath the
surface of PIRA's rhetoric, where such options as the deliberate targeting of
ordinary British citizens may appeal to the instincts of certain republican
extremists. In the aforementioned interview, the Provisionals warned:
Vhat the British people have to realise is that because of their apathy
towards Ireland, which is extremely frustrating, and because of British
atrocities in Ireland, some oppressed Irish people and republican sup-
porters, out of desperation, would view no-warning bombs as a way of
shaking up the British people and their government.7
The comfort that the Provisionals draw from opinion polls conducted on
the mainland can also be challenged. By their nature, opinion polls provide
only a rough guide to public feelings and are prone to fluctuate, especially
on complicated issues, and consequently tend to produce mixed findings.
Like many political actors, the Provisionals simply select those results
which are the mast favourable to their point of view. In the mid-1980s one
of the polls mast agreeable to the republican position, suggested that 45% of
those sampled were against lorthern Ireland remaining in the UK while 43%
believed the government should hold direct talks with the Provisionals.
Yet 39%, still a sizeable number 1 were in favour of the statue' qua. A
more extensive survey of British attitudes was revealed in a Daily Express-
XORI poll in 1987. The findings provided some encouragement for the Prov-
isionals with 61% wanting a withdrawal of troops (22% for immediate with-
drawal, 39% for a phased withdrawal, against 34% in favour of keeping the
troops in the province for as long as necessary). Furthermore, 55% agreed
66. D. O'Canaill, quoted in O'Xalley, p. 287.
67. PIRA interview, AFIREI 5 Jan. 1984.
68. The Guardian, 27 Aug. 1.984.
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that the province was costing too much to maintain. However, attitudes
were more divided when it came to political settlements with 58% favouring
non-republican solutions, (29% in favour of Northern Ireland remaining part
of the UK and 29% supporting Independence) while Irish unity was the least
favoured solution (27%) .
Broadly, results from opinion polls have been ambiguous rather than
conclusive. Even if poiis reflect decisively against the retention of
Northern Ireland as part of the state, it would still take a remarkable level
of public cynicism to expel a consenting region of the UK. Such cynicism
is simply not evident within British society. For example, in 1980 one
poll recorded that 50% of people would vote against Northern Ireland rem-
aining In the UK. Yet two-thirds of those questioned said that it was for
the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own future with only 8%
believing that anyone elsewhere in the UK should be consulted.7°
Proceeding from thought to action is the true test of the intensity of
public feelings on any issue. PIRA's campaign may have had a negative
effect on popular regard for Northern Ireland, but this has been insufficient
to override public attitudes towards the maintenance of certain democratic
principles like that of regional consent and self-determination. Indeed,
when one examines the practicalities of a British withdrawal against the
wishes of the majority in the province, or more specifically, against the
will of the Protestant community, the prospect looks highly troublesome.
Opinion surveys in Northern Ireland consistently register huge Protestant
majorities in favour of remaining inside the UK, as high as 91% of the
community,7 with one poll in the late 1970s revealing only 1.5% Protestant
support for a united Ireland.' 2 The near monolithic nature of Protestant
89. The Daily Hxpress, 10 Feb. 1987.
70. The Guardian, 22 Dec. 1980.
71. New Society, 8 Sept. 1979.
72. Noxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland, p. 24.
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opposition when confronted with the united Ireland option, suggests that the
forcible incorporation of the province into an all- Ireland framework could
well meet with considerable resistance. The question of the military
balance is important here. The RUG is the second largest and most heavily
armed police force in the UK with over 12,000 officers (including reserves).
The UDR is the largest regiment in the British Army numbering some 6300
members. Being 90% and 97% Protestant in composition respectively, they
can ultimately be treated as offshoots of the unionist community, and should
they choose to resist the imposition of any initiative, would represent a
formidable military bloc in themselves. Indeed, along with the UDA, the
largest paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, currently with an estimated
membership of 13,000 and other assorted loyalist factions, plus the number
of Ulstermen serving with regular Irish regiments in the British Army, the
territorial reserves and other branches of the armed services, as well as
the other licenced firearms in the province (125,904 in 1988),7a one could
plausibly claim, that for its size, the loyalist community is the mast miii-
tarised in the world. In total, if one adds in all those who have passed
through these organisations over a 20-year period since 1969/70, one is
talking about a vast body of people with military experience, access to
weapons and control over the intelligence system and security apparatus.
Should an anti-unionist solution be imposed on the province, it is difficult
to envisage the Protestant community consenting to be disarmed as the Pra y
-isionals wish, except with the greatest of reluctance.	 It is not unreal-
istic to posit that massed and armed Protestant resistance could be numbered
in tens and possibly hundreds of thousands, conceivably even out-numbering
the entire regular British Army. Voluntary disarmament of the loyalist
community is therefore an improbable notion, while physical suppression
would be a hazardous undertaking. Suppression would also apply a double
73. Chief Constable's Annual Report (Belfast, 1988), p. 26.
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standard.	 If the British and republicans are prepared to countenance the
extirpation of Protestant resistance, then Protestants could argue with equal
force for the wholesale subjugation of the republicans. Overall, the mili-
tary balance in Northern Ireland indicates that the imposition of any sett-
lement remains potentially unenforceable if the Protestants choose to resist
en passe. Further, if the British operate in Ireland on the basis of self-
interest, as the Provisionals contend, then following this logic, Britain
cannot be expected to fight a costly war against the Protestant community.
Aside from the question of whether it is in Britain's moral or physical
power to deliver Protestant acquiescence, there is little to suggest that
PIRA's actions, either in Northern Ireland or the mainland, can produce the
intended effect of disillusioning both public and government to the extent
where the disengagement of Northern Ireland from the JK is seriously con-
templated. At beet, this intention can be described as an assertion, at
worst, a wholly discredited military objective. One of the most significant
findings of the 19B7 Di1y Express-NOR I poll was that only 3% of respond-
ents placed Northern ireland as an urgent problem on their list of priorit-
ies. Noreover, 45% believed the conflict to be a religious war. Only 6%
blamed the British Army for the trouble while a negligible 2% thought that
the border was a factor. 'Generally, the survey leaves an impression of
apathy and contempt' complained an article in An Phoblacht/Republican News,
'Ireland can still safely be kept at the very back of the election manifee-
toe'.7' Such comments, whether intended or not, are an indictment of the
failure of PIRL's strategy. After nearly two decades of violence the Prov-
isionals' efforts, by their own admission, have produced no more than an air
of impassive insouciance amongst the only group of people who they believe
have a significant degree of leverage over the British government. If one
chooses to follow the Provisionals' arguments, then one can say that they
74. II. XacThomas, 'British Public Says "Jo", AFIRE, 12 Feb. 1987.
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have unwittingly hindered their own cause by desensitising the British
public to the kind of low level military campaign which PlEA wages, thereby
contributing to the air of general apathy which they so bitterly resent. In
so doing, the Provisionals are helping to perpetuate the very conditions in
which the 'ruling establishment's' activities in Ireland can flourish free
from any popular inquiry.
Where does all this leave the Provisionals' strategy? There is scant
consistency in PlEA's rhetoric on the subject, reflecting little methodical
construction as to how the military instrument can be employed within the
context of the total strategy to bring about the desired changes. This
leaves the Provisionals looking both intellectually and physically vulnerable
in the sense that they can neither field solid evidence for the effectiveness
of their strategy, nor provide any adequate answer, should they actually
succeed in encouraging the British to disengage, about how to survive, let
alone overcome, the potential power of Protestant resistance. The lack of
clarity in the mechanics of PIRA's strategy conceals a deeper flaw in the
Provisional's design.	 It would be fair to surmise that a confusion in
rhetoric is also a symptom of a confusion in analysis. If so, this
suggests that despite the revisions in strategic thinking since the late
1970s, the Provisionals still do not possess a clear understanding of the
role, efficacy and limitations of the armed struggle.
The Inequality of Power - PilL's Eternal Dilemma
The imprecision with which the Provisionals regard the function of the mili-
tary instrument derives in part from the nature of the long war/total strat-
egy. There is no question that the total strategy is a far more advanced
theory than the outright military pasture of the early 1970s. The aim is
to yield absolute military potential for time, in the hope that over the
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long-term a reduced but steady level of operations, combined with political
activities away from the military conflict, will eventually defeat British
resolve to hold Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. As discussed
in Chapter 6, the strategy is a rarif led form of psychological attrition.
Yet for all the refinement of the total strategy it is a paradoxical con-
struct which, again, fails to square with much of the Provislonals' rhetoric.
Although the military instrument is theoretically graded as a tactic
within the total strategy, the Provisionals still recognise the unique pres-
eurising and publicity-getting properties that a campaign of violence poss-
esses compared to other methods of resistance. As a consequence, the
Provisionals continue to extol the virtues of the armed struggle: 'The IRA by
unrelenting armed struggle, has made (the British) foothold (in Ireland] a
very costly one for the British establishment U'B It is plain that the
Provisionals still regard physical force as the key component in their cam-
paign to obtain a British withdrawal. They pledge that 'attacks will con-
tinue and escalate until the final option is taken and Britain leaves Ireland
for good.' One might enquire, If the armed struggle plays such a vital
role for the Provislonals, why should they then adopt a strategy and organ-
isational system where the main coercive element is scaled down by such an
appreciable degree? Given the extent of infiltration by the security forces
in the 1970s, it was quite obvious that PIRA could not have carried on with
the battalion structure without jeopardising the survival of the movement.
Yet a lot of the advantages and disadvantages of dropping the old structure
and shifting to the cell system have largely cancelled each other out. By
reorganising into such a small force PIRA has been unable to sustain con-
certed offensives of the kind which did so much to destabilise Northern Ire-
land in the early 1970s. In addition, the reduction in the number of PIRA
75. AFIRE, 3 larch 1988.
76. 'Taking Stock', APIRI, 24 April 1986.
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activists makes it far easier for the security forces to concentrate their
resources against known operatives which leaves the movement just as vulner-
able to lasses in personnel as it was under the old system. In particular,
the successful monitoring and penetration of PIRA has led to a rise in the
number of counter—ambushes mounted by the security forces 1 most notably by
the Special Air Service (SAS). Between 1978 and 1988. some 30 PlEA
members had been killed in SAS operations. 77 The periods between 1983 and
1984, and between 1987 and 1988, were particularly severe as the Provision-
ale lost around 15 and 20 members respectively to accidents and shoot-outs.
Combined with the arrests of PIRA members, (628 persons were charged with
offences in connection with republican paramilitary activities between 1981
and i987), such losses are bound to have a serious impact on a small
organisation.	 The damage is not felt just in numerical terms but also in
the lose of experience and seniority. For example, in lay 1987 one of
PIRA's most hardened units, the East Tyrone Brigade, was all but wiped out
when 8 of its men were killed in an SAS ambush during an attack on an RUG
station at Loughall, Co. Armagh.7' The move to the cell system has thus
made even modest losses hard to bear. Earlier in the mid-1980s, when PIRA
was suffering heavy casualties with 6 personnel killed between November 1983
and June 1984, the Provisionals acknowledged that; 'By any standard, it is a
high rate of attrition by a ruthless and undeniably sophisticated British
enemy with far greater manpower and technical resources than the IRA has at
its comiiand.'°
One purpose of the long war/total strategy is to help deal with the
problem of facing a stronger opponent. In particular, it is designed to
overcome the danger of provoking a massive security crackdown which PLEA
77. See Appendix A, J. Adams, et al, Ambush, pp. 191-192.
78. Source: RUG Statistics.
79. 'Tyrone Group One of lost Active', The Irish Tines, 11 Nay 1987.
80. 'A War of Sacrifice and Attrition', Iris, Aug. 1984.
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may not be able to withstand. The intention is to offset the loss of
direct military pressure by making greater political capital out of low level
engagements in order to demonstrate growing political support in place of
growing military momentum. However, the total strategy does not eliminate
the escalation dilemma but merely displaces it to another dimension of the
conflict. The point is that any reasonably sophisticated counter-insurgent
will view a conflict as a many sided confrontation, not simply one which
exists on the military/security plane, and fashion repsonses accordingly.
In other words, a counter-insurgent will usually have the potential to
interdict what one may call an opponent's 'political escalation' just as
effectively as military escalation. The political strides made by PSF in
the early 1980s came as a shock to the British, but it spurred the govern-
ment to find more effective means of dealing with the Provisionals, the
outcome being the Anglo- Irish Agreement. The Agreement can be seen as a
response to stave off danger in the political field just as Operation
Xotorman was a reaction to the heightened military threat posed by the
Provisionals in mid-1972. According to the Provisionals: 'The catalyst for
the Hillaborough Treaty was undoubtedly a combination of the Brighton bomb
and the electoral rise of Sian Fein.'' This may be true, but it is immat-
erial. The fact that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is a development which has
taken place outside the military arena in response to a perceived political/
security threat, does not mean that PSF can expect to benefit politically
from the introduction of a measure intended to stunt its growth.
Despite their attempts to claim credit for the introduction of the
Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Provislonals have always viewed the Anglo-Irish
process as a piece of counter-insurgency aimed at 'putting a diplomatic
veneer on British rule and injecting a credibility to constitutional nation-
81. Iris, Oct. 1987.
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alism so that British rule and Its interests can be stabilised in the long-
term.' In 1985 the perceived dangers to the Provisionals' position
initiated a debate within the movement on how to respond to the introduction
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Informed journalistic sources in the weeks
before the signing of the Agreement, said that the Provisionals believed any
London-Dublin agreement would initially be a trap to entice the movement to
escalate Its military campaign in order to try to kill off the deal, possibly
by inciting unionist anger through a return to indiscriminate bombings, so
providing the pretext for a security clampdown. 3 Such reports were endor-
sed following the signing of the Hillsborough Accord when the Provisionals
stated their belief that the two governments were trying to create 'a climate
in which coercive moves against Sinn Fein would be made possIble.' In
fact, it seems that the Provisionals had settled on their response over a
month before the signing, deciding that an intensification of violence was
simply too risky. In October they outlined their intentions:
.,.the IRA is stating that actions will not be carried out that are
specifically aimed at dramatically undermining or wrecking the (Anglo-
Irish] talks or summit. In this way, the IRA intends to expose the
weaknesses of constitutional nationalism and strengthen the case that
real gains - independence, peace with justice - can only be achieved
through struggle and resistance, through expanding the revolutionary
armed struggle of the Irish Republican Army!
The Anglo- Irish Agreement had thus scored its first success against
the Provisionals by placing them in a double bind. Either they could
escalate the conflict, which would damage their electoral support and justify
a security clampdown, or they could forego a direct military challenge to the
Anglo-irish Agreement and risk losing the political initiative they had
established over the past few years by allowing the benefits of the Agree-
ment to materialise and appeal to the nationalist community. 	 The effects
82. G. Adams, 'Presidential Address', AP/RI, 7 Nov. 1985.
83. See B. Noloney, 'Provos Wait for the Anglo-Irish Offensive', Fortnight,
21 Oct. 1985.
84. 'Attempt to Isolate Republicans', AP/RI, 21 Nov. 1985.
85. 'IRA Not To Be Drawn,' AP/RI, 3 Oct. 1985.
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of choosing the latter course of action were soon apparent in PSF's poor
showing in the January 1986 by-elections.
	 The Agreement had been immedi-
ately popular with many nationalists.	 This bolstered the standing of the
SDLP, the party with which the Agreement was most closely associated. Even
some PSP voters were initially sympathetic.	 According to one opinion poll,
22% of PSF voters favoured the Agreement while 10% were strongly support-
ive.	 The erosion of PSF's electoral fortunes were confirmed by the 1989
local elections and by the European election of June the same year when PSF
attained only 9.1% of the vote. 7
	The loss of political impetus in the
years following the Agreement's introduction is still a cause of concern to
the Provisionals. One source admitted PSF's 'lack of ability to influence
political events against a background of the Hilleborough Agreement,' and
added, 'as an organisation we have not been able to coma to terms with the
reality of the effects of Hillsborough within the nationalist community.'
The Provisionals' fear of political iiarginalisation increased further in
the late 1980s following the imposition of a series of media restrictions on
the broadcasting of interviews with paramilitary organisations and their
supporters. The restrictions were introduced in November 1988 as a res-
ponse to an upsurge in PIRA activity earlier in the year which culminated in
the killing of 8 soldiers in a bomb attack on an Army coach in August.
Regulations of a similar kind have existed in the Republic of Ireland since
1976, though these prohibit rather than restrict, the transmission of any
paramilitary interviews. 	 PSF has frequently blamed these curbs for its
electoral failures in the South. 	 'Censorship of Slim Fein is a crucial
factor in the Dublin establishment's campaign of disinformation and a cent-
ral part of its effort to marginalise us,' claimed Adams after the disap-
86. Fortnight, Oct. 1986.
87. Fortnight, July/Aug. 1989.
88. 'Denis the Nenace', 'Needs of the Struggle'.
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pointment of the 1987 e1ection.	 PSF has become increasingly disturbed
that sets of controls in both countries are hampering its ability to extend
its message beyond its core of support. In 1989 PSFS publicity director,
Danny Xorrison, disclosed that enquiries to PSF's press centre from the
British broadcasting media in the 4 months following the introduction of the
restrictions had fallen to 110, compared to 471 in the preceding 4 months.'°
Behind the worries about PSF's electoral prospects lies the Provision-
als' anxiety that what they are seeing in the developments in Anglo-Irish
relations, accompanied by measures like the broadcasting controls and so on,
is the conjunction of forces lining up against them. Their view is that the
Anglo- Irish Agreement is intended to push the unionists into a power sharing
deal with the constitutional nationalists while the Irish government under-
pins this process by 'policing the border' and 'supporting British initita-
tives." The Provisionals are fearful that political isolation will set the
context for the 'Nilitary and legal suppression of republicans.' 2 It Is
manifest from what the Provisionals say that they want a relaxed security
regime in which to practise their strategy. They do not harbour any wist-
ful notions about a harsher security regime somehow being of benefit to
insurgents. One contributor to Iris Bheag, warned the movement, 'not to
place hope in inadequate theories that resistance rises autonomously out of
repression.1a Being strong advocates of the utility of the armed force,
the Provisionals themselves are, conversely, also afraid of its power should
they feel threatened by their enemies with similar means.
The spectre of suppression and political oblivion has prompted a wide
debate inside PSP about how to tackle the movement's isolation from the
political mainstream. Two internal conferences, one in 1986 and the other
89. Interview with G. Adams, The Irish People (USA), 7 Xarch 1987.
90. D. Norrison, Ireland: The Censored Subject (Dublin, 1989), pp. 9-10.
91. Hillsborough - The Balance Sheet 1985-88: A Failure (Dublin, 1989), p. 13.
92. Ibid., p. 13.
93. 'Paxo', 'A Question About Enniskillen', Iris Bheag, No. 5, Dec. 1987, p. 16.
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in 1987, concluded that the best way forward would be to develop a broad
front by uniting other small pressure groups and parties around themes upon
which all could agree, like the desire to expel Britain from Jorthern Ire-
land. Such a coalition would campaign on a wide range of economic, social
and cultural issues in the South in order to 'polarise the people against the
Free State government', and eventually build up the necessary base of support
to 'undermine collaboration between the Free State and the Brits."
	 The
most noticeable result of this new emphasis on coalition building has been
the banishment of much of the overt socialist idealism from PSF's propa-
ganda. Danny lorrison even took some of his colleagues to task for using
obscure socialist terminology which he believed inhibited public under-
standing of PSF's position.	 'Introducing Xarxist esperanto', he argued, 'is
one sure way of keeping the revolution at bay.'
	 Adams also stressed the
'need to avoid ultra-republican positions'. Me outlined the way in which
the Provisionals should seek to broaden the appeal of the movement while
keeping it firmly on republican lines:
Ye have to proceed on the basis of the lowest possible common denomin-
ator and at the level of peopie's understanding... Ye have to understand
those who oppose us. Ye have to view all this in political terms and
develop policies accordingly. The guiding light for such policies must
be that they are based on general republican principles and that they
bring us somewhere along the road towards our objectives, meeting the
needs of the people and the particular conditions which exist?
The most tangible sign of PSP'S desire to establish its political cred-
entials amongst a wider audience came in January 1988, when the party began
a formal dialogue with the SDLP. PSF's goal in the talks was to engage the
SDLP in an attempt to priorities the issue of Irish unification by pressing
the Irish government to launch a 'diplomatic offensive to secure national
94. 'Tonto', 'The Internal Conference - Some Reflections', h-is Bheag, Jo. 1,
1987, pp. 5-6.
95. D. Jorrison, 'Bad Language (1)', h-is Bbeag, Jo. 3, 1987, pp. 7-8.
96. 'A Bus Ride to Independence and Socialism' speech given to PSF Internal
Conference 1986 in G. Adams, Signposts to Independence and Socialism'
(Dublin, 1988), p. 16.
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self-determination.' 7 PSF stated that the aim of its political struggle in
Northern Ireland: 'is to popularise opposition to British rule, and to extend
that opposition into some form of broad anti-imperialist campaign. Our
main political task is to turn opposition to British rule in Ireland into a
political demand for national self-determination.' 	 In subsequent corres-
pondence the SDLP made it clear that support for a Joint initiative would be
conditional on the ending of PIRA's campaign? The logic of the broad
front strategy certainly impale the Provisionals in this direction since
PSF's endorsement of violence is mainly responsible for its isolation and
pariah status on the irish political scene. it is conceivable that a cess-
ation of the armed struggle would enable the movement to profit electorally,
probably by picking up an increased vote from the political left. There
are indications that Adams recognises the obstacle that PIRA's campaign
poses to PSP's involvement in broad front politics. For example, he agreed
that a large measure of the nationalist populations' support for constitu-
tional parties 'rests upon their understandable aversion to the use of phys-
ical force and the consequences of physical force."°° But In a passage
redolent of wanting it both ways, Adams stated:
Such a movement should not be expected to restrict its support to any
particular method of struggle. Therefore, while such a movement would
in itself be a non-armed political movement it should not be expected to
support armed struggle, nor far that matter, condemn it. Individual
members would, as of right, have Individual attitudes towards the use of
armed struggle.'°1
This type of statement encourages the impression that from the Provis-
ionals' own point of view, a broad front would merely be an extravagant
version of PSF which would itself remain something of an adjunct to PIRA.
97. G. Adams, Towards a Strategy for Peace, Letter to J. Hume (PSF Document
No. 1, PSF-SDLP Talks), 14 larch 1988, p. 20.
98. IbId., p. 5.
99. J. Hume, Letter to G. Adams (SDLP Document Jo. 1, PSF-SDLP Talks)
18 larch 1988, p. 5.
100. Adams, A Pathway to Peace, p. 62.
1O1.IbId., p. 77.
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The ambiguity displayed towards the use of force within a possible broad
front scenario reiterates all the suspicions discussed above about the move-
ment's emotional attachment to violence and the inability, or unwillingness,
of PSF to control the military instrument. The doubts surrounding this
issue were confirmed during the talks with the SDLP when the Provisionals
volunteered a curious description of the purpose of armed force. They
began by offering a perfectly valid basis upon which to define the role of
the military instrument within their strategy: 'Armed struggle is seen as a
political option.	 Its use Is considered in terms of achieving national
political aims and the efficacy of other forms of struggle.boa After
stating this, the Provisionals did not go on to elaborate the specific
rationale for the use of force but immediately proceeded to give a moral
justification:
This need to wage an armed struggle arises from within the political
experience of the Northern nationalist community. This experience has
clearly taught them that the inherent undemocratic nature of the Union is
maintained through the superior use of force by the British state; that
the British state still acts against the democratic wish of the Irish
people by its commitment to maintain the Union; and that Britain has no
intention of withdrawing its political, military and economic interests
from the Six Countiee.boa
Not only does the passage not follow logically from the statement which
precedes it, but the imperative contained in the extract, the reference to
the 'need to wage an armed struggle', is never explained. Furthermore, the
reasoning in the excerpt is itself questionable and reinforces the view that
the Frovisionals have little comprehension of the functional value of armed
struggle as the passage inadvertently undermines any subsequent explanation
they may seek to provide regarding the role of armed force in their cam-
paign. The Provisionals argue that the British maintain the union through
the 'superior use of force'. Yet, if the British are prepared to commit that
superior level of force in the first place, then what possible use can PIRA's
102.Adams, Towards a Strategy for Peace, p. 7.
103.Ibid., p. 8.
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Inferior force be in challenging the might of British dominion?
The lack of coherence in the Provisionals' strategic pronouncements led
the SDLP to ask, 'is the method more sacred than the om It is a
question which neatly encapsulates the tensions between those arguments that
the movement may see for keeping the armed struggle and those for dispen-
sing with it for the sake of political progression. If the Provisionals
ever choose to renounce violence in order to participate in mainstream
politics, either as an independent entity or within a broad coalition, the
movement risks losing its sense of identity and becoming submerged among
the welter of other minor parties, thus allowing other groups like RSP to
push themselves forward as the new ultra-nationalist standard bearers. On
the other side, persistence with the campaign of violence merely underwrites
the Provisional& isolation by ensuring their exclusion from any part in the
framing of a political settlement.
Since late 1989 there have been a number of press reports which have
suggested that the Provisionals are engaged in a debate between hardliners
and more pragmatic elements who believe that a military impasse has been
reached and that the movement should call a ceasef ire, possibly to allow PSF
to participate in constitutional talks on the future government of Northern
Ireland.'° At the time of writing nothing of this sort has materialised
and the Provisionals have consistently denied any such talk of a ceasef ire.
Xartin XcGuinness has condemned the reports as a product of 'lazy journal-
ism', which he describes as 'less than useless' because 'it engenders futile,
wishful thinking.l0G	 In television interviews during 1990, Adams has
declared that aside from routine differences of opinion, there is no serious
104,SDLP statement on end of PSF-SDLP Talks, The Irish Tizes, 6 Sept. 1988.
105.See for example, C. Ryder, 'IRA Supporters Debate Calling Bnd to
Violence', The Daily Telegraph, 23 Xarch 1990.
106.X. WcGuinness, 'A lajority... On the Island... Are in Favour of
Unification', FortnIght, April 1990.
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internal debate over the validity of the armed struggle.'° 7 Certainly, the
absence of any firm evidence from the republican side means it is right to
treat rumours of a ceasefire with caution, especially since to call off the
armed struggle to engage in the constitutional politics of the North would
require a huge ideological somersault and would raise the spectre of yet
another split. However, if only partially true, the rumours underline the
difficulties confronting the movement in trying to unify the demands for
more effective political participation with the hardline military exclusivism
of the republican tradition. If anything, the Provisionals' present predica-
ment highlights the fact that the move to abandon abstention was conceived
in haste without a great deal of consideration for the disruptive effects
this was likely to have upon the internal cohesion of republican doctrine.
The rush to bankroll its electoral gains, partly out of a desire to capital-
isa on PSF'e successes earlier in the 1980s, and partly out of fear at the
possible impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on its level of support, seemed
a sensible move at the time. The adoption of a strategy which emphasiees
political activity alongside a military campaign can be highly effective if
the insurgent enjoys an expanding popular base. When the Provisionals
decided to end abstention they were still riding on a wave of optimism
regarding their electoral prospects. Since 198C, however, the Provisionals
have experienced a reversal in their political fortunes which in many ways
has produced the worst possible outcome for the movement, as a contracting
political base merely generates negative publicity by demonstrating to the
outside world that PIRA fights its war on a minority definition of nation-
alism. Yet the Provisionals still rigidly maintain the correctness of their
position.	 The immobilism in their evaluation of the conflict in Northern
Ireland was evident during the talks with the SDLP which concluded in
1O7.Interview with G. Adams, 'Terms for Peace', Dispatches, Channel 4,
12 April 1990. Also, interview with G. Adams, Iewsnight, BBC 2, 20 June
1990.
- 373 -
September 1988. Challenged to accept in principle that it was the deeply
felt objections of Northern Protestants, and not malign British interference,
which prevented Irish unification, Adams merely reasserted the fount of all
republican belief: 'Prom the outset of the dialogue Siun Fein has put the
consistent republican and democratic view that the root cause of the con-
flict in Ireland is to be found in the British government's denial to the
Irish nation of its right to national self-determination."°
Whatever the weaknesses of the Provisionals' analysis, their compact
interpretation of the conflict makes it easier to draw out some of the main
conclusions regarding PIRA's present strategic position. The palarised view
of a straight fight between British imperialism and the forces of Irish
freedom returns us to PIRA's central strategic problem. In essence, no
matter how the Provisionals try to configure their strategy in relation to
their attempts to balance the military and political components of their
campaign, they simply do not possess the capacity to neutralise superior
British power.	 Whatever the merits of the total strategy, it aspires to
reconcile two conflicting requirements. On the one hand, it endeavours to
preserve a degree of coercive military pressure. On the other, it tries to
reduce reliance on military means in order to lower the risk that PIRA's
violence will induce the British to take even sterner counter-measures
against the movement. Although the total strategy does, on the whole, get
the movement off the escalation hook, it should also be said that it gets
the British government off as well since the introduction of counter-insur-
gency measures are always likely to be politically contentious. In effect,
whether the Provisionals realise it or not, they are playing to the British
tune. The efforts to ensure that PIRA's violence is not too provocative is
itself a form of deference to British power. Indeed, one might say that it
assists the British goal of reducing the conflict to a so-called acceptable
108.PSF statement on end of PSF-SDLP Talks, The Irish Tiiies, 6 Sept. 1988.
-374-
level of violence, low that the movement has partially gone down the poli-
tical road, the British are, presumably, content to leave PSF to wrestle with
its self-imposed dilemmas over how to establish its credibility within the
mainstream of Irish political life. The confused and contradictory rhetoric
which has been engendered in trying to resolve the tensions within irish
republican strategic thinking still makes it difficult to determine the exact
function of military instrument. It remains an enigma for outside observ-
ers, and, quite possibly, for the Provisionals themselves.
A war of psychological attrition can be accurately described as a
clash of wills aimed at wearing down an opponent's resolve. However, when
waged by a small and comparatively weak belligerent, a war of psychological
attrition can only be expected to function as a limited pressurising inst-
rument, as the efficacy of such a strategy, and the survival of the organi-
sation which practises it, will ultimately rest on the self-restraint of a
more powerful adversary. This brings us back to PIRA's irreducible
dilemma. Regardless of the intensity with which the Provisiona].s choose to
fight its war, Britain will always have the power to recontain the conflict
at a level it finds tolerable, be it through military operations like
Notorman, legal measures like the Prevention of Terrorism Act, or political
measures like the Anglo-Irish Agreement. If it is tolerable for the
British, then the Provisional IRA has virtually no chance of attaining all
its objectives with its chosen means. The military instrument may be able




This research has attempted to understand and dissect the Irish republican
strategic perspective in order to determine how the movement has seen its
aims being advanced through the employment of armed force. Reference to
strategic theory has been used to help analyse the judgeiients exercised by
the movement on this issue, It is difficult to reach any definitive con-
clusion, not least because republican violence is itself the product of
immensely complex historical antecedents which go beyond the parameters of
strategic theory. In addition, as long as the conflict which the movement
wages is still in progress, the potential will always exist for a change in
conditions to affect the application of military means. Indeed, with an on-
going conflict of this sort, it is tempting to try to analyse the signif 1-
cance of the very latest turn of events. liowever, this would not only be
highly conjectural, but really a futile exercise in running to stand still
which would, as a consequence, be unlikely to enhance our understanding of
the general historical forces which guide the movement's military thinking.
Therefore, this concluding section will try to reflect rather than speculate.
So, accepting that any chronological cut-off paint is inevitably going to be
somewhat arbitrary, let us pause for thought on the development of repub-
lican strategy up to around 1989/90. First, by drawing out some of the
main themes of the thesis we can start to form an overall assessment of the
role of the military instrument within Irish republican strategy.
This research began by outlining a number of ideas that have informed
republican thinking about the use of force in the political process. Kany
of these ideas have been drawn from the inspiration of Volfe Tone, the Young
Irelanders and the Fenians, though the genesis of the Irish republican trad-
ition undoubtedly extends much further back in time. These ideas include
the depiction of Britain as the colonial interloper, the source of all
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Ireland's hardship; the dedication to a purified vision of a nation cleansed
from British influence; and a commitment to the forcible expulsion of the
British from Ireland. The inculcation of these beliefs through a continuous
process of generational revolt coalesced into a staunch, exclusive military
tradition which has formed the ideological core of the Irish republican
strategic thought over many decades.
The 1916 rising was the ultimate expression of republican symbolism;
an exemplary act of sacrificial violence against British authority. For
republicans, the nationalist vanguard was seen to crystallise disaffection
with British rule and set in train the events that were to lead to revolt.
In the Anglo-Irish war the IRA fought a model anti-colonial campaign where
small-scale guerrilla actions were skilfully exploited to pressurise Britain
into a settlement.	 However, full independence and Jurisdiction over the
whole of Ireland could not be achieved by military means alone. Despite
forcing Britain into negotiations, the combined strength of British and
unionist opposition ensured that the island was partitioned and the Irish
Free State granted limited sovereignty. It was at this point that the
tensions in the republican strategic outlook became apparent. The absolute
adherence to the precepts of republican doctrine meant that the movement was
unable to accept the reality of the Treaty settlement. Ideological rigidity
was the main reason why the more pragmatic elements never prospered inside
the movement and at various stages over the next few decades would feel
compelled to withdraw.
The immediate impact of the refusal to come to terms with the Treaty
plunged Ireland back into war. The civil war demonstrated the full weight
of the Irish republican tradition in action; the lack of control over the
military instrument, the inability to recognise the extent of the power of
its opponents and the total belief in the efficacy of violence in pursuit of
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the true republic.	 The civil war marked the complete domination of ideo-
logical symbolism over practical considerations of the use of force. Even
after the trauma of defeat, the notion of the unfinished revolution and the
feeling of ideological betrayal continued to prevail within republican strat-
egic thought. Consequently, the pressure to engage in military action
remained pervasive. The 1939 bombing campaign and the 1956-82 border war
epitomised the image of a self-possessed military organisation devoid of
coherence and direction. The reinterpretation of the armed struggle within
a social revolutionary context, though a radical departure from standard
republican practice, represented the rise of the socialist-republican trad-
ition to a position of predominance in the movement's leadership. Even so,
with the mounting sectarian conflagrations over the civil rights issue in
Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, the more traditional and Northern based
elements of the IRA increasingly came to view the preoccupation with the
techniques of social revolution as an irrelevant indulgence.
The Provisional IRA's campaign from 1970 to 1977 mirrored almost
exacttly the republican experience between 1919 to 1962. The effectiveness
of PIRA's strategy again tempted the British into talking with the republican
leadership in the summer of 1972. However, the uncompromising nature of
republican doctrine prevented the Provisionals from seeing war as a barg-
aining instrument.	 This made the movement incapable of converting its
military successes into political gains. Frustrated in its attempts to
reach its objectives with its limited means, and having already stimulated
the activities of the Protestant paramilltaries, PIRA tried to reaffirm its
military strength which merely provoked a security crackdown from its more
powerful British adversary. After Operation Motorman, the Provisionals lost
much of their momentum and have never regained such a position of potential
influence. Vith the protraction of the conflict, the ideological symbols of
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republicanism again started to assert themselves as the main regulators of
the movement's military activity. This was especially noticeable during the
1975 ceasef ire when the lack of control over PIRA units helped fuel outright
sectarian attacks on Protestant targets. The politically autonomous nature
of the Provisional IRA, and the random violence with which it was increas-
ingly associated, placed the movement at the edge of disaster. Gripped by
intellectual stasis, and with only the prospect of yet more violence to offer
beleaguered lorthern Catholics, the Provisionals' strategy lost most of its
credibility.
Prom 1977 onwards, with the rise of the Northern radicals, a real
attempt was made to tackle some of the main defects within the process of
strategic formulation. The reorganisation and politicisatlon of the move-
ment, and the forming of the long war approach, saved PIRA from defeat and
placed the military instrument on a theoretically more adequate plane, though
in practice, there remain doubts over whether the difficulties and contra-
dictions that have afflicted republican strategic thought have really been
resolved.
Having outlined the progression of the main themes of the research, one
can make a number of observations about the process of strategic change
within the republican movement. Although the republican movement's strat-
egic development during the twentieth century, particularly after 1921, was
undoubtedly hindered by ideological inflexibility, its pattern of military
activity has, in fact, been very diverse. Over the decades the movement has
embraced an assortment of low intensity war techniques, ranging from anti-
colonial guerrilla warfare in the early twentieth century, terrorist bombings
of Britain in the late 1930s, rural insurgent war in the 1956-62 border
campaign, through to a social revolutionary strategy of the 1960s and the
- 379 -
largely urban guerrilla campaign in the early 19?Os, ending up in the pres-
ent with a dual military/electoral strategy.
The constant factor in republican strategic history has been the perva-
sive influence of the aforementioned doctrinal precepts. These affect how
republicans interpret different methods of resistance and guide the assump-
tions they make about their chosen strategies. 	 It is this process which
has sometimes pulled the military instrument out of the realms of estab-
lished strategic theory. For example, by defining the present conflict in
Northern Ireland in colonial terms as a struggle solely over the British
presence, the Provisionals feel able to ignore Protestant opposition as a
factor in their strategic calculations, regardless of the fact that it prob-
ably constitutes the main obstacle to their goal of a united Ireland. Con-
sequently, PIRA's campaign against local members of the 'crown forces' merely
reinforces Protestant hostility. Also, the commitment to the absolutist
convictions of republicanism have obstructed the IRA from recognising when
its strategies have been successful in fulfilling their potential, as in l21
and l72 when the British were pressured by republican violence to open a
dialogue. The inability to think in terms of compromise has made it diff i-
cult for the movement to detect the limited utility of its violence and has
prevented the IRA from moving ahead in stages. Instead, the IRA has squan-
dered positions of temporary military advantage by persisting with a partic-
ular strategy even though it has exhausted its potential. When this hap-
pens, a process appears to be set in train whereby ideological symbolism
comes to dominate over the careful evaluation of the function of armed
struggle. In these circumstances, the military instrument can become
uncontrollable as the ideological attachment to physical force starts
fulfilling its own inner dynamic, even if such actions, as evinced in the
sectarian war in the mid-1970s, are regressive in relation to the movement's
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stated goals. Faced with the defeat of its strategy, the IRA proceeds to
search for another way in which to recast the military instrument. There-
fore, the history of the IRA has been marked, not by a stolid persistence
with a single unsuccessful strategy, so much as a tradition of poor strat-
egic analysis which causes the movement to over-estimate the ability of its
means to overcome far more powerful adversaries.
Although this appraisal represents a broadly accurate description of
the process of strategic change, it does need to be qualified because ideo-
logical principles can be challenged if they are deemed to impede the pro-
gress of the republican movement, though invariably at the expense of a
split. It is easy to see why internal disruption has taken place over the
issue of abstention as it is the key factor which inter-relates with all the
other doctrinal precepts. It insulates the movement from corrupting
external influences, preserves the idea of the nationalist vanguard and
sustains the perceived virtues of the armed struggle, though as the 1986 RSF
split revealed, it is not always the doctrinaire hardliners who have
remained in the ascendant. The general tenor of republican history shows
that following the 1927 split with de Valera, when the movement was pruned
down to a dedicated few, where divisions have occurred, it has been those
factions which have had both the means and the willingness to sustain the
commitment to armed struggle that have remained the most prominent.
Overall, the process of strategic change within the republican movement
has been both capricious and volatile. Although the republican tradition is
certainly inward looking, it is not incapable of self-criticism and this has
permitted the movement to change or modify its strategy, though usually
within very limited bounds. Whether such changes have necessarily enhanced
the movement's ability to achieve its goals is, of course, open to question,
but they have enabled the IRA to adapt and survive. 	 Yet for all the
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military instrument's many incarnations, and in spite of the republicans'
deterministic rhetoric and self-belief that they are predestined to win, the
over-riding need to endure in the face of adversity has resulted in the IRA's
strategic tradition being characterised more by insecurity than certainty
and continuity.
The substantive revisions wrought by the Northern radicals in the late
1970s was certainly a product of the desperate insecurity induced by the
disastrous 1975 ceasef ire, but it did appear to herald a serious attempt to
rectify some of the structural deficiencies in republican strategic analysis.
Theoretically, the re-evaluation has shifted the traditional perspectives of
the movement by placing the military instrument in a wider context where
the value of all available means are considered without favour, while the
abandonment of abstention suggests a determination to end any sense of elit-
ism, with the movement now prepared to submit itself to the electorate for
popular endorsement. Fundamentally, the re-evaluation has sought to reject
any idea that the maxims of the past should regulate republican activity in
the present. Martin XcGuinnese said in 1985 that part of the process of
reinvigoration lay in the willingness of many republicans to 'discard many
of the myths that nourished our movement, myths that had, objectively,
become fetters.' McGuinness continued:
As a national movement we are still learning but at least republicans can
now admit that there are unthinking republicans, and that we cannot ex-
pect unconditional and uncritical support because of Raster 1916 or just
because a majority of Irish people voted for Sinn Fein in 1918. Any
support that Sinn Fein gains must be earned through a coherent revolu-
tionary political programme. By accepting that fact we remove the
danger implicit in all liberation struggles, that a blind desire for
freedom can become an irrational dash into reaction and despair.'
The modern republican leadership now seems keenly aware of the trends
and nuances of the movement's history. The leadership appears particularly
sensitive to the stultifying effects that a self-conscious invocation of an
1. X. XcGuinness, 'Discarding the Fetters of Republican Myth', Fortnight,
3 March, 1985.
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ideological tradition can have in preventing the movement from adapting to
changing conditions which has, in the past, trapped the movement in a debil-
itating cycle where initial military success is followed by marginalisation
and defeat.	 It was a theme that Adams was anxious to stress at the 1986
Ard-Fheis: 'Our experience teaches us that as a group we are often successful
when we have a flexible approach. Ye are at our weakest when we are
forced into a static political position where the more powerful forces of
imperialism can be employed to isolate us.'
In spite of the evident desire to adopt a more flexible approach to the
process of strategic formulation through the constant re-examination of the
relevance of policies, the utility of the means and the validity of beliefs,
there is little to suggest that the movement's central assumption has been
challenged from within. The perception of the Northern Irish conflict as a
problem of British colonial interference remains firmly in place as the
cornerstone of republican analysis. 'The fundamental aim', Adams proclaimed
in a speech in April 1988, 'has always been to get Britain to abandon its
partition policy and adopt instead a policy of reunifying Ireland - that is
withdrawing from Ireland and handing over sovereignty to an all-Ireland
government.'3 This constitutes the basic mental frame around which PIRA
seeks to construct a viable strategy, but it also sustains other traditional
facets of republican belief. It still drives the perception of the armed
struggle as the most effective means of forcing Britain out, and belligerent
statements continue to issue forth on the subject: 'The British will only be
talked out of Ireland through the rattle of machine guns and the roar of
explosives."
The Provisionals' colonial exegesis also governs the movement's die-
2. Adams, 'Presidential Address', in PSP, The Jblitics of Revolution, p. 9.
3. 'Freedom - Nuch Nore than the Right to Vote', speech delivered in April
1988, in Adams, Signposts to Independence and Scctallsm, p. 5.
4. Easter Statement, AP/RI, 23 Nay 1987.
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position towards Ulster-Protestants who are still perceived as 'hopelessly
reliant on Britain' and regarded by the British purely 'in terms of their
place In the political and strategic interests of British imperialisa.' As
a national minority who make up only 20% of Irish people they are not entit-
led to a 'veto over national independence'. The movement's offhand dismis-
sal of loyalism has been summed up by Danny Morrison: 'There is nothing we
can do to convince them and I think it pointless to waste energy trying.'7
The disregard for the Protestant viewpoint tends to uphold the charge
of crypto-sectarianiem. To argue, as Adams has, that 'If there are five UDR
men lined up by the IRA there is no question of asking which of these five
are Protestant and which are Catholics,' is either disingenuous or simply
naive when over 90% of the locally recruited security forces are drawn from
the Protestant community. The objective truth about PIRA's campaign, what-
ever that might be, is irrelevant, it is a question of interpretation. The
cold logic of PIRA's colonial analysis may well mean that it makes no rel-
igious distinctions in its targeting policy. The point is that the Protest-
ante interpret the killing of members of the RUG and UDR as deliberate acts
of sectarian genocide. Moreover, PIRA's record both in the sectarian war in
the mid-1970s and in more recent times with operations like the Enniskillen
bombing and the assassination of unionist politicians, renders the Provis-
ionals secular incantations somewhat unconvincing.
Furthermore, the rejection of loyalism as a phenomenon of any durable
significance sits uneasily with the nature of Protestant/unionist power as
revealed over the past 20 years in Northern Ireland, with, for instance, the
rise of the Protestant paramilitaries which did so much to undermine PIRA's
strategy in the early 1970s and the Ulster Workers Council Strike in 1974.
5. AP/RI, 14 July, 1988.
6. Adams, A Pathway to Peace, p. 41.
7. Morrison, in Collins, Ireland After Britain, p. 92.
8. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, p. 120.
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It also ignores the fact that it is Protestants who continue to dominate
much of the security apparatus. The commentator, David XcKittrick, has
written that 'Sinn Pein represents the last expression of the failure of
Irish nationalism to come to terms with Unionism.' A product of this
failure is that PIRA conducts its military operations in a manner which
fuels the Protestant siege mentality and in many ways reinforces Protestant
political cohesion by keeping the unionist community alarmed and armed.
The extent to which PIRA's campaign has militarised the loyalists and
retrenched their hostility towards Irish nationalism must put a serious
queetionmark over whether PIRA could survive in any vacuum created by a
British withdrawal.
In a speech delivered in 1986, Xartin XcGuinness sought to elaborate on
the new, progressive bearing of the republican leadership by describing how
the movement's historical tradition should be squared with the need to main-
tain a forward looking, energetic and politically mature oraganisation cap-
able of responding to popular concerns, acknowledging its own problems and
accepting criticism:
In 14 years' time we will be in the 21st century and the struggle of our
past, no matter how heroic, no matter how tragic, will have limited rele-
vance. Of course, we must remember Irish history. As republicans we
possess a continuity of vision and of action that stretches back to 1798
and beyond. But the Ireland Wolfe Tone lived in bears only a historical
relationship to the Ireland of today and of tomorrow. Every time we
refuse to consider new options, to engage in revolutionary self-criticism,
to examine the politics and the aspirations of the Irish people, we be-
tray reality. And republicans of all people, should never be afraid to
face the real world... However, one of our political failings, and one that
still must be combated, is our apparent readiness to dismiss evaluations
of the movement that conflict with our own views.'0
The passage encapsulates the essence of an evolving movement, drawing
inepiraton from the past but continually seeking to refine its analysis and
methods. However, the limits to the revisionist process were clearly
9. D. XcKittrick, 'Decades of Violence in a World of Stalemate', The
Independent, 14 Aug. 1989.
10. K. KcGuinnees, Bcdenstown 1986, Text of oration to annual Wolfe Tone
commemoration (Wolfe Tone Society) (London, 1986).
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marked out earlier in the speech when XcGuinness attacked the 'rewriting of
history by Vest Britons and British propaganda'." The presumption seems
to be that only republicans are entitled to review history when it suits
them, while everyone else should conform to a rarified traditional view, and
that intellectual development within the movement is permissible only so
long as it sustains the basic assumptions of republican analysis. 	 In fact,
the speech underlines the dichotomy in republican political thinking. At
one level, the Provisionals attempt to project the image of a consummate
rational actor operating in the 'real world', untutored by the myths of the
past and dispassionately assessing alternative courses of action, yet at the
same time, trying to evade essential questions of the 'real world' which
impinge on the issue of strategic formulation, such as the nature of the
British presence, the limited effectiveness of republican means and the scope
of Protestant hostility.
The lengths to which the Provisionals go to avoid addressing sensitive
areas in order to maintain the parameters which underpin their analysis
makes their pronouncements about the validity of the military instrument
both shallow and inconsistent. Part of the problem in trying to detect any
firm comprehension of the role of the military instrument is that ever since
the early 1970s the Provisionals have cited so many theories and theorists
in support of their campaign that it is difficult to know exactly what they
believe. The Provisionals' propaganda is often full of references to,
amongst others, the theories of Mao, Narighela, Taber, Guevarra, Clausewitz
and Liddell Hart. 12 Iris Bheag, the PSF journal which is largely for inter-
nal consumption, is regularly interspersed with excerpts from the writings
11. Ibid..
12. Examples of allusions to such theorists in the early mid-1970e can be
found in the following, AP, 1 Feb. 1974 (Liddell Hart), RN, 29 May 1974,
(reference to Clausewitzian theories), RN, 13 July 1974, (Taber & Mao),
The Volunteer (Derry), Aug. 1974 (Taber), Hire Og, 18 Oct. 1975, (refer-
ence to Itarighela's theories), and RN, 8 Jan. 1977, (Taber).
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of military practitioners, third world leaders and revolutionary theorists.'3
The pamphlet, Iotes for Revolutionaries, contains an extensive list of
inspiring strategic proverbs from almost every major military thinker since
Sun Tzu in the fifth century BC.' 4 The inclusion of such dictums, may only
be designed to enthuse the movement with revolutionary ardour and, of
course, usually there is no more than a loose relationship between theories
of war and the practical reality. But, ultimately, their rhetorical usage in
the Provisionals' literature seems both a cause and effect of PIRA's own
confusion. The Provisionals tend to quote these aphorisms out of thin air
without giving due regard to the fact that low intensity warfare strategies
and philosophies of war are highly divergent, often at complete odds with
each other.	 Clausewitzian theory is not the same as that of Liddell Hart.
JIao all but contradicts Narighela. And so on. There is no attempt to
assemble these disparate pieces of information into any systematic theory or
plan.
One might suspect that the closer one examines the evidence surrounding
PIRA's military rhetoric the more it would converge into a sense of unifor-
mity. It does not. It splays out into an intriguing form of strategic
chaos where every piece of rationalising information is extracted to give
the impression of the skilful appreciation and exploitation of the military
instrument. The end product is one where it is extremely hard to pin down
the Provisionals to any coherent statement of strategic intent. In 1989,
Danny Morrison stated, 'when it is politically costly for the British to
remain in Ireland, they'll go... it won't be triggered until a large number of
British soldiers are killed and that's what's going to happen."	 This
appears to be the only discernible core of republican military doctrine; hit
the British hard enough and they will eventually give up. 	 It is simple,
13. See for example, Iris Bheag, Moe. 2,3,4,5, (1987) and 6,8,12 (1988).
14. PSF, Notes for Revolutionaries, pp. 27-40.
15. 'Playboy Interview: The IRA', reprinted in Nagill, March 1989.
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crude, theoretically it may even be true, but totally beyond PIRA's demon-
strable capacity to achieve in practice.
The lack of any credible definition of the role of th. armed struggle
casts doubt as to how far the Provisional IRA has changed its basic outlook
since the movement's reorganisation in the late 1970s. In Xay 1987,
NcGuinness declared that 'the IRA is now a real people's army' which 'has
broken with militarism and 'with elitism'." This stood in contravention to
a statement issued 7 months later which proclaimed the movement's intention
to 'militarise the armed struggle in the North'.' 7
 Furthermore, it is deba-
table whether the politicisation of the movement has banished elitism and
turned PIRA into an army of the people, or even if it was ever intended to.
Just after he was elected NP for West Belfast, Gerry Adams argued: 'The IRA
does not need an electoral mandate for armed struggle. It derives its man-
date from the presence of the British in the six counties." But how can
the Provisionals profess to be a 'people's army' without regard to some form
of quantifiable mandate? There is a strong sense here in which the Provis-
ionals appear to be seeking to use elections as a propaganda ploy to claim
political backing for their campaign while, in fact, retrenching their own
emotional commitment to the use of violence. This suspicion is reinforced
by comments carried in the republican press such as that of an editorial in
April 1985: 'Sinn Fein, by popularising political and cultural resistance and
by defending the right of the IRA to wage war, has consolidated and made
permanent the sympathetic base from which the armed struggle is launched."
So, according to such statements, the use of force is not a direct function
of popular approval, but a pre-existing historic right of resistance which
happens to be acknowledged by a certain level of electoral support. If this
10. I. XcGuinnese, 'The Right to Freedom', Bobby Sands Nemorial Lecture,
10 Jay 1987, reprinted in AF/RI, 28 Nay 1987.
17. Christmas and New Year Statement, AF/RL 31 Dec. 1987.
18. Interview with 6. Adams, Ng111, July 1983.
19. AF/RI, 25 April 1985.
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assessment is accurate, then the principles which supposedly underwrite the
entire politicisation process are little more than a pretence to suggest that
the armed struggle is a carefully selected and reasoned instrument of policy,
when, in truth, it is an independent variable unconstrained by reference
either to external sources of legitimacy or serious analysis of its utility.
Due to the historical longevity of the republican movement, it is
impossible to believe, and unreasonable to expect, the present leadership to
have unburdened itself completely from the impedimenta of the republican
legacy. Inevitably, such ideological symbolism will continue to be ref lect-
ed in the process of decision making, no matter how radical and progressive
the Provisionals believe themselves to be. Yet the degree to which repub-
lican ideological symbolism still appears to be the main regulator of PIRA's
activity opens up the whole question as to whether, beneath the surfeit of
confused rationalisations, the military instrument has any strategic value at
all? After the killing of Lord Iountbatten along with a number of his com-
panions and the loss of 18 soldiers at Warrenpoint in August 1 q79, the Prov-
isionals issued a ferocious statement promising the 'British ruling class'
that 'as long as they do not give a damn then they shall hear from us the
oppressed Irish people'. The statement went on to spell out PIRA's inten-
tion towards the 'old bulldog': '...WB WILL RIP OUT ITS SBITII(ENTAL IXPER-
IALIST HEART.'° Rather than accentuating the killings as actions designed
to elicit certain responses that would advance PIRA's goals, the language
contained in the statement, instead, betrayed strong emotional undarcurrente
which indicated a desire to strike at Britain regardless of any effects,
positive or negative, such actions engendered. Whatever the exact purpose
of the Kountbatten and Varrenpoint killings, the description of such oper-
ations in the terms expressed in the statement, and the apparent motivations
they reveal, do not reside within any recognisable strategic framework.
20. AF/RI, 1 Sept. 1979.
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Could, then, the military instrument merely be a vehicle for the trans-
mission of republican anger and revenge? Could it be both the ends and
means of PIRA's campaign, where the emphasis is on sustaining the self-image
of a strong and feared enemy of British influence in Ireland? 	 Such a
hypothesis is given substance by the way in which the Provisionals appear
to feed off the reaction caused by their campaign of violence. After each
major PIRA attack the republican press invariably examines the impact it has
had in the British media, taking particular gratification from any backhand-
ed compliments paid to the effectiveness of PIRA's campaign through pron-
ouncements that its 'bombers are the deadliest in the world,' 21
 or that:
'Nowhere in Ireland, Britain or Europe can any of the British forces truly
relax'.22 Perhaps the most revealing comment was made by the Provisionals
themselves following two explosions in central London on 20 July 1982 in
which 9 soldiers were killed:
'Why did the IRA do it? What did they hope to achieve?' was the basic
formula screamed out in various shapes and forms by most British news-
papers in their Wednesday morning editions. The fact that literally all
of these mass circulation newspapers devoted their front pages, several
other pages, and their leader column or editorial to Tuesday's double-
bomb attack should have served as sufficient answer to them.23
If PIRA's underlying raison d'etre is simply to fortify its self-image,
then this will have a disruptive effect on strategic decision making as the
military instrument will not necessarily be calculated purely in functional
terms as the desire merely for self-preservation may become the over-riding
goal of the movement. It is a theory which may go some way to explain the
apparent paradox whereby PIRA's actions appear to be one of the main factors
reinforcing the status quo. If the survival of the movement is paramount,
21. Quoted from The Daily Mirror, following killing of Lord Justice Naurice
Gibson on 25 April 1987 in 'Deadliest in the World', AF/RI, 30 April
1987.
22. Quoted from The Sunday Telegraph, following killing of 8 soldiers at
Ballygawley, Co. Tyrone, in A. XacDiarmada, 'Britain's Dilemma', AP/RN,
25 Aug. 1988.
23. 'What the Papers Say', AP/RI, 22 July 1982.
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then the Provisionale will have no real interest in seeing the conflict
brought to any resolution. Instead, their actions will be geared towards
sustaining the conditions in which the movement can thrive irrespective of
how the ability to achieve its declared objectives is affected. Consequent-
ly, PIRA's violence mi lames Protestant opinion and encourages instability,
thereby sustaining the requirement for a British Army presence and high
levels of security in general.	 This situation, in turn, nourishes the
Provisionals by feeding Catholic fear, resentment and alienation.
To suggest that the military instrument is being used to sustain col-
lective identity rather than fulfil external goals is a serious charge for a
strategic theorist to level at any political organisation. However, it is
only in the period between the early 1920s and early 1960s, notwithstanding
the odd excursions into socialist theory during the 1930s, that one could
claim with any certitude that the IRA was a self-perpetuating military trad-
ition dedicated to keeping alive the purity of the republican vision. At
other times, the IRA could at least justify its violence with reference to a
context in which, as in Northern Ireland today, it could legitimately claim a
level of communal support.
The problem with the theory of bureaucratic self-perpetuation is that
it ascribes subconscious drives to the actions of a particular group.	 In
effect, it is a psychological conspiracy theory.	 For this reason, the
theory is unprovable. So it is with the Provisionals, because there is no
question that for most of the time they do provide a rhetorical rationale
for the armed struggle. For example, the long war approach, adopted in the
late 1970s, is a perfect self-justifying framework, as it allows the perpet-
uation of the movement to proceed in tandem with a strategic rationale,
excusing present failure with the promise of future success. 	 The motto
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Tlocfaldh ar la - our day will come - is perhaps more than a meaningless
republican slogan.
Even if NRA's pronouncements on the armed struggle do not stand up to
academic interrogation, it does not automatically follow that the movement is
being governed by the internal dynamics of group survival. There may be a
myriad of other political, psychological and sociological explanations as to
why PIRA acts in the way it does. The group dynamics explanation therefore
opens up the entire issue of causality in relation to republican violence
which is both a massive area in its own right and falls outside the ambit of
the strategic theory. Also, the hypothesis offers only a mono-causal ex-
planation of political violence and rests on a number of problematic assump-
tions concerning the attraction of socially deficient personalities towards
groups like the IRA. Such assumptions, if not fairly dubious themselves,
require a great deal of psychological research, which this author is not
qualified to undertake, before the theory could be propounded with any con-
fidence.24 In any case, in the light of both the republican movement's
history, which has shown that aspects of its doctrine can be successfully
overturned and rumours of debates inside the republican movement over the
value of the armed struggle, any outright assertion of the group dynamics
theory would be premature. Nevertheless, there is an aspect of the theory
which does have some bearing on this analysis. One perceptible thread in
the history of the republican movement after 1 q21 is that the desire to
preserve a distinct ideo-military entity often appears to have been placed
at a higher premium than the willingness to consider whether military action
has necessarily been the beet way to advance republican goals. We can say
that this may be one factor which has caused the republican movement, at
24. For a discussion of this theory see J. Poet, 'Group and Organisational
Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications for Counter-Terrorist
Policy' in P. Wilkinson and A. Stewart (eds.), Contemporar-y Research on
Terrorism (Aberdeen, 1987).
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points in its history, to misapply the military instrument.
	 This is only
as far as the evidence allows the strategist to go. A wider investigation
into the theory of bureaucratic self-perpetuation as a causal factor may be
the next stage in the argument, for there are occasions when PIRA's mask of
rationality does appear to slip which, implicitly at least, reveals the
incentive to maintain the armed struggle to be less than directly functional
in any strategic sense. 	 For example, in 1978 a senior member of PIRA's
leadership was asked during an interview whether the fighting of the past
decade had been worth the cost?	 'Of course not', he replied, 'Virtually
nothing has been achieved.'	 He went on: 'Ye can't give up now and admit
that men and women were sent to their graves died for nothing.' These
sentiments were echoed nine years later in an editorial in An Phoblacht/
Republican News commemorating the 1918 Easter rising: 'the struggle goes on,
not out of any sham emotionalism but out of duty both to those who have
died and future generations and out of the recognition that peace and
prosperity depends on victory being achieved.' Neither of the two
statements attempted to address how the continuation of the armed struggle
could achieve victory, but perhaps they did illustrate that the primary
motivation for the republican movement to carry on, is simply because it
always has carried on.
The task of the strategist is usually to ask the how of it all. How
has the republican movement viewed the use of force in the political pro-
cess? How has ideological symbolism affected the employment of the miii-
tary instrument?	 How do the Provisionale attempt to obtain their object-
ives? And so on. Now that it has been suggested that the process of
republican strategic formulation sometimes distorts the application of force
for realisable ends, it is perhaps necessary for someone else to ask the
25. Interview with PIRA spokesperson, Nagill, Aug. 1978.
26. IF/RI, 10 April 1987.
- 393 -
more complicated question as to why the Provisionals persist in the manner
they do?	 Raybe this thesis will help light the path to a comprehensive
appraisal of this question by stimulating research in this area.
During the 1988 Bodenstown speech, Pat Doherty affirmed that 'the armed
struggle is about achieving the political demands for national self-deter-
mination, an end to partition and the creation of a 32 County Irish Repub-
lic.' 7 Yet over 20 years after taking up arms in defence of a long trad-
ition of physical force nationalism, the Provisional IRA still looks no
closer to this objective than when it started. No-one can deny that PIRA's
violence has not had an impact. It may have placed the issue of Northern
Ireland on the political agenda and stimulated efforts to resolve the con-
flict, but this does not mean that the Provisionale have necessarily been the
beneficiaries. Possibly the most tangible effect of PIRA's armed struggle
to date has been to further polarise sectarian divisions In Northern Ireland,
making the prospect of arriving at any solution which the Provisionals might
find acceptable even more improbable. 	 Given this situation, one might
plausibly ask whether, In strategic terms, the Provisional IRA is as good as
defeated? This is not to say that the Provisionals still do not possess
significant destructive potential. Reports over the past couple of years
suggest that the movement is supplied with sufficient arms and recruits to
keep it going for years to come. 	 The point is, though, that physical
extinction is not a pre-requisite for strategic failure, merely the inability
to attain designated ends with chosen means.	 P IRA's quandary in this
respect is that the British government seems content to contain the conflict
at a point which it finds tolerable.	 This may not be the ideal scenario
for the British authorities, but it is one where the Provisionals cannot pose
27. P. Doherty, 'Ye Vill Yin this Struggle', Bodenstown Speech, AP/RN, 23 June
1988.
28. See for example, D. XcKittrick, 'Semtex in Terrorist Armoury is Key to
Growing Threat', The Independent, 31 Dec. 1988.
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any serious threat to the status quo. So, for the Provisionals themselves,
Just to exist may be a sufficient achievement. In l98, when it was put to
Gerry Adams that the armed struggle was not up to much these days, he
replied that after all that had been thrown at the movement and all the talk
of imminent defeats and the power of the British, he thought that PIRA was
actually 'doing very well.' This may be so, but while fighting to survive
without any real chance of reaching proposed ends may satisfy certain inter-
nal imperatives to engage In armed action, ultimately, it means vary little
in strategic theory.
The purpose of this conclusion is not to belittle a highly complex
phenomenon or to imply that the entire Irish republican military experience
can be reduced to a few trite strategic equations. That Irish republican
violence is a manifestation of important social, economic and political
factors which deserve sensitive handling by those responsible for managing
the conflict is not disputed. 	 Nor is the intention to be iconoclastic in
order to demythologise Irish republicanism. The myths of republican
ideology will survive anything this thesis says. But if this analysis does
challenge any popularly held assumptions, then it is the idea that the
Provisional IRA's employment of the military instrument is necessarily
conditioned by responses which accord with the norms of strategic theory.





Society of the United Irishmen founded in Belfast,
1798
23 May: United Irishmen launch rebellion.
July: Rebellion around Vexford defeated at Battle of Vinegar Hill.
19 November: Wolfe Tone committed suicide following his capture after the
French invasion force in which he was sailing had been intercepted by Royal
Navy in September.
1800
Act of Union between Britain and Ireland.
1803
23 July: Robert Bmaet leads attempt to seize Dublin Castle. Rebellion col-
lapses immediately.
20 September: Emiiet executed.
1823
The Catholic Association formed led by Daniel O'Connell.
1842
Foundation of the Young Ireland newspaper, The Nation edited by Thomas
Davis.
1845
John Mitchel takes over the editorship of The Nation on Davis' death.
Beginning of potato blight, to become known as the Great Famine, 1845-49.
Nearly a million perish and another million emigrate, mainly to the USA,
Canada and Australia. Over the next 50 years the Irish population would be
halved, due mainly to emigration, from over 8 millIon in 1841 to 4.5 million
in 1901.
1846
Young Ireland split from Daniel O'Connell's Repeal Association.
1846
January: Young Irelanders set up their own organisation, the Irish Con-
federation.
1848
Early in year John Mitchel leaves The Nation to found The United Irishman.
Young Irelanders mount short lived rebellion under William Smith O'Brien,
defeated after skirmish at Ballingarry, Co. Tipperary, 5 August.
1858
17 March: Foundation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, also known as the
Fenians, led by James Stephens in Ireland and John O'Mahoney In USA.
1867
March: Fenian uprising.
November: Execution of 3 Fenians - the 'MAnchester Martyrs' - following
killing of policeman during rescue of 2 IRB prisoners in Manchester.
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December: Penian bomb outside Clerkenwell prison kills a dozen people.
1870
Home Government Association formed under Isaac Butt to campaign for return
of self-government to Ireland.
1879
Land League formed by Iichael Davitt and Charles Stewart Parnell.
1881
January: Fenian bombing campaign in England, sponsored by the American Arm
of the Fenians the Clan-na-Gael, begins with attack on Salford Barracks.
The bombings continue intermittently until 1887.
April: Land Act introduced following widespread agitation on the land organ-
ised by the Land League.
1882
6 lay: Secretary of State for Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish, and Under-
Secretary, T.H. Burke, stabbed to death in Dublin by the Irish Invincibles,
known as the Phoenix Park lurders.
Gaelic Athletic Association formed.
1886
First Home Rule Bill defeated in House of Commons.
1893
Second Home Rule Bill defeated in House of Lords.
Gaelic League formed.
1907
Sinn Fain formed under leadership of Arthur Griffith.
1912
Third Home Rule Bill passed.
Ulster Volunteer Force formed to oppose imposition of home rule.
1913
Irish Volunteers formed to resist threat from UVF.
Irish Citizen Army formed by James Connally.
1914
Outbreak of World War One.
Irish Volunteers split over attitude to World War One with majority fol-
lowing call of John Redmond to enlist in British Army, leaving smaller group
under Boin )IacNeill opposed to involvement in the war.
1916
Easter Rising in Dublin.
lay: Leaders of Rising like Patrick Pearse and James Connally executed.
1917
Eamon de Valera elected President of Sinn Fain.
Sinn Fein win a number of by-elections.
1918
December: Sinn Fain win 73 seats in general election.
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1919
21 January: Dali Bireann formed. 	 Two policemen killed at Soloheadbeg, Co.
Tipperary, signalling the start of the Anglo-Irish war.
1920
Widespread violence.
Attacks on police and army by units of Irish Volunteers, increasingly known
as the IRA.
British introduce Auxiliaries and 'Black and Tans' to support security
forces.
December: Government of Ireland Act provides Northern Ireland with its own
assembly and government at Stormont.
1921
Violence continues.
7 June: Northern Ireland parliament opened.
11 July: Truce declared between British and IRA.
Negotiations on peace settlement arranged.
8 December: Anglo-Irish Treaty reached between British and Irish delegations.
1922
7 January: Dali approves Anglo-Irish Treaty, 84 votes to 57.
March: IRA splits Into pro and. anti-Treaty factions.
April: Anti-Treaty IRA or 'Irregulars' set up headquarters at Four Courts in
centre of Dublin.
June: The pro-Treaty party, Cumann na nGaedheal, win large majority in elec-
tions to the first Irish Free State parliament.
28 June: Free State forces attack IRA Irregulars at Four Courts, signalling
start of Irish civil war.
Widespread violence ensues.
ii September: Free State parliament, or Dali Eireann, opened.
October: Free State government introduces severe measures to curb IRA vio-
lence.
1923
27 April: IRA orders ceasefire bringing civil war to a close.
Sinn Fein wins 44 seats in general election.
1920
16 Nay: De Valera and some of his colleagues in Sinn Fein split from the
anti-Treatyites to form Fianna Fail.
1927
12 August: Fianna Fail deputies enter Dali for the first time.
1931
Saor Hire, a republican-socialist group, is formed.
October: Free State outlaws IRA and Saor Hire.
1932
Fianna Fail wins general election. De Valera becomes Prime Minister.
1933
9 September: Fine Gael party formed out of old Cumann na nGaedheal.
1934
Peadar O'Donnell and George Gilmore set up short-lived Republican Congress.
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1936
June: De Valet-a government declares IRA illegal.
1937
New Constitution changes name of Free State to Bire and claims territorial
jurisdiction over Northern Ireland.
1938
April: IRA Convention approves a bombing campaign in England.
1939
12 January: IRA ultimatum threatens to declare war on Britain unless its
forces withdraw from Northern Ireland.
16 January: IRA begins bombing campaign in England.
August: 5 people killed by IRA bomb in Coventry.
1940
January: Irish government passes Emergency Powers Act to intern IRA sus-
pects.
IRA bombing campaign in England peters out.
1946
Clann na Phoblachta, a small group of disaffected republicans, is formed.
1948
A Fine-Gael/Clann na Phoblachta coalition wins power from Fianna Fail.
1948
Irish government declares the country a full republic.
British government passes Ireland Act in which Northern Ireland's position
in UK guaranteed so long as the Storiiont parliament wishes.
1953
July: Sean XacStiofain and Cathal Goulding gaoled for abortive arms raid in
Feletead, Essex.
1954
June: IRA mount arms raid on Gough Barracks, Co. Armagh.
1955
Xay: in British general election Sinn Fain gains 152,310 votes in Northern
Ireland and wins 2 seats for its abstentionist candidates.
1956
11 December: IRA launch border campaign against Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland government introduces internment.
1957
Xarch: Fianna Fail returned to power in Irish general election.
July: De Valera introduces internment in Irish Republic.
1959
Sean Lemass replaces de Valera as Irish premier.
October: In British general election Sian Fain vote halved to 73,415.
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1962
26 February: IRA calls off border campaign.
Cathal Goulding becomes Chief of Staff of IRA and embarks on reassessment
of IRA strategy.
1963
March: Terence O'Neill becomes Prime Minister of Northern Ireland.
1964
Campaign far Social Justice formed to lobby for civil rights reform.
1966
Series of UVF killings - organisation declared illegal in Northern Ireland.
1967
January: Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association formed.
1968
August: First Civil Rights march from Coalisland to Dungannon.
1969
January: Civil Rights march from Belfast to Derry attacked by loyalist crowd
at Burntollet Bridge.
19 April: Rioting in Bogside, Derry.
28 April: Tarence O'Neill replaced as Northern Ireland Prime Minister by
James Chichester-Clark.
12-14 August: Severe rioting in Bogside, Derry.
14 August: British troops sent onto streets of Derry.
15 August: British troops also enter Belfast to quell disturbances.
December: Extra-ordinary IRA Convention approves ending of abstention.
Opposition delegation form PIRA Army Council.
1970
11 January: Split between Official and Provisional wings of IRA confirmed at
Sinn Fein Ard-Fheie when a third of delegates opposed to the ending of
abstention walk out to form Provisional Sinn Fein.
March/April: Videepread rioting between British Army and young Catholics in
Vest Belfast.
1 April: Ulster Defence Regiment formed to replace RUG B Specials.
July: Curfew imposed by British Army on Lower Falls area of Vest Belfast.
21 August: Social Democratic and Labour Party formed.
October: PIRA begins sustained bombing campaign, mainly against commercial
targets.
1971
6 February: First British soldier to be killed by PIRA.
20 March: James Chichester-Clark resigns as Northern Ireland Prime Minister
and is replaced by Brian Faulkner.
June: PSF issue Eire Nua programme.
9 August: Stormont government introduces internment.
September: PIRA set out 5-point peace plan.
Ulster Defence Association formed.
4 December: 15 people killed by UVF bomb at McGurks Bar, Belfast.
1972
30 January: Parachute Regiment shoot dead 13 men during a civil rights
demonstration in Derry, the incident becomes known as 'Bloody Sunday'.
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22 February: Official IRA bomb kills 7 people at Parachute Regiment's head-
quarters in Aldershot,
10 Narch: PIRA call 3-day ceasefire.
20 Narch: 6 people killed by PIRA car bomb in Donegall Street, Belfast.
24 larch: Stormont parliament suspended. 	 Direct rule from Westminster
introduced.	 William Vhitelaw appointed Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland.
20 Nay: OIRA announces ceasef ire.
14 June; Whitelaw grants special category status (political status) for pris-
oners convicted of paramilitary of fences.
22 June: PIRA announces ceasef ire.
26 June: Ceasef ire comes into effect.
1 July: IJDA erect 'no-go' areas in loyalist districts to match those in
nationalist areas of Derry and Belfast.
7 July: PIRA delegation meets William Whitelaw in London. 	 Nothing is
agreed.
9 July: Ceasef ire collapses over PIRA claims that British Army had broken
truce during incident at Lenadoon, Vest Belfast.
21. July: 9 people killed in PIRA bombing assault in Belfast, the Incident
becomes known as 'Bloody Friday'.
31 July: British Army launches Operation lotorman to retake 'no-go' areas of
Derry and Belfast. 8 people killed in car-bomb in Claudy, Co. Landonderry.
24 September: Vhitelaw initiates conference at Darlington to consider poli-
tical options for the province.
19 November: PIRA Chief of Staff, Sean XacStiofain, arrested in irish Repub-
lic and sentenced to 6 months for IRA membership. His arrest ends his
involvement in PIRA activities. Seamus Twomey becomes new Chief of Staff.
1973
8 larch: Border poll in Northern Ireland produces large vote for staying In
UK. PIRA car bombs in London kill 1 person and injure 180.
28 June: Voting for new Northern irish Assembly. PSF call to boycott elec-
tions ignored.
December: SunnIngdale conference agrees to establish a Power Sharing Exec--
utive for the province.
1974
January: Power Sharing Executive takes office under leadership of Brian
Faulkner. Immense unionist objections to Executive, especially to Council
of Ireland.
5 larch: Following Labour victory in British general election, Nerlyn Rees
made new Secretary of State for Northern ireland.
15 Nay: Ulster Workers Council (UVC) Strike aimed at bringing down Power
Sharing Executive begins.
17 Nay: 30 people killed In Irish Republic by loyalist car bombs in Dublin
and Nonaghan - highest loss of life in any single day of conflict to date.
28 Nay: UWC strike forces collapse of Power Sharing Executive.
4 July: Secretary of State, Nerlyn Rees, announces the setting up of a Con-
stitutional Convention to work out a new form of devolved government for the
province.
5 October: 5 people killed by bomb explosions in two pubs in Guildford.
21 November: 21 people killed by bomb explosions in two pubs in Birmingham.
25 November: Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, announces introduction of a series
of anti-terrorist measures, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which makes the
IRA an illegal organisation in Great Britain and extends the powers of
arrest and detention.
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December: Irish Republican Socialist Party formed by OIRA breakaway group
led by Seamus Costello.	 Over the next few months the IRSP establishes a
military wing - later known as the irish National Liberation Army.
10 December: PIRA announces a ceasef ire to run from 22 December to 2 January
1976.
1975
2 January: PIRA ceasef ire extended.
16 January: PIRA calls off ceasefire.
10 February: P1RA suspends operations against security forces after new
ceasef ire negotiated.
Incident centres set up by PSF to monitor ceasef ire and liaise with Northern
Ireland Office.
February: Violent feud breaks out in Belfast between OIRA and lILA.
1 Nay: Polling takes place for Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention.
24 July: Rees promises to release internees by end of year.
31 July: 3 members of Xiaiii Showband killed in UVP ambush, 2 UVP men also
killed by their own bomb during the attack.
September: 5 Protestants killed at Tullyvallen Orange Hall by South Armagh
Republican Action Force 1 widely believed to be a cover name for PIRA's units
in the area.
11 November: Rees closes down incident centres.
5 December: Last series of Internees released.
1976
4 January: 5 Catholics killed in shooting incidents near Whitecross, South
Armagh.
5 January: 10 Protestant workmen killed by SARAF attack on their mini-bus
outside Kingemills, South Armagh.
7 January: Prime Ninister, Harold Wilson, announces SAS to move into South
Armagh, though SAS widely suspected to be there already.
1 larch: Special category status ended for those convicted of paramilitary
of fences.
9 larch: Northern Ireland Convention dissolved after failure of participants
to agree on a form of power-sharing system.
10 August: 3 children killed in Andersonstown, Vest Belfast, when car pursued
by British Army careers out of control after the driver had been shot dead.
Incident provided impetus for the establishment of Peace People. Next few
months sees large-scale demonstrations to call for an end to violence.
September: Protest in laze Prison against the ending of special category
status begins when Ciaran Jugent refuses to wear prison uniform.
10 September: Roy Nason, new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
28 October: lairs Drumm, Vice-President of PSF, shot dead by UVF.
25-27 December: PIRA Christmas ceasef ire.
1977
3 Nay: Loyalist strike launched as protest against the British government's
security policy and to demand return of majority rule in Northern Ireland.
13 Nay: Loyalist strike called off after failing to rally support and in face
of the British government's determination to resist stikers' demands.
June: Jimmy Drumm tells PIRA supporters at Bodenstown that previous strategy
had been mistaken.
2? July: 4 people killed in PIRA/OIRA feud.
5 October: IRS? leader, Seamus Costello, shot dead almost certainly by OIRA.
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1978
17 February: PIRA fire bombs kill 12 people at the La Non Hotel, Co. Down.
30 November: PIRA says it is preparing for a long war after widespread fire
bombing campaign throughout province.
1979
20 February: 11 Protestants known as the 'Shankill Butchers' sentenced to
life imprisonment for series of sectarian murders carried out in aid-19?Os.
30 larch: Airey Heave, Conservative shadow spokesman on Northern Ireland,
killed by LILA car bomb in House of Commons car-park, London.
5 Nay: Humphrey Atkins, new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland follow-
ing election of Conservative government on 3 lay.
2 July: lILA declared illegal.
27 August: Lord Xountbatten and 4 of his companions killed when PIRA bomb
planted on his boat explodes off lullaghmore, Co. Sligo. 18 soldiers killed
in double-bomb ambush at Yarrenpoint, Co. Down - biggest daily loss suffered
by Army in Northern Ireland to date.
29 September: On visit to Ireland, the Pope appeals for an end to violence.
2 October: PIRA rejects Pope's appeal claiming only force could remove the
British.
1980
7 January: Constitutional conference convened at Stormont to debate forms of
government for the province.
27 October: PIRA prisoners in laze prison begin hunger strike to demand the
restoration of political status.
18 December: Hunger strikes called of f.
1981
21 January: Former speaker of Stormont parliament, Sir Norman Stronge and
his son James, killed by PIRA gunmen.
1 larch: Second hunger strike begins in laze prison.
9 April: Hunger striker, Bobby Sands, elected NP for Permanagh and South
Tyrone following the death of the sitting member, Frank Jiaguire in April.
5 lay: Bobby Sands dies on 68th day of his hunger strike causing widespread
rioting in Belfast and Derry.
12 lay: Second hunger striker, Francis Hughes dies.
19 lay: 5 soldiers killed in land mine attack near Besebrook, South Armagh.
20 August: Owen Carron, Bobby Sands' election agent, elected NP for Fermangh
and South Tyrone in the by-election caused by Sands' death.
13 September: James Prior becomes new Secretary of State for Northern Ire-
land.
3 October: Hunger strike called off after 10 republican prisoners in all had
died.
10 October: PIRA bombs kills 2 civilians and injures 23 soldiers outside
Chelsea Barracks in London.
14 November: PIRA kill Reverend Robert Bradford, Official Unionist NP for
South Belfast.
23 November: Loyalist day of action to protest at British government's
security policy - rallies and marches all over province.
1982
April: James Prior issues Vhite Paper on proposal for 'rolling devolution'
Assembly which would agree on measures of self-government for the province.
20 July: PIRA bombs in London kill 11 soldiers.
20 October: Voting takes place for 'rolling devolution' Assembly. 	 PSF gain
10,1% of the vote in Northern Ireland compared to the SDLP's 18.8%.
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27 October: 3 RUC officers killed in PIRA booby trap, near Lurgan, Co.
Armagh.
6 December: 11 off-duty soldiers and 6 civilians killed by bomb planted by
lILA at the 'Droppin Well' pub at Ballykelly, Co. Londonderry.
1983
April: Conclusion of first 'supergrass' trial when 14 UVF men convicted on
evidence of Joseph Bennett.
24 Kay: PIRA bomb Andersonstown RUG Station, West Belfast, causing extensive
damage to neighbouring houses.
9 June: British general election. PSF gains 13.4% of the vote and Gerry Adams
wins the seat of Vest Belfast. The unionist parties win 15 seats and the
SDLP one seat.
5 August: 30 people convicted on evidence of PIRA 'supergrass' Christopher
Black.
25 September: 38 PIRA prisoners escape from laze prison, during which a
prison officer is killed.
13 November: Gerry Adams elected PSF President.
7 December: Official Unionist Assembly member, Edgar Graham, shot dead by
PIRA in Belfast.
17 December: 5 people killed when PIRA bomb explodes outside Harrods depar-
tment store in London.
1984
14 June: European election poll.	 PSP gain 13.3% of vote in Northern Ire-
land.
10 September: Douglas Hurd appointed new Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland.
12 October: PIRA bomb planted at Grand Hotel, Brighton, explodes during
Conservative Party Conference. Conservative Prime Kinister, Kargaret
Thatcher, narrowly escapes death but 5 others killed.
2 December: SAS soldier and PIRA member killed during shoot-cut at Drumrush,
Co. Fermanagh.
6 December: 2 PIRA men shot dead by SAS soldiers in Derry.
1985
28 February: 9 RUG officers killed in PIRA mortar attack on police station
at Newry, Co. Down.
20 April: 4 leadIng PIRA members expelled from organisation after alleged
disagreements over movement's new political orientation.
20 Kay: Local government elections - PSF wins 11.4% of vote in the province
and 59 seats.
2 September: Tom King becomes new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
15 November: Irish Prime linister, Garret FitzGerald, and British Prime
Ninister, Kargaret Thatcher, sign Anglo-Irish Agreement at Hulleborough, Co.
Down.
16 November: Unionist IPs say they will resign their seats in protest at the
Anglo- Irish Agreement in order to cause a series of by-elections over the
issue.
23 November: Large Loyalist demonstration held in Belfast to protest at
Anglo- Irish Agreement.
1986
23 January: In the 15 by-elections caused by the resignations of unionist
IPs, the unionist parties Increase the size of their vote (71.5%) on their
1983 general election performance (62.3%) but lost the seat of Newry and
Armagh to the SDLP. PSP gained only 6.6% of the vote.
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26 February: Loyalist day of action against the Anglo- Irish Agreement causes
widespread disruption to most areas of the province.
31 March-i April: Serious loyalist rioting in Portadown, Co. Armagh.
15 Kay: Renewed loyalist protests to mark 6 month anniversary of Anglo-
Irish Agreement.
29 May: Tom King announces that Northern Ireland Assembly will be dissolved.
6-15 July: Serious loyalist rioting in Portadown.
2 November: PSF Ard-Pheis votes to end abstention from the Leinster House
parliament in the Irish Republic. The vote causes some former PSF members
to break away to establish Republican Sinn Fain.
10 November: New unionist paramilitary style grouping, Ulster Resistance,
formed to oppose the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
1987
19 February: In general election in the Irish Republic, PSP gains 1.9% of the
vote and fails to win a seat.
26 March: Announcement of end of internal feud within lILA which had claimed
a number of lives over the previous year.
ii April: Muted response to loyalist 'Day of Defiance' to protest at Anglo-
Irish Agreement.
25 AprIl: Lord Justice Maurice Gibson and his wife killed by PIRA car bomb
at Killeen, Co. Down close to border with Irish Republic.
B Kay: 8 PIRA men killed in SAS ambush as they tried to place a bomb at
Loughall, RUC Station, Co. Armagh; a civilian also died in the shoot-out.
12 June: In British general election PSF gains 11.4% of the vote in Northern
Ireland. Gerry Adams retains his seat.
8 November: PIRA bomb kills 11 people at a Remembrance Day ceremony in
Enniskillen, Co. Fermanagh.
30 November: New Extradiction Act comes into effect in Irish Republic.
22 December: Deputy leader of LIDA, John Mclichael, killed by PIRA car bomb.
1988
January: PSP-SDLP talks begin.
6 March: 3 PIRA members shot dead by SAS in Gibraltar.
16 March: 3 mourners killed at Militown Cemetery, Vest Belfast, by loyalist
gunman during funerals of those PIRA members killed in Gibraltar.
19 March: Two Army corporals attacked and killed when their car got caught
up in funeral cortege in Andersonstown, Vest Belfast.
1 Kay: 3 RAP men killed in gun and bomb attacks in the Netherlands and Vest
Germany.
iS June: 5 of f-duty soldiers killed by bomb planted under their van in
Lisburn, Co. Antrim.
23 July: PIRA bomb intended for High Court judge kills all 3 members of the
Ranna family as they were returning over the border from the Irish Republic.
20 August: 8 off-duty soldiers killed by PIRA bomb attack on their bus at
Ballygawley, Co. Tyrone.
30 August: SAS shoot dead 3 PIRA men in ambush near Drumnakilly, Co. Tyrone.
2 September: PSP-SDLP talks end.
19 October: Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, announces restrictions on the
broadcast of interviews with members of paramilitary organisations and their
supporters.
1989
January: PSF President, Gerry Adams, publicly cautions PIRA over increasing
number of civilian deaths caused by its operations.
17 May: Local elections in Northern Ireland sees PSF win 11.3% of vote.
-
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18 June: In general election in Irish Republic PSF gain only 1.2% of the
vote.
20 June: Polling in European elections sees PSF gain 2.3% of vote in Irish
Republic and 9.2% in Northern Ireland.
24 July: Peter Brooks becomes new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
14 August: Twentieth anniversary of introduction of British Army onto
streets of Northern Ireland.
22 September: 10 Royal Marines bandsmen killed when PIRA bomb explodes at
their base in Deal, Kent.
17 October: 4 people imprisoned for the Guildford pub bombings in 1974
released on appeal on the grounds that their convictions were unsafe when
the Director of Public Prosecutions withdrew evidence against them.
25 October: PIRA shoot dead an RAP serviceman and his six-month old
daughter in Vildenrath, Vest Germany.
1990
9 January: PSF publicity director, Danny Morrison, charged along with 4
others of conspiracy to murder and membership of IRA.
9 April: 4 UDR soldiers killed by PIRA land-mine outside Downpatrick, Co.
Down.
27 May: 2 Australian tourists shot dead by PIRA in Roermond, the Nether-
lands.
24 July: 3 RUG officers and a Catholic nun killed in PIRA bomb attack Just
outside Armagh city.
30 July: Ian Gow NP, former parliamentary private secretary to Margaret
Thatcher, killed by car bomb at his home in Hankham, Sussex.
9 October: 2 PIRA men shot dead by 543 near Loughall, Co. Armagh.
24 October: 6 soldiers and a civilian killed in 2 simultaneous PIRA human
proxy bombs which were driven into border checkpoints at Ccshquin, near
Derry, where 5 soldiers and the civilian were killed and at Cloghoge, near
Newry, Co. Armagh where one soldier died.
29 October: PSF publicity director, Danny Morrison, committed for trial along
with 8 others accused of unlawful imprisonment and PIRA membership.
10 November: 4 people, 2 off-duty policemen and 2 civilians shot dead by
PIRA at Castor Bay, near Lurgan.
1991
7 February: PIRA mount mortar attack on Downing Street, London, while (Gulf
Var) War Cabinet was in session; no-one is injured.
18 February: PIRA bomb at Victoria Station, London, kills one person and
injures 40 others.
3 March: 4 people killed by UVF attack on a bar in Cappagh, Co. Tyrone.
14 March: 0 men imprisoned for Birmingham pub bombings in 1974 released on
appeal on the grounds that their convictions were unsafe and unsatisfactory.
30 April: Inter-party talks on the political future of Northern Ireland
involving the constitutional parties in the province, get underway at Stor-
mont.
8 May: Former PSF publicity director, Danny Morrison, found guilty of
unlawfully imprisoning a police informer, though he and 6 others acquitted
of conspiracy to murder. He was sentenced to 8 years in prison.
4 June: 3 PIRA men killed in SAS ambush in village of Coagh, Go. Tyrone.
3 July: Following protracted procedural difficulties the inter-party talks in
Northern Ireland brought to an end.
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